Munich Security Conference
Selected Key Speeches
1963–2024

Volume I

edited by Benedikt Franke

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Forewords

Foreword by the Chair of the Munich Security Conference

For six decades, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) has been a cornerstone of peace through dialogue, serving as a powerful platform for diplomacy and international cooperation. Founded during a time of intense geopolitical division, when our visionary founder Ewald von Kleist sought to rebuild trust between Germany and the United States, and his friend Henry Kissinger was a young professor committed to the same ideals, the MSC has evolved into something far greater. As global dynamics shifted, so did we, adapting and expanding to address emerging security threats and changing political landscapes.

Under the guidance of my predecessors, the MSC evolved from a small, annual gathering into the world's premier platform for high-level debate on foreign and security policy. With each leadership transition, the MSC adapted and grew in scale, impact, and relevance. As I prepare to lead my final conference as Chair, I reflect on the significant progress the MSC has made — expanding its global presence, amplifying its role in shaping international security discourse, and broadening its scope to address the diverse challenges of our time. As we look ahead to the next chapter under Jens Stoltenberg's leadership, I am confident that the MSC will continue to evolve, remaining at the heart of global diplomatic efforts, while staying true to the founding principles that have guided us for over six decades. While we now host events worldwide and regularly publish on pressing international affairs, our mission has remained constant since 1963: to foster trust, understanding, and ultimately peace, through open and sustained exchange among key decision-makers from across the globe.

Throughout its history, the MSC has borne witness to defining moments in global security. From the early debates on nuclear disarmament to the complexities of post-Cold War cooperation, our conference has always mirrored the ever-evolving geopolitical landscape. As the world faces new challenges — cybersecurity, climate change, and pandemics — the MSC has adapted, expanding its scope to address non-traditional threats, while maintaining its foundational role as a space for high-level discussions on global security. The participation of a diverse range of voices — from governments to international organizations and the private sector — has only enriched the discourse, ensuring that we are always at the forefront of addressing the world's most pressing security issues.

One of the defining features that distinguishes the MSC from other gatherings is what we call the Munich Rule. Our founder designed the conference to be a true forum for debate among equals, not just a one-way lecture where a few select voices are heard. Initially, foreign policymakers crafted speeches for major announcements, but as the MSC grew, so did its approach to fostering engagement and interactivity. Today, we prioritize substantive exchange over lengthy monologues, and while keynote speeches are kept to a minimum, the true power of the MSC lies in its many thousands of interactions — whether bilateral conversations, side events, or impromptu exchanges — that fuel the most productive and dynamic discussions on global security.

As you will see in this publication, selecting the speeches featured here was a challenge, not only because of the sheer number of impactful moments, but because we aimed to capture the essence of each decade in the foreign policy debates they shaped. Rather than curating them into specific themes, we chose to highlight selected visionary speeches from every decade, each of which resonated well beyond the walls of the Hotel Bayerischer Hof and set the tone for global discussions on security. From Helmut Kohl's 1988 speech on European security to Joschka Fischer's unscripted remarks in 2003, Putin's address in 2007, and Angela Merkel's candid words in 2019, each of these moments sparked a broader discourse that continues to influence policy today. They serve as prime examples of how the MSC has always been a space for unfiltered, impactful dialogue on the pressing issues of our time.

The speeches included here are just a glimpse into our rich history. For those interested in exploring further, I invite you to visit our website, where you can access more speeches and debates that continue to shape the global security agenda.

As geopolitical tensions remain high and new challenges arise, the MSC will remain a vital diplomatic arena for de-escalation and conflict resolution. The future of global politics will depend on the ongoing commitment of political leaders to multilateralism and cooperation. We are proud of the many "Munich Moments" we've created in the name of diplomacy, and we are confident that many more will come in the years ahead. We invite you to continue engaging with us as we work together to meet the challenges of the future.

Christoph Heusgen

Foreword by the Editor of this Volume

For over six decades, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) has served as a barometer for global security — a space where history has been debated, and, occasionally, even made. This small book, the first of two volumes, is a testament to the MSC's legacy, bringing together a curated selection of what we call Munich Moments that have defined not just the conference, but the trajectory of international security policy.

As we undertook the task of selecting these speeches, we were reminded of the weight and urgency behind the words spoken at the MSC. These are not just speeches; they are reflections of their time — snapshots of a world grappling with Cold War tensions, the fall of the Soviet Union, the challenges of globalization, and the emergence of new threats. Each decade brings with it a unique flavor, from the cautious optimism of post-Cold War cooperation to the sobering realities of recent years.

There are, however, also remarkable constants, even red threads running through the sixty years, such as the calls of American officials for greater burden-sharing within and across the transatlantic alliance or the attempts of German officials to define a role for a "new Germany" in the emerging security order of the day. President John F. Kennedy's introduction to the 1963 National Security Strategy in the year the MSC was founded ("NATO states are not paying their fair share and are living off the fat of the land") does not sound very different to what the current US Vice-President, and then Senator JD Vance, said on our stage at the sixtieth anniversary conference in 2024 ("Europe has to take a bigger role in its own security"). What Helmut Schmidt or Helmut Kohl said during their respective appearances about the need for Germany to assume a stronger role does not sound very different to what Angela Merkel or Olaf Scholz have said decades later on the very same stage. These red threads do beg a number of questions which will have to be looked at just as closely as the enormous shifts in geopolitics and narratives over the years.

This first collection was carefully chosen to provide readers with exactly this sense of continuity and evolution that has defined the history of the Munich Security Conference. It captures moments of profound clarity, like Helmut Kohl's vision for European security, alongside speeches that sparked intense debate, such as Vladimir Putin's address in 2007. What struck us most about these speeches is not just their content, but their ability to resonate far beyond the walls of the Hotel Bayerischer Hof.

This first volume highlights many of the defining moments of the past six decades, while the second volume will delve further into the broader discussions and debates that have emerged from these speeches – meaning many of the more famous speeches will be found in this volume while the second volume will assemble less known but certainly no less insightful speeches referring and reacting to the former. Together, the two volumes will hopefully provide a useful glimpse into the MSC's contribution to the global security agenda – and, much more importantly, as a source of inspiration for future leaders and thinkers. In a world where the challenges to peace and stability are growing ever more complex, the lessons of the past are as much invaluable guides as they are powerful warnings.

Allow me a few technical remarks on the selection of speeches: First, while we have tried to include only so-called keynote speeches, in a number of cases the subsequent questions and answers segment included important points which we thought worth including. Second, while we value interactivity above all else, we have not included any of the many well-known panel sessions of the last decades such as the famous debate between former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and former French President Giscard d'Estaing, in this volume. Only in one case, namely JD Vance's appearance at the 2024 MSC, have we made an exception and included the opening statement of his panel in lieu of a speech – mainly because his remarks have sparked numerous reactions we would like to include in the next volume.

Let me end by thanking Nardine Luca and Ronny von Gülich-Thurow for supporting this project from the very beginning and the entire and wonderful team of the Munich Security Conference, now and all of its many predecessors, for all they have done to provide the stages on which the speeches in this and the next volume were held. Now that it is our turn at the helm of the MSC we will do our outmost to enable many more Munich Moments and provide ample content for future volumes in this series.

Benedikt Franke

KARL THEODOR FREIHERR VON
UND ZU GUTTENBERG

HELMUT SCHMIDT

JOHN G. TOWER

JERRY W. FRIEDHEIM

J. WILLIAM MIDDENDORF II

Chapter 1

THE FORMATIVE YEARS

1963 – 1979

1966

Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg

State Secretary in the Ministry of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany (later Minister of Defense)

Karl Theodor Freiherr von und zu Guttenberg spoke at the 3rd Wehrkunde Conference to address the constant state of crisis in Europe and its dependence on US nuclear guarantees.

The Atlantic Alliance is in a state of perpetual crisis. There seems to be a general consensus about the need to reform NATO. However, there are significant disagreements about the nature and objectives of this reform.

While some advocate greater integration, others seek at least a partial dissolution of current arrangements. Some believe the Alliance's military responsibilities should extend to other continents, viewing this as not only possible but necessary. Meanwhile, others aim to limit even the existing scope of joint political activities. Similarly, while some wish to orient the Alliance around a strategy of "flexible response," others advocate a strategy of nuclear prioritization, including corresponding armaments and organizational changes.

The reasons for this crisis, as well as the accompanying reform discussions of recent years, are manifold. It is not my intent here to analyze these reasons in detail, but they may be briefly outlined as follows.

These reasons are both military and political in nature. It is futile to ask whether military causes have triggered political ones or vice versa since both are inextricably linked. Among the key factors contributing to NATO's current crisis — frozen in its structural form since the late 1950s — are the following:

1. The nuclear stalemate that has developed between the two principal powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.
2. The increasing military and political engagement of the United States on non-European continents.

3. The cessation of the Soviet Union's crisis-driven policies in Europe following the acute Berlin Crisis.
4. The intensifying rift between Communist China and the Soviet Union, as well as a certain loosening of the European Eastern Bloc and the relative resurgence of European states.

In addition to these concrete changes — and partly as a result of them — factors rooted in mere assumptions or even hopes play a significant role in current discussions about the Atlantic Alliance. These factors can carry more weight in an alliance of democratic states subject to public opinion than facts themselves. For instance, such dynamics are evident where the American public increasingly perceives Communist China as the primary threat or where both American and European audiences depict the Soviet Union as a changed power, more inclined toward cooperation.

No one would seriously deny the possibility — or even the historical likelihood — that the revolutionary, aggressive nature of Soviet Communist politics could eventually transform. Likewise, no one can ignore that the brutal, terroristic methods of Lenin and Stalin have given way to a relatively milder form of Communism across the Soviet Union and its European sphere of control.

But what guarantees are there that this development might not one day be at least partially reversed? And who could argue that this change in methods has, to date, altered the ultimate objectives of Communist policy? To speak concretely: while one may debate the likelihood of an imminent revival of the Berlin Crisis, there can be no doubt that such a scenario remains possible and that we must therefore be prepared. It is even conceivable that the disintegration of the Communist bloc — a development welcomed for many reasons — could itself directly provoke the resumption of crisis-driven policies by Moscow.

Who does not know examples where a dictatorial regime, facing internal challenges, seeks a solution in the form of an "escape forward"?

Whatever changes the world situation has undergone in recent years, those concerning the balance of power remain the most significant for the Atlantic Alliance. It is not the visible or assumed intentions of the adversary that must serve as the starting point and standard for shaping the alliance, but rather their actual power. This will remain the case as long as there is no guarantee that the adversary has definitively ceased to be a threat.

This means — particularly for the European NATO states and especially for the Federal Republic of Germany — that the Atlantic Alliance has

not lost any of its importance or weight. On the contrary, the NATO alliance finds itself in a significantly more precarious position today than during the first decade of its existence. It now faces an adversary of substantially greater strength, one that has achieved a state of parity with the Western superpower — a situation which, militarily speaking, can be characterized as "mutual deterrence" or mutual paralysis.

This unsettling reality cannot simply be dismissed with the common refrain that the balance between East and West — whether referred to as the "balance of terror" or the "balance of power" — has been maintained overall. I do not dispute this claim; on the contrary, I affirm that the overall balance of power between NATO and the so-called Warsaw Pact remains numerically in favor of the West. However, the critical issue lies beyond the simple arithmetic of missiles, warheads, divisions, aircraft, and warships. The calculation must also account for two enduring elements of strategy: space and time.

When these factors are integrated into the balance of power equation between East and West, it becomes clear that Europe's security now rests on what has been aptly termed an "asymmetric equilibrium." While there exists a balance of terror — and arguably of power — between the Euro-Asian power of the Soviet Union and the Atlantic power of the United States, no such balance exists between the Soviet Union and Europe. Europe's future peace rests, pointedly stated, on the assumption that the Soviet Union remains convinced that America will risk everything to defend European territory, including taking on the ultimate risk of a nuclear exchange on its own soil.

As long as American troops remain stationed on the European continent, face-to-face with the Soviet Army, the Soviet Union must consider the possibility that any military conflict in this region could escalate into a direct nuclear confrontation with the United States. Nevertheless, there remains the risk that a more aggressive Soviet policy — perhaps driven by internal pressures — might gamble on the idea that a limited military campaign in Europe would not prompt the U.S. to commit its full strength, thereby avoiding the risk of nuclear strikes on the American mainland.

While there is no immediate reason to fear the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, which seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, no European government can guarantee that this will never happen. More importantly, it would not be responsible European policy to indefinitely accept this "asymmetric equilibrium," which leaves Europe wholly dependent on Atlantic security guarantees and perpetuates the reality that Europe remains an object of decision-making by non-European powers.

I see this one-sided dependence of European security on American nuclear guarantees as the primary source of NATO's crisis. The debate over the French *Force de Frappe*, the unfortunate back-and-forth over the ill-fated Multilateral Force (MLF) project, British indecision regarding nuclear strategy, the proposal for a global non-proliferation agreement, and other developments must all be viewed against the backdrop of this "asymmetric equilibrium," where the two superpowers hold each other in check, but Europe must place its security in the belief that America will not hesitate to act decisively on Europe's behalf.

To be clear, I am speaking here about military power dynamics and strategic considerations, but I am primarily concerned with politics. One hallmark of the nuclear age, in my view, is that while the actual risk of war between nuclear powers — and, to a lesser extent, between their non-nuclear allies — has diminished to a minimum, the military balance of power continues to heavily influence politics, either through direct threats or the mere perception of potential conflict.

This is why the de facto continuation of the American nuclear monopoly remains the defining structural element of NATO. It is also why the American policy of maintaining and institutionalizing this monopoly represents the most significant factor in considerations about NATO's future. As long as this monopoly remains intact, there can be no reform of the alliance that would shift this "asymmetric equilibrium" in Europe's favor.

Whatever responsible American proposals for nuclear "sharing" or "co-determination" within the alliance may have been made thus far, their implementation would not alter the ultimate responsibility of the U.S. leadership for the deployment of nuclear weapons. Given the current circumstances, one must understand the rationale behind this American policy. By what criteria could the transfer of nuclear weapons to national control within the alliance be regulated? Which member states of the alliance would "deserve" such trust, and which would not? How could an alliance function in which numerous states might develop their own nuclear strategies — or, in a crisis, choose to abstain from action altogether?

On the other hand, it is necessary to move away from the illusion that non-nuclear powers could secure "access" to the nuclear weapons of others through technical constructs such as the MLF (Multilateral Force) or ANF (Atlantic Nuclear Force). Such projects would not truly alter the current monopoly situation; they would only incur significant costs, create confusion, and stir up unnecessary commotion. The notion that the USA could be "forced" in this way to deploy a "multilateral" nuclear

weapon under American veto, when they would otherwise simultaneously deploy their own weapons against the same targets, strikes me as outright absurd.

Atlantic "integration" in the nuclear field is both a misleading concept and a pipe dream. It is misleading because "integration" should imply the creation of a new sovereignty formed by the "integrated"; however, the USA does not intend to make even the slightest concession regarding its nuclear sovereignty. It is a pipe dream because such "integration" — for instance, under the MLF model — would, in truth, institutionalize the existing monopoly or dominance within NATO.

In the short term, there is no fundamental way to alter the unsatisfactory state of nuclear defense in Europe. However, this certainly does not mean that German policy should refrain from:

1. Seeking greater influence on the development of American nuclear strategy.
2. Gaining a stronger voice regarding the deployment and selection of weapons, among other factors.
3. Ensuring that target determination in areas of its own interest is better aligned with its priorities than before.

At the same time, German policy must clearly abstain from striving for "physical co-ownership" of other nations' nuclear weapons, as this would not enhance security but would significantly worsen Germany's political standing worldwide.

Additionally, a project like the MLF would become an obstacle to the only feasible long-term solution to NATO's nuclear dilemma. The "unequal equilibrium" can only be resolved if Europe itself eventually establishes itself as a second nuclear power within NATO, alongside the United States. However, projects implemented under the guise of so-called "Atlantic integration," but in reality serving to entrench the current monopoly situation, would hinder the goal of future cooperative partnership between the USA and a unified Europe.

From this perspective, Europeans must also consider the possibility of an American-Soviet accord on a "non-proliferation treaty" for nuclear weapons. Such an agreement between the two major nuclear powers, accompanied by their invitation for NATO states to join, would pose serious challenges for Europe. If the European states signed such an agreement, it would condemn Europe to remain, for an unforeseeable period, subject to the decisions of non-European nuclear giants.

Even if, as American policy asserts, such a non-proliferation treaty allowed for the formation of a joint enterprise similar to the MLF, the outcome would remain unchanged: the "unequal equilibrium," with all its risks for Europe, would become immutable. The emergence of a European nuclear power would face insurmountable barriers.

Although the draft "Non-Proliferation Treaty" presented in Geneva by the USA contained a clause interpreted by some as permitting the future creation of a joint European nuclear power, it only allowed for the transfer of an already existing nuclear capacity — such as that of the UK or France, or both combined — into a joint organization of European states. Simultaneously, however, another article prohibited any support from any state for the nuclear weapons development of this organization, effectively banning collective European efforts to establish such a European nuclear power.

I have stated that, in my opinion, there is only one lasting solution to the problem of Europe's nuclear security: namely, the establishment of a joint European nuclear power within the framework of NATO, and thus in alliance with the United States. It must again be emphasized that this is a long-term goal. Indeed, no one can say with certainty whether it will ever be achieved. However, the idea of a European nuclear power under European authority is undoubtedly a more realistic notion than that of an Atlantic nuclear power under Atlantic sovereignty could ever be.

What German policy should pursue today, in my view, is to openly articulate this goal, to oppose anything that could hinder its realization, and to resolutely commit to the gradual implementation of the necessary political prerequisites. The world must come to understand the German concept for NATO reform. The keyword for this concept was provided by President Kennedy, who spoke of the Atlantic partnership between the global power of the USA and the emerging "global power" of Europe.

1967

Helmut Schmidt

Member of the German Bundestag of the Federal Republic of Germany (later Minister of Defense and Chancellor)

Helmut Schmidt dedicated his speech to the 4th Wehrkunde Conference to the role of a divided Germany within the European system of security.

When considering the headline and the topic that has been assigned to me here, one must assume that the German problem is certainly the cardinal issue for Europe's future security.

However, I find it very questionable whether it can be presented in a way that makes sense to all parties involved, and whether it can be convincingly embedded in the context of the general security interests of the nations of Europe, especially by a German. Furthermore, I believe this is a bit difficult for another reason, if I may allow myself a personal "footnote," because for far too long, we have been conducting our analyses and predictions exclusively within the circle of Western allies, and as a result, the views, interests, and analytical results of our eastern — how shall I say it — neighbors, partners, or adversaries, have only been considered in a very reflective way. Perhaps it would be useful to more frequently consider whether Eastern interlocutors should be included in such conversations more often than we have until now.

I assume that the German problem remains the main disruptive factor in Europe, that the continuation of German division is the real source of concern in Europe, because the German people cannot and will not accept their division; because of the unresolved border issues; because there are significant tensions between Bonn and East Berlin; because there is not only concern in the East but also in the West about a possible explosive development of such tensions; because abroad there are sporadic concerns, and these concerns are occasionally fueled, about a relapse into German nationalism; because in both the East and the West there are significant concerns about the size and power of a possibly reunified Germany; and

finally, because both German territories represent the actual staging ground for the largest military concentrations Europe has ever seen in peacetime.

Uncertainty about the German problem also arises because the respective allies of the Federal Republic of Germany on the one hand and the so-called GDR on the other do not feel entirely secure about the future course of the two German states. If I now consider the Federal Republic of Germany, our most important ally, the United States, expects an Atlantic course from us for the sake of our security, but at the same time, the U.S. makes it clear that the threat is not actually as great it has previously portrayed it. Conversely, the French demand from us a far-reaching departure from the Atlantic concept, overlooking the fact that we, in turn, are convinced that our security, insofar as it is threatened, can only be maintained with the support we receive from the United States. The British expect our support for the desired accession to the EEC, which has been blocked by France, and overlook the fact that we have no leverage over Paris to persuade it to open the door. As for the Soviet Union, they misunderstand us — this is still a mild term; one should rather say they distort the basic tendency of our politics and public opinion in our country as revanchist and aggressive.

And as for the self-perception of German foreign policy within the Federal Republic of Germany, I can say for the past year, 1966, it was marked by deep confusion over the foreign policy latitude of the Federal Republic, confusion over the right or most appropriate course, confusion also over security policy necessities, confusion over the ranking of military security and political problems. Hand in hand with this went an internal political destabilization, the collapse of a coalition, and the somewhat spectacular rise of a new right-wing extremist party, all at the same time as an unfamiliar and not easily accepted recession, which, if measured by international standards, would not seem as severe as it does when measured by the internal German psychology.

Since the end of 1966, there has been an attempt to stabilize public opinion in Germany through a new coalition, an attempt to restore authority to the government. But there can be no doubt that the foreign policy and security problems of the Federal Republic of Germany at the end of 1966, at the beginning of 1967, are no different from what they were for the old government in mid-1966. Finally, there is uncertainty about the future significance and course of the government in East Berlin. It has obviously gained some leeway with Moscow. It uses this leeway, among other things, to agitate excessively against the Federal Republic of Germany. Provocateurs who, by exaggerating, somewhat reduce the effect of their provocations, making them less credible even in the eyes of their immediate friends. Nevertheless, they do manage to bring several Eastern European states and communist parties into a dilemma, forcing them to consider how strongly they depend — whether in Warsaw, Prague, or elsewhere — on East Berlin for ideological, strategic-political, or economic reasons, and how far they must yield as a result. At various times, different responses will be found in various Eastern European capitals, so that the future influence and weight of the so-called GDR cannot be predicted with certainty.

If I may now attempt to sketch the current state of the reunification issue from a German perspective in just a few points, I would do so in three parts.

The construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 and the psychological and conceptual shift that accompanied it within the Federal Republic shattered the illusion that had largely dominated the 1950s and had characterized public opinion in Germany at least throughout that decade. The illusion, namely, that NATO and time were working in favor of German reunification. The construction of the wall in August 1961 will probably be retrospectively seen as the end of the Adenauer era in German politics.

Since then, there has been a growing realization among large parts of the population in the Federal Republic that reunification, from today's perspective, can only be achieved within an overall European framework. There is an increasing awareness that reunification is only conceivable if, firstly, the four powers agree and reach a consensus on the conditions and prerequisites; secondly, both German parts agree; and thirdly, all the Western and Eastern European neighbors of the German nation agree. I say that the awareness in this direction is growing, and I add that the sense of urgency regarding the reunification issue seems to have increased in recent years among the population of the Federal Republic, and today, among the issues that one might rank in terms of urgency in a public survey, it likely ranks at the very top. This is also reflected in public opinion polls.

Although within the Federal Republic there is growing recognition that German reunification is only possible within the context of European reunification, there remains a considerable, and I believe understandable, fear of potential central agreements between East and West on key issues that could affect Europe's configuration and security. There is particular concern about bilateral agreements between Washington and Moscow on central issues, because, as Robert Osgood mentioned earlier, there is a fear that the German problem could simply be frozen in such agreements.

Let me add a few remarks, which I do not present as the opinions of others, but as my own, concerning the international configuration of states in the 1970s. At the 4th Wehrkundetagung in Munich, we are discussing

America and Europe, transformations in world politics, and I am specifically asked to speak about Germany and the future European security system.

Let me try to make a few remarks about the future, particularly how it may manifest here in Europe. The term "polycentrism" has often been used in presentations and discussion contributions. Personally, I consider it, just like the term "bipolarity," to be an overly simplistic conceptualization that is prone to mislead. First of all, there has certainly been, is, and will be something like bipolarity in a number of fields between Washington and Moscow. Some of this is antagonistic bipolarity, some of it is cooperative bipolarity, to use Weizsäcker's term — take, for example, the Non-Proliferation Treaty; it is also about securing common interests of the two superpowers vis-à-vis everyone else.

But in addition to this bipolarity, which is partly antagonistic and partly cooperative, there are not only the "non-aligned countries," but also, above all, a certain independence of several allies, who are gaining increasing independence, not only nuclear allies, who use it to varying degrees (like England and France), but also non-nuclear allies, who have already made use of their growing independence to varying extents and will certainly continue to do so in the near future. Apart from these smaller allies, still somewhat fitting into the bipolarity scheme of the two leading powers, there are large areas of the world where "atomic competition" prevails, to use a national economic term; this will also be the case in the next decade.

It seems to me, however, that what is crucial for the 1970s is that, instead of a bipolar situation, a triangular situation is emerging, which is already being anticipated today and is already felt very palpably in Asia. I have the impression that this emerging triangular situation will make the overall configuration of world politics much more unstable than we have experienced in the last ten or twelve years, especially since, for many people, and for me as well, the future world politics of China seems quite open, particularly given the fact that many, including myself, can hardly make any predictions about the domestic developments in China at present and what potential foreign policy consequences might arise from that.

What I want to say next, I say under the assumption that the Southeast Asian conflict remains regionally confined, as it has been so far, and under the assumption that there is no direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, no direct military confrontation between the United States and China, and no direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and China. I want to exclude all of that here. Whether one can truly exclude this is very questionable. If any of the aforementioned

military confrontations were to occur, they would change the world situation within a very short time, and also the European situation to such an extent that, from today's perspective, it seems impossible to predict or calculate.

I would like to make a second "footnote" here: I believe — despite all the wishful thinking of people like Starlinger, Adenauer, de Gaulle — that we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that, due to the competition for political leadership of world communism, due to the rivalry between Peking and Moscow for leadership, Moscow might, in the short term and temporarily, be driven to create more tension in Europe against the West. I think this possibility should not be excluded, especially if it were to come down to Moscow showing the other communists that it is not yielding to capitalist imperialism, or if Moscow feels compelled to intervene more strongly in the Vietnamese conflict, even though it would prefer not to do so for well-considered reasons. I believe that such a possibility should not be ruled out, especially when I, like others, speak of continued détente in Europe.

If the Southeast Asian conflict were to escalate or have stronger global consequences, our American friends should know and assume that the tendency toward neutrality in this conflict, which has so far been not just a tendency but an explicit policy voiced by France — Senator Baumel has just done so again — this tendency will extend to many more European states. This is to be expected, and our American friends should take this into account. It has been surprising to me how relatively restrained public opinion in the Federal Republic has been so far regarding the Vietnam War. We have been quite reserved in our public opinion, despite the close relationship with our most important ally. But this need not remain the case; we cannot rely on it completely.

If we set aside the potential entanglements that could arise from Southeast Asia, I would still, in the best case, say that even in the 1970s, the two superpowers, the two semi-European powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, will be equally interested in maintaining the "status quo" in Europe. Both know that, due to the tremendous risks of a nuclear clash in Europe, where they are directly militarily and nuclearly confronted, they are condemned to relative immobility toward each other. Consequently, they will not want to move, nor will they want to address European issues, especially the German issue, by themselves. As a result of this immobility of the two superpowers in Europe and the diminishing tension between them, it is now becoming very clear that the maneuvering room for other players in Europe has increased. Some have already exploited this to the extreme, while others have not gone that far. But the space for action has

not only grown for Paris or Bucharest; it has also grown for Prague, for Bonn, and for others. It will continue to grow. It will continue to grow, unless the fear of a conflict between the two superpowers flares up again, which could occur here in Europe.

In other words, the two semi-European superpowers will, I believe, significantly lose their command position over their respective European allies in the 1970s. There will be an even greater loosening of bloc unity and solidarity in foreign policy, both in Eastern and Western Europe. The disintegration phenomena within NATO, which Ambassador Grewe rightly lamented, and which we all see and have been observing with growing concern for years, find (certainly not yet to the same extent, but in terms of the same tendency, as the same causes and reasons are behind them) corresponding mirror-image processes in Eastern Europe.

If I may summarize all this, it seems to me — whether I like it or not, I don't enjoy it very much — that the 1970s will de facto be characterized as a "Europe of Fatherlands," a pan-European Europe of nation-states. It seems to me that there is much evidence to suggest that Europe will develop in this direction.

Western European integration has been in retreat for years, and there is hardly anything to suggest that this trend of the last four, five, six years could reverse. A completely different matter is that many of us, myself included, would not wish this. In Eastern Europe, similarly, there is no progress in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON).

Let me now speak about potential dangers to the security and peace of Europe. Theoretically, as always for nearly twenty years, a Soviet attack is possible, whether by surprise or after careful planning or a slowly developing critical escalation. However, I align myself with those who, for many reasons, consider this highly unlikely.

Let me make a "footnote" here about the famous problem of "capabilities versus intentions." Depending on what one wants to prove politically, depending on how it fits into one's political daily agenda, one person presents the results of their military intelligence apparatus to prove what the Soviets have in terms of divisions, tanks, airplanes, and missiles; and the other says: yes, your numbers may be correct, but I am assuming what the Soviets intend; and moreover, both sides — or, more recently, all three parties involved in this conversation — also distort the numbers they present. None of us should trust political figures in this area without verification. Everyone must rely on their own political judgment to properly assess them. With that in mind, I believe that when evaluating the political and strategic possibilities of the 1970s, one must take a balanced approach,

considering both the scale of what others have and their capabilities, as well as what they intend today and may intend in the future; but above all, one should use the scale that comes from attempting, as far as possible, to put oneself in the other side's position and project into the future from there. If one analyzes the world — and Europe — from the Soviet Union's perspective on interests, there is no interest for the Soviet Union in a war with the West because, in that case, China would be the laughing third party. In one sentence, this would likely be the outcome of a rational analysis of a Soviet policy in the 1970s, assuming that the policy is rational. (A side note: It is a bold endeavor to attribute a consistently rational foreign policy to another state, or even to one's own state. We must always consider the possibility that something else may occur for irrational reasons.)

A second possible danger (which I consider much more real and significant) is the maintenance of constant pressure from the Soviet Union on Europe, or individual European states, which can be intensified depending on the situation and weakened depending on the counterpressure. The third danger certainly lies in the possibility of acute crises that neither of the superpowers may want or cause but could, for example, be triggered by Mr. Honecker or whoever succeeds Mr. Ulbricht.

I believe it is necessary to keep in mind, in this context, that from an Eastern European perspective, additional dangers for Europe arise. For example, there is someone in Eastern Europe — based on my impression — who genuinely believes that Western German aggression poses a real danger, namely Mr. Gomulka. Others use this as propaganda, but there are certainly many in Eastern Europe who would believe in a real German threat from the moment they got the impression that Germany had control over nuclear weapons. Secondly, there are certainly many people in Eastern Europe who would believe in a real German threat if they got the impression of a substantial increase and rearmament of the Bundeswehr following an Anglo-American withdrawal from Europe. Thirdly, there are certainly a lot of reasonable people in Eastern Europe who would believe in a real German threat if they got the impression that the Allied control over Germany was ending or that there was a significant military autonomy of the Federal Republic of Germany. Therefore, there is also significant interest in Eastern Europe in keeping NATO functional, at least to the extent that it maintains control over Germany.

In this regard, the answers from our two guests from France and the UK to my somewhat exaggerated question were not entirely complete. This interest is not only one arising from Eastern Europe; it also undoubtedly plays a role among our Western allies. Not least, as I must remind you,

the contractual agreement for the United Kingdom to maintain a certain number of military forces in Germany was not made at the request of the Soviets, nor was it made to balance out a specific Soviet troop number, but it had to do with reassuring French concerns regarding Germany.

Personally, I believe that a truly overwhelming threat to Europe's security in the 1970s or in the longer term would arise if there were a loss of balance of military power in Europe. As long as the balance of military power is somewhat maintained, I have little real fear or concern. However, the balance of military power in Europe already seems to be threatened today by the clear tendency towards unilateral troop withdrawals by Western states.

It seems to me that it is wishful thinking to act and speak as if the ability to mass conventional troops can no longer have any effect in the future in the nuclear age. Only someone trying to turn necessity into a virtue would claim that. I believe that conventional troop massing will still play a role, especially when nuclear states are involved on both sides, even more so than in the 1950s. They will play an even greater role the less we can credibly threaten each other with nuclear weapons, because both sides are nuclear-armed. I do not believe that, however technically and militarily feasible it may be, an "airlift" could politically replace withdrawn troops, because it would seem very difficult for me, as an American president at the moment of a critical escalation, to undertake the dramatic gesture — the undoubtedly psychological and political escalation — that would be caused by shipping a certain number of American troops towards the European continent. Unilateral withdrawal, meaning only on the Western side, means danger, accelerates the dissolution process of the Western alliance for psychological and political reasons, and opens the door for increased Soviet pressure.

Furthermore, an overly extensive American and British withdrawal, but especially a withdrawal of French troops, could be interpreted in Eastern Europe — and perhaps not even misinterpreted — as a loss of control over the Federal Republic of Germany, and therefore, analyzed as a real threat. (I am not saying this must be correct; I am only suggesting that one must also put oneself in the other side's position to understand it.) The erosion of alliances, which was discussed this morning, would also qualitatively progress very quickly due to a quantitative imbalance.

By the way, there are also other forms of imbalance that have hardly played a role in international discussions so far, but which, in connection with the problems raised by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the issues it will raise in the coming years, I believe could play a role. The imbalance, for example, that there are two national states in Western Europe with nuclear weapons, whereas this is not the case in Eastern Europe. France and the UK are already largely outside the framework of the Western alliance; France much more so than the UK. This is still considered tolerable in Eastern Europe.

No one has yet given much thought to this, because there is trust in Eastern Europe regarding the peaceful nature of these two states. This creates a broad field for psychological and political complications, which, as it seems to me, have not yet been considered in Europe at all. Similarly, the awareness of imbalance in Europe could emerge if a country like Sweden or Switzerland were forced to the conclusion of proliferation. I just want to hint at this here to get a more comprehensive catalog of possible imbalances in Europe.

As the final point of a possible threat to European security, I would like to mention the impairment of peaceful development in all of Europe caused by governments and public opinion in countries overestimating their own security needs. Most of the time, we, those of us who deal with military strategy — particularly professional soldiers — are concerned with making others aware that they are underestimating the threat to security. However, I want to point out that a great danger also lies in overestimating it. Both Warsaw, as well as East Berlin and, at certain times in recent years, Bonn, have tended, or have tended, to maximize their security problems — to maximize the perceived danger — and then subsequently to maximize what they supposedly or actually need to counter the threat.

Overall, Europe will undoubtedly be shaken much more in the 1970s, whether there will be a Non-Proliferation Treaty or not, and whatever it looks like, by the issue of nuclear security guarantees than before.

If, for example, the two superpowers were to produce and install "anti-ballistic missiles" on a significant scale, this might further destabilize Europe, especially if there were a "time lag" regarding ABM arms between the United States and the Soviet Union. But even if both make progress in this area simultaneously, the psychological backlash in a completely unprotected Europe will lead to consequences that are hard to foresee today. And if exaggerated security thinking were to take hold in this field, I would see it as a threat to a peaceful development process.

Let me now make a few remarks about the opportunities for positive development for all of Europe. I can define the task based on a few comments made by our friend André Beaufre at the Vienna meeting of the London "Institute for Strategic Studies" at the end of 1966. Beaufre said at the time: Since the essential dangers in Europe — and especially their core cause, the German issue — are overall European problems, and since they will only become more difficult with an indefinite continuation of the

current situation, it is necessary to end the division of the continent and Germany. I quote: "At the same time, however, the German reunification, if it is to be sought for these reasons, must not restore a powerful state at the heart of Europe, which, especially by striving to restore the borders of 1939, would become a source of concern for Europe." I assume that Beaufre expresses in these two or three sentences what all our Western European friends think but do not all say as clearly.

The French response to this problem, as we heard again from Mr. Baumel, is that a united Europe must grow together again. This united Europe, which includes Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, etc., must grow together in a way that is large enough to balance out Germany, to have counterweights against Germany. It is added that this could only be possible and achievable after a very long period of evolution.

Beaufre then went on to ask, and one could quote similar remarks from many other papers by our Western European friends: "How can this long-term perspective of a European political development leading to the reunification of all of Europe be reconciled with the need to maintain security during this process?" He then provides the answer himself: "The alliances must not hinder this process of détente, they must not become the brake on evolution, and they must not present themselves, particularly to the other side, as aggressive war machines. The task of the alliances is to provide guarantees against any serious, violent disturbance, but also against a possible reversal of this entire developmental trend. Therefore, détente must not jeopardize the credibility of strategic protection."

So, we have reached the paradoxical point. Beaufre argues that mutual de-escalation and the reduction of military deployments are possible and useful. As paradoxical as this formulation may sound, and as much as one can critically interpret it, I still believe, as far as I can foresee the future, that André Beaufre is right. If I translate him into military terms, it would mean: The attempt to maintain the balance of power not only globally — this is a matter for the United States — but also within the European theater, can only succeed if a balance of the superpowers' engagement in Europe is preserved. Moreover, the balance should be transposed from higher levels to lower levels. This does not necessarily have to be achieved through arms control treaties, as there are many conceivable processes for that; this is a topic in itself. I believe that, militarily speaking, it also means reducing any pressure for automatic nuclear reactions.

In this regard, I am in stark contrast to the previous doctrine of former German foreign and defense policy. As for how the current government will position itself, we will have to wait and see.

Furthermore, I believe that it would be in the interest of those who wish for this European development process to structure their own armed forces in such a defensive manner, with respect to armament, structure, and deployment, as can be responsibly justified.

Here's a "footnote": It seems to me that the debate over the necessity or feasibility of a European, or more precisely, a Western European nuclear force is quite superfluous because no one — except for some Germans — actually wants it, and no one is willing to make their existing nuclear weapons available for it. This does not seem to me to be a problem for the 1970s but rather, at the earliest, for the 1980s and more likely for the next century.

When asked what German politics can do in such a context, I believe that in the coming years it will contribute to such a development by, first, pursuing an Ostpolitik à la Brandt, with an attempt at diplomatic relations with several Eastern European countries; second, attempting to calm tensions through the exchange of non-aggression pacts (this would not only be à la Brandt, but this policy began quite promisingly under Schröder, although it was unfortunately interrupted); third, trying to strengthen integration in economic and trade matters; and finally, by adopting a more defined policy towards the so-called GDR than before.

Certainly, the will to avoid "de jure" or "de facto" recognition will remain. However, I assume it would be useful (and I could imagine that the new Kiesinger-Brandt government will also do this) to address East Berlin not just once in ten years, but many times throughout a year with concrete questions and proposals. Not questions about reunification, but questions such as those concerning the bridge over the Saale, the opening of a border crossing, or issues of similar importance. If this is done four or five times in a year, Ulbricht or Honecker might afford to say no four or five times, but by the sixth time, it will no longer be possible. You just need to present them many times with questions that are clear and sensible to the West German population, achievable and reasonable to the people in the zone, and above all sensible to the Communists in Prague, Bucharest, Rome, Paris, and elsewhere, and that would appear reasonable to public opinion worldwide.

Then, no one can afford to keep saying no indefinitely. They cannot afford to do so if they do not want to isolate themselves completely.

One of the main mistakes of Bonn's policy towards East Berlin in the past ten years has been that, with one or two exceptions — the most recent being the attempt to exchange speakers — East Berlin was allowed to take the initiative.

The security policy for the near future should, as I see it, be as defensive as possible, as far as the Federal Republic is concerned. For example, it

is not necessary for us to have a particularly large share in SACEUR's strike task, but I would not completely give up any share. I would prefer a better division of labor at sea and in the air; however, on land, all divisions that stand side by side must also be equally equipped, have the same mission, and be able to fulfill it with the same resources. I would prefer the German army to be smaller but of higher quality than it is today. I would explicitly wish for the renunciation of nuclear co-possession, but not the renunciation of co-planning all matters concerning the alliance's strategy, including nuclear issues, and no renunciation of a regional veto in case nuclear weapons are to be fired from our soil or against targets on German soil.

I would like to conclude with four remarks:

1. Reunification remains a fixed goal. The previous path, which ended around 1961, did not give the impression that it led us in the right direction; whether the new path leads in the right direction remains uncertain; but it must be attempted.
2. I would like to highlight one aspect, particularly in relation to the connection between the German issue and the security of Europe, namely the aspect of the German people's trust in the Germany policy of their Allies. Our Allies know, as I have said for ourselves, that there is no chance for comprehensive international negotiations on the German issue in the foreseeable future. They know, just as we do, that reunification could only be the result of a very long historical process. But still, there must not be any disinterest from the Allies regarding the German issue. I quote Henry Kissinger, who expresses exactly what we Germans should also be telling our allies, our friends: "An alliance that does not show sufficient respect, understanding, and activity toward this overriding German interest can, in the eyes of Germans, soon lose its meaning." I do not say this as a threat, but simply as a statement of the expected development of public opinion in my country.
3. I would like to emphasize once again that, at least in the relevant points here, I agree with the French analysis, namely that the solution to the German issue, as seen from today's perspective, can only be possible within the broader European context. For this reason alone, we Germans must necessarily maintain the Franco-German friendship politically and strengthen its functionality, regardless of whether this means much or little for our security.
4. Because the dependence of Western Europe's security and Germany's security on American support is evident, the Federal Republic of Germany cannot make a principled decision against the political strategy of the United States, no matter what that may mean for our other policies, even though the tactical room for maneuver of German politics has been expanded by the conflicts between Paris and Washington. It seems quite certain that the Federal Republic of Germany will, in any case, use the expanding space to pursue what it may see as the interests of the German nation. Even the Federal Republic of Germany, where after the war the will and enthusiasm for a political unity of Western Europe was strongest, is increasingly entering into the development that is most strongly driven by France, and which I have tried to define purely prognostically and without personal judgment, in such a way that the 1970s will be characterized by the slogan once used by de Gaulle: "A Europe of Fatherlands."

1970

John G. Tower

United States Senator from Texas
and Member of the Senate Armed Services Committee

John G. Tower addressed the 7th Wehrkunde Conference with a plea to maintain a military posture of "unquestioned superiority" towards the Soviet Union.

The present time has been described by President Nixon as one in which we are moving from an era of confrontation to an era of negotiation. He believes that we must realistically view our present world not as what we would like it to be, but as it actually is.

In my opinion, Mr. Nixon is a pragmatist who believes that any sign of weakness on our part, any attempt at appeasement, any diminution of our resolve will be viewed with contempt by the Soviets and will be exploited by them. In this context, it is essential that we maintain a military posture not of parity, but of unquestioned superiority. I am stating the obvious when I say the maintenance of such posture serves as a deterrent to Soviet aggression against the non-communist world and provides us the power base from which to negotiate. We have learned we cannot think and act solely in global and nuclear terms, just as we cannot do so only in regional and conventional terms.

We must maintain a spectrum of deterrents ranging from well-equipped foot soldiers to the ICBM. Further, we believe that the possession of superior force alone is not enough.

Our deterrent is not credible unless friend and foe alike are convinced of our willingness to use our force if necessary. Without that conviction, the Soviets and the Chinese might be tempted to risk dangerous adventures.

It is my belief that we delude ourselves that there can be a detente or a stable and secure world with the current polarization of power between a sphere dominated by the Soviets and a sphere dominated by the United States. Rather, to achieve a secure and progressive world (particularly *in* light of the fact that in fifty years this planet will not be able to produce the food and fiber necessary to sustain the projected population), there must be at least four spheres of influence.

In addition to a Soviet sphere and an American sphere, there must be a West European sphere dominated by the collective powers of Western Europe, and an Asian sphere dominated, in the near future, by Japan with China being unable to play that role by virtue of the fact that Mao-Tse-Tung has virtually collapsed the economy of that country and the current leadership thinks in irrational and introspective terms.

In this context, let us consider Vietnam and the American commitment there. There *is* no question that we made errors of judgment that led to our involvement there. It is moot to argue whether or not we should have been in Vietnam in the first place. The fact is that we are there and the security of the peripheral nations of Asia depends on the outcome. This has been a difficult war for the United States because we have not fought an extensive guerilla war since the American revolution. We have had to learn new techniques and devise new weapons. It *is* a kind of war *in* which success is difficult to measure, but I can report to you in all candor that we have achieved measurable success.

Approximately 85 percent of the territory and over 90 percent of the citizenry are now under effective allied control. The Thieu government is showing increasing stability and responsiveness to the needs of the country. The ARVN has demonstrated increasing combat proficiency and "esprit de corps." Pacification is proceeding at a satisfactory pace. On the other hand, the VC infrastructure is decimated, demoralized, and unable to recruit effectively.

The North Vietnamese probably reached their peak strength at the Tet offensive in 1968 — a brash gamble that failed. North Vietnamese manpower resources have steadily deteriorated since that time, both in terms of numbers and quality.

Under present circumstances, the enemy is convinced that he cannot win a military victory in south Vietnam. Conscious that the war against the French was won in Paris, Hanoi seeks to achieve its objectives by continuing the war to the extent that the American people weary of it and bring popular pressure to bear on the President for unilateral American withdrawal.

The Nixon Administration is determined to see the issue to a successful and honorable conclusion and is not prepared to accept a camouflaged surrender to the demands of Hanoi. The President is determined to follow his established policy of the Vietnamization of the war with the withdrawal of American troops contingent on the criteria of level of enemy activity and competence of the Vietnamese to take over the ground fighting.

There is no doubt but that a substantial residual American force will have to be maintained there for some time. Even after maneuver battalions and their support elements have been withdrawn, we will have to continue to provide logistical, air, and naval support to the South Vietnamese.

It is my belief that we must look also to the sanitization of Laos and Cambodia, in light of the fact that there is a considerable communist infrastructure in Thailand, a SEATO ally of the United States, which is slated to be the next target for a so-called war of national liberation.

The current make-up of that infrastructure in Thailand is largely ethnic Chinese and ethnic Vietnamese and minority tribesmen. Laos serves as a base of operations against Thailand. It is our hope that we can ultimately contain communist expansion in Asia by surrounding China with a number of politically, economically, and socially progressive Asian nations. Because of its great economic potential, Vietnam fits into this picture.

Despite our involvement in Southeast Asia, we Americans are much less preoccupied with Southeast Asia than we were a short time ago. And since the advent of the Nixon Administration, there has been a growing consciousness of our responsibilities elsewhere in the world. A question that seems to come first and foremost in international discussions today is the United States attitude towards Europe and the future of our force commitments in Europe.

It seems to me that the priority which the United States gives to Europe is evidenced by the fact that President Nixon's first trip was to Europe where he made it abundantly clear that the need remained to maintain an adequate deterrent to aggression against Europe. The President also stressed that our Allies should concentrate upon the quality of their force and not increased quantities of men and that it would be helpful to the United States if our European Allies could do more multilaterally.

As recently as last December, Secretary Laird told the Ministers of the Defense Planning Committee that our strategic review has convinced us that the United States commitment must remain as firm as it has been in the past and that the security of the NATO Allies is indivisible from the security of the United States. He also noted that the critics of our present force posture base their criticism not on strategic or economic considerations, but on a feeling that the United States continues to bear a disproportionate share of NATO's defense burden. I would agree with Secretary Laird's comments and also agree with President Nixon's statement that it would be helpful if our European Allies could do more multilaterally to demonstrate the solidarity of Western Europe's defense commitments.

Many of you are wondering what decisions will be made on Senator Mansfield's proposed Resolution regarding the level of forces permanently stationed in Europe. I do not intend to predict the outcome of deliberations in Congress on this subject but would like to stress one point: Senator Mansfield's Resolution acknowledges that the security of the United States and its citizens remains as interwoven with the security of other nations signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty as it was when the Treaty was signed. It is the sense of his proposed Resolution that a substantial reduction of permanently stationed United States forces can be made because of our vast increase in capacity to move military forces and equipment by air. I am personally of the opinion that deterrence to aggression is best achieved by having sufficient forces on hand.

I further believe that NATO's military planners' views on what comprises sufficiency need careful consideration before they are altered for economic or political reasons. Moreover, we have, in the cases of world Wars I and II, found that intervention is far more costly in terms of lives, let alone funds, than deterrence. In evaluating the United States commitments to Europe's defense, I often feel too much attention is paid to words and too little to deeds. For example, We have made no secret of the reductions in our defense budget expenditures or the actions which we have taken to change our force structure to achieve these budgetary savings.

As evidence of our commitment and awareness of our NATO obligations, you need only look around you to see that we have achieved our budgetary savings without affecting our combat forces in Europe. In fact, quite the contrary, we have made and are making significant qualitative improvements. Our Army improvements include introduction of more helicopters and mobile assault bridge and ferry units; the self propelled HAWK, REDEYE, and CHAPARRAL-VULCAN units for air defense, and GENERAL SHERIDAN armored vehicles. Our PERSHING battalions are receiving modernized equipment and increased manning. Navy improvements include the introduction of more modern aircraft such as the A-6, A-7, and F4J for our carriers and P-3C aircraft for land-based anti-submarine warfare operations.

Our Air Forces in Europe are undergoing an intensive modernization program with the conversion of F-100 and F-102 Wings to the F-4E and F-111 aircraft. In addition, we have improved our air base posture and wartime aerial port facilities, munition storage, and are well into a program for providing aircraft shelters and air base defense. The Marine Corps has completed the equipping of both Marine expeditionary forces earmarked for assignment to NATO with a new generation of wheeled vehicles and has made qualitative improvements in communications, engineering equipment and aircraft.

To me these actions are firm evidence of our commitment and would seem to me to speak with more authority than any oral pledge of our interest in NATO defense. As you know, our engineering, construction and maintenance endeavors in Europe are largely performed by civilian personnel of the countries where our forces are based. All of these programs outlined above are common knowledge to local personnel working on our installations but perhaps have not received the public attention that they merit or it may be that the sum total has not been brought to your attention.

We have made certain reductions in support functions and in headquarters and other areas where we felt advanced technology permitted reductions. Since they affect the local labor force they too are apparent to you and have also been publicly announced. In some instances, local governments and townships have noted the economic problems this places on the local community due to a reduction in spending by our troops and the loss of revenue from salaries of personnel employed by these installations.

As a Senator, I can appreciate their concern. But here again, the sincerity of the United States commitment is evidenced by the magnitude of the cuts taken in our own labor forces and the number of defense installations we have closed in the United States in order to maintain our combat forces in Europe.

As to the future, I would be less than candid if I did not report that popular opinion in the United States expects our European Allies to do more and to accept a greater financial share of the defense burden. There are means to do this that would be of mutual benefit and we need to get on with them. We must find ways to fully offset the United States balance of payment deficits so that this is removed as an argument for additional dual basing of forces.

If you agree that in place forces are a greater deterrence than dual-based forces, you should look to your own standards of readiness and seek improvements in existing active forces. In particular, improvements in manning levels and equipment of your active forces and in your mobilization systems, and an increase in the number of immediately available and ready combat reserve forces would be firm evidence of your interest. Some of you have indicated interest in the impact our Southeast Asia activities have had on our strategic reserve forces that are earmarked for Europe. I can tell you that they are fully manned and equipped and that a sizable proportion of their troops are now combat veterans who have completed their tour in Vietnam. Personnel rotations create problems in unit training programs but individual proficiency is high and combat experience is an offsetting factor.

We too have proponents of reduced terms of conscription, and it will be difficult for us to hold the line if the trend of reduced terms in Europe continues. In this connection, our minimum overseas tour in Europe is equal to the total conscription period of some of our Allies . In fact, our combat tour in Southeast Asia is twelve months. We cannot afford the increased costs and loss of efficiency resulting from more frequent rotation of personnel to Europe and urge consideration of these factors in your own defense planning.

It seems to me that all NATO nations might review costs or charges now borne by the United States to see if they are truly fitting or if they can be reduced. For example, airport taxes, leased telephone circuits for military facilities and air defense networks, and landing fees when it is necessary to utilize civilian airfields for military purposes. I am sure that your interest is in United States combat forces and equipment and I am equally sure that our continued presence can best be assured by reductions in our support costs to the point where it is no more or even less expensive to base them in Europe than in the United States.

I would like to make one last point before turning to other key issues. The future political and economic structure of Western Europe are issues for Europeans to decide. However, I am in full agreement that it would aid NATO's supporters in the United States Congress if you would do more multilaterally in defense matters. Proposals for rationalization of forces and co-production of defense weapon systems make sense to me and would be concrete evidence of your interest in an integrated defense posture. Pursuing these proposals should be a matter for your urgent consideration. The subject other than forces that appears most on people's minds today is East-West negotiations on arms limitations. The human race is a hopeful race, but we must deal with such issues as disarmament with realism and in the light of the cold, clear facts of history.

Regarding the preliminary round of talks on strategic arms limitation with the Soviet Union (S.A.L.T. as we call them for short), we should not be too optimistic about early, favorable results. Our delegation was impressed with the serious, businesslike approach of the Soviets toward the negotiations, and we believe that the prospects are better than they have been in the past. On the other hand, we can be sure that the Soviets will make no agreements that are unfavorable to their national interests.

It should be noted that the Soviets agreed to the talks immediately after the United States announced its decision to go ahead with a limited ABM system. Although the Soviets may sincerely desire to reduce the threat of nuclear war and divert more resources to the civilian economy,

they may see S.A.L.T. talks as a strategy for political gain. One objective might be to loosen the bond of mutual trust that binds America to the European members of the North Atlantic Alliance.

In keeping with our standard practice, we are coordinating our S.A.L.T. negotiations closely with the other members of NATO. Both prior to and after the first round of talks, our chief delegate consulted in detail with the North Atlantic Council. We plan to continue this close coordination, and I can assure you that our Administration will make no arrangements which lessen the security of its NATO Allies.

Another area we should approach with caution is the Warsaw Pact bid for an early European Security Conference. According to their Prague Declaration, the Communists would convene the Conference to discuss a renunciation of force and increased economic cooperation. However, these are being handled by bilateral talks. We should not rush to a conference that would serve no useful purpose for the West and might have the disadvantage of granting recognition to the East German regime and ratifying the present division of Europe.

If the Communist states show a willingness to discuss seriously substantive issues of European security, and I find it difficult to exclude in this context the problems of the German nation, then we should certainly agree to a meeting with the East European states and the Soviet Union. However, I must say that it is incongruous for regimes that have recently made a military invasion of a European state in order to force political changes on it to suddenly advocate a renunciation of the use or threat of force in Europe.

We should go to any conference that promises real improvements in European security. We should not, however, let propaganda moves by the Soviet Union divide our NATO Alliance or promote the permanent division of the German nation or of Europe. If the North Atlantic countries stand together, their security can be threatened by no one. In concluding, it seems to me that the European members of NATO need to be more forthcoming about their concepts of NATO's defense policy. It would help if there were a consensus among you on other issues as strong as the existing consensus on United States force levels. Here too a multilateral approach would be desirable and enable us to make difficult defense decisions that are most likely to supplement your own defense efforts and to assure you of our continued commitment to NATO. Allies with bonds as strong as ours can have frank discussions over difficult and complex issues and emerge from them with even stronger bonds and greater understanding.

1973

Jerry W. Friedheim

Assistant Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

In his speech at the 10th Wehrkunde Conference in 1973, Jerry W. Friedheim highlighted the common threats faced by the US and its European NATO allies.

I was pleased to accept an invitation to present the United States paper to this Wehrkunde Conference on "The Role of Europe in US Policy," a subject both important and timely because of our mutual need to maintain a strong defense posture during the ongoing negotiations concerning security and cooperation in Europe and mutual and balanced force reductions.

As you are well aware, US national security strategy is designed to move us toward President Nixon's goal of lasting world peace achieved and maintained through strong deterrence, based on strength, on partnership with our allies, and on a willingness to negotiate.

For 25 years after World War II our international role was shaped by a belief that the responsibility for world peace, stability, and prosperity rested largely on the United States. But what true for the two decades following World War II is no longer feasible for the 1970s. The United States must no longer be the free world's only policeman. Increasingly, the domestic and international conditions — which once warranted such a role — have changed, and that change has called for a new role for the United States in International affairs.

Our President's international policy — the Nixon Doctrine — is a statement of the new US role. And, at our Department of Defense our national security strategy, called realistic deterrence, provides the defense tool to implement the President's policies. The Nixon Doctrine defines a new partnership — a more realistic sharing of roles and responsibilities — between us and other nations in the building of our common peace, stability and prosperity.

Our policy can be summed up in three statements:

First, the United States must continue to play a major role in world affairs. Our own security and well-being demand it. Our sheer weight in the international scheme of this make it unavoidable. Any US withdrawal into some sort of modern-day isolationism would be a recipe for disaster — disaster for us and the other nations of the free world. Our objective — and our responsibility — is and must be to work in concert and cooperation with other nations to build a stable, peaceful international order.

Second, the United States cannot and should not do everything itself. As President Nixon has said, "No nation has all the wisdom, and all the understanding, and all the energy required to act wisely on all problems at all times and in every part of the world."

Moreover, the American people are realists, and they believe we must place realistic limits of our world role in light of our own interests and our own domestic needs. And it is clear to all free nations that in the long run, no free society can pursue and sustain international policies which its citizens do not support.

Third, other nations can and must assume greater responsibility that they have in the past in helping to provide for mutual security and economic well-being, and in building a peaceful and prosperous world order. Thus, we have the concept of NATO burden-sharing.

The post-war economic and political recovery here in Europe, and also in Japan, has long been an accomplished fact. Further, many of the newer nations of the world already have demonstrated that they have the resilience and the resources required to assume a greater share of the burden for their own security and well-being.

But, important as it may be that others are capable of doing more than they have done, there is an even more substantive reason for asking a greater degree of burden-sharing from them. It is our own view that unless a nation feels itself primarily responsible for its own security and well-being, it will leave the task to others and fall to marshal its resources and political will in its own defense.

For those nations which demonstrate that will and require technical assistance and materiel resources to assure their own security, the United States will continue to provide security assistance. But as President Nixon said in his recent inaugural address, "Let us measure what we will do for others by what they will do for themselves."

Apart from what a nation does for itself, there is the larger question of its responsibility for maintaining the peace. International order can be stable only if nations have a stake in its maintenance. Nations will not have such a stake unless they have participated in building that order.

These principles — these broad directions — guide current US defense efforts.

In developing our national security strategy of realistic deterrence, we have sought answers to these basic questions: What should be the relative responsibilities of the United States and its allies for deterring threats? What resources can and should each nation concerned contribute to the common defense? How can we make optimum use under a total force concept of all available military and related resources to meet the requirements of the common security?

The answers to these questions, and the implementing actions taken delineate what has been accomplished over the past four years and what remains to be done in the years ahead.

First, deterrence of nuclear threats, both to the United States and its allies, has been and will continue to be primarily the responsibility of the United States. No other nation can maintain sufficient strategic nuclear power on the scale required to deter attack, threats or blackmail from the other nuclear superpower. Without a continued US nuclear deterrent for the common security of our allies, they might have neither the will nor the reason to do what can and must be done to deter conventional war.

But, while US nuclear power is essential to the common security, it is not sufficient to deter the full spectrum of potential conflict and potential threats to US and allied interests. Thus, the new Nixon Doctrine international policy concept of partnership and the new total force concept of our security strategy comes into full play.

In Asia, we face jointly with our allies the problem of how to deter major theater conventional conflict and at the same tine deter sub-theater or localized conventional threats.

There is, of course, a tendency on the part of some persons — on both sides of the Atlantic — to see in the new era of negotiations a reason or an excuse to reduce defense efforts. Yet it must be apparent to thoughtful students of international security that free world and NATO military strength helped bring this new era about by effectively closing all paths except that of negotiation. And it must be equally apparent in Europe that Western positions and interests cannot be adequately protected and advanced in negotiations unless the West shows continued will and ability to maintain its military strength.

President Nixon in 1969 recognized the need to re-examine our collective NATO strategy to see if it was still viable in the light of new circumstances

and new realities. We knew there were weaknesses and imbalances in NATO's conventional capabilities vis-à-vis those of the Warsaw Pact. The status of United States Forces in Europe has, before, 1969, been affected by our troop commitments to Southeast Asia. It also was important to clear away some of the misunderstandings between the US and its allies which have arisen over the years and to work together to revitalize the cohesion of the Great Alliance.

Together, we carried out in NATO an exhaustive study of Alliance defense problems for the 1970s in which we reaffirmed the validity of our current military strategy and agreed on ways in which to improved NATO forces, their armaments, logistics, supporting infrastructure, and our ability to consult on their possible use in a crisis.

President Nixon has emphatically reaffirmed the American commitment to NATO. He has firmly said that, given a similar approach by our allies, the US will maintain and will improve its forces deployed in the European area. We will keep that pledge.

But in the years immediately ahead, it will be very difficult to support an undiminished American troop presence in Europe if some of our partners whittle down the effectiveness of their own forces — whether by budget reductions, manpower reductions, or shorter terms of service.

At the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting two months ago our Secretary of Defense based his major intervention on burden-sharing and the need for more of it, Beyond his admonition that defense expenditures must grow in real terms and that funds must be used more efficiently in support of our common defense, he called for a continued European defense improvement program effort and a decreased United States cost share of NATO's infrastructure program. These suggestions will be difficult to realize but the time is right, and our allies must understand the need to relieve us of some of the defense burden.

The era of negotiations is well upon us with agreements we already have concluded — such as SALT I and Berlin — and with CSCE preparatory talks and MBFR initial talks underway. And, in the light of this intricate complex of East-West discussions, we are beginning to hear a great deal from politicians and writers about some sort of profound and lasting shift in the basic attitude and approach of the Soviet Union toward the West.

This talk is premature, and détente without adequate defense is delusion. Profound differences and disagreements continue between the East and ourselves. These differences cannot simply be ascribed to historical accident or misunderstanding. They are rooted in different conceptions of the rights and responsibilities of men and of governments, and in different approaches to dealing with other nations.

Not dare we ignore other facts of international life. We cannot discount the large, highlight capable and improving Warsaw Pact armed forced in Europe.

We cannot shut our eyes to the rapid, sustained and growing Soviet arms expansion and arms improvement programs. We cannot ignore the worldwide expansion of Soviet maritime forces and activity, including the construction of an aircraft carrier. We cannot safely disregard growing Soviet military presence in areas adjacent to NATO such as the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.

The simple fact is that as we meet here in early 1973 the Soviet military buildup, conventional as well as nuclear, continues with vigorous momentum.

Unless we face this strategic and political reality and make this recognition the starting point for our negotiating efforts, we jeopardize the chances of achieving peace, while subjecting our vital interests and our people to serious danger.

This is not to say why we should be totally unprepared to consider certain reasonable risks for peace. On the contrary, we should seek prudently and carefully to build a new relationship, if possible, with the Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern Europe. It should be a relationship based on reciprocal self-restraint and on accommodation of mutual interests. But that relationship only can be built on the foundation of a strong and unified West.

This era of negotiations is, in many ways, more dangerous, difficult and demanding that the previous era of confrontation. But the United States is confident that NATO is equal to the challenge. Some persons have expressed concern about our ability to manage MVFR and other negotiations while maintaining allied cohesion. But however great a challenge MBFR may be for us, in many ways, it will be an even more severe test for the East.

Whatever our problems here in the West, the mutual understanding and trust that have long prevailed among us will be a great asset over the months ahead as we negotiate with our adversaries. It is an asset all of us must guard with care.

Let us now briefly consider the US Defense Budget for fiscal year 1974, which continues funding for a strong defense posture essential to the security of the United States and its allies in support of negotiations. It is an austere budget that reflects no real increase in total funds allocated for defense over fiscal year 1973. The transition from support of US Force involvement in Southeast Asia to Vietnamization is substantially completed.

This permits in the fiscal year 1974 Budget the further modernization of our peacetime or "baseline forces" consistent with the principles of the

Nixon Doctrine without affecting the size and strength of US Forces in Europe. The budget provides a program balance between personnel, modernization and technology. And for the first time, it stabilizes the growth of personnel and related costs in order to preserve this balance.

Some of the more important points to be noted are:

Financial: Total budget authority requested for fiscal year 1974 is $85 billion, an increase of $4.1 billion over fiscal year 1973. This cost increase largely represents military and civilian pay increases. Nixon Doctrine Military Assistance Programs are budgeted at $1.3 billion — an increase of $300 million over fiscal year 1973.

Major Program Changes: Strategic Force funding remains level at $7.4 billion between fiscal year 1973 and fiscal year 1974. Major strategy weapons systems funding, however, reflects increases for research and development work of Trident ballistic missile submarines and significant decreases for Safeguard missile defense. Poseidon submarines and the proposed short-range attack missile.

General Purpose Forces program levels will increase slightly. This is the net result of decreases in funding for support of Southeast Asia offset by pay increases and modernization programs. Significant modernization program increases cover funding for the F-15 fighter and the F-4J fighter, a new attack aircraft, another nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, and a new series of destroyers.

Forces and Personnel: Strategy Missile Forces remain stable with programs continuing for the Minuteman III modernization and the conversion of Polaris to Poseidon submarines.

Strategic Bomber Forces are reduced from 30 squadrons to 28 squadron, reflecting fact-of-life retirements of older B-32's that have reached the end of their structural life.

Naval General Purpose Forces continue to reflect decreases an older, less effective ships and submarines are retired and replaced in lesser numbers by new, highly effective ships. Principal reductions are in destroyers and diesel submarines. Two nuclear ships and four nuclear attack submarines will join the fleet along with five destroyers' escorts and a missile frigate.

General Purpose Ground and Air Forces remain substantially at the level programmed for fiscal year 1973.

Military personnel are programmed to decrease by 58,000 to a total of 2,233,000 during fiscal year 1974. This is in part attributable to programmed reductions in Southeast Asia support and in part to efficiencies in overall staffing.

Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson reported, in response to questions last month by a member of the US Congress, that the most recent Department of Defense estimate of costs for the US Forces and Support Programs earmarked for NATO is roughly $16 billion annually — about one fifth of our total Defense Budget. This estimate is defined as the annual savings to the Defense Department Budget that would accrue if all of the following did not exist: All of the US General Purpose Forces (both active and reserve) that are formally committed to NATO but are not in Europe.

Variable costs of US-based support including training, individual support and logistics for the above forces.

Military assistance for European countries and the NATO infrastructure program. About $7 billion of the $16 billion is related to the cost of US combat forces actually in Europe and to their US-bases support.

I have described for this Wehrkunde Conference the dominant defense implications of the Nixon Doctrine which has guided US national security planning and actions over the past four years, particularly as they related to Europe. By any standard of measurements, we have covered together a good part of the security road that we must continue to travel together. And it is in the nature of the enterprise that the first steps were the hardest. For they entailed reorienting long-held views and patterns of actions, not only on our part, but on yours. For a quarter century, we had all believed that it was fitting and feasible for the United States to assume primary responsibility for countering all threats to the common security. The lesson we have learned together over the past four years is that partnership, not predominance — sharing, not supremacy — is in our common interest.

"Shared Sufficiency" is what it is all about. The Alliance has been and remains the world's mightiest force for peace. And as President Nixon has said, for the United States this year is the "Year of Europe."

1976

J. William Middendorf II

Secretary of the Navy of the United States of America

On the occasion of the 13th Wehrkunde Conference, J. William Middendorf II represented US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In his speech, he emphasized the need to match the increasing military capabilities of the Soviet Union.

It is an honor for me to be here today representing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the former Ambassador of the United States to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It was my pleasure, as US Ambassador to The Netherlands, to work with Secretary Rumsfeld in numerous matters relating to the NATO alliance. The defense and preservation of Europe as we know it has always been a matter of great concern to Americans. The actions of my Government have demonstrated that concern over and over again, and it is my intention today to stress that the United States continues its policy of support for Europe through a common defense.

While this is not a NATO conference, I feel compelled to point out that during the past twenty-seven years NATO has been eminently successful in accomplishing its designed task. The collective defense to deter aggression preserve peace provided by NATO is more and more important to us today, for reasons which I shall describe in detail.

I strongly believe that NATO and its military capabilities are perhaps the single most important factor in deterrence of great disruption in Europe as a time when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries continue to increase their capabilities; here are some of the facts about this increase in Soviet capabilities:

The key fact is that over the past dozen years, Soviet defense spending has increased by about 35 percent. In this period, the Soviet military establishment (not counting border guards and internal security forces) expanded from 3.4 to 4.4 million men. Intercontinental ballistic missiles increased from 224 to 1,600. Sea launched ballistic missiles went up from 29 to 730. Strategic warheads and bombs were up from 450 to 2,500.

And between 1964 and 1974 the Soviets produced 249 new major combatant ships, establishing themselves as a naval power and adding a new dimension to the problem of defending Europe — an oceanic dimension.

The Soviet strategic buildup unfortunately seems to be gaining momentum, with qualitative improvements such as the development of four new ICBM's, two of which are currently being deployed with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV's).

The production of a new generation of ballistic to missile submarines one class of which has recently deployed with the 4,200 mile SS-N-8 missile.

Improvements which could give their ICBM's significantly better accuracy. Large MIRV's with high-yield warheads. Development of a mobile IRBM. The Soviet general purpose forces have not been without their expansion also: The number of divisions has increased from 141 to 168 with an increase in numbers of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel carriers. An addition of nearly 2,000 tactical aircraft, combined with the introduction of more sophisticated fighter/attack aircraft.

As the Secretary of the Navy I have a particularly keen interest in the Soviet navy and its capabilities. Soviet naval presence in peacetime is becoming a very significant factor throughout the world. Nowhere have the new directions of the Soviet Navy been more apparent than in the Mediterranean — NATO's southern flank. In 1964 this presence averaged five ships. The present Soviet average is between fifty and sixty. During the 1973 Middle East crisis the Soviet Mediterranean squadron reached some ninety-five units. The new Soviet Navy has one vertical and short takeoff and landing aircraft carrier undergoing sea trials, a second under construction and a third in the planning stages. Their sea denial ability has been enhanced through the addition of powerful new surface combatants, such as KARA-class cruisers.

The Soviet Navy has new ships, modern weapons systems, and access to facilities in the Black Sea and to a limited extent along the Mediterranean Coast, This increased Soviet strength has led some to question the capability of NATO and the US Sixth Fleet. At best we are maintaining adequacy. Even this could be in jeopardy as unsettled conditions in several countries threaten to increase our logistics problems. I feel that today the Allied NATO partners are still the dominant force in the Mediterranean as long as there are aircraft carriers capable of sustained actions, but we no longer have a monopoly. For this reason, I feel that it is imperative that the NATO nations be as supportive as possible to the new government in Spain. Spain

has a valuable role to play in the European community and should not be prevented from doing so because of policies of a previous era.

What have we seen outside the Mediterranean? Recently Soviet units have made unprecedented deployments and conducted exercises indicating a change in the basic mission of defense of the homeland to one of sea denial. This change has serious meaning for Europe. The Soviets are now capable of significantly threatening vital overseas areas and the sea lanes. The NATO countries are dependent on the sea for overseas trade, just as is the United States. In fact, the very existence of Western Europe as we know it today depends on the unimpeded flow of oil and other strategic materials which can only be supplied in the proper quantities by ocean going vessels.

The latest Soviet presence on the African continent in such places as Nigeria, Guinea and Angola could in the time of hostilities literally cripple Europe. Approximately 80% of the NATO alliance's oil and 70% of the strategic materials move through the waters along the west coast of Africa, mow vulnerable to the air and naval bases of Soviet supported governments.

During OKEAN 75, a Soviet naval exercise observed by NATO units, more that two hundred Soviet nuclear submarines and surface ships and 400 aircraft, in three oceans, were assembled and coordinated through a sophisticated world-wide communication network, including satellites, Soviet aircraft operated from bases not only in the Soviet Union, but also from air facilities made available to them in Cuba, Guinea and Berberra in the Somali Republic.

Putting this altogether, it is apparent that the number of new ships and weapon systems which the Soviet Navy is acquiring and the experience it is gaining from its continuing high level of operations in distant areas, are giving the Soviet navy the level of capability, professionalism, and importantly, self-confidence to explore new Naval strategies which could be applied against NATO in various stages of hostilities ranging from an economic blockage to an all-out nuclear war.

OKEAN 75 saw Soviet naval units operating in more or less traditional areas such as the Norwegian Sea but also in areas such as the sea approaches to Europe, in the approaches to the Persian Gulf, off the west coast of Africa and off the coast of Japan. In much of the exercise activity, the Soviets displayed a remarkably sophisticated and well-integrated capability for surveillance of the oceans, making extensive use of sophisticated systems. Having located ships on the high seas with this system, Soviet surface, air and submarine forces exercised in convoy and anti-convoy operations, reconnaissance of vital sea lines of communication, and the control of key chokepoints throughout the world. These new departures were in addition to the normal exercising of Soviet navy anti-carrier and anti-submarine missions, as well as simulated strategic strikes at the culmination of the exercise.

You may ask "so what?". Well, quite frankly it is a question of survival. Geographically, western Europe is a peninsula. But in reality, the NATO countries of Western Europe and Southern Europe are virtually an economic island. They maintain tremendous dependence on the sea. The food, raw materials and energy consumed and needed for their survival are in large part imported. Many important markets are overseas, whether in the United States or elsewhere.

The question today is whether the West is capable of recognizing the realities that confront it: a burgeoning Soviet military capability that includes a new element of sea denial, which has the potential to threaten a standard of living that is the envy of many; and a feeling of euphoria that comes with détente. To make détente work, we must have strength; and military and economic strength are the essence of detente.

In order to maintain détente and a credible NATO deterrence we must continue of our joint operations, training, technology exchanges, logistics support, intelligence and mutual support. However, a major stumbling block which causes the alliance to waste money each year due to duplication of effort thereby sacrificing military effectiveness, is the lack of standardization and rationalization.

This should make it obvious that there is a need for standardization not only in weapon systems, but also in areas like training, communications doctrine and force structures, and the very important logistics field. Of late there has been an increased realization of this problem by senior officials and a genuine desire to correct it.

We also see a situation where defense expenditures as a percentage of the gross national product are not the same for all NATO partners. The United States percentage for last year, as estimated by NATO, was 6.7. That figure is down significantly from the 1971 US figure, which was 7.7 percent. Even so, it is well above that estimated for the average of European NATO countries, which was an estimated 4.3 percent of GNP as a defense expenditure in 1975. I realize of course that a good part of the "extra" American expenditure goes for US strategic forces.

During the past few years, as an ambassador and as a US Secretary of the Navy, I have personally visited key maritime officials and been aboard naval units of the navies of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Spain. From my firsthand observations, I can tell you that their professionalism is outstanding, and that they make a valuable contribution for security in Europe.

Today, no less than in the past, US military strategy, and hence the structure of our forces, must continue to support the NATO alliance. To do otherwise would be seen by friend and foe as a step toward withdrawal to that outmoded concept of isolation. It would undermine the very strength and confidence that we have in Western Europe, while encouraging the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies to exploit any weakness or division in Europe or in the world.

The United States will remain a friendly ally as long as leaders in America (like Senator John Tower of Texas who by his very presence at the Wehrkunde Conference this year and in the past years show his dedication to the Atlantic Alliance) recognize the importance of mutual support. Few things could be more damaging to the future of Europe than any of us on their side of the Atlantic to lose sight of the continuing value of the Atlantic Alliance and the cooperation which underlies it. To do so would be an undercutting of those American leaders who support the Alliance, and encouragement of the emergence of other leaders — isolationists — with little understanding of the inter-relationships of the Alliance, and little concern for Europe. Therefore, our concern today should be maintaining a full partnership of strength that is perceived on both sides of the Atlantic to be essential to our very own survival.

FRANK C. CARLUCCI
JOHN GLENN
ROBERT C. BYRD

Chapter 2

EXPANDING HORIZONS

1980–1989

1981

Frank C. Carlucci

Deputy Secretary of Defense of United States of America

Frank C. Carlucci used this speech to the 18th Wehrkunde Conference to call upon the European members of NATO to support the US in assuring common interests in the Persian Gulf.

I am honored and pleased to be here today. Honored to address so distinguished and assemblage. Pleased to return in an official capacity to Europe, where I spent some of the most interesting and satisfying years of my career in public service.

Europe holds a special place in the hearts of Americans. We draw from you much of our cultural heritage, our language, even our religious traditions. In this century, peace and security in Europe have become inseparable from peace and security for the United States. Three decades ago, we joined with our European friends in an unprecedented alliance of free people, an alliance whose raison d'etre is as clear and persuasive today as it was when the North Atlantic Treaty was signed.

Our common commitment to the goals of the Alliance are undiminished. As allies, we believe now, as we did then, that an attack against one of us is an attack against us all. We believe now, as we did then, that we must maintain and develop our individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

Some of the challenges that confront us in the 1980s are those forged our Alliance in the 1940s — the menacing and continuing growth of Soviet military power in Europe. Yet, in many ways, the context for even these familiar challenges has changed. The Soviet buildup in Europe clearly exceeds any rational requirement for defense. It bears all the marks of an offensive military capability, consistent with Soviet military doctrine. This steady and cumulative expansion of conventional, chemical, and theater nuclear forces has been accompanied by a long-term and major shift in the strategic nuclear balance, from one of unquestioned US superiority to essential equivalence, and the prospect, if appropriate steps are not taken,

of possible inferiority. The twin results of this shift are that the United States no longer enjoys a strategic edge to compensate for other deficiencies and that Soviet ability to use the threat of conventional force for political purposes could be significantly enhanced. On all levels of military capability, the trends are ominous.

The United States must recognize its responsibilities in this mature alliance. All too often in the past we have talked of consultation and acted on our own. Too frequently we have urged the need for consistency yet presented our allies with what at times must have seemed like annual changes in priorities and programs. The new Administration is aware of these dangers. We are determined to avoid them.

Europe, too, should recognize its responsibilities. Like the East-West balance, the relationship between the United States and Western Europe also has shifted dramatically over 30 years. The United States no long produces and consumes 50 percent of the world's GNP. Europe is no longer shattered, impoverished and disunited. Indeed, Western Europe's total GNP exceeds that of the United States. In this situation, the United States cannot be expected to improve and strengthen US forces in Europe, unless other Allies increase their own contribution to the combined defense effort. Nor can the United States, unaided, bear the burden of promoting Western interests beyond Europe.

There is, I might add, great concern in the US Congress over the issue of burden-sharing concern that was brought home quite clearly and explicitly to Secretary Weinberger and to me in our confirmation hearings. This concern is a political fact of life for us, and that should be understood by all concerned.

An integral element of this mature Alliance is an expanded concept of European security. Only by meeting and mastering Soviet challenges both inside Europe and in areas of critical interest beyond, can European security be maintained. Only then can the possibility of a more constructive East-West relationship in Europe be held open.

Let me suggest three areas for concentrated effort.

First, what the United States can do. Second, what we as Allies can do in Europe. Third, what the United State and Europe can do outside Europe.

What the United States can do: This Administration's agenda is as clear as the results of last November's election. We are unequivocally committed to a major and sustained increase in military capability and therefore in defense spending. We will use these resources to ensure the following objectives: We will increase confidence in our strategic nuclear forces. We will maintain momentum behind theater nuclear force modernization. We also need to continue the program we have made in rationalization, standardization and interoperability of weapons and munitions production. These programs have resulted in elimination of much duplication, reduction in costs, and increases in overall capability. As part of our family of weapons concept, we reached an agreement in August 1980 whereby the Europeans would produce a short-range air-to-air missile, and the United States would build a medium-range air-to-air missile. Dual production of weapons systems reduces duplication in research and development. We are currently producing the F-16 fighter, the ROLAND Air Defense System, as well as other important weapon systems.

Again, we want to work closely with Europe in developing common arms control positions in areas of special concern to you. As in other areas of common interest, we must not let the Soviets benefit from any appearance of disunity, or let them gain leverage as a result of European pressures on the United States to proceed before we are ready, to pursue unrealistic objectives, or to make unnecessary concessions.

What Europe and the United States can do outside Europe: Generally, we all understand well what needs to be done within Europe. The challenge there is to marshall the political will to generate the resources required to be on with the job. But it will require fresh vision, as well as renewed political will, to come to grips with the threats to European Security from outside this continent.

What is needed first is an expanded private and public dialog on these issues. We have begun the process of consultations at senior levels of allied governments, and this will take on new intensity in coming weeks. I also hope that this conference and many other efforts in the months ahead can promote wider public awareness of the threats to European security in regions outside of Europe and will generate new understanding and new motivation to deal with these threats.

The threat to vital Western interests in key areas, such as the Persian Gulf, can be met only if all concerned share the burden and find new ways to make greater contributions in support of our common interests. Western Europe's stake in the security and stability of the Persian Gulf is enormous and well-recognized. What is perhaps less well understood is the great contribution the Western European members of the Alliance could make to help protect the security of this region so vital to them. For obvious reasons, I am not speaking here of a formal role by NATO. I have in mind individual, but complementary efforts by the members of our Alliance.

Close political relations with nations throughout Southwest Asia can be activated to strengthen understanding of Western objectives in the region and of our common interest in resisting Soviet aggression.

Security arrangements between European Allies and countries in Southwest Asia can help our friends in that region to strengthen their capability for self-defense.

The hard truth is that none of us can have social welfare and economic prosperity unless our Alliance is strong enough to maintain the peace and to protect our access to vital energy sources and raw materials. And those of you here in this meeting know full well that the relative military strength of the Alliance has been declining for far too long.

Let us face the facts honestly and begin now to take the necessary action together.

1982

John Glenn

United States Senator from Ohio

In this speech at the 19th Wehrkunde Conference, John Glenn called on European NATO members to refrain from cutting back on defence commitments at a time of historic challenges.

Defense Minister Apel refers to this gathering as a symposium. One definition of a symposium given by my Webster's Unabridged Dictionary is that of "a meeting following the banquet proper, usually with music, singing, and dancing." There may be little music, singing, and dancing about subjects we discuss here today. I am concerned that NATO is preparing for one particular threat, but that there is another threat of equal importance that has crept up on us that is not being adequately considered, even through it affects us all.

When NATO was established, the major Soviet threat in Europe was a land attack on the central front. I would submit that this started changing at the time of the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviets went home in embarrassment and decided to build their military capabilities. And they built — not defensive forces — but power projection forces. Where they were capable previously only of land attack from their homeland, they became capable slowly over the past 15 years or so of airmobile and amphibious operations continents away.

And the Kremlin leaders have used these projection forces. You saw the original coup in Afghanistan, for instance. Major help then followed for Syria and Iraq. After this came the use of a new military experiment — surrogates. Cubans with Soviet equipment used that equipment in such places as Angola, Zaire, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and doubled their presence in the Indian Ocean and the islands north of Japan with an additional 12,000 troops. The Soviets gave major help to the Vietnamese in their invasion and occupation of Cambodia and followed that up with a military takeover in Afghanistan. So we are seeing them move without hesitation in these areas as they have developed their strategic mobility and conventional forces.

So why should we of NATO be concerned with what the Soviets do in other areas? While NATO has remained focused on the central European front, we have seen our resources dependency expand at a tremendous rate. Oil is but one example. While we get some 20 percent of our oil in the Persian Gulf, Europe gets approximately 60 percent from the same source and Japan gets over 75 percent.

But we are not vulnerable solely because of energy dependence. We in the United States have some 90 materials we consider to be of strategic and critical importance. Two-thirds of them are minerals. We are self-sufficient in two, mellithemum and magnesium. We are close to sufficiency in two more, copper and lead. But we have virtually no US production in four of the most critical — cobalt, manganese, chromium and platinum. Just to use one example, on our F-100 jet engines, we use some 1,485 pounds of chromium for each engine. Significant amounts of aluminum, cobalt, columbium, manganese, nickel, tantalum, and titanium are also required. We have a US dependency on overseas supply for between 77 and 100 percent of all those metals. The same thing can be said across the board of our industrial base and for the industrial base of the rest of the free world, including, of course, Germany and Europe.

So the Soviet Union can now threaten resources that are absolutely necessary to our society. Indeed, if one looks at the map and plots those African areas where the Soviets have made their move with their Cuban surrogates and will find an ominous alignment with the sources of these vital resources.

The United States has been trying to come to grips with this new vulnerability and to protect the West from this changed threat. I myself came to this conference from a visit around the Persian Gulf area. But NATO still concentrates on the central front. At last year's conference, Minister Apel stressed that NATO had no business getting outside of its traditional area unless there are individual commitments that particular nations wish to make. This year in the English version of his paper, Herr Apel says in part "... we should bear in mind that expanding NATO area is out of question." I would submit that NATO needs to do a new threat analysis that now includes resources. The United States is expanding its commitments to benefit all of the three major free world economic centers — Europe, Japan and the United States. But Americans expect our European and Asian allies to increase their share of the new burdens we must all bear.

Let me give a view of things from the United States and what I think this may well result in — perhaps even this year. I'm sure that many here recall that back 12 or 13 years ago, Mike Mansfield annually introduced a bill in the Senate to force the United States' withdrawal from NATO. Senator Mansfield believed we had been here too long, and he thought it was right that we withdraw our forces from NATO. He did not get broad support for the proposal. But I think there is a change in the United States today.

I think that Americans expect a greater degree of burden sharing and are willing to press in the same directions outlined by Senator Mansfield. If we see that move coming, I think many politicians may be obliged to follow. It would not surprise me at all to see such an amendment this year. I am personally not for it. I think it would send all the wrong signals. But I am being very blunt and straightforward in saying that I think it would be possible, perhaps even this year with the mood of the people in the United States with regard to burden sharing, that there will be a reduction of our European commitment unless there is some sort of additional help or aid for our Middle East expenses and our commitment there.

I am not making threats, but I think I am being realistic in saying that Americans believe that we are reaching the limits of our resources by taking on broader global commitments. There are commitments that we see benefiting all NATO and all free industrial world nations. But we see far too little additional burden sharing by our allies.

Now how much is enough for defenses? Well, that is difficult to say. I think too often we set up a balance sheet between the social and the military programs as though military spending is merely some sort of sop to a special interest constituency of generals, admirals, and defense contractors and that somehow military budgets ought never exceed what is spent on social welfare programs. I wish it were that simple. I am reminded during America's first Constitutional Convention in 1787, one of the delegates wanted to make it law that America's army would forever be limited to 5,000 men. George Washington, the presiding officer, turned to another delegate and whispered, "Amend the motion to provide no foreign enemy shall invade the United States with more that 3,000 soldiers at any one time."

We cannot benefit from balanced budgets if we are subjugated from abroad. We cannot prosper if we are deprived of critical raw materials. And we cannot survive unless we remember that the most important social service a democracy owes all its citizens is to keep them free of oppression.

The major cause of our inaction, perhaps, lies in the fact that the locale of Soviet advances fits the indirect strategy so clearly described by B. H. Liddell-Hart. NATO wakes each day to find itself increasingly threatened by yet another Soviet move in areas outside the European arena. Areas in which our traditional patterns of thinking do not prepare us to respond in any meaningful way. Our energy supply lines and critical materials are

more threatened now than ever before. The economies of Western Europe, Japan and the United States could literally be devastated without a shot being fired at the Fulda Gap. The Soviet arms build-up has clearly challenged the alliance where it is the most vulnerable.

What is the purpose of the alliance? It seems to me the purpose of the alliance is to protect against the threats of our collective and individual freedoms. The threat has advanced; the NATO response has not kept pace.

1988

Robert C. Byrd

Senator Majority Leader of the United States of America

Robert C. Byrd addressed the 25th Wehrkunde Conference on arms control and the future of the transatlantic alliance against the background of the "prospect of sweeping reform in the Soviet Union" tied to the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev.

1988 promises to bring about a massive shift in the way most of the free world sizes up to its own security. The sudden emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev — and the prospect for sweeping reform in the Soviet Union — has provoked great hopes, even among the most skeptical. With remarkable force and openness, he has come more than halfway in the pursuit of arms reduction at a time when the Reagan presidency — and his chief adversary is coming to a close.

The signing of the INF treaty last December has opened the door to new optimism — new uncertainties and new risk. For NATO, the treaty is both a tribute and a test — an invitation to fashion a stronger alliance among ourselves — and a more pragmatic strategy toward the Soviets

I come today to give an accounting of the ratification prospects in the United States Senate — but more, to raise some crucial questions about the security of Europe and the United States beyond the INF agreement.

Given the nature of politics in America — particularly in an election year — the messages coming out of Washington are at times misleading. With the White House controlled by one party, and the Senate by another, the conventional wisdom is that the prospects for agreement on even the simplest issue are remote. But the truth is that, in the end, we manage to agree more often that not — a fact explained less by goodwill than by the nature of our institutes.

In the case of treaties, the document bears the mark of the President and his diplomats. It falls to the Senate to scrutinize the document from the perspective of a nation divided by region and ideology.

By historic construction, the Congress is the people's forum and, in the end, the stabilizing force.

The INF treaty has been presented with a sense of urgency and promise. Given the tense and volatile relations between America and the Soviet Union since the War, it is hardly surprising to hear the echoes of old fears and suspicions rise for the Senate debate. Both countries have been looking at each other down the same gun sight for too long to expect unanimous ratification. For all the attendant flourish, the final vote will belie our entrenched skepticism toward the Soviets.

Munich of our apprehension can be laid to Mr. Gorbachev's stunning achievement in eclipsing his predecessors — both in style and message. At times he seems to have almost mesmerized Western publics with the prospect of détente with his adversaries abroad and the trappings of glasnost at home. Compared with the heavy-handed leaders that have gone before, he cuts a dashing new figure — even by the high art of image-making in the West. American polls are now recording a trust toward this Russian leader when none existed before. Yet, even those of us who have traditionally given our support to arms reduction pacts are still nagged by questions that must certainly move to the center of the Senate debate.

Where is the evidence that a half-century of Soviet pursuit of dominance and control has been bridled? Who is to risk deterrence on the professed goodwill of a man only three years into power? What gives us to believe that he will have the economic endurance, or the political backing to turn glasnost into prosperity and stability? Glasnost should not be confused with freedom of the press or freedom of speech by Western standards.

We all understand the argument that less distraction and tension from its traditional adversaries will allow the Soviets to reallocate revenues and attention from the military to domestic affairs. And that, in turn, will further ease tensions with the West. Yet, if Soviet and Russian history is any guide, we cannot take much comfort that a leader with an ambitious reform agenda will also promote foreign policies that favor us as well. Nikita Khruschev was the last Soviet reformer of our time. But while he pressed for destabilization at home, he took the game of international brinksmanship to new limits — at the Berlin Wall and Cuba's missile silos.

For now the implications for the West are very unclear should his domestic reforms work; and they are just as unclear if they do not. If they do, will Mr. Gorbachev's new power be turned to peaceful competition — or a redoubling of the old policies of confrontation? If they do not — and his mandate is narrowed — will he be able to continue the bold initiatives toward the West that have so far defined his tenure?

These are the dark unknowns and the challenges that we in the United States and you in Europe must confront in the months ahead. Because it is our response that will be the measure of our common trust and our common bond for years to come. Let caution be the watchword.

Like it or not, we live in an age of instant perception — as changeable and as powerful as the wind. He who masters the game of images — the ability to turn 30 seconds of television into a global metaphor — becomes a force of enormous magnitude. The very act of suddenly halting his heavily guarded motorcade to greet a crowd of Washington bystanders was a more lasting image than the actual signing of the treaty. It was Mr. Gorbachev at his theatrical best, playing to a post-war generation raised on the dream of détente — a generation with no memory of a Berlin blockade, of Soviet tanks in Hungary. No banging a shoe in anger at the United Nations. No clicking glasses with bearded revolutionaries, Merely the appearance of open friendship.

Mr. Gorbachev's mastery of style has no more brilliant example than his seductive handling of the occupation of Afghanistan. History is pretty clear on the subject. The Soviet army invaded and carried on a scorched earth war against a nation with little more that courage to defend itself. After a decade, the Afghan people have refused to collapse. With public opinion, mounting causality lists, and finances running against further engagement, Mr. Gorbachev is looking for a graceful way out. His hope is to make the Soviet withdrawal appear to be an act of generosity — rather than a surrender. He will use the withdrawal to advance Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East. We should no more reward the Soviets for having failed to devour Afghanistan than NATO should thank Moscow for pulling back from your borders an excessive show of nuclear forced aimed at intimidation.

While new style and the new substance are a welcome change from the brooding inflexibility that has marked Soviet foreign policy, in reality, they are in large measure due to the courage, the cohesion, and the vision of the West. Without cocking our guns, we made the point that democracy's frontiers are worth defending, We proved that, together, we are the match for any aggressor — that we are the only real foil to Soviet expansionism.

Witness the fact that the Soviets gave up far more to get a treaty than we did — including on-site verification and dropping the linkage to SDI.

Their compromise does not mean that the treaty is not in the Soviets' interest, and will not be used to advantage in other maneuverings with the West. But neither does it mean that we cannot seize opportunities to test the Soviet willingness to compromise on conventional forces and further arms control.

In the end, it would be ironic, indeed, if we allow our brief victory to conclude that our adversary has abandoned its historic goals on the world scene. Rather, our course should be one of new initiative to constantly test the confidence and the willingness of the new Soviet leaders to expand the pace and the radius of peaceful coexistence.

As leaders, we must change the perception held by too many of our own peoples that Mikhail Gorbachev has pulled the West to the nuclear negotiating table. He may have won the battle of the briefing books during the long months of negotiations. He may have won the competition for headlines during his visit to Washington. But we must not let him walk away from the INF table with nothing more than a signature and a promise. Nor must we let the Soviets quit Afghanistan with a shred of honor or reward.

We cannot effectively deal with the Soviets until our people are convinced that the Western alliance must be united, strong willed, and well-armed. We must sharpen the sense of need for continued deterrence in Europe. And we must test the Soviets with ever tougher initiatives for peace — real peace, not the image of peace.

For doubters and supporters alike, the central questions in the Senate debate will not be so much the terms of the treaty — but rather, the direction of NATO, the proper depth of our combined deterrence and, our ability above all and our will to sustain the doctrine of flexible response toward the Soviets.

These are both the questions and the challenges. If we cannot take our own measure, and to give a response supported by our own people — then the INF treaty will become less a breakthrough to a peaceful world than a footnote to a dangerous illusion of security.

Strategists speculate whether the West can keep our combined level of deterrence credible in the face of Soviet claims that NATO modernization circumvents the INF treaty and jeopardizes future arms agreements. They wonder whether we can sustain the political will necessary to keep the Alliance countries truly secure — or whether we will be distracted by Soviet charges of "foul" as they continue to improve their own offensive capabilities.

I speak for the vase majority in the United States when I underscore our commitment to a strong European alliance — in arms and men, as well as in words. It is never easy to convince people to pay the high costs for their national security — to hedge again uncertainty in the future. But we have done it in the past, and we will do it in the future. Because America well understands that Europe is more than yesterday's home for so many of our people — its security is our security as well — and worth paying a great price to maintain.

I was born at a time when Woodrow Wilson proclaimed World War I the "war to end all wars." And I was a young man when Franklin Roosevelt galvanized a nation with his call to arms. A generation has come of age since America and Europe last fought side by side. That that generation has been spared the trauma of war is a credit to the trust and strength we have given on both sides of the Atlantic.

In the coming months, we have a number of opportunities to declare our unity of purpose — not just the Soviets. But to our own public.

Our defense ministers should vote to move ahead with the Montebello decisions during their NATO meeting in April. I would certainly support whatever funding is necessary in the American budget cycle this spring to move ahead the Montebello program without delay.

A strong Western agreement to keep American troops at their present strength would counter any Soviet disinformation campaign aimed at forcing fissure into NATO on the grounds that America is not a reliable ally. America has stood the test before and will not waver in the future.

I welcome France's proposals for bilateral initiatives, so long as they remain within the NATO context, and are a means to strengthen the alliance — not fragment it.

We should renew our support for joint maneuvers, combined brigades, the stationing of alliance troops across each other's borders, and the modernization of our conventional and tactical nuclear forces. Guns are useless without ammunition. Such cooperative measures serve the cause of military preparedness and visibly make the case that deterrence in this era is not a unilateral or obsolete issue.

The French and British nuclear arsenals should be kept separate from arms control talks between the United States and the Soviets.

Pragmatism underscores the truth that we have no satisfactory substitute for nuclear deterrence in the pursuit of peace, not the peace that comes with bondage — which needs no deterrence — but peace with freedom, which does. As much as we all dream, we know we are still far from a time when the world is in perfect balance. We must still depend on the production and deployment of nuclear systems to remind would-be aggressors that aggression, even by conventional means, will be answered with nuclear force.

But the most immediate challenge for the NATO Alliance is to take the initiative on conventional forces negotiations by presenting a full-fledged reduction and constrains proposal to the Soviets this year. No matter how sincere the Soviets may be in calling for a total nuclear disarmament, there remains the dark truth that their offense rests less on the bomb rather than on the foot soldier.

If peace ultimately rests on balance, then we must address the existing asymmetry on all fronts. The Soviets agreed to eliminate more of their medium range missiles because they had more than we. So there is no reason why we should not ask that they respond with commensurate real reductions in the conventional threat. No other agreement would so bolster NATO's security interests. For many in the United States Senate and the tens of millions of Americans we represent, it is the natural preface to any agreement on long-range missile reduction.

The truth, however, is that we can mount no strong proposal on conventional arms without the support of our own peoples. Perhaps the most difficult task for Western leaders in the months ahead is to deflect the Soviets' attempt to play to our natural fear of nuclear arms, particularly among our youth. The entire West must come to understand that neither the denuclearization of Europe nor total nuclear disarmament will remove the threat of Soviet expansion — but would, instead, increase it.

In the end, the fulcrum for peace is credibility. We must redeclare ourselves an Alliance — not just in name, but in force. The Soviets must be convinced of our public support, the depth and flexibility of our armed response — and our staying power. All of this is within our reach. If we do not grasp the moment, we risk failing the cause of our common security.

GERHARD STOLTENBERG
VOLKER RÜHE
WILLIAM S. COHEN
HELMUT KOHL
WILLIAM J. PERRY
JAVIER SOLANA

Chapter 3

TRANSITION AND EXPANSION

1990 – 1999

1990

Gerhard Stoltenberg

Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany

In his speech to the 27th Wehrkunde Conference, Gerhard Stoltenberg addressed the momentous change resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall just a few months earlier.

The face of Europe is changing. In a dramatic upheaval of historic importance much has begun to move, and what appeared to be firmly established structures are transforming or beginning to dissolve. Until last year the forced division of Europe seemed an immutable fact of life; at best to be mitigated gradually in its consequences, the dictatorship of a totalitarian socialism weighed heavily on half of our continent. Today, the picture of Europe is more and more one determined by the ideas of freedom and democracy. There are still contradictions and risks; especially the latest internal developments in the Soviet Union are characterized by worsening. conflicts, creating new uncertainties. But the changes in Eastern Europe open up new political chances for us to dynamically shape the future, chances which we intend to use.

As we enter the last decade of this century it is especially important to develop perspectives for a new system of cross-border political, cultural, economic and, not least, security cooperation in all of Europe under the banner of freedom. In doing so, illusionary political concepts or abstract visions are as out of place as is faintheartedness on the part of the democracies or holding on to a status quo-oriented stability mentality that has long been called in question by the course of events. After the East European revolution of 1989, our security policy is looking toward new horizons which may lead to fundamental changes in the European and global power structure. We will use this opportunity for finally overcoming the division of our continent, for eliminating the East's excessive armaments and military superiority, for more comprehensive disarmament to lower levels of forces.

The democratic popular movements in East and Southeast Europe are so powerful that a return to the old forms of communist dictatorship is not

conceivable. But the newly emerging democratic institutions and polities are still vulnerable, particularly because the economic situation there is getting increasingly worse and important social questions remain unresolved. Therefore, periods of setbacks and new strains are not ruled out.

The Soviet leadership is searching for a way of its own. As of now, it still wants to combine perestroika and glasnost, federal and more open society in a multinational state, with the claim to leadership of a renewed Communist Party.

But the outcome of this experiment is quite open. Also the future relations of the Soviet Union with the member states of the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON are uncertain. And this goes for the future of these organizations as well as for the bilateral relations.

In this phase of transition in the foreign, security and economic policies of Eastern Europe and the associated emotionalization of the public debate we depend, perhaps more than ever, on a course of political realism. For that we must recognize in the process of European restructuring certain basic currents and at the same time point out the strategic benchmarks for European and German security interests. In other words, it is necessary that we distinguish between what can be changed and what cannot.

With this, it remains a goal of our policy to see that the citizens of Western Europe and North America, and hopefully soon also of Eastern Europe, can maintain freedom and democracy against any external pressures as they determine for themselves.

We are witnessing today that the erosion and self-refutation of Eastern socialism as an idea and as a form of government and an economic order is leading to a renaissance of democracy in Eastern Europe. As internally Marxism-Leninism is losing its binding character and credibility, externally it is losing the cementing power to hold together the states in the Soviet hegemonial sphere. Gradually the Soviet Union will have to accept the emancipation of the peoples of Eastern Europe from illegitimate communist dominion.

This is a necessity and equally a prerequisite if Europe is to find a new structure for a new era, a structure based on freedom, human rights and peaceful cooperation. The idea of a peaceful order involves more than respect for the principle of non-violence which merely means forgoing the use of physical force to transform or overcome the status quo and the political order in another country, confederation of states or alliance.

In Western Europe, too, we are witnessing at present a historical change — the peaceful and steadily advancing process of West European integration. The establishment of the single European market by the end of 1992 is already creating a new dynamic in and for Europe. In this process new impulses also promote the political growing-together of Europe, and the European Community can become the nucleus of a stable peaceful order in Europe based on freedom.

The process of West European unification and the associated strengthening of Europe's role in the world, as well as the far-reaching disarmament being sought, will likewise have an effect on the close strategic links between Europe and the United States. As part of this process NATO will both have to adapt its structures and redefine some of its tasks. In this, the maintenance of the bonds between Europe and particularly the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States and Canada remains of fundamental importance.

Whoever today speaks of plans for a restructuring of Europe must be aware that we can attain this goal only together with and not against our allies. However, in the process of European transformation the issue of sharing responsibility is increasingly moving to the fore: Western Europe must increasingly assume political and security responsibility on our continent and beyond. Of crucial importance for the configuration of a new European political structure is the solution of the German question. It is on the agenda of world politics. With their will for freedom the Germans in the GDR have also pointed to the necessity of overcoming the division of Germany. We intend to achieve it in a European framework together with our neighbors. National "go-it-alone" acts by the Germans offer no answer here — no more than a "go-only-European" way would that excluded German unification. In the Comprehensive Concept the NATO heads of state and government made clear that the division of Germany cannot be the basis for European security, much less the basis of our Western community of nations. It was and still is the fundamental principle of the Alliance to stand up for the right of self-determination of all Europeans and thus also of the Germans.

Today we are seeing proof that the integration of Western Europe, the alliance with our North American partners, and our joint determination to stand firm against the totalitarian peril are among the central foundations of European freedom, security and stability.

Also in the future, pursuing and shaping the European perspectives and improving the West-East relationship is something that can be successfully accomplished only on the basis of the Western Alliance. The Alliance remains an important instrument for shaping the future, preventing war and insuring against uncalculable risks in the process of European restructuring the future. Our armed forces and the North Atlantic Alliance remain guarantors of stable change and thus key elements for peace.

Intact armed forces in an intact Alliance do not prevent the reshaping of Europe but promote it. For without stability and predictability the new security architecture of Europe cannot be realized.

It would be a grave strategic mistake if in the event of an increasing erosion of the Warsaw Pact we called NATO into question, as a reciprocal move so to speak. By contrast to the Warsaw Pact, NATO was never an instrument of hegemony but always an alliance for the organization of freedom. In view of the huge tasks of the future and of global challenges we will continue to need NATO in the years to come. To meet the global diversity of tasks the Alliance will to an even greater extent than in the past have to perform political functions without neglecting defense. Today, NATO must combine foreign policy, security policy and economic objectives in a comprehensive political concept in order to seize the political opinion-leadership in East-West relations. Only thus can we support the democratic forces in Eastern Europe and effectively meet the considerable risks, and at the same time arrive at an all-European coordination of security.

To use the opportunities provided by the changes in Eastern Europe and at the same time not to neglect existing or new risks is the greatest challenge for Western politics today. Creative power and risk awareness, imagination and caution are equally called for. In this sense the NATO heads of state and government at their summit meeting last May not only reaffirmed their common policy for stability and security in Europe but also worked constructively towards relaxing tensions and overcoming the division of our continent. They thus acted in the best tradition of NATO. By a conceptual broadening of its tasks in the political field but also in the increasingly important economic sphere, NATO is becoming a constructive force for change towards freedom in a future Europe. In a program of change for freedom, the Western Alliance will in the next decade have to meet the following concrete tasks:

First: Maintain our ability to defend ourselves, and by this visible ability prevent any aggression and thus any war in Europe. This task may be adjusted in response to changing conditions — not least in the area of arms control — but it is not outdated. Security remains the foundation of freedom.

Second: Maintain a stable and predictable framework for dialog, negotiation and cooperation with the countries of Eastern Europe in all important areas. Only in this manner can a new and solid basis for a comprehensive European security architecture |>e created.

Third; Political and economic cooperation with Eastern Europe. Negotiations on armed forces cannot replace removing the causes of tension and the risks to security. Doing this is the task of politics. The events in East and Central Europe have provided the starting points and new opportunities. Now that freedom has been won, stable and robust democratic systems must be established. At this stage the West must support through political as well as economic cooperation the as yet halting progress of democratization, which cannot succeed without a radical restructuring of the economy. It would be unforgivable if we did not seize this historical chance for change.

Fourth: Expand and monitor the present arms control process. An agreement on conventional forces is the cornerstone of the new security structure we seek for Europe. We want to develop a perspective beyond the disarmament results we seek to achieve in CFE 1 in order to achieve further reductions.

Fifth: Initiate an expanded security dialog. If and when in the course of this year democratic governments are formed after free and secret elections, we seek — beyond arms control — an expanded security policy discussion in all of Europe. Part of this discussion is the conceptual manner in which the division of Germany can be overcome, as the Federal Chancellor described it in stages in his Ten-Point Program.

What we must do now is combine the solution of the German question with the considerations for a new European security architecture.

Beyond that, we seek a continuation of the CSCE process. It offers to the members of the alliances and the neutral countries alike a suitable forum in which to discuss the central security issues of Europe as a whole with the inclusion of North America, develop a concept of at least coordinated, if not cooperative, security and ultimately cast it into internationally binding form. This process must take place in a peaceful and democratic way, in accordance with the relevant agreements and treaties and all the principles laid down in the Helsinki Final Act, including the inviolability of existing borders. It must al the same time be embedded in the perspective of European integration and the general context of West-East cooperation.

Sixth: Expanding and strengthening the European Community can promote an all-European development. Now even less than in the past must the EC become a closed, exclusionary region. It must offer the democratic states of Eastern Europe association and cooperation and also promote transatlantic cohesion.

Seventh: Ensure American involvement in Europe and expand and intensify transatlantic relations in the political and economic sphere. Without North America there is no European security — this is recognized in Eastern Europe too. In view of global challenges, a common policy will in the future be even more important than it is now. Regional conflicts or

international drug trafficking, but also the ecological hazards of our time and the growing problems *of* the developing countries increasingly demand joint action by the Western industrial nations. Not all of this will take place in the existing organizational framework of NATO. But surely the Alliance will have to gear up for such more comprehensive tasks.

The many and diverse tasks which the Atlantic Alliance will be confronted with before the end of this century cannot be solved by individual states alone. Therefore, the Federal Republic of Germany in particular continues to depend on the close alliance with its West European neighbors and North America.

Never since 1945 has the danger of a major war on our continent been smaller than in our time. This is a success of the political steadfastness of the Western Alliance. At the same time, with his reform policy, General Secretary Gorbachev has provided the impetus for the removal of the rigid old structures both in his own country and in the other countries of Eastern Europe. But the domestic crisis in the Soviet Union is now exacerbating dramatically, making Soviet politics less predictable. Also the other countries of Eastern Europe that are ready today for democracy have to contend with considerable economic difficulties.

As early as the end of last year Gorbachev himself, aware of the dramatically worsening economic situation and the growing national and religious tensions in his country, spoke of the "sword of Damocles" hanging over perestroika. This and many other utterances of Soviet leaders reflect the present, considerable risk to the developments in Eastern Europe: The political opening and the restructuring into liberal systems could be put under a severe strain by exacerbating economic and social crises and national upheavals.

Andrei Sakharov clearly expressed these concerns in his last writing: "In the course of the past year my concerns about the principal direction of Gorbachev's domestic policies have grown constantly. What troubled me is the huge gulf between word and deed in the economy, in politics and in society. The economic reform should be based on a change of the structure of ownership in agriculture and industry as well as on an end to power in the hands of the Party and the State and a stop to corruption in the ministries. These reforms have not yet begun. I am also concerned about Gorbachev's obvious desire to secure unlimited power for himself. Also critical is the manner in which he just does not rely on the progressive forces which today support perestroika but falls back on those that are politically obedient and controllable, but at the same time reactionary." True, to attain the objective of realizing the reforms in the long term, the Soviet Union needs the cooperation of the West. We are ready for such cooperation, but solving the internal problems of the Soviet Union remains the responsibility of its own political leadership groups. Especially at this time of very severe concussions the limits of our influence become very plain to us. Also open are the Soviet Union's ideas about the future of the Warsaw Pact. We do not know whether it will be basically remodeled or whether as a result of the new policy pursued by several member-states it will be left to erode and ultimately to dissolve.

It is the objective of the Alliance to achieve, this year, a first binding disarmament agreement in Vienna. It is to codify the elimination of Soviet conventional superiority in Europe, which is still massive today, and in addition lead to a balance of weapon systems and armed forces in East and West at lower levels. We welcome the progress in the S.T.A.R.T. negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and we expect for 1990 an agreement reducing the number of strategic weapons by half. An agreement on the elimination and worldwide proscripotion of chemical weapons also appears within reach. As soon as the results of the first Vienna negotiations become fully apparent, the NATO nations should develop their ideas for the follow-on negotiations that can ensue in 1991.

We have a strong interest in seeing that parallel negotiations are then also held to drastically reduce the nuclear weapons in Europe. The Soviet Union's superiority in this area is also very great. It must be eliminated by negotiations. With this premise, the West can substantially reduce its substrategic nuclear weapons in Europe and a balance can be achieved with a small portion of today's volumes in all of Europe. From such treaties and an agreement on comprehensive verification covering all the countries concerned, first effective structures of a comprehensive European security system are to evolve. At the same time we know that a responsible security policy continues to depend on military precautionary measures to prevent war and contain conflicts. Security policy is always also defense policy — the two belong inseparably together. A new European security architecture is possible only on the basis of an assured defense capability in a functioning and firmly united alliance. We must not, under the visionary influence of a hoped-for eternal peace, fail to undertake the troublesome efforts we need to prevent forcible encroachments or coercive pressures in the future.

Therefore we must explain to our citizens that political stability in Europe can be improved and maintained only if it is secured by a balance of power. Neither in Europe nor globally can the threat of force or armed conflict be positively and forever excluded. It would therefore be insincere to promise an ideal or conflict-free political world of tomorrow. The better

world of tomorrow which we seek with all our strength does not mean that the negative use of force as a factor, and above all a possibility, will vanish from international politics. A European peace order cannot be a power vacuum either. The purpose of any defense and of the associated political strategic principles remains the assurance of self-determination, territorial integrity and political freedom of action. Together with its partners in the Western Alliance the Federal Republic of Germany pursues a military strategy which guarantees protection from the effects of military force by the ability to deter the use of just such force.

For the foreseeable future there is therefore no responsible alternative to the strategy of war prevention which has found its strategic expression in the close connection of conventional defense and nuclear dissuasion capability. International politics today is under the imperative of self-restraint, the moderation of political aims. But it continues to need security and stability promoting elements to counter uncontrollable, fundamentally unfavorable developments in the political sphere. War prevention by military means, including the nuclear weapons that this requires, remains our framework for change and our insurance against a fallback into confrontational power-political or military structures.

The same goes for the political principle of forward defense. Its political purpose — preserving the territorial integrity and freedom of action of the member states — continues to apply unchanged. But the translation of the political principle of forward defense into military defense plans will always have to be adapted to the changes in the political situation. This is true especially today if the political changes in Europe and the growing-together of the two German states continue and there is a CFE treaty. With these conditions taken into account, the defense plans will above all be determined by the type and number of available friendly forces and the expected enemy capabilities.

Therefore, one of the most important political tasks in the future security dialog between the Warsaw Pact and NATO might be to reach a common understanding on the implementation of the political principle of forward defense. In our view it comprises the right of every state to protect its territory at its borders and in particular the right to pursue the objectives of maintaining its political freedom of action and meeting the requirements for the limitation of damage and the rapid termination of conflict. In our time, the political purpose of armed forces can and must only be a defensive one. Therefore, as NATO said clearly again and again, it remains true that none of our weapons will ever be used first. This understanding, too, could become part of a European security architecture, and perhaps in Vienna one can agree on a formula that first use of weapons — and by this I mean both nuclear and conventional weapons — shall be permissible only against states or groups of states whose armed forces invade one's own territory or that of one's allies.

The security of Europe cannot be guaranteed without North America. Developments in the 1920s have shown what consequences a withdrawal of North America from the European continent has. Not least for this reason we Europeans are called upon to make a greater political commitment, also and above all in the field of security. If we want to preserve the American presence, we Europeans must make a greater contribution to North Atlantic security.

In addition, the future political demands on NATO as well as the reduction of the military presence of the United States in Europe to be expected after successful negotiations call for appropriate European answers. Today, Europe must recognize its special obligation to shape its security.

We must recognize that we cannot afford a fragmentation of European security interests. In view of the tremendous tasks of building a European security architecture and overcoming European and thus German division, an emergence of thinking in terms of purely national interests would have disastrous consequences for European stability.

This danger of a nationalization of security policy in Europe — as still in the 19th century — we must meet with a firm and united resolve to jointly shape special or separate ways in security policy — by whomsoever — that the Europe of the future can no longer afford.

The French President pointed out these problems earlier this year, calling instead for "the coming into being of a European federation of states in the proper sense of the word", a "European confederation". Here, however, much conceptual work remains to be done.

We know that something like this cannot be accomplished overnight and that this process can take place in stages and need not take place for all European states at one and the same time. But, both Western and Eastern Europe can move at different speeds toward a new European order.

With regard to the process of West European integration one must ask, however, whether in the long run we can exclude questions of security and defense. Europe is more than the growing-together of its national economies. On the contrary: if we forge ahead with integration only with economic considerations in mind and forget about the political growing-together, there will be danger of the process of economic integration losing momentum and the promising dynamism of Europe reversing in the long term.

Therefore, the time has come to talk about a continuation and widening of West European integration, as the French President remarked. This may also have an impact on the exercise of national sovereignty rights. Also to be thought about in this connection would have to be the area of security and defense — in the sense of a military cooperation that includes all areas important for security, in parallel with foreign-political and economic integration.

With this we are resuming where the debates conducted as early as during the sixties and seventies on a more effective organization of the European defense tasks in the Alliance left off. Of course, our plans today must go further, especially if we consider the possible changes in the structures of NATO. Conceivable are both an expansion of the so-called Eurogroup within the overall structure of NATO as well as an evolution of the Western European Union. Neither of them is an enterprise competing with NATO, but both are fora for more intensive cooperation of its European members, fora which could at the same time be used for the fuller military integration of Western Europe which we seek.

A Western Europe that is transatlantically secured and has grown together also in defense can in the long term become an important center of gravitation of the new complete Europe. In addition, such a development would be an important contribution toward a new balance in a European security system in view of a Soviet Union which will likely continue to be strong politically and militarily.

For the overall political development of Europe the CSCE process continues to be of great importance. Only as the popular movements for freedom in most of the Eastern European countries succeeded did the principles formulated in Helsinki 14 years ago really come into their own. Now it must be our concern to anchor them permanently and see that they become binding norms in the lives of the states and nations internally as well as in their external relations. In this connection, a Europe of tomorrow must never confine itself to its own problems and shut itself off from others.

As I said earlier, the transatlantic Alliance remains a vital factor for its own future and its worldwide responsibility. Also, Europe's contribution in the global organizations and institutions, above all the United Nations, will become even more important if it unites more closely.

So, Europe today is looking toward new horizons; yet a long and risky way to the "house of freedom" as Konrad Adenauer phrased it in 1961 lies still before us. The alliance of the Western democracies will continue to be the cornerstone of our freedom. Secure on this 'foundation — as the heads of state and government noted in May 1989 — "we will reach out to those who are willing to join us in shaping a more stable and peaceful environment."

1995

Volker Rühe

Minister of Defense of the Federal Republic of Germany

Volker Rühe dedicated his address to the 32nd Munich Conference on Security Policy to his vision of a new European security order which should include Russia.

Never has Henry Kissinger's 1965 observation been more relevant than today: "History teaches that the greater the changes in the political environment, the greater the efforts required to ensure the cohesion of a community of states." The challenges we face today are different from those during the Cold War. While the risk of a major war between East and West has vanished, instability is increasing across Europe's eastern and southern periphery. Simultaneously, global interconnectedness and interdependence are intensifying.

The internationalization of economics and politics continues to grow, and economic strength and technological innovation are becoming decisive factors in the international system, now assuming strategic significance. This development affects North America and Europe equally. The demanding task of reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe and the stability-promoting integration of these regions into Euro-Atlantic processes can only be achieved with active American support. In light of Eastern Europe's instability, we need America's strategic backing.

Russia's size and potential transcend European dimensions in every sense, particularly if the country regains its strength. Europe has a vital interest in strategic stability, which cannot be achieved without America. Stability in Europe was, is, and will remain unattainable without the United States. Europe's interest in American involvement aligns with America's interest in engaging in and for Europe. There are solid political, strategic, and economic reasons for this partnership.

While many Americans are captivated by the economic dynamism of the Pacific region, Europe remains of paramount economic importance to the U.S. The figures speak for themselves: recent annual direct investments

between the U.S. and Europe have amounted to approximately $500 billion, more than half of the total volume on both sides. By comparison, U.S. investments in the Pacific region lag far behind. Over 12 million American jobs depend on exports to Europe and the operations of over 4,000 European firms in the U.S.

The transatlantic economic interdependence reveals two things: first, how crucial each region is to the other's strength and prosperity; and second, how neither partner can afford to go it alone. Partnership with and presence in Europe are indispensable for the U.S., not only for economic reasons but also for strategic ones. U.S. troops stationed in Europe are instruments of power projection and are geographically close to regions of vital interest to America.

Neither the European Union nor the U.S. alone can stabilize our continent and its strategic environment. Only by pooling our strengths can we tackle the new challenges. The eastern and southern arcs of crisis on Europe's periphery intersect in the geographic triangle of the Caucasus, the Balkans, and the Middle East. In these regions, deep-seated ethnic, religious, and nationalistic conflicts repeatedly erupt into open hostilities.

Germany is now surrounded only by allied or friendly nations. However, the distances to regional conflicts in our part of the world are short, and these conflicts all carry the risk of escalation and geographic expansion. It is therefore strategically insufficient to focus solely on crises in Bosnia, Chechnya, or Algeria without addressing their broader regional contexts in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean.

The Mediterranean connects our continent with the nations and cultures of North Africa and the Middle East into a geopolitical macro-region. Here lie essential sources of resources for us. The success of the peace process in the Middle East opens up new opportunities for intensified economic cooperation, particularly for Europe. However, this shared interest in peace is repeatedly undermined by brutal acts of terrorism.

The Mediterranean region is a place where the societal and cultural contrasts of East and West clash, requiring both peacekeeping measures and the ability to manage political crises. Therefore, our political-strategic thinking must not only focus on Central and Eastern Europe. It must also consider all risks and opportunities essential to Europe's future while aligning with shared vital European-American interests.

Partnership means acting together and sharing responsibility. Shared responsibility entails mutual political influence, regionally and globally. The unifying Europe is a political, economic, and strategic partner of the United States. Equal partnership is the key term for future relations between the U.S. and Europe. This was decisively set in motion at the NATO summit in January 1994. America supports the development of an independent European political identity.

NATO remains the only organization that can genuinely guarantee the security of its members. It also possesses the best prerequisites for effective crisis management in Europe. Moreover, the alliance serves as an essential driver of political change, having made the stabilization of Central and Eastern Europe a top strategic priority. However, the Atlantic Alliance must learn the necessary lessons from its engagement in Bosnia. It cannot merely function as the executor of others' policies with unsatisfactory effectiveness.

In the future, NATO should act only under the mandate of the United Nations, provided all alliance partners equally accept the political objectives, there is a feasible military-operational concept, and NATO can deploy its forces and resources without hindrance. Only under these conditions can the alliance maintain the necessary international credibility and domestic acceptance on both sides of the Atlantic.

Together with NATO, the European Union forms the foundation of a lasting and just peace order on our continent. The European Union is a zone of stability unprecedented in history. Those who promote fashionable Euro-skepticism or backward-looking nationalism fail to recognize the progress we have achieved. The equal integration of nations has fostered a unique dynamic of peace and brought us one of the longest periods of peace in history. The institutional integration of Europe is thus far the most successful attempt to reconcile nations that have historically been rivals.

What we have gained in terms of stability and prosperity must now be preserved, further developed, and shared with others. Precisely because the situation in Europe and the world has become so dynamic, diverse, and complex, we must vigorously advance the process of European unification — now. France and Germany bear a particular responsibility in this regard. Given the challenges we face, we cannot afford to retreat into national or regional complacency, nor can we shy away from the task at hand. The Talmud says, "If not now, when?" and "If not us, who?"

We have three main tasks:

1. The expanding Union must maintain its internal balance.
2. The European Union must gain the capacity to act as a global player.
3. The Union must make Europe's mission understandable to its citizens to gain acceptance.

Political identity grows from the ability of common institutions to master the future for mutual benefit. A positive European awareness will develop through the pragmatic evidence of the future European Union — or not at all. However, identity also stems from the awareness of a shared past and the will to build a common future. The sovereign nation-state is not obsolete. It remains the framework within which peoples organize themselves freely, under the rule of law and democracy, providing them with a sense of identity. The confident certainty of belonging to a nation is what first enables the freedom for European unification and diversity.

At the same time, however, the European level also requires state-like functions. Individual states can no longer provide security for their citizens on their own. The current challenges compel European nations to find themselves in a "system of shared sovereignty," as recently articulated by the Austrian President. The future European Union will not be the same as the old Western European alliance, nor will it be a replica of the United States of America. It will be a unique political union, and it would be both unhistorical to dismiss this possibility and unwise not to work toward it.

Europeans must consolidate their strengths — for their survival and competitiveness. The economic integration of North America, the dynamism of the Asia-Pacific region, global population trends, Islamic fundamentalism, worldwide ecological issues, and cross-border crime leave us no alternative. Political union must follow economic integration. Bosnia is not evidence of the failure of a Common Foreign and Security Policy but rather proof of its urgent necessity.

This requires a common determination of shared interests, based on a consensus analysis of the current situation and its development. Until now, we have often allowed our respective immediate neighborhoods to dictate the main focus of our policies. Naturally, it is understandable that countries like Spain, France, and Italy focus primarily on North Africa or that Germany pays particular attention to its neighbors in Eastern Europe. However, stabilizing Central Europe is not a task that Germany can handle alone. Similarly, we cannot leave France, Spain, and other Mediterranean countries to address the region's challenges alone.

The security and stability of Europe are indivisible, demanding that we all recognize we can only meet these challenges together. Recently, France and Germany have developed approaches to further European integration. Despite differences, I see a remarkable degree of agreement, which could significantly influence the discussion on Europe's future shape. A path that balances sovereign nations with supranational integration in an intelligent way seems sensible to me.

The decision-making system of the European Union must become clearer and simpler as the Union grows larger and more diverse. We must achieve a clear delineation and distribution of competences between the EU and individual states. This should address the differentiated interests, potentials, and capabilities of nations without compromising the Union's capacity to act.

The European Union is growing. The northern enlargement has been completed. For our eastern neighbors, we outlined the path to Union membership and the European security framework at the European Summit in Essen. With the admission of new members, the question of the security dimension of membership for new partners inevitably arises. It is inconceivable that future members of the European Union should have a lower security status than the existing members, who are simultaneously members of NATO. Therefore, the expansion of the European Union and NATO are inextricably linked in a logical relationship.

However, both the European Union and NATO would politically, economically, and strategically overextend themselves if they were to admit all potential candidates at once. We must also recognize that security policy prerequisites are likely to be met earlier than the economic standards. The interplay between the expansion of the European Union and the Atlantic Alliance has moved from conceptual considerations to a concrete stage. While the two processes are interconnected, their respective milestones must be defined independently.

The North Atlantic Council set an important new milestone in NATO's expansion with its decisions on December 1, 1994. We can now systematically discuss rationale and modalities, creating the conditions to answer the questions of who can become a member and when. In the expansion process, it is essential to establish an appropriate balance with Russia. Stability in Europe can only be achieved with Russia, not against it. It is in the interest of all parties involved to uphold the goal of a strategic partnership between NATO and Russia as well as a political-economic partnership between the European Union and Russia.

NATO expansion and the development of a functioning political and strategic relationship between the Alliance and Russia are parallel processes with practical content. It must also be in Russia's interest not to undermine this mutually beneficial approach. However, the basis of our relations with Russia remains the principles, agreements, and treaties we have all jointly recognized and signed since the Paris Charter. Russia's intervention in Chechnya has deviated from these standards. International agreements have been violated. We owe it to ourselves and to a

credible relationship with Russia to clearly call these actions by their name.

Clear communication both internally and externally, combined with a willingness to engage in dialog, are not contradictions but rather go hand in hand. We are guided by our responsibility to support reforms in Russia with long-term commitment.

Given the magnitude of future challenges, the differences in interests between the two major democratic and prosperous zones, Europe and North America, pale in comparison. Going forward, Europe and America should coordinate their foreign and security policy strategies more comprehensively than the current security cooperation framework within NATO, which has been primarily Europe-focused, allows. Europe and America need a new transatlantic agenda that encompasses the full spectrum of political, economic, and military-strategic issues.

This entails reaching an understanding on shared political objectives and strategies for addressing the fundamental questions of a complex world in a new era. As President Clinton aptly stated, America and Europe have "little to fear but much to gain." In the global strategy of the United States, the Euro-Atlantic partnership must remain the foundation and core, reinvigorated with fresh impetus to leave no room for unilateral actions on either side of the Atlantic.

The shared strategic challenges necessitate collaboration, and the common foundation of values and interests makes this possible. The American-European partnership must evolve into a comprehensive problem-solving community. The old "transatlantic bargain" — an agreement of protection in exchange for influence — must be developed into a new, expanded "transatlantic contract." It is essential to imbue the transatlantic partnership with vision and strategic substance for the future.

The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court on the deployment of the Bundeswehr abroad has provided us with additional political room for maneuver. We can now act in full solidarity. In the future, German soldiers will be able to take on the same tasks and risks as their comrades in NATO and the WEU. For many years, our allies ensured security within our own country. Today, we are preparing to assist our allies in containing conflicts at their points of origin and preventing them from escalating into larger crises.

The Bundeswehr is being developed into an instrument that meets the demands of our time — capable of defending our country, responding to crises across the entire alliance territory, and serving the United Nations when humanity and peacekeeping call for it. Over the past year, we have set the conceptual framework for the further development of the Bundeswehr and established the key parameters for its size and structure. At the same time, the development of the Bundeswehr has been placed on a reliable budgetary foundation.

We are committed to maintaining universal conscription, which shapes the character of the Bundeswehr. In our democracy, national defense and conscription go hand in hand. Over the coming years, the Bundeswehr will be moderately reduced by 30,000 personnel, reaching a peacetime strength of 340,000 soldiers, including 50,000 in crisis response forces. Crisis response forces and main defense forces will be structurally interconnected to ensure the Bundeswehr maintains a healthy internal structure.

We are now prioritizing preparations for the most likely challenges we will face. Crisis response capabilities are being developed gradually, but we are swiftly establishing initial units that can be deployed immediately. Furthermore, through consistent rationalization, we are creating room for investments. The Bundeswehr now has legal certainty for its mission and a basis for planning confidence. This year, political decisions will determine its future structure. Over the next three to four years, the Bundeswehr will gradually transition to its new structure. Germany will retain modern and capable armed forces.

As we move forward, we will support our allies to the best of our ability when the alliance is called upon. We will also assist the United Nations when people in need require our solidarity. Each individual case will be carefully considered, but we will fulfill our responsibilities.

In doing so, we are guided by principles that align with our legal and moral values as well as our interests:

- Our primary responsibility lies in Europe and its periphery.
- Our commitment can only extend as far as our capabilities allow.
- A central condition for the deployment of armed forces is its legitimacy under international law. A mandate from the United Nations is a prerequisite.
- Germany will not act alone but only alongside friends and partners within the Euro-Atlantic community.
- In principle, there is no region where Germany, due to its history, could not participate in peacekeeping missions with Blue Helmets. Historically and morally, there may be valid arguments for and against Bundeswehr involvement in peace missions in such regions. The decisive factor is whether we can genuinely provide assistance.
- A peacekeeping mission only makes sense where German soldiers, under the mandate of the UN, have broad acceptance among all conflict parties.

- For combat operations beyond national and alliance defense, there must be compelling reasons. The threat to Germany's security, European stability, or international peace must be evident enough for the public to support such a deployment.
- An indispensable requirement is a credible political concept that ensures lasting success and a precise military mandate that can be carried out within a clearly defined timeframe.

Europeans and Americans are facing a great task today. In a new era, we must and want to shape Euro-Atlantic relations to develop into a comprehensive partnership of equals. The foundation of the transatlantic relationship has changed. NATO, as the sole institutional basis, is no longer sufficient. With the Maastricht Treaty, the Euro-Atlantic community has not only changed qualitatively but has also expanded to include countries that are not or will not be NATO members. Economic and trade issues have so far been institutionally underdeveloped in Euro-American relations. However, the European Union and the United States still represent each other as the most important trading partners.

Close relations within the West are even more important as new fault lines in the international system emerge along cultural boundaries. The European Union and North America still represent the most important axis in global politics. The new challenges can only be successfully overcome together. We want a transatlantic economic and security community that is more than the sum of NATO and a Euro-American prosperity area. It could become the core and driving force of a northern stability zone that leads North America, the European Union, and Russia into a new, cooperative balance. We must hold on to this great goal, even if setbacks occur along the way.

1995

William S. Cohen

Senator and Member of the House of Representatives of the United States of America (later Secretary of Defense)

Speaking at the 32nd Munich Conference on Security Policy, William S. Cohen underscored the erosion of NATO's military credibility and the serious weaknesses of the UN protection forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We have entered a new world of disorder and our inability to formulate coherent policies and strategies to deal with ethnic conflicts and the expansion of NATO membership has led to cross-Atlantic fear, confusion, incoherence, and recrimination — a state of affairs not unprecedented for the NATO alliance. I would like for the moment to offer a few observations on Bosnia to see whether the present is a prolog:

1. NATO cannot act unless America leads.
2. America will not lead unless it can persuade the American people that it is imperative for us to do so.
3. The conflict in Bosnia is not perceived to involve American interests that are vital. Rather, it is a quagmire where its inhabitants would rather dig fresh graves than bury old hatreds.
4. The European members of NATO were not willing to wade into the quicksands of ancient rivalries and engage in peacemaking operations so the responsibility was passed to the U.N., which has fewer divisions than the Pope and none of his moral authority.

As a result, we are all bearing witness to the decimation of a nation that was guaranteed protection under the U.N. Charter while the best we can offer is to seek to minimize the bloodshed by denying arms to the victims of aggression.

Our collective acquiescence to aggression may be the lesser of two evils — but it is nonetheless the participation in the evil of ethnic cleansing

that we hoped might never again touch the European continent. We are hesitant to take more aggressive action because the consequences of our action cannot be predicted. The absence of predictability prevents the development of consensus: Should we do nothing militarily to stop Serbian aggression? Lift the arms embargo unilaterally if necessary and strike? Lift and get out of the way — if that is possible?

Time is running out on our Hamlet-like irresoluteness. Before the decision is made to lift the arms embargo, with all of its attendant uncertainties — including the fear of Americanizing the war on the part of some and the hope of doing so on the part of others — we should make an effort to establish the credibility of UNPROFOR's mission and might:

New leadership is required. General Rose has departed. General Smith has taken his place. Mr. Akashi should be asked to resign immediately. When a no-fly zone or weapons exclusion zone has been declared, it should be enforced, not allowed to be violated with impunity.

No tribute or tolls should be paid by UNPROFOR forces to gain passage to help the victims of war. No tolerance should be granted for taking hostages or using them as human shields. If any harm should come to UNPROFOR forces, we should take out every major target that allows the Serbs to continue to wage war. That power should be disproportionate to the transgression and no area in Serbia ruled out of our bomb sites. UNPROFOR should be given the heavy armor necessary to protect its forces and achieve its humanitarian mission.

If we are unable to give UNPROFOR — whose troops are trapped in the layers of a disastrous dual command structure — the authority and firepower to achieve these ends, then we should remove the forces before the U.N.'s political impotence is allowed to corrode NATO's military integrity and credibility any further than it has already done so.

1996

Helmut Kohl

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

In his speech to the 33rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Helmut Kohl called for the creation of a common European security and defense policy.

It is a pleasure for me to participate once again today in the Munich Conference on Security Policy. As a forum for the transatlantic exchange of ideas, the body you established has long enjoyed an excellent international reputation. The participants in these meetings have always derived particular benefit from the talks and discussions here in Munich. We all have reason to thank you, Mr von Kleist, in particular for this.

Today, Europe is in the midst of a decisive phase in shaping our common future. The aim is to secure lasting peace and freedom for our entire continent. The foundations for this are the resolute continuation of European integration and close transatlantic co-operation. At the same time, Europe must be prepared to assume greater co-responsibility and individual responsibility.

However, we must also take every opportunity to consolidate security in Europe by utilising and strengthening proven institutions such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE. The Munich conference is a good opportunity for an intensive exchange of views, which can provide important impetus for our future work.

We are meeting here at a time when the Atlantic Alliance is bearing impressive witness to its determination to act and at the same time to its ability to tackle new tasks. By taking the lead role in the international peacekeeping force in the former Yugoslavia, the Alliance is demonstrating its ability to act.

The alliance is gradually growing into new tasks. The USA, European states, Russia, Japan and also Islamic countries are working together in the former Yugoslavia to achieve one goal: We want to make a joint effort to help ensure that the long-suffering population in this region can finally live

in peace again. This co-operation can be of groundbreaking importance for securing peace and future coexistence in Europe. This major peacekeeping operation by the Atlantic Alliance also shows that we can rely on the transatlantic alliance, which is indispensable for our common security.

Through its substantial contribution to the international peacekeeping force, the United States has made it clear that peace and stability in Europe is a common, transatlantic concern. The deployment of many thousands of American soldiers to support peace in the former Yugoslavia shows that the Americans stand by their commitment in Europe. We Europeans are grateful to them for this.

The NATO Council will meet in Berlin in June. NATO's future tasks and security in Europe will be important topics. Just like the subject matter, the venue is also an expression of the changed situation in Europe. Just a few years ago, such a meeting in Berlin would have been unthinkable. Today it is the norm.

At the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994, the Alliance offered the countries of Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe a "Partnership for Peace". At the same time, the Alliance confirmed that it is open to the membership of other European countries. The Alliance thus wants to contribute to security and stability in the coming Europe.

The recently presented study on NATO enlargement has paved the way for further developments. This year, the Alliance will continue its intensive dialogue with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. It is important that the Alliance's practical cooperation with the countries of the former Warsaw Pact is further advanced, especially now. Good progress has already been made in this respect. I am thinking, for example, of the joint exercises within the framework of the Partnership for Peace, in which units from Poland, the Czech Republic and Romania, for example, have taken part alongside soldiers from NATO countries. I would also like to mention Hungary's willingness to make its territory available for the organisation of supplies for the American troops in Bosnia.

The desire of our eastern neighbours to join the Alliance is legitimate. It is being put forward by democratic states in our common Europe. It also enjoys broad support in the parliaments and among the public of NATO member states.

We must approach the opening up of NATO with care and political prudence, as this involves steps of fundamental importance for the Alliance itself and for security in a future Europe. We Germans and Europeans have a fundamental interest in ensuring that NATO remains stable and capable of acting in the future. However, we also have the greatest interest in developing a partnership-based, friendly relationship with Russia and Ukraine.

We must take into account the well-understood security interests of Russia and Ukraine. It goes without saying that it can only be detrimental to an issue of this importance if it becomes an issue in the Russian, but also in the American presidential election campaign.

The Alliance takes Russia's concerns seriously. It has therefore declared its willingness to develop and deepen cooperation with Russia from the outset. The German government has strongly advocated this. It is our wish that this cooperation will lead to a special relationship between NATO and Russia, which could become the core of the future security architecture in Europe.

We must take note of the changes in Russia. We should never forget that Russia is a great country, a country with a great history, a great tradition and with important contributions to the culture of mankind. In this sense, Russia's involvement in the peace process in the former Yugoslavia can point the way to a new quality of relations between Russia and NATO. This co-operation can be a model for future cooperation in Europe.

Collective defence remains the Alliance's core mission. However, the Alliance must also increasingly be able to manage crises and ensure security and stability throughout Europe. In order to fulfil these new tasks, the Alliance's existing political and military structures and procedures must be adapted and further developed. An important aspect of this is the participation of non-members in peace operations.

However, leaner and more flexible alliance structures are also necessary in order to advance the further development and shaping of the European security and defence identity. In future, Europe must be in a position to fulfil military tasks itself in individual cases in coordination with the Atlantic Alliance. I particularly welcome the fact that France has decided to participate in the future reform of NATO within the Atlantic Alliance and to intensify its co-operation with NATO's military and military-political bodies. Europe's ability to act within the Alliance will benefit from this.

Just a few years before the turn of the millennium, we find ourselves in a transitional phase of historic significance in Europe. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, the collapse of communism and the peaceful reunification of Germany, opportunities for a new form of co-operation are opening up for our continent. These must be utilised through the further construction of Europe.

Peace and freedom on our continent cannot be taken for granted. They must be secured anew every day. The immediate threat of the East-West conflict has been replaced by incalculable risks that are no less serious.

There is no sensible alternative to an ever closer union of the European peoples. We all need a united Europe. The policy of European unification is in reality the question of war and peace in the 21st century. Nationalism has brought great suffering to our continent — just think of the first 50 years of this century.

"Nationalism, that is war." This is what my late friend François Mitterrand said to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 17 January 1995. If there is no momentum to continue the work of European integration, then there will not only be stagnation, but also regression. However, we do not want a return to the old-style nation state. It cannot solve the major problems of the 21st century. But we also need Europe so that our common word carries weight in the world. We can only adequately assert our common interests if we speak with one voice and join forces. And we need Europe to remain competitive on the world markets. Only together can we hold our own in global competition with the other major economic areas.

We Germans also have very specific reasons why we need a united Europe more than others. We have more neighbours than any other country in Europe. What happens there affects us directly — and vice versa. We owe a great deal to European unification. Germany has a fundamental national interest in all its neighbours one day belonging to the European Union.

However, it is also a matter of common sense that we Germans should always be aware of how our neighbours see us. This image is still characterised today by historical burdens, but also by the population of 80 million people and the economic power of a united Germany. German foreign policy must therefore be clearly committed to the principles and goals of European unification. It is therefore the goal of the Federal Government that I lead to resolutely advance the process of European unification and make it irreversible.

The Intergovernmental Conference on the Reform of the European Union will meet in Turin at the end of March. One of the priority tasks of the conference will be to give the European Union a clearer profile in foreign and security policy. I am aware that there is a great deal of scepticism here, especially in view of the experience of recent years.

Nevertheless, Europe must be prepared to take on more responsibility for European and international crisis management tasks in the future. The WEU has an important role to play here, both as a European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and as a defence component of the European Union. Without a defence component, the work of European unification will always remain incomplete.

We cannot expect the United States to always take on the role of the guardian of order in the European house in the face of the multitude of possible conflicts. This is why greater European efforts are needed to further develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The creation of an independent European security and defence identity will certainly not be achieved overnight. But we must now set a substantial course. Our medium-term goal is and remains the integration of the WEU into the European Union. The Intergovernmental Conference must take us a long way along this path on the basis of the Maastricht Treaty. The Intergovernmental Conference should look for steps to bring the two institutions closer together. There is already broad agreement that the objectives of the WEU's Petersberg Declaration on humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations should be enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. This would indeed be an important step not only for institutional rapprochement, but would also bring EU member states that are not yet members closer to the EU.

In addition, we should also consider giving the European Council the authority to issue directives for the WEU and a solidarity clause for all member states of the European Union, analogous to the mutual assistance guarantee in the WEU and NATO treaties. It is unacceptable that in the European Union, which we see as a community of solidarity, some are responsible for security and defence and others for trade.

Without a genuine common foreign and security policy, without the pooling of its member states' strengths, the European Union will not be able to realise its values and interests in Europe and worldwide in the long term. At the Intergovernmental Conference we must therefore — in addition to bringing the WEU closer to the European Union — also consistently develop the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty on the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

In my opinion, we should define areas of common European interest and commit to joint action in these areas. Of course, we also need the appropriate instruments and structures for this. So far, the opportunities in Brussels to produce the necessary analyses as a basis for our joint action have been inadequate. In order to be able to act, we also need to create better conditions for speaking with one voice.

Developments in our neighbouring regions are of crucial importance for security in Europe. Joint, sustained efforts are needed to promote political and economic stability in these regions. In addition to Central and Eastern Europe, I would like to mention the Mediterranean region from North Africa to the Middle East.

Poverty, misery and a lack of prospects for the younger generation are breeding grounds for religious fanaticism, which in turn is increasingly becoming a threat to peace. It is of fateful importance for the future of this region that the peace process between Israel and the Arab states is a success.

One should not believe that treaties alone can create peace, but they can open the door to peace. However, if the majority of the population sees no prospects for a humane and peaceful future, the danger of radicalisation and fundamentalism grows. Together with other countries, Europe must play its part in realising the peace process. We should also carefully consider whether a kind of Marshall Plan for the development of a pacified Middle East would not be necessary for reconstruction in Europe, as was the case after the Second World War.

European efforts to strengthen the Common Foreign and Security Policy must not lead to a weakening of the transatlantic partnership. We must do both: give Europe the ability to act and strengthen transatlantic ties. These have ensured us a life of peace and freedom for over forty years. They are and remain of vital importance for security and stability in Europe.

We want to further consolidate and deepen Europe's partnership with the United States. This includes greater coordination and cooperation in all areas of common interest. We welcome the Transatlantic Agenda and the Action Plan for the coming years, which were agreed at the summit meeting between the Spanish EU Presidency and President Clinton on 3 December 1995.

The aim of German foreign policy is to further deepen German-American relations in the face of changing global political conditions. This includes expanding our cooperation in business, science and culture and, above all, more encounters between young people on both sides of the Atlantic.

In November 1993, President Clinton and I launched the German-American Academic Council, which is primarily intended to be a forum for young academics to meet. The opportunities for economic exchange are also far from exhausted. I would like to see more German companies investing in the United States and more American companies investing in Germany, especially in the new federal states. That is a good investment in the future.

We Germans suffered directly from the division of our country during the Cold War. We know from this experience: Peace and freedom do not come for free.

Two years ago, I said at this point: "Historical experience demands that Germany does not stand aside when it comes to peace and freedom in the world and in Europe. We want to and must take responsibility alongside our partners." And I added: "Reliability and the ability to form alliances are the cornerstones of German foreign policy. German special paths in Europe and the world inevitably lead to political isolation."

Last December, we took the decision to contribute 4,000 Bundeswehr soldiers to the international peacekeeping force to secure the peace treaty for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Germany is thus emphasising in a concrete way its willingness to play an active role in securing peace in Europe.

The very serious debate in the German Bundestag and the broad parliamentary approval of the deployment of the German contingent last December showed that our country is prepared to meet the international community's growing expectations of a united Germany.

Let me take this opportunity to say something about the integration of our Bundeswehr into the democratic society of the Federal Republic of Germany. For 40 years, the Bundeswehr has made a significant contribution to securing peace within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. At the celebrations to mark its fortieth anniversary last year, it became clear that the Bundeswehr can rely on the support of our population. This support has also grown because the experiences in the former Yugoslavia, just an hour's flight from Germany, have shown many Germans that the German soldiers there, together with their comrades from the Alliance, also guarantee our freedom and our peace.

Germany needs a Bundeswehr that can meet the changing requirements and is equipped accordingly. This also includes maintaining compulsory military service. It is and remains an expression of civic responsibility in a free and democratic society. We need armed forces that are capable of national defence. They must also be capable of responding to crises within the framework of the Alliance. Finally, they must be available to the international community when our help is needed.

In recent years, the Bundeswehr has increasingly supported the United Nations in peacekeeping tasks — for example in Yugoslavia and Iraq as well as previously in Cambodia and Somalia. This is also an expression of solidarity with our allies, as we have experienced for over 40 years in guaranteeing our security and freedom. Demonstrating this solidarity should be a matter of course for us Germans. After difficult domestic political discussions, the Federal Constitutional Court provided the necessary legal clarification with its judgement last summer.

Together with our partners and friends, we want to overcome the challenges we face in shaping the security of a future Europe. The integration of important parts of the German armed forces with units of European allies shows the path we have travelled.

I would mention the EUROKORPS, cooperation in the Franco-German brigade and the newly created German-Dutch corps as important examples. I am also thinking of the possibility envisaged between Germany and France of allowing young conscripts to do their military service in the other country. We should also follow this example with other partners.

Who would have thought ten or even twenty years ago that we would have come this far together in Europe today? The Atlantic Alliance and European integration have made a decisive contribution to peace, freedom and growing prosperity in Europe. We have achieved this despite all the difficulties and some setbacks.

That is why I am certain that Europe is coming, and this also applies to security and defence policy. Let us put aside pusillanimity and narrow-mindedness and continue to move forward step by step — with calm and patience, a sense of proportion and the right compass.

1996

William J. Perry

Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

At the Munich Conference on Security Policy in 1996, William J. Perry outlined his vision for the future of NATO and its relationship with Russia.

Behind my desk at the Pentagon hangs a portrait of the great statesman, George C. Marshall. Marshall, who was the third Secretary of Defense in the United States, is a role model of mine. He had a great vision for Europe — a Europe which from the Atlantic to the Urals was united in peace, freedom and democracy; and a strong trans-Atlantic partnership sustained by bipartisan political support in the United States. Marshall not only had this vision, he also had a plan to make this vision a reality in post-war Europe. And in a famous speech at Harvard University in 1947, he outlined what came to be called the Marshall Plan.

A little-known fact is that joining Marshall on the dais that day was the famous poet, T.S. Eliot, who 10 years earlier had written: Footfalls echo in the memory Down the passage we did not take Towards the door we never opened. These words by T.S. Eliot foreshadowed the fate of Marshall's plan in Eastern and Central Europe. Because on that day, 50 years ago, as the footfalls of World War II still echoed across a shattered continent, the Marshall Plan offered Europe a new passage toward reconstruction and renewal. Half of Europe took this passage and opened the door to prosperity and freedom. Half of Europe was denied this passage when Joseph Stalin slammed the door on Marshall's offer. And for 50 years, the footfalls of what might have been echoed in our memories.

Today, as the Cold War becomes an echo in our memory, we have a second chance to make Marshall's vision a reality: To go down the passage we did not take 50 years ago, towards the door we never opened. Behind that door lies George Marshall's Europe. To open this door, we do not need a second Marshall Plan, but we do need to draw on Marshall's vision. Marshall recognized that peace, democracy and prosperity were ultimately

inseparable. And Marshall understood that if you identify what people desire most, and provide them with a path to reach it, then they will do the hard work necessary to achieve their goals. In the late 1940s what Western European countries desired most was to rebuild their societies and economies. And the Marshall Plan provided a path for achieving this goal. By taking this passage, the nations of Western Europe built an economic powerhouse. And along the way, they built strong democracies and a strong security institution called NATO.

Today, countries in the other half of Europe are struggling to rebuild their societies and economies, and the one thing they all desire is greater security. NATO's challenge is to provide these Europeans a path for achieving their security goal. And along the way, we want them very much to develop strong democracies and strong economies. This other half of Europe includes the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States. It includes Russia. And it includes the nations of the former Yugoslavia. Today, NATO is reaching out to all three areas and providing a path to Marshall's Europe. The primary path NATO has provided is the Partnership for Peace. Just as the Marshall Plan worked because it was rooted firmly in the self-interest of both the United States and Europe, so too does the Partnership for Peace work because it is rooted firmly in the self-interest of both NATO and the Partner nations. PFP is bringing the newly free nations of Europe and the former Soviet Union into the security architecture of Europe as a whole.

Our nations are working and training together in military joint exercises. But make no mistake, the Partnership for Peace is more than just joint exercises. Just as the Marshall Plan had an impact well beyond the economies of Western Europe, PFP is echoing beyond the security realm in Central and Eastern Europe, and into the political and economic realms as well.

Just as the Marshall Plan used economic revival as the catalyst for political stabilization — and ultimately the development of the modern Europe — the PFP uses security cooperation as a catalyst for political and economic reform. PFP members are working to uphold democracy, tolerate diversity, respect the rights of minorities and respect freedom of expression. They are working to build market economies. They are working hard to develop democratic control of their military forces, to be good neighbors and respect the sovereign rights outside their borders. And they are working hard to make their military forces compatible with NATO.

For those Partner countries that are embracing PFP as a passage to NATO membership, these actions are a key to opening that door. For many of these nations, aspiration to NATO membership has become the rock on which all major political parties base their platforms. It is providing the same overlapping consensus that NATO membership engenders in NATO countries, making compromise and reconciliation possible.

In Hungary, all six major political parties in the Parliament united to pass a resolution in support of IFOR, the Bosnia peace implementation force, by a vote of 300 to 1. In Poland, the new President — a former member of the former communist party — re-affirmed Poland's NATO aspirations. In Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania, governments are quietly resolving border disputes, and putting into place protection for ethnic minorities.

For these countries, the Partnership for Peace is becoming a passage to democracy and market reform, as well as a passage to security cooperation with the West.

But even those countries that do not aspire to NATO membership are realizing many of the same political and social gains from active participation in the PFP. Moreover, PFP is providing them the tools and the opportunities to develop closer ties to NATO and learn from NATO — even as they choose to remain outside the Alliance. And PFP is building bonds among the Partner nations — even outside the framework of cooperation with NATO.

That is why defense ministers from many Partner nations have said to me that even if, or when, they eventually join NATO, they want to sustain their active participation in PFP. In short, by creating the Partnership For Peace, NATO is doing more than just building the basis for enlargement. It is, in fact, creating a new zone of security and stability throughout Europe.

That is why I believe that the creation of the Partnership for Peace has been one of the most significant events of the post-Cold War era. By forging networks of people and institutions working together to preserve freedom, promote democracy and build free markets, the PFP today is a catalyst for transforming Central and Eastern Europe, much as the Marshall Plan transformed Western Europe in the '40s and '50s. It is the passage this half of Europe did not take in 1947; it is the door that we never opened. To lock in the gains of reform, NATO must ensure that the ties we are creating in PFP continue to deepen and that we actually proceed with the gradual and deliberate, but steady, process of outreach and enlargement to the East. NATO enlargement is inevitable.

And if NATO enlargement is a carrot encouraging reforms, then we cannot keep that carrot continually out of reach. So it is critical that we implement the second phase of NATO enlargement agreed upon at the NAC Ministerial Meeting in December.

And even as some countries join NATO, it will be important to keep the door open for others down the road. We must make sure that PFP continues to provide a place in the security architecture of Europe so that we keep the door open to Marshall's Europe even for those nations that do not aspire to become NATO members.

For Marshall's vision to be truly fulfilled, one of the nations that must walk through this door is Russia. Russia has been a key player in Europe's security for over 300 years. It will remain a key player in the coming decades, for better or for worse. Our job is to make it for the better.

Unlike with the Marshall Plan 50 years ago, Russia today has chosen to participate in the Partnership for Peace. And in the spirit of Marshall, we welcome Russia's participation, and hope that over time it will take on a leading role in PFP commensurate with its importance as a great power.

But for Russia to join us as a full and active partner in completing Marshall's vision, NATO and Russia need to build on our common ground, even when we don't agree with each other's conclusions. It is fair to say that most members of Russia's political establishment do not welcome or even accept NATO's plans for enlargement. Anybody that doubted that yesterday, if you heard Mr. Kokoshin's speech, realized the extent of the opposition to NATO enlargement in Russia.

When I was in Russia last June, I had a number of conversations with Russian government leaders and Duma members about the future of European security. I offered them a series of postulates about that future. I told them if I were in Russia's shoes, I would want the future security picture in Europe to have the following characteristics:

First, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want the United States to be involved in the security of Europe. They agreed with that postulate. Then, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want to see Germany an integrated part of the European security structure. And they agreed with that postulate.

And third, I said, if I were a Russian leader, I would want Russia to be in the security architecture of Europe, not isolated outside of it. They agreed with this postulate also.

Finally, I asked them how could a Russian leader best achieve these goals? I concluded they could only be achieved through a healthy and vibrant NATO. That is NATO, far from being a threat to Russia, actually contributes to the security of Russia, as well as to the security of its own members.

When I reached that conclusion most of the Russians I talked to fell off the cliff. They agreed with each of my premises — but they did not agree with my conclusion. But in the absence of NATO and its partnership arrangements, I do not see any way of achieving those goals — our shared goals — of a safe and peaceful Europe.

I have to tell you that I did not persuade my Russian colleagues with my argument. But I do believe that as Russia deepens its involvement with NATO, it will come to believe in the truth of my conclusion, as well as my premises. And I believe that Russia will want to have a cooperative relation with NATO and a leading role in the Partnership for Peace. And that Russia will come to understand that enlargement means enlarging a zone of security and stability that is very much in Russia's interest, not a threat to Russia.

But the way for this new understanding to occur is for NATO to continue to reach out to Russia not only from the top down but from the bottom up. Last year at Wehrkunde, I proposed that NATO and Russia begin a separate plan of activities, outside the Partnership for Peace. Since then, we have all discussed and even agreed upon this proposal in principle, but we have not yet put it on paper. We must do so. We cannot let disagreements over the "theology" of building NATO-Russia relations get in the way of "here and now" opportunities to work together where our interests clearly overlap.

Instead of letting theology dictate our practice, we should let our practice shape our theology. One example of where the United States is already doing this is with our program of bilateral training exercises with Russia. We have held four such exercises in the last year, each a great success, and each conducted in a spirit of trust and goodwill. This summer, the United States and Russia will move beyond the bilateral and jointly participate in a major regional Partnership For Peace exercise with forces from Ukraine, Russia, United States and other regional powers.

Our bilateral contact program with Russia is not confined to joint exercises or even to just the security field. Through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission, it extends to the fields of science and technology, space, defense conversion, business development, the environment, health care and agriculture.

Just this past week the Commission met in Washington, and Mr. Kokoshin and I both participated in the defense conversion program of this Commission. I urge all NATO nations to build on this model. These contacts provide important exchanges of information.

They help break down years of distrust and suspicion. They weave the Russians into the kind of personal and professional networks that have long characterized relations among all of the Allies. These are the kind of activities that will build trust between Russia and NATO. And these are the kind of activities that will keep Russia on the passage toward integration with Europe, to pass through that open door. Mr. Grachev and I attended

the joint U.S. exercise in Kansas last October. And we met after the exercise with the American and the Russian soldiers conducting that exercise, and talked to them. He told the Russian soldiers what they were doing was very important, that they should extend their friendship and cooperation with the American soldiers, and that this was the basis for creating a peaceful world for their children. The American soldiers were as much interested in what he was saying as the Russians were, I can assure you. Ironically, the place where a distinct NATO-Russia relationship is occurring in practice is in Bosnia. Today, as we speak, a Russian brigade is serving in the American Multinational Division of IFOR. It took an enormous amount of work to make this happen.

Minister Grachev and I met four times over a two-month period to iron out the details. Generals Joulwan and Nash work closely every day with their counterparts, General Shevtsov and Colonel Lentsov. NATO and Russia *do* have a special relationship today in Bosnia, and Russia is demonstrating its commitment to participating in the future security architecture of Europe.

The reason we are all working so hard to make this relationship successful is not just because of the additional troops Russia brings to Bosnia, but because Russia's participation in Bosnia casts a very long shadow that will have an impact on the security of Europe for years to come. When we deal with the most important security problem which Europe has faced since the Cold War was over, we want to have Russia inside the circle, working with us, not outside the circle, throwing rocks at us.

Indeed, the more you think about what NATO and Russia are doing together in Bosnia, the more amazing it becomes. I can only imagine what General Eisenhower, the first SACEUR, would think if he saw a General from Russia sitting with General Joulwan, today's SACEUR, at the SHAPE compound reviewing a secret NATO OPLAN. We need to build on this model, to institutionalize it, and expand it to cover the entire range of NATO and Russia's overlapping security interests. By so doing, NATO and Russia can move forward as full partners in completing Marshall's version.

Just as the NATO-Russia relationship is being forged in Bosnia, so too is the future of NATO itself. I was in Bosnia several weeks ago. I was struck by the dedication and professionalism of every unit from every country that is participating. I was also struck by the stark contrast between the devastation and suffering I saw in Sarajevo, and the rebirth and renewal I have seen in the other capitals of Central and Eastern Europe. Bosnia is what happens when newly independent nations focus on old hatreds instead of new challenges. Four years ago, some people in the former Yugoslavia chose not to join Marshall's Europe. And the death and bloodshed that resulted will long echo in our memory. But today the door to Marshall's Europe is open again for them — and holding that door open are NATO, Russia and the newly free peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.

The success or failure of IFOR is crucial to whether or not we will complete Marshall's vision. It is in Bosnia where we are sending the message that NATO is the bedrock on which the future security and stability of Europe will be built. It is in Bosnia where NATO is first reaping the benefits of joint peacekeeping training with our new Peace Partners. It is in Bosnia where future NATO members are showing themselves ready and able to shoulder the burdens of membership. And it is in Bosnia where we are showing that we can work as partners with Russian forces. Bosnia is not a peacekeeping exercise. It is the real thing.

Bosnia is also teaching us important lessons about the kind of NATO that Marshall's Europe will require. Ever since the end of the Cold War, NATO has struggled to develop a mechanism for executing the new missions using NATO assets with the voluntary participation of NATO members.

In the conference room, we have so far failed to come up with an agreement on a Combined Joint Task Force, CJTF. But in the field, we have cut through these theological arguments and put together IFOR, which is CJTF. As with the NATO-Russia relationship, we need to take the practical lessons learned in putting IFOR together and extrapolate back until we have a CJTF that works.

Bosnia also casts in sharp relief something we have suspected for some time: that it is time for NATO to adapt itself internally to deal with the new challenges of this new era. NATO was not well structured for the Bosnia mission. At a time when our political and geostrategic thinking has been completely reoriented, symbolized by our partnership in peacekeeping with former adversaries, and at a time when our individual military forces have streamlined and modernized for the battlefield of the future, NATO's command and decision-making structure is still geared for the challenges and the battlefields of the past. The time has come to streamline and modernize NATO, recognizing that our challenge is no longer simply to execute a known plan with already designated forces, as it was during the Cold War.

We must make NATO's command structure more responsive and more flexible, and streamline the planning and force preparation process, and simplify and speed-up the entire decision-making process. And we must complete the task of giving NATO's European members a stronger identity within the alliance. These kinds of internal changes will ready NATO for enlargement, and will allow us to better respond to the future challenges to European security and stability.

It is in this context that we welcome the French decision to participate more fully in NATO's military bodies. And we look forward to working with France as we transform the Alliance and realize Marshall's vision of a Europe united in peace, freedom and democracy.

In 1947, Marshall told America that it must "face up to the responsibility which history has placed upon our country." Today, it is not only America, but also Russia; is not only NATO nations, but all of Europe — all of us must face up to the responsibility which history has placed upon us. This means reaching out to each other not only in the spirit of friendship, but also in the spirit of self-interest. This means working towards our goals not only from the top-down, but also the ground-up. And it means recognizing that when the outside world changes, we must look inside our institutions and see what changes are needed there.

If we do these things, then next year, when we commemorate the 50th Anniversary of the Marshall Plan, we will be able to say that we made Marshall's vision our own.

That Partnership for Peace is a strong, permanent pillar of Europe's security architecture. That NATO and Russia have a relationship where trust, understanding and cooperation are givens, not goals. That all the nations of the former Yugoslavia are adding, not detracting, from Europe's security. And that we have taken the passage to a new Europe and opened the door to a new era of peace, freedom and democracy.

1998

Javier Solana

Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

In 1998, Javier Solana used this address to the Munich Conference on Security Policy to underscore the significance of NATO enlargement and the establishment of a political framework for a long-term relationship with Russia.

I am very pleased to participate in this year's Wehrkunde Conference, all the more so as this is the last Wehrkunde chaired by its founder, Ewald von Kleist. He has made this conference into what it is today: a unique forum on transatlantic security relations. The Wehrkunde meetings have always been more than ritualistic gatherings. They are occasions which offer — no, which demand that we use them to refresh our thinking about security issues.

In masterminding the Wehrkunde, Ewald von Kleist has created much more than a widely acclaimed international conference: he has created a transatlantic family, held together not only by shared interests but also by personal friendship is undergoing profound change, this achievement cannot be over-estimated.

Ar many previous Wehrkunde-meetings we have talked about the Euro-Atlantic area being in a transition phase. This term captured the notions that while the Cold War was over, we were not yet sure where we were going to.

I would argue that this transition is now coming to an end. Today, we are witnessing the end of a Post-Cold War era. What we have put in its place is a new strategic consensus — a strategic consensus on the main pillars of our security in the next century.

What are the elements of this consensus? First and foremost, a new transatlantic bargain between Europe and North America.

Bosnia taught us a lesson of unity which is essential for maintaining a healthy transatlantic relationship. But it is not sufficient. The end of the Soviet threat and the dynamics of European integration are going to affect

the transatlantic relationship in ways far deeper than many of us may be ready to admit. If the transatlantic relationship is to remain healthy in the longer term, a new bargain must include a Europe willing and able to shoulder more responsibility.

I would argue that NATO has indeed begun to implement this new bargain. It is after all, in NATO where the real, operational future of a European Security and Defence Identity is now taking shape. With a new command structure, Combined Joint Task Forces, and stronger relations between NATO and WEU, the stage is set foe Europe to play a security role more in line with its economic strength. Such a stronger Europe will not only make a more coherent contribution to security in Europe; it will also be a more attractive partner of North America in managing global contingencies.

A stronger Europe also implies a less fragmented defence industrial base. That is why I believe that within NATO a transatlantic dialogue on technology-sharing could help us forestall a growing technology gap and, thus keep the transatlantic relationship healthy.

These decisions and initiatives constitute elements of a new bargain between North America and Europe. Together, they constitute the new parameters of burden-sharing for the next century. Together, they demonstrate that this Alliance remains responsive to the security needs on both sides of the Atlantic.

Clearly, Europe is not yet the strategic actor it wants to be, nor the global partner the US seeks. But these shortcomings do not result from "too much United States", as some still claim, but from "too little Europe". That is why the European integration process is not only relevant foe Europe's own identity, but for a new transatlantic relationship as well.

The second element of a new strategic consensus is the need foe a strong Russian involvement. No one today would be seriously consider building security without, let alone against, Russia. Indeed, how Russia settles herself within the new Europe is perhaps the most important single factor that will determine the quality of European security in the years ahead.

That is why the NATO-Russia relationship we seek is not simply one of mutually acknowledging each other's importance, but one of active cooperation, leading to mutual trust. And I believe that with the Founding Act and the Permanent Joint Council we have created the right mechanisms to achieve this close cooperation.

The Permanent Joint Council is barely half a year old, yet it is already working at a high pace. We have monthly meetings of Ambassadors, we had several meetings of Foreign and Defence Ministers, and we have agreed an ambitious work programme. To put it bluntly: The PJC works. It works, because both NATO and Russia want it to work. Its works because both NATO and Russia know that they are destined to cooperate.

This new political relationship between NATO and Russia cleared the way for a closer military relationship. This means that the superb cooperation we have achieved in IFOR and SFOR must now be extended across the full spectrum of security-related issues.

We are setting up military liaison missions between NATO and Russia, starting at the highest level first — NATO Headquarters, SHAPE, SACLANT and equivalent locations in Russia. We already have meetings of the Military Committee and the new Russian military representative at NATO. We are developing cooperation between NATO and Russia on defence-related environmental issues. We have opened the new NATO Science for Peace Programme to some 1,500 Russian scientists. And we have already exploratory meetings on armaments-related cooperation.

These are just a few examples of the work we hope to undertake with Russian in the future. So if we say that Russia needs to be in the architecture, and not outside of it, we mean what we say.

The third major element of the new consensus is the need for a wider architecture — an architecture based on different institutions acting towards shared strategic objectives.

In Bosnia, we see most clearly how much such an architecture can work. NATO, OSCE, the UN and the EU are all involved in creating the conditions for a long-term stability in this region. But for our institutions to cooperate is not enough. They must also be open to new members.

That is why getting NATO's enlargement right is so crucial. What is at stake is not only the credibility of NATO as a cohesive Alliance. The successful accession of the first three invitees will also be an incentive for future aspirants to continue on the course of freedom.

Even as our Alliance is growing, it will not lose sight of a wider Euro-Atlantic security ship for Peace and the EAPC both have created a powerful momentum for continent-wide cooperation. Through these mechanisms we have been able to tie virtually all countries of the Euro-Atlantic region into a network of close military cooperation. Even countries with a neutral security tradition have involved themselves in these endeavours. This demonstrates that NATO's commitment to a wider Europe is not mere rhetoric, but has become an uncontested reality of a new strategic consensus. In this new Europe, the old notion of dividing lines no longer makes sense.

The decisions of last year's Madrid Summit have put key elements of this new strategic consensus in place. We are now in a consolidation phase. But this should not make us complacent. If we want this strategic consen-

sus to be more than a fleeting moment of the late 1990s, then we must continue to perfect the instruments we have at our disposal. There is still unfinished business.

Our most pressing immediate task is to decide on the future of our operation in Bosnia. We have to create the conditions for a self-sustaining peace that does not require a continued international military presence. That point will be reached when all parties realise that their stakes in peace are higher than their possible gains in war.

1998 is a decisive year for the political future of Bosnia. This is the year when the politics of war must finally be replaced by the politics of peace. This is also the year in which the return of refugees and displaced persons should take place on a large scale.

We are moving in the right direction in building peace in Bosnia. Successful action against war criminals has been undertaken; a new government has taken office in Republika Srpska, with its capital far from the Pale hard-liners; refugees continue to return from overseas; a common currency is in circulation; common licence plates have come into effect; and fresh concepts are in the air — Sarajevo has to become an Open City; a weapons amnesty programme to curb the number of illegal weapons in private hands — to name but two.

These are encouraging signs. They demonstrate that our perseverance is paying off. And we will stay the course. There is already agreement in NATO and among other troop-contributing nations and international organisations that a follow-on force is needed in Bosnia. The precise options of such a force are now under discussion. But whatever the exact option we settle on, one thing is particularly clear for the Alliance. Our operation in Bosnia has shown that we make most progress if we act as a unit, not as a coalition of the willing. To act in solidarity should, thus, remain the rule, not the exception — for such solidarity will provide the cornerstone of our success in managing the challenge of the 21st century.

The new strategic consensus I outlined here owes a lot to NATO. Much of the positive developments of the last years have been inspired by the decisions and initiatives of this Alliance.

Our cohesion — whether at 16 today, or at 19 tomorrow — is what enables us to successfully manage NATO's broader agenda. It is our cohesion that makes our collective defence commitment credible; it is our cohesion that ensures that SFOR command such tremendous respect; and its our cohesion which gives NATO's cooperative initiatives their direction and momentum.

If we retain this cohesion we can confidently cope with an ever more complex agenda. But this requires more than a common vision of the future, or a political commitment to common course of action. It also requires the commitment of adequate resources to get the job done. Security still carries a price tag. This, too, should be part of our wider strategic consensus.

In April next year, we will celebrate NATO's 50th anniversary at our Washington Summit. This Summit should be more than a celebration of NATO's past achievements. It should first and foremost look ahead.

We will look ahead. At next year's Washington Summit:

- we will complete the accession of our first new members;
- we will adopt a new Strategic Concept, defining a new balance between NATO's traditional and new missions;
- we will have our new command structure in place, with more flexibility and a stronger European element in it;
- we will have turned the NATO-Russia relationship into a major element of a new security architecture;
- we will have firmly anchored Ukraine in a distinct relationship with NATO; — we will have made the EAPC and the Partnership for Peace permanent fixtures of Euro-Atlantic security cooperation; and
- we will have moved closer towards a re-balanced transatlantic relationship, in which Europe and North America are sharing the burdens more equally.

This is an ambitious agenda. But in defining NATO's role for the 21st century we have every reason to be bold. For we now know that we can do far more than prevent the worst case. If we maintain the strategic consensus I outlined, we can achieve the best case: a stable Europe within a vibrant Atlantic community.

DONALD RUMSFELD
JOSCHKA FISCHER
ABDULLAH II IBN AL HUSSEIN
GERHARD SCHRÖDER
VLADIMIR PUTIN
ROBERT GATES
HENRY KISSINGER

Chapter 4

GREAT PROMISES, GREATER PERILS

2000–2009

2003

Donald Rumsfeld

Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

In his speech at the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy, Donald Rumsfeld urged the world to unite behind the US course of increasing military pressure and preparing a potential military operation against Iraq.

I'm delighted to be with you. Indeed it is most certainly not my first visit to this conference. I've come off and on over many decades. It's a particular pleasure to be back in Europe! I'm told that when I used the phase "old Europe" the other day, it caused a bit of a stir. I don't quite understand what the fuss is about. As I said at the time — at my age, I consider "old" a term of endearment. Like an old friend.

As a matter of fact, you mentioned, I forget quite how you said I say things, but I'm told one of the German newspapers referenced the fact that my ancestors came from northern Germany and that it is an area known for plain, straight talk.

One of the advantages of age, and I've got some, — when you are as old as I am, you've seen a lot of history. I lived through our depression, and World War II. A young man when the NATO Alliance was founded, the names Churchill, Roosevelt, Adenauer, Marshall and Truman were not figures I learned about from history, but leaders that we all followed over the years, as Europe drifted into war and then was lifted from the ashes of World War II. They helped build our transatlantic Alliance, and fashioned it into a bulwark against tyranny and in defense of common values and our freedom.

When the President appointed me Ambassador to NATO in the early 1970s, it was a defining moment in my life. I worked closely with dedicated and highly skilled diplomats such as Andre de Starke, the former dean of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, my close friend Francois de Rose, then the French Ambassador to NATO, Franz Krapf from the Federal Republic of Germany, and so many other very talented diplomats. None of us could have imagined then that NATO leaders would one day meet in Prague,

where they would invite Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania to become members of the Atlantic Alliance.

It is remarkable how Europe has changed just over the course of my lifetime. Thanks to NATO's efforts, the center of Europe has indeed shifted eastward-and our Alliance is stronger for it.

Not only is the map of Europe being transformed, but so too is the map of the world. Out of the tragedy of September 11th came great responsibilities, to be sure, but also unprecedented opportunities-to tear down calcified barriers left over from earlier eras, and build new relationships with countries that would have been unimaginable just a few short years ago. And that is precisely what we have been doing in the global war on terror.

Our coalition for the global war on terror today includes some 90 nations-almost half the world. It is the largest coalition in human history. We are fighting alongside old allies and new friends alike. (Whoops-there's that word "old" again). Some are involved in the military effort in Afghanistan. Others are helping elsewhere in the world — in Asia, the Gulf, the Horn of Africa. Some are helping with stability operations; still others are providing basing, re-fueling, over-flight, and intelligence. Some are not participating in the military effort but are helping in the financial, diplomatic and law enforcement efforts. All of these are important, and deeply appreciated by all nations committed to the global war on terrorism.

As to Iraq, we still hope that force may not be necessary to disarm Saddam Hussein. If it comes to that however, we already know that the same will hold true-some countries will participate, while others may choose not to. The strength of our coalition is that we do not expect every member to be a party of every undertaking.

The support that has already been pledged to disarm Iraq, here in Europe and across the world, is impressive and it's growing. A large number of nations have already said they will be with us in a coalition of the willing-and more are stepping up each day.

Last week, the leaders of Britain, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, issued a courageous statement declaring that "the Iraqi regime and its weapons of mass destruction represent a clear threat to world security," and pledging that they would "remain united in insisting that his regime be disarmed."

Their statement was followed this week by an equally bold declaration by the "Vilnius 10" — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia. They declared: "Our countries understand the dangers posed by tyranny and the special responsibility of democracies to defend shared values ... We are prepared to contribute to an international coalition to enforce [Resolution 1441] and the disarmament of Iraq."

Clearly, momentum is building-momentum that sends a critically important message to the Iraqi regime-about the seriousness of purpose and the world's determination that Iraq disarm.

Let me be clear: no one wants war. No, war is never a first or an easy choice. But the risks of war to be balanced against the risks of doing nothing while Iraq pursues the tools of mass destruction.

It may be difficult for some to fully understand just how fundamentally September 11th transformed our country. Americans saw the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Towers as a painful and vivid foreshadowing of far more deadly attacks to come. We looked at the destruction caused by the terrorists, who took jetliners, turned them into missiles, and used them to kill 3,000 innocent men, women and children-and we considered the destruction that could be caused by an adversary armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. Instead of 3,000 to be killed, it could be 30,000, 300,000.

Konrad Adenauer once said that "history is the sum total of things that could have been avoided." With history, we have the advantage of hindsight. But we must use that advantage to learn. Our challenge today is even more difficult: it is to try to connect the dots before the fact-to prevent an attack before it happens-not to wait and then hope to try to pick up the pieces after it happens.

To do so, we must come to terms with a fundamental truth-we have reached a point in history when the margin for error that we once enjoyed is gone. In the 20th century, we, all of us here, were dealing, for the most part, with conventional weapons that could kill hundreds or thousands of people. If we miscalculated-or underestimated or ignored a threat-it could absorb an attack, recover, take a deep breath, mobilize, and go and defeat an attacker. In the 21st century, that's not the case; the cost of underestimating the threat is unthinkable.

There is a momentous fact of life that we must come to terms with: and it is the nexus between weapons of mass destruction, terrorist states and terrorist networks. On September 11th, terrorist states discovered that missiles are not the only way to strike Washington-or Paris, or Berlin or Rome or any of our capitals. There are other means of delivery — terrorist networks. To the extent a terrorist state transfers weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups, they could conceal their responsibility for an attack.

To this day, we still do not know with certainty who was behind the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia. We still do not know

who was responsible for the anthrax attacks in the United States. The nature of terrorist attacks is that it is difficult, and sometimes impossible, to identify those responsible. And a terrorist state that can conceal its responsibility for an attack certainly would not be deterred.

We are all vulnerable to these threats. As President Bush said in Berlin, "Those who despise human freedom will attack it on every continent." We need only to look at the recent terrorist bombings in Kenya or Bali, or the poison cells that have recently been uncovered and disclosed here in Europe, to see that is the case.

Last week, President Bush spoke to the world about the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. This week, Secretary Powell presented additional information in the Security Council:

- Intercepted communications between Iraqi officials,
- Satellite images of Iraqi weapons facilities, and
- Human intelligence-from agents inside Iraq, defectors and detainees captured in the global war on terror.

He presented not opinions, not conjecture, but facts demonstrating:

- Iraq's ongoing pursuit of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons;
- Its development of delivery systems, including missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles;
- Its tests of chemical weapons on human beings;
- Its ongoing efforts to deceive UN inspectors and conceal its WMD programs; and
- Its ties to terrorist networks, including al-Qaeda-affiliated cells operating in Baghdad.

It is difficult to believe there still could be questions in the minds of reasonable people open to the facts before them. The threat is there to see. And if the worst were to happen-and if we had done nothing to stop it-not one of us here today could honestly say that it was a surprise. It will not be a surprise. We are on notice. Each of our nations. Each of us individually. Really the only question is: what will we do about it?

We all hope for a peaceful solution. But the one chance for a peaceful solution is to make clear that free nations are prepared to use force if necessary-that the world is united and, while reluctant, is willing to act.

There are those who counsel that we should delay preparations. Ironically, that approach could well make war more likely, not less likely — because delaying preparations sends a signal of uncertainty, instead of a signal of resolve. If the international community once again shows a lack of resolve, there is no chance that Saddam Hussein will disarm voluntarily or flee his country-and thus little chance of a peaceful outcome.

There is another reason to prepare now: NATO member nations have an Article V commitment to defend Turkey, should it come under attack by Iraq. Those preventing the Alliance from taking even minimum measures to prepare to do so, risk undermining the credibility of the NATO Alliance.

The stakes are high. Iraq is now defying the 17th UN Security Council resolution. The Council voted to warn Iraq that this was its "final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations." Quote, unquote. The resolution, which passed unanimously, did not say the "next to final opportunity." It said the "final opportunity." And those who voted for it, and they voted unanimously, knew what it said. They were explicitly reminded what it said. The question is did the UN mean it? Did they mean it? We will soon know.

Seventeen times the United Nations has drawn a line in the sand-and 17 times Saddam Hussein has crossed that line. As last week's statement by the eight European leaders so eloquently put it, quote: "If [those resolutions] are not complied with, the Security Council will lose its credibility and world peace will suffer as a result."

Let me add these sad thoughts about the state of the United Nations. An institution that, with the support and acquiescence of many of the nations represented in this room, that would permit Iraq, a terrorist state that refuses to disarm, to become soon the chair of the United Nations Commission on Disarmament, and which recently elected Libya — a terrorist state — to chair the United Nations Commission on Human Rights of all things, seems not to be even struggling to regain credibility.

That these acts of irresponsibility could happen now, at this moment in history, is breathtaking. Those acts will be marked in the history of the UN as either the low point of that institution in retreat, or the turning point when the UN woke up, took hold of itself, and moved away from a path of ridicule to a path of responsibility.

To understand what is at stake, it is worth reminding ourselves of the history of the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations. When the League failed to act after the invasion of Abyssinia, it was discredited as an instrument of peace. It was discredited properly. The lesson of that experience was best summed up at the time by Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King, who declared: "Collective bluffing cannot bring about collective security."

That lesson is as true today, at the start of the 21st century, as it was in the 20th century. The question before us is-have we learned it?

There are moments in history when the judgment and the resolve of free nations are put to the test. This is such a moment. The security environment we are entering is the most dangerous the world has seen. The lives of our children and grandchildren could well hang in the balance.

When they look back at this period, what will they say of us? Have we properly recognized the seriousness of the threat, the nexus between weapons of mass destruction, terrorist states and terrorist networks? Will they say we stood still-paralyzed by a straitjacket of indecision and 20th century thinking-while dangers gathered? Or will they say that we recognized the coming danger, united, and took action before it was too late?

The coming days and weeks will tell.

2003

Joschka Fischer

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany

In reaction to Donald Rumsfeld, Joschka Fischer used his speech at the 39th Munich Conference on Security Policy to present a passionate defense of his government's skeptical position towards military action in Iraq, emphasizing that he was "not convinced" by the case for war.

When we discuss today the dangers that lie ahead, the Iraq crisis, and the challenge of terrorism, I believe this is an excellent opportunity to address these issues in the context of transatlantic relations — just as Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has explained — among friends, among old friends. I think few would contest this characterization.

From my perspective, the critical turning point is September 11, and we understand all too well the emotions, concerns, and even the anger of our American friends in the aftermath of that day. These emotions, concerns, and anger are not only ones we have shared but continue to share.

Allow me to make one thing clear at this point. Today, I find myself in the position of having to engage in two debates: one domestic and one transatlantic. I will focus on the transatlantic dimension. However, let me briefly address a domestic point. It has been suggested that the leadership question was the key issue. During the election campaign, as my colleague Mr. Pflüger noted, the opposition stated, "If we had won..." Well, you didn't win, and your positions played a significant role in that outcome. You had every opportunity to make your stance clear during the campaign, and I believe the result would have been even more decisive had you done so. This is a central point, and I will leave it at that.

Secretary Rumsfeld, it is simply not accurate to claim that the issue is exclusively about whether a government supports or opposes the Iraq strategy. Instead, it is about the balance of public opinion. If you examine

the numbers, you will find no substantial difference in public opposition between countries such as the UK and Germany or France and Spain.

We do not need to engage in a fundamental debate about whether we are pursuing pacifist illusions or whether there are serious questions regarding the strategy. A strategic disagreement is different from embracing a pacifist approach. I say this as someone in a government that has risked its existence three times on questions of war and peace. The first was in Kosovo, where we were convinced that, after exhausting all other means, confronting Milosevic militarily was the only option left to prevent a second Srebrenica. Personally, I fought for Germany to stand alongside our American and European democratic allies for human rights and strategic European interests — for peace and stability on our continent. Kosovo was not about force; it was the last resort. And if I regret anything, it is that action did not come sooner. A credible threat in 1991 would likely have sufficed.

For me, the crucial point is this: In Kosovo, we combined military strength with a political vision and strategy. The alternative to nationalism's rule in post-Cold War Yugoslavia was not merely military opposition but a political offer — a perspective on Europe. Strength and political vision must go hand in hand, formulated and implemented in strategy.

Allow me to address the analysis. On this point, the U.S. and we are not far apart. I agree that after September 11, the status quo is no longer acceptable; it is too dangerous. We are indeed facing a new type of threat. It is no longer Imperial Japan, Nazi Germany, or the Soviet Union under Stalin. The threat is asymmetrical.

Yet, when we look back, why did we misjudge this danger together? Even in the 1990s, there were warnings — the first attempt to bomb the World Trade Center, the attacks on U.S. embassies in East Africa, and the USS Cole. Why did we not grasp the scale of the threat? We underestimated the emergence of a new form of totalitarianism, one rooted not in Europe but within the cultural and ideological framework of the Arab-Muslim world. This totalitarianism, though different in origin, poses an equally severe challenge.

Afghanistan, as the weak territorial base of Al-Qaeda, exemplifies this. After September 11, it was clear that we had to confront this territorial base. And so, Germany stood in solidarity with its American friends. A few years ago, the idea of German troops in the Hindu Kush would have seemed unimaginable. Today, we have nearly 3,000 soldiers there, serving under essential missions like ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Let us not be under any illusions: Afghanistan is a long-term commitment, just like the Balkans. Without nation-building, which may take

decades, terrorism will return. The political conditions in Afghanistan remain precarious and could lead to renewed instability and terror.

This brings me to my first critical question: Why prioritize Iraq now? We are far from completing our mission in Afghanistan, and the dismantling of Al-Qaeda remains unfinished. None of us knows whether tomorrow might bring another devastating terrorist attack — not from Saddam Hussein but from the corner where the greatest threat still lurks: Islamist terrorism.

This is why I struggle to understand the current prioritization. To me, it remains unclear.

Saddam Hussein is a terrible dictator; we have all known this for a long time. He used weapons of mass destruction against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, invaded Iran, and fired Scud missiles at Israel. He brutally suppresses opposition and his own population — this is well-established. Furthermore, he is attempting to acquire weapons of mass destruction. However, does this justify the prioritization of this issue in light of the threats we have faced since September 11? That is my first major question. And I must say, I have participated in three significant democratic debates — Kosovo, Macedonia, and the most challenging one, Afghanistan — where we truly put our coalition to the test. Three times.

We owe the USA our democracy. The USA is indispensable for peace and stability, but for Germany, it plays a particularly special role because we did not liberate ourselves from the Nazis, nor did we rebuild our democracy without its help. However, my generation has learned something important: You have to make the case! And in a democracy, to make a case, you must convince others on your own merit. Excuse me, but I am not convinced. That is the problem — I cannot address the public and advocate for war on grounds that I do not personally believe in. This is why we must have this discussion.

My second major question is why we have not systematically conducted this strategic discussion — one I deem urgently necessary — within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. Let me be clear: since September 18/19, 2001, during a visit to Washington, I have been having this conversation with our American friends. They are aware of my deep skepticism. They know I have questions about Iraq that I find have not been satisfactorily answered. The ambassador is also well aware of this, as we have had ongoing discussions about it over the months.

Now, let me address the second point — the world after September 11. When trying to decode the grammar of terror, while simultaneously examining shifts in the world order, we observe that the Cold War world, though highly dangerous, was defined by a global system of "stability through deter-

rence." It was akin to two massive electromagnets that absorbed all peripheral conflicts into the gravitational pull of the central conflict.

Since 1989/90, this dynamic has completely changed. Back then, we had a unidimensional political space defined by the central conflict. Today, we operate in a three-dimensional political space. At the global level, major powers and their alliances shape global stability. At the regional level, we have regional conflicts. And at the basement level, we face collapsed states and asymmetric conflicts.

Security is now defined across all three levels. If we examine the root causes of September 11, it is the forgotten conflict in Afghanistan, the underestimation of the threat posed by a new form of totalitarianism that established a regional base there, and its evolution into a global threat — not only to the people and government of the USA but to world peace. This means that when we discuss security and stability, we must act across all three levels — global, regional, and in addressing asymmetric conflicts and failing states — combining strength with political perspective. Strength alone will not yield a political solution. Without a political solution, negative, destructive, and even terrorist energies will be emboldened. This is the critical point we must continue to debate.

In this context, I agree with those who say that we face a crisis in the Islamic-Arab world — a loss of order. While Europe has experienced great gains in order since the end of World War II, the Middle East faces enormous losses in order. This raises the question: How do we restore order? There is a need for robust discussion on this point — not necessarily dissent, but certainly the need for dialog.

From my perspective, Secretary Rumsfeld, the correct strategy would have been to say: Afghanistan is non-negotiable. We must fight Al-Qaeda because no alternative exists; we must dismantle terrorist structures — this is indisputable. But then, I believe, the next step should have been to pursue the Saudi initiative related to the Middle East conflict, aiming for a difficult compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Why? Because I believe achieving that difficult peace, which we must work on together, would change the entire environment in the region, creating a new foundation of support — even for tougher measures, if necessary.

This is now water under the bridge, but I want to clarify our concerns, questions, and alternative perspectives. These are not rooted in anti-Americanism, questioning our alliance, or Germany seeking to step away from its commitments. Far from it.

Today, we face a different situation under UN Security Council Resolution 1441. Decisions have been made. However, I must raise some questions

that are critical for us. This brings me to the topic of the preventive strategy. Is what Secretary Rumsfeld described an isolated case, or is it part of a longer-term strategy? If it is the latter, then there is a significant need for discussion because this will have profound implications for the transatlantic relationship.

I must also address the high levels of public opposition in our country. I predict that even those celebrated eight leaders who published a letter in the *Wall Street Journal* supporting the U.S. stance would face significant challenges without open debate. In the long run, a democratically elected government cannot act in opposition to the overwhelming majority of its population. That is the essence of democracy, and I find it both important and correct.

And therefore, I believe we must carefully discuss the consequences of a Preventive Strategy. Questions:

Is the Preventive Strategy being discussed exclusively based on the threat analysis of the United States and the consequences derived from it? Is it tied to principles? Will there be universally binding rules? Will these rules be consulted? Or is this exclusively a discussion taking place within the United States?

This is a crucial question for us within the alliance, and we must prepare for it, regardless of how you perceive these matters. However, this discussion needs to take place. Naturally, this also applies to other consequences. What are the plans for the Middle East? What do you think will work in terms of a democratization strategy there? What if an intervention in Iraq, in the medium term, actually fosters a trend towards Islamization? That is my major concern. Will democracy ultimately prevail, or will we face an Islamization movement of a more long-term nature? That would result in a loss of stability and security with which we Europeans, as well as Israel and moderate Arab states, would then have to contend significantly.

Thus, the questions are reversed and directed toward us: What are the consequences of inaction? I can only underline what several others have said: if we base our analysis on these risks, we must utilize every possible means to mitigate or eliminate them. These must include both instruments of strength and political alternatives. Neither strength alone nor the renunciation of strength and political alternatives alone will achieve results. Only a combination of the two can be effective, in my view, and that must be repeatedly clarified.

In this context, allow me to ask a question about weapons of mass destruction. Let's consider the threat analysis. If what Secretary Rumsfeld or my esteemed friend Colin Powell recently presented is accurate — and I

listened very carefully — if it is the case that states we consider dangerous and non-democratic possess weapons of mass destruction, what are the implications of that? I look around, and while I won't name names, I examine missile capacities, nuclear programs, and programs for weapons of mass destruction. A lot comes to mind. What does this mean in practice? This needs to be urgently discussed.

Now I turn to the second threat analysis: terrorism. I look at where terrorism truly originates, where the breeding grounds are, where the activists come from, where the ideology originates, and where the financial support stems from. A lot comes to mind here as well. This must all be brought together. This is precisely where the mistrust in our populations arises — that things don't add up. That is the crucial point. It's not about governments being unwilling. For us, it would be much easier if this aligned with public sentiment. Because we naturally see the alliance interests on the other side. But the population senses that things don't align.

This is why we believe that we urgently need a discussion about the consequences of this threat analysis and its political implications. This is necessary to avoid greater dissent, which currently primarily revolves around the use of force. This must be seen very clearly, in my opinion. Therefore, I also advise not to exaggerate this dissent, which must be discussed but can simultaneously be transformed into a productive consensus.

Allow me to briefly address the current situation with Resolution 1441. Iraq is now under greater control than ever before. Let me be very clear: Saddam Hussein must unconditionally guarantee the implementation of Resolution 1441. It is now up to Baghdad to avert a major tragedy. He must not possess weapons of mass destruction, and he must fully cooperate with the inspectors. That is the issue at hand. But given the risks that cannot be ruled out, I ask: when weighing the risks of war against the risks posed by Iraq today, can we truly say we have exhausted all other means? I believe we have not. That is the proposal our French friends made, which we support — that with a stricter inspection regime we still have options beyond entering a war. Given the risks of war, which you also cannot dismiss, it is urgently necessary to deploy all these instruments and resources and to take the time needed. We must not fall under the logic of military mobilization but must use the time required by the inspectors. We need to develop alternatives so that it becomes entirely clear what is at stake.

Lastly, Mr. Teltschik, the role of the United Nations. The United States is indispensable, and let there be no doubt about that. The notion that France and Germany could or would want to challenge the United States is unfounded. Beyond feasibility, I believe it would be wrong because the United States is indispensable for regional and global peace and stability. Its power is indispensable. But on the other hand, the United Nations — yes, decisions there sometimes leave me shaking my head, I admit that openly. Some examples were mentioned. But conversely, do you believe peace can be achieved without the United Nations? I do not think so. As difficult as the United Nations can be, we will need it more than ever in the 21st century.

This is not the retreat of a weak country into the United Nations or multilateralism. This opposition, as framed by Kagan, a return to Hobbes, is, for me, a nightmare. A Hobbesian world in the 21st century would be catastrophic for us all, for peace and stability. Incidentally, Hobbes dealt with civil war. Thus, if Kagan's position is taken seriously, he becomes the prophet of a global civil war — a nightmare for us all. Kant, on the other hand, addressed the peace of sovereign states and developed a corresponding system. This is not a critique but simply to say that Kagan is fundamentally off the mark here.

The United Nations, for all the reasons I have mentioned, is indispensable to me. Its role, combined with the dominant power of the United States — the cradle of democracy and human rights — is the formula for success in a 21st-century world order. This formula cannot be dissolved into either — only U.S. power — or only the United Nations.

2004

Abdullah II Ibn Al Hussein

King of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

King Abdullah II dedicated his speech at the 40th Munich Conference on Security Policy to the future of the Middle East.

It is a pleasure to be in Munich once again, and an honour to be part of this forum.

Our topic, the future of the Middle East, and our dialogue are both important. Today, the Middle East is on the frontlines, perhaps it is the frontline, of a global struggle for peace and development. In solving long-term conflicts, in achieving genuine development and reform, in living up to the values of our faith and heritage; in all these ways the Arab world is engaged in a great enterprise. The results will impact the entire world. And we who are on that frontline look to the friends of peace and freedom for your support and partnership.

Today, I would like to give you a brief situation report. Let me begin with the core challenge: ending the Arab-Israeli conflict. Given the headlines from elsewhere in the region, some of you may wonder if this is, indeed, still at the core. Let me assure you, it remains central to the region and the world. No other conflict has cast such long shadows on our globe, or been used to cause such division, or promoted such bitterness. The time has come to put a stop to the long and hateful cycle of violence.

In fact, the contours of a historic reconciliation are before us. It involves a two-state solution, in which an independent Palestinian state lives in peaceful coexistence alongside a secure and recognised Israel within the 1967 frontiers. As you know, the Arab League collectively endorsed this proposal with full normalisation between the Arab countries and Israel. Mainstream Palestinians accept that the refugees' right of return must not undermine the demographic balance of Israel. Mainstream Israelis understand that they cannot be occupiers of another people.

A Palestinian capital in Eastern Jerusalem would be matched by an Israeli capital in Western Jerusalem. This is the unavoidable road to peace. The parties know it. And the extremists know it. They are doing what they can to stop forward movement. And with every day of delay, there is harm to the region and the world.

For us in Jordan, the crisis in Palestine is very near. From parts of my country, at night you can see the lights of Jerusalem. Every day, our people know the suffering that is going on. And we experience the destructive regional impact of the conflict. So, Jordan has been a leader in the search for peace. For decades, we have taken the risks that peace requires. And we are committed to helping achieve a real resolution.

But, friends, neither the parties, nor their neighbours, nor the region can do it alone. The international community has a crucial role. To achieve a just and lasting peace requires the active leadership of the United States, and more, it requires a collective international alliance for peace. We share a commitment to peace and stability. We share respect for human dignity and security. Now we must share the leadership in achieving these values. Such an alliance can secure the future of Palestine and Israel, bolster peace and stability in the Middle East and promote the security interests of free nations worldwide. It is time to act, and time to succeed.

This brings me to a second regional challenge, the challenge of development. Reports show that per capita income has actually shrunk in the Arab countries during the last 20 years. One of every five Arabs lives on less than $2 a day, and in the labour force, one in seven is unemployed. Youth, who are more than sixty per cent of the population, can be especially vulnerable. When young people lose hope, they can turn to apathy or violence, and either course threatens the drive for reform and the move towards modernity.

It takes a collective Arab effort to address these issues. And, indeed, historic opportunities are before us. They include educational systems dedicated to excellence, responsive, transparent governance, a vigorous private sector that can harness the region's tremendous human potential and other positive programmes.

We look to ourselves to create our own future. But our friends around the globe can also make a vital contribution. When the international community supports those of us who are engaged in reform, when it supports development, it helps create a climate of justice and hope — the necessary environment for security in the region and the world.

Hope is not merely material. This leads me to say a few words about the Islamic faith that is central to Jordan's identity. Recent years have brought new dialogue in the West about the nature of Islam. Some believe that

Muslims are forbidden from engaging constructively in the modern world. Jordanians will tell you that is untrue. From its earliest days, Islam pioneered a path that respected diversity and tolerance, promoted new ideas and empowered its people. This is the true Islam, and these values are why Jordanians speak out against hatred, why we were among the first to condemn 9/11 absolutely and without reservation, and why we have taken the lead against extremism and terrorism.

Jordanians partake of a special heritage: From our soil, the Levant, faith in one God, the united belief of Judaism, Christianity and Islam took root and spread across the world. I believe that what is taking root in the Middle East today can also impact the world. If we succeed, and success will require all of us, this may be a century in which billions more people have access to the world's promise.

No discussion of the future of the Middle East can be complete without addressing the prospects for Iraq. Here as well it is urgent that the friends of freedom win the peace. That means more than replacing the old failed structure. There must be sustainable security, security in which Iraqis are able to resolve their own problems peacefully. It is not a question of how fast an election is held, but how well the governing institutions are built. It is the substance, not the pace of change that will ultimately define success.

As Iraq's neighbours, we bear a specific responsibility: to do all that is in our capability, to help the men and women of Iraq achieve the foundations for self-determination. This is the path to a free and prospering future, one that can benefit Iraqis and help opportunity flourish across the region. It is the path to Iraq's historic place: a great country, of knowledge and opportunities, within the family of Arab and Middle Eastern nations.

We are now well on our way into a new century. It was entered, in the words of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, "Through a gate of fire." Ahead lies the promise of freedom, human rights, global justice and development — if we make the right decisions now.

Those who believe in peace must stand together. To you, I say: you can count on Jordan. As we fight against terror, we are also working to deliver on something better, the promise of moderation, freedom and reform. We are working for new hope, hope for a future of prosperity and peace. As that future takes root and flourishes in my region, it will spread its benefits throughout the world.

In a recent speech, US Secretary of State Colin Powell said, "We fight terrorism because we must, but we seek a better world because we can". And I am sure that you all agree, for the aspirations of men and women across the world are much the same, and so should their opportunities be. We must now deliver on that promise, and work together to face the risks and the new dangers.

Jordan is reaching out to you on this agenda. We want your support, but we also want to support you in the march towards our common goals. For what we are facing, is indeed, a shared destiny but more importantly, a shared commitment for freedom, security and peace.

2005

Gerhard Schröder

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

In his speech to the 41st Munich Conference on Security Policy, Gerhard Schröder advocated a "truly strategic partnership with Russia".

The terrible tsunami disaster in Asia generated a unique groundswell of sympathy, solidarity and readiness to help all around the world. In common with many other governments, the German Government acted quickly and in a spirit of solidarity. This disaster made it abundantly clear to us that we live in one world.

In this one world, we undertook in the United Nations Charter "to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security". Today our security is threatened by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional instability and failing states. However, poverty and underdevelopment pose no less a threat. This has created ample breeding ground for international terrorism. The new dangers are causing tensions and can have an impact on any part of the world. That grim truth was brought horrifyingly home to us by the terrorist attacks in the US on 11 September 2001, in Madrid on 11 March 2004 and in Beslan last September.

But one thing is certain: we can only successfully master the new challenges if we tackle their root causes — and we must do so together, in a comprehensive manner and with a view to prevention. The fight against international terrorism must not be limited to military and police measures. Our commitment must help overcome the modernization crisis in many parts of the world, not least in the Islamic-Arabic countries. We should do so not with public admonitions but, rather, with encouragement and support for their own efforts.

Promoting democracy, the rule of law, good governance, economic and social development, education opportunities, women's rights and the protection of the sources of life on our planet play a prominent role in security policy today. We are pursuing these objectives together with our partners in the Middle East and through the G8 programme "Broader Middle East and Northern Africa" initiated by President Bush. Federal Foreign Minister Fischer presented the German proposals for this initiative here in Munich last year. They were expressly welcomed by many partners on both sides of the Atlantic and in the region.

One thing is certain: We will only master the challenges of the 21st century if transatlantic relations, the close ties between Europe, Canada and the United States are — and remain — intact. Only then will we also achieve the major international objectives which our governments have set themselves. That was true during the long years of the Cold War and it is still true in today's fundamentally different world.

The maxim continues to apply: close transatlantic ties are in the interests of Germany, Europe and America. However, we cannot look to the past when it comes to translating this maxim into practical policies, as is so often the case when transatlantic loyalty is professed. Rather, we must adapt to the new circumstances.

Every now and again during the last few years, there have been misunderstandings, strains, mistrust, even tensions across the Atlantic. I suspect that these were due not least to the fact that this process of adjustment to a changed reality has still not been completed. The changes are considerable, and some are even dramatic.

Not only the United States, but also Europe, need no longer fear a military attack on its borders today. The American military presence, which at that time both provided protection and represented a token of close solidarity, is no longer the security policy priority that it used to be. However, it continues to be of political significance.

In fact, the strategic challenges lie today beyond the North Atlantic Alliance's former zone of mutual assistance. And they do not primarily require military responses. In Asia, China and India are emerging as new world powers whose weight will have an impact not just on the region but on global politics. And the enemies we face together are no longer functioning states with a defined territory but the new global risks.

But it is not only the environment for Atlantic cooperation which has changed. The ensuing responsibility of the two states which, as it were, were the linchpins of this cooperation for many decades, namely the United States and Germany, has also changed. You, ladies and gentlemen of the US Congress, know best how your country's view of the world and perception of its role has altered during the last few years.

My country, too, sees its international role in a different light. As part of the European Union, Germany today feels that it shares responsibility for

international stability and order. And our active commitment in numerous crisis regions around the world demonstrates that we Germans are living up to this responsibility. At present, some 7,000 German troops are being deployed abroad.

However, this responsibility also brings with it a right to be involved in decision-making. Our wish to see Germany become a permanent member of the UN Security Council derives from the need to base responsibility on legitimacy.

I believe that the transatlantic partnership must take such changes into consideration. And, to be honest, it does so insufficiently at present. This becomes clear when we look at the institutions which are supposed to serve this partnership. The admission of new members is proof that NATO continues to be attractive. And NATO's presence in Afghanistan has highlighted how helpful its military organization can be even in distant crises. However, it is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and coordinate strategies.

The same applies to the dialogue between the European Union and the United States which in its current form does justice neither to the Union's growing importance nor to the new demands on transatlantic cooperation. I hope that new impetus will be generated in both areas on 22 February when the US President visits Brussels.

Today, no-one can produce ready answers. However, we should focus with even greater determination and resolve on the task of adapting our cooperation structures to the changed conditions and challenges. To this end, the governments of the European Union and the US should establish a high-ranking panel of independent figures from both sides of the Atlantic to help us find a solution. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan set us an example by establishing such a panel to deal with the necessary reform of his organization.

This panel should submit a report to the heads of state and government of NATO and the European Union by the beginning of 2006 on the basis of its analysis and proposals, the necessary conclusions could then be drawn.

In many regions of the world, not only major security challenges but also opportunities lie ahead. In Iraq, the elections held on 30 January marked an important step along the road towards the establishment of democratic political structures. The political process must now be vigorously continued and put on a broader basis. Only the participation of all political, ethnic and religious groups can provide any hope of lasting stability.

In Iraq, the international community is facing the considerable task of stabilizing the country, with repercussions for the entire region. Germany is making an important contribution towards this. Its share in the Paris Club debt relief for Iraq amounts to 4.7 billion euro. We are involved in the political and economic reconstruction and launched successful programmes to train and equip Iraqi soldiers and police officers very early on. Indeed, we were the first to do so. Due to the considerable advantages of conducting this training in the region, we are carrying out this project in and with the cooperation of the United Arab Emirates.

In Afghanistan, the presidential elections last October paved the way for national consensus. The forthcoming parliamentary elections offer hope of this country's further stabilization and democratization. The sustained support of the international community continues to be indispensable. At the same time, however, Afghanistan must, and can, gradually assume greater responsibility, also in the spheres of security and counter-narcotics policy.

Within the framework of the obligations it entered into in the Alliance, Germany will maintain its political, financial and military commitment in the long term and help ensure that the Alliance lives up to its tasks. In Afghanistan, we are prepared to support the progress made towards stabilization by assuming greater responsibility, especially in the north of the country.

2005 will also be a key year in the western Balkans where the European Union is increasingly engaged. Lasting stabilization of this region can only be achieved through close cooperation between the European Union, NATO, the UN and the OSCE. This applies to Bosnia and Herzegovina and, above all, to Kosovo. Around mid-year, it will be decided whether and when negotiations on the status issue can begin. It is up to political leaders — both Albanians and Serbs — to create the prerequisites for an acceptable solution.

We will lend our support to a solution which is both realistic and points the way ahead. Above all, this includes a long-term constructive European perspective based on European values and standards, such as protection of minorities, the repatriation of refugees and decentralization. The European perspective applies to Kosovo and to the entire western Balkans.

In the Middle East, the election of the Palestinian President Abbas and Israel's readiness to withdraw from Gaza have opened a window of opportunity for the revival of the peace process. The cease-fire agreed upon in Sharm el Sheik must become permanent. The Road Map remains the key framework for the peace process. Our goal must be to ensure that Israelis and Palestinians live together in peace in two independent and recognized states. We welcome the declared intention of the US to make an active con-

tribution without which a solution cannot be found. Europe, too, and Germany in particular, is aware of its responsibility and is prepared to support the process.

We must prevent the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which are in violation of international law. To this end, we must ensure that every state complies with the Non-Proliferation Treaty and that there are no gaps in the non-proliferation regime. We remain committed to preventing a nuclear arms race in the Middle East.

The negotiations with Iran, which we are conducting together with our British and French friends and the European Union, are intended to serve this objective. We are strongly committed to making the process a success. That would entail objective and verifiable guarantees from Tehran that its nuclear programme serves exclusively peaceful purposes. Our American friends share this goal.

I strongly encourage the US Administration to actively support the Europeans' diplomatic efforts. We must overcome Iran's massive isolation. For Iran will only abandon its nuclear ambitions for good if not only its economic but also its legitimate security interests are safeguarded. In order to achieve this, it will be necessary to work with our American partner and in a dialogue with the region to develop sustainable security structures for the Gulf region.

German foreign and security policy is determined by our geographic and political location at the heart of Europe. We are formulating it in Europe, for Europe and from Europe. It is in Germany's, as well as the international community's interests, that the European Union assume greater international responsibility. The step towards creating its own set of political and military instruments with the European Security and Defence Policy is therefore necessary.

The European Union is assuming an increasing number of security tasks in close coordination and cooperation with NATO. It has already demonstrated this in several missions. A strong European pillar guarantees Europe's loyal partnership in the transatlantic alliance and its willingness to share the burden of tasks. This is also in the vested strategic interests of the US.

One of the fundamental truths of European politics is that security on our continent cannot be achieved without, and certainly not against, Russia. Since the sea change of 1989/90, we have managed to remodel our relations with Russia and moved away from Cold War confrontation towards ever more comprehensive cooperation — in political, security and economic terms. Given the historical background, this could certainly not be

taken for granted. Russia itself has made considerable progress during the last few years, despite the enormous problems and difficulties which such an unprecedented transformation inevitably brings with it. The West has a vital interest in a democratic Russia which plays a constructive role in resolving global issues.

That is why we are working with Poland towards a truly strategic partnership with Russia, a partnership made to last which will include all key areas and benefit both sides. The NATO-Russia Council shows what opportunities lie in close security cooperation.

It would send a far-reaching message if the European Union and Russia were to agree on the content of a strategic partnership in all key areas at the EU-Russia summit on 10 May — one day after the ceremony to mark the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. We will do all we can to achieve this goal.

The fresh democratic start in Ukraine also offers new opportunities. Developments in this European country are of great importance to the stability of Europe as a whole. We therefore have a vital interest in an independent, democratic, market-oriented Ukraine which develops close relations based on trust with the European Union and Russia. We will support President Yushchenko in this and assist him in his policy of reform and national reconciliation.

No country in the world can successfully tackle the new international challenges on its own. We need a strong and effective multilateral system for this, one which provides a reliable framework for cooperation and solidarity between states and guarantees good global governance.

I am convinced that the international community will succeed in mastering these challenges. Germany is prepared to make its contribution and to live up to the international responsibility which we are expected to shoulder.

2007

Vladimir Putin

President of the Russian Federation

In his speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy, Vladimir Putin criticized the post-Cold War state of affairs marked by US dominance, unrestrained use of force, and a disregard for international law.

I am truly grateful to be invited to such a representative conference that has assembled politicians, military officials, entrepreneurs and experts from more than 40 nations.

This conference's structure allows me to avoid excessive politeness and the need to speak in roundabout, pleasant but empty diplomatic terms. This conference's format will allow me to say what I really think about international security problems. And if my comments seem unduly polemical, pointed or inexact to our colleagues, then I would ask you not to get angry with me. After all, this is only a conference. And I hope that after the first two or three minutes of my speech Mr Teltschik will not turn on the red light over there.

Therefore. It is well known that international security comprises much more than issues relating to military and political stability. It involves the stability of the global economy, overcoming poverty, economic security and developing a dialogue between civilisations.

This universal, indivisible character of security is expressed as the basic principle that "security for one is security for all". As Franklin D. Roosevelt said during the first few days that the Second World War was breaking out: "When peace has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger."

These words remain topical today. Incidentally, the theme of our conference — global crises, global responsibility — exemplifies this.

Only two decades ago the world was ideologically and economically divided and it was the huge strategic potential of two superpowers that ensured global security.

This global stand-off pushed the sharpest economic and social problems to the margins of the international community's and the world's agenda. And, just like any war, the Cold War left us with live ammunition, figuratively speaking. I am referring to ideological stereotypes, double standards and other typical aspects of Cold War bloc thinking.

The unipolar world that had been proposed after the Cold War did not take place either.

The history of humanity certainly has gone through unipolar periods and seen aspirations to world supremacy. And what hasn't happened in world history?

However, what is a unipolar world? However one might embellish this term, at the end of the day it refers to one type of situation, namely one centre of authority, one centre of force, one centre of decision-making.

It is a world in which there is one master, one sovereign. And at the end of the day this is pernicious not only for all those within this system, but also for the sovereign itself because it destroys itself from within.

And this certainly has nothing in common with democracy. Because, as you know, democracy is the power of the majority in light of the interests and opinions of the minority.

Incidentally, Russia — we — are constantly being taught about democracy. But for some reason those who teach us do not want to learn themselves.

I consider that the unipolar model is not only unacceptable but also impossible in today's world. And this is not only because if there was individual leadership in today's — and precisely in today's — world, then the military, political and economic resources would not suffice. What is even more important is that the model itself is flawed because at its basis there is and can be no moral foundations for modern civilisation.

Along with this, what is happening in today's world — and we just started to discuss this — is a tentative to introduce precisely this concept into international affairs, the concept of a unipolar world.

And with which results?

Unilateral and frequently illegitimate actions have not resolved any problems. Moreover, they have caused new human tragedies and created new centres of tension. Judge for yourselves: wars as well as local and regional conflicts have not diminished. Mr Teltschik mentioned this very gently. And no fewer people perish in these conflicts — even more are dying than before. Significantly more, significantly more!

Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force — military force — in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts. As a result we do not have sufficient

strength to find a comprehensive solution to any one of these conflicts. Finding a political settlement also becomes impossible.

We are seeing a greater and greater disdain for the basic principles of international law. And independent legal norms are, as a matter of fact, coming increasingly closer to one state's legal system. One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations. Well, who likes this? Who is happy about this?

In international relations we increasingly see the desire to resolve a given question according to so-called issues of political expediency, based on the current political climate.

And of course this is extremely dangerous. It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasise this — no one feels safe! Because no one can feel that international law is like a stone wall that will protect them. Of course such a policy stimulates an arms race.

The force's dominance inevitably encourages a number of countries to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, significantly new threats — though they were also well-known before — have appeared, and today threats such as terrorism have taken on a global character.

I am convinced that we have reached that decisive moment when we must seriously think about the architecture of global security.

And we must proceed by searching for a reasonable balance between the interests of all participants in the international dialogue. Especially since the international landscape is so varied and changes so quickly — changes in light of the dynamic development in a whole number of countries and regions.

Madam Federal Chancellor already mentioned this. The combined GDP measured in purchasing power parity of countries such as India and China is already greater than that of the United States. And a similar calculation with the GDP of the BRIC countries — Brazil, Russia, India and China — surpasses the cumulative GDP of the EU. And according to experts this gap will only increase in the future.

There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity.

In connection with this the role of multilateral diplomacy is significantly increasing. The need for principles such as openness, transparency and predictability in politics is uncontested and the use of force should be a really exceptional measure, comparable to using the death penalty in the judicial systems of certain states.

However, today we are witnessing the opposite tendency, namely a situation in which countries that forbid the death penalty even for murderers and other crimes, are airily participating in military operations that are difficult to consider legitimate. And as a matter of fact, these conflicts are killing people — hundreds and thousands of civilians!

But at the same time the question arises of whether we should be indifferent and aloof to various internal conflicts inside countries, to authoritarian regimes, to tyrants, and to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction? As a matter of fact, this was also at the centre of the question that our dear colleague Mr Lieberman asked the Federal Chancellor. If I correctly understood your question (addressing Mr Lieberman), then of course it is a serious one! Can we be indifferent observers in view of what is happening? I will try to answer your question as well: of course not.

But do we have the means to counter these threats? Certainly we do. It is sufficient to look at recent history. Did not our country have a peaceful transition to democracy? Indeed, we witnessed a peaceful transformation of the Soviet regime — a peaceful transformation! And what a regime! With what a number of weapons, including nuclear weapons! Why should we start bombing and shooting now at every available opportunity? Is it the case when without the threat of mutual destruction we do not have enough political culture, respect for democratic values and for the law?

I am convinced that the only mechanism that can make decisions about using military force as a last resort is the Charter of the United Nations. And in connection with this, either I did not understand what our colleague, the Italian Defence Minister, just said or what he said was inexact. In any case, I understood that the use of force can only be legitimate when the decision is taken by NATO, the EU, or the UN. If he really does think so, then we have different points of view. Or I didn't hear correctly. The use of force can only be considered legitimate if the decision is sanctioned by the UN. And we do not need to substitute NATO or the EU for the UN. When the UN will truly unite the forces of the international community and can really react to events in various countries, when we will leave behind this disdain for international law, then the situation will be able to change. Otherwise the situation will simply result in a dead end, and the number of serious mistakes will be multiplied. Along with this, it is necessary to make sure that international law has a universal character both in the conception and application of its norms.

And one must not forget that democratic political actions necessarily go along with discussion and a laborious decision-making process.

The potential danger of the destabilisation of international relations is connected with obvious stagnation in the disarmament issue.

Russia supports the renewal of dialogue on this important question.

It is important to conserve the international legal framework relating to weapons destruction and therefore ensure continuity in the process of reducing nuclear weapons.

Together with the United States of America we agreed to reduce our nuclear strategic missile capabilities to up to 1,700-2,000 nuclear warheads by 31 December 2012. Russia intends to strictly fulfil the obligations it has taken on. We hope that our partners will also act in a transparent way and will refrain from laying aside a couple of hundred superfluous nuclear warheads for a rainy day. And if today the new American Defence Minister declares that the United States will not hide these superfluous weapons in warehouse or, as one might say, under a pillow or under the blanket, then I suggest that we all rise and greet this declaration standing. It would be a very important declaration.

Russia strictly adheres to and intends to further adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as well as the multilateral supervision regime for missile technologies. The principles incorporated in these documents are universal ones.

In connection with this I would like to recall that in the 1980s the USSR and the United States signed an agreement on destroying a whole range of small- and medium-range missiles but these documents do not have a universal character.

Today many other countries have these missiles, including the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, India, Iran, Pakistan and Israel. Many countries are working on these systems and plan to incorporate them as part of their weapons arsenals. And only the United States and Russia bear the responsibility to not create such weapons systems.

It is obvious that in these conditions we must think about ensuring our own security.

At the same time, it is impossible to sanction the appearance of new, destabilising high-tech weapons. Needless to say it refers to measures to prevent a new area of confrontation, especially in outer space. Star wars is no longer a fantasy — it is a reality. In the middle of the 1980s our American partners were already able to intercept their own satellite.

In Russia's opinion, the militarisation of outer space could have unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era. And we have come forward more than once with initiatives designed to prevent the use of weapons in outer space.

Today I would like to tell you that we have prepared a project for an agreement on the prevention of deploying weapons in outer space. And in the near future it will be sent to our partners as an official proposal. Let's work on this together.

Plans to expand certain elements of the anti-missile defence system to Europe cannot help but disturb us. Who needs the next step of what would be, in this case, an inevitable arms race? I deeply doubt that Europeans themselves do.

Missile weapons with a range of about five to eight thousand kilometres that really pose a threat to Europe do not exist in any of the so-called problem countries. And in the near future and prospects, this will not happen and is not even foreseeable. And any hypothetical launch of, for example, a North Korean rocket to American territory through western Europe obviously contradicts the laws of ballistics. As we say in Russia, it would be like using the right hand to reach the left ear.

And here in Germany I cannot help but mention the pitiable condition of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.

The Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe was signed in 1999. It took into account a new geopolitical reality, namely the elimination of the Warsaw bloc. Seven years have passed and only four states have ratified this document, including the Russian Federation.

NATO countries openly declared that they will not ratify this treaty, including the provisions on flank restrictions (on deploying a certain number of armed forces in the flank zones), until Russia removes its military bases from Georgia and Moldova. Our army is leaving Georgia, even according to an accelerated schedule. We resolved the problems we had with our Georgian colleagues, as everybody knows. There are still 1,500 servicemen in Moldova that are carrying out peacekeeping operations and protecting warehouses with ammunition left over from Soviet times. We constantly discuss this issue with Mr Solana and he knows our position. We are ready to further work in this direction.

But what is happening at the same time? Simultaneously the so-called flexible frontline American bases with up to five thousand men in each. It turns out that NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders, and we continue to strictly fulfil the treaty obligations and do not react to these actions at all.

I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not have any relation with the modernisation of the Alliance itself or with ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask: against whom is this

expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact? Where are those declarations today? No one even remembers them. But I will allow myself to remind this audience what was said. I would like to quote the speech of NATO General Secretary Mr Woerner in Brussels on 17 May 1990. He said at the time that: "the fact that we are ready not to place a NATO army outside of German territory gives the Soviet Union a firm security guarantee". Where are these guarantees?

The stones and concrete blocks of the Berlin Wall have long been distributed as souvenirs. But we should not forget that the fall of the Berlin Wall was possible thanks to a historic choice — one that was also made by our people, the people of Russia — a choice in favour of democracy, freedom, openness and a sincere partnership with all the members of the big European family.

And now they are trying to impose new dividing lines and walls on us — these walls may be virtual but they are nevertheless dividing, ones that cut through our continent. And is it possible that we will once again require many years and decades, as well as several generations of politicians, to dissemble and dismantle these new walls?

We are unequivocally in favour of strengthening the regime of non-proliferation. The present international legal principles allow us to develop technologies to manufacture nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes. And many countries with all good reasons want to create their own nuclear energy as a basis for their energy independence. But we also understand that these technologies can be quickly transformed into nuclear weapons.

This creates serious international tensions. The situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme acts as a clear example. And if the international community does not find a reasonable solution for resolving this conflict of interests, the world will continue to suffer similar, destabilising crises because there are more threshold countries than simply Iran. We both know this. We are going to constantly fight against the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Last year Russia put forward the initiative to establish international centres for the enrichment of uranium. We are open to the possibility that such centres not only be created in Russia, but also in other countries where there is a legitimate basis for using civil nuclear energy. Countries that want to develop their nuclear energy could guarantee that they will receive fuel through direct participation in these centres. And the centres would, of course, operate under strict IAEA supervision.

The latest initiatives put forward by American President George W. Bush are in conformity with the Russian proposals. I consider that Russia and the USA are objectively and equally interested in strengthening the regime of the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment. It is precisely our countries, with leading nuclear and missile capabilities, that must act as leaders in developing new, stricter non-proliferation measures. Russia is ready for such work. We are engaged in consultations with our American friends.

In general, we should talk about establishing a whole system of political incentives and economic stimuli whereby it would not be in states' interests to establish their own capabilities in the nuclear fuel cycle but they would still have the opportunity to develop nuclear energy and strengthen their energy capabilities.

In connection with this I shall talk about international energy cooperation in more detail. Madam Federal Chancellor also spoke about this briefly — she mentioned, touched on this theme. In the energy sector Russia intends to create uniform market principles and transparent conditions for all. It is obvious that energy prices must be determined by the market instead of being the subject of political speculation, economic pressure or blackmail.

We are open to cooperation. Foreign companies participate in all our major energy projects. According to different estimates, up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia — and please think about this figure — up to 26 percent of the oil extraction in Russia is done by foreign capital. Try, try to find me a similar example where Russian business participates extensively in key economic sectors in western countries. Such examples do not exist! There are no such examples.

I would also recall the parity of foreign investments in Russia and those Russia makes abroad. The parity is about fifteen to one. And here you have an obvious example of the openness and stability of the Russian economy.

Economic security is the sector in which all must adhere to uniform principles. We are ready to compete fairly.

For that reason more and more opportunities are appearing in the Russian economy. Experts and our western partners are objectively evaluating these changes. As such, Russia's OECD sovereign credit rating improved and Russia passed from the fourth to the third group. And today in Munich I would like to use this occasion to thank our German colleagues for their help in the above decision.

Furthermore, as you know, the process of Russia joining the WTO has reached its final stages. I would point out that during long, difficult talks we heard words about freedom of speech, free trade, and equal possibilities more than once but, for some reason, exclusively in reference to the Russian market.

And there is still one more important theme that directly affects global security. Today many talk about the struggle against poverty. What is actually happening in this sphere? On the one hand, financial resources are allocated for programmes to help the world's poorest countries — and at times substantial financial resources. But to be honest — and many here also know this — linked with the development of that same donor country's companies. And on the other hand, developed countries simultaneously keep their agricultural subsidies and limit some countries' access to high-tech products.

And let's say things as they are — one hand distributes charitable help and the other hand not only preserves economic backwardness but also reaps the profits thereof. The increasing social tension in depressed regions inevitably results in the growth of radicalism, extremism, feeds terrorism and local conflicts. And if all this happens in, shall we say, a region such as the Middle East where there is increasingly the sense that the world at large is unfair, then there is the risk of global destabilisation.

It is obvious that the world's leading countries should see this threat. And that they should therefore build a more democratic, fairer system of global economic relations, a system that would give everyone the chance and the possibility to develop.

Speaking at the Conference on Security Policy, it is impossible not to mention the activities of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). As is well-known, this organisation was created to examine all — I shall emphasise this — all aspects of security: military, political, economic, humanitarian and, especially, the relations between these spheres.

What do we see happening today? We see that this balance is clearly destroyed. People are trying to transform the OSCE into a vulgar instrument designed to promote the foreign policy interests of one or a group of countries. And this task is also being accomplished by the OSCE's bureaucratic apparatus which is absolutely not connected with the state founders in any way. Decision-making procedures and the involvement of so-called non-governmental organisations are tailored for this task. These organisations are formally independent but they are purposefully financed and therefore under control.

According to the founding documents, in the humanitarian sphere the OSCE is designed to assist country members in observing international human rights norms at their request. This is an important task. We support this. But this does not mean interfering in the internal affairs of other countries, and especially not imposing a regime that determines how these states should live and develop.

It is obvious that such interference does not promote the development of democratic states at all. On the contrary, it makes them dependent and, as a consequence, politically and economically unstable.

We expect that the OSCE be guided by its primary tasks and build relations with sovereign states based on respect, trust and transparency.

In conclusion I would like to note the following. We very often — and personally, I very often — hear appeals by our partners, including our European partners, to the effect that Russia should play an increasingly active role in world affairs.

In connection with this I would allow myself to make one small remark. It is hardly necessary to incite us to do so. Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy.

We are not going to change this tradition today. At the same time, we are well aware of how the world has changed and we have a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential. And of course we would like to interact with responsible and independent partners with whom we could work together in constructing a fair and democratic world order that would ensure security and prosperity not only for a select few, but for all.

Horst Teltschik: Thank you very much for your important speech. We heard new themes, including the issue of global security architecture — one was not in the foreground over the last few years — disarmament, arms control, the issue of the NATO-Russian relations, and cooperation in the field of technology.

There are still a whole number of questions and Mr President is ready to answer.

Question: Dear Mr President, thank you for your speech. I would like to emphasise that the German Bundestag is convinced of Russia's importance as Europe's partner and of the importance of the role you play. The Federal Chancellor said this in her speech.

Proceeding from experience, I would like to mention two issues in your speech. First of all, on your opinion of NATO and NATO expansion, a phenomenon that you consider dangerous for Russia. Would you acknowledge that this phenomenon is, in practice, not expansion but rather the self-determination of democratic states who want this? And that NATO finds it difficult to accept states that do not declare this readiness? You could

admit that thanks to NATO expansion eastern borders have become more reliable, more secure. Why are you afraid of democracy? I am convinced that only democratic states can become members of NATO. This stabilises neighbours.

About what is happening inside your country. The murder of Anna Politkovskaya was a symbol. One can say that this affects many journalists, makes everybody afraid, and the law on non-governmental organisations also causes alarm.

Question: I well understand your comments about non-proliferation. Especially at the end of the Cold War we saw a reduction of the deployment of nuclear weapons, but we also saw increased terrorism. Nuclear materials must be kept away from terrorists.

Question: Coming back to the question that was also asked to the Federal Chancellor. What does the future hold for Kosovo and Serbia? What is your opinion of Mr Ahtisaari? How will Russia influence resolving this problem?

Question: Can you comment on the experiences of Russian servicemen in Chechnya? And about your comments on energy: you briefly mentioned the market role energy plays in politics. The EU is interested in reaching a partnership agreement that contains fixed policy principles. Are you ready to guarantee reliable energy deliveries, including in the agreement?

Question: Mr President, your speech was both sincere and frank. I hope that you understand my frank and direct question. In the 1990s Russian experts actively helped Iran develop missile technologies. Iran now has advanced medium- and long-range missiles that would enable it to strike Russia and part of Europe. They are also working towards placing nuclear warheads on these missiles. Your country has made efforts to negotiate with Iran on this issue and supported the UN Security Council resolution to prevent Iran from carrying out such a policy.

My question is as follows: what efforts will Russia make — through the UN or otherwise — to stop these very serious events in Iran?

Question: I am confident that the historians of the future will not describe our conference as one in which the Second Cold War was declared. But they could. You said that it is necessary to put pressure on Iran and to provide positive incentives. But is it not true that Russia is interfering with the process of applying strong pressure through sanctions? Secondly, with regards

to deliveries of weapons, Russia is encouraging Iran, especially since these weapons appeared in Lebanon and in Gaza. What are your comments on this?

Question: I understand your sincerity and I hope that you will accept our sincerity. First of all, about arms control. Who needs a new arms race? I want to point out that the USA has not developed a new strategic weapon in more than two decades and that you recently tested the Topol-M missile, and that it is already deployed in silos and on mobile installations. You criticised the USA for unilateral actions and said twice that military actions can only be legitimate if they receive UN approval. The USA is carrying out military actions in Iraq and in Afghanistan according to UN decisions and today in Kosovo the majority of troops are supporting peace-making operations in this country.

My question is the following: are you saying that independently of how Russia perceives a threat to its international interests, it will not undertake military operations without UN approval?

Question: You talked about the danger of a unipolar world in which one sovereign makes a decision without consulting anyone else. In many people's opinion, in Russia we are seeing an increasingly unipolar government where competing centres of influence are forced to tow the party line, whether it be in the State Duma, the regional leadership, the media, business communities or non-governmental organisations. Would a unipolar government be such a reliable partner when the issue of energy security is at stake?

Vladimir Putin: First of all I would like to thank you for your questions. Very interesting. It is a shame that we have little time left because I would be pleased to have a separate discussion with all of you. I very much enjoy this, I like it.

I will begin with the last question about the unipolar nature of the Russian government. Today the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the United Russia Party, the Liberal Democratic Party and other political forces as well sit in the Russian parliament. And their basic positions differ significantly. If you aren't aware of this then just have a talk with the leadership of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and then with the leader of our liberal democrats, Mr Zhirinovsky. You will see the difference at once. If you cannot see it now, then have a talk with them. There is no problem here, simply go to Moscow and talk to them.

About our future plans. We would like to have a mature political system, a multi-party system with responsible politicians who can anticipate the country's development and not only work responsibly before elections and immediately after, but in a long-term future as well. That is what we aspire to. And this system will certainly be a multi-party one. All our actions within Russia, including changing the State Duma election regime, the election regime in the Russian parliament, are designed to strengthen a multi-party system in Russia.

And now about whether our government cabinet is able to operate responsibly in resolving issues linked to energy deliveries and ensuring energy security. Of course it can! Moreover, all that we have done and are doing is designed to achieve only one goal, namely to transfer our relations with consumers and countries that transport our energy to market-based, transparent principles and long-term contracts.

I will remind you and my colleague, the President of Ukraine, who is sitting opposite from me, also knows this. For fifteen years prior to 2006, as long as we did not make the corresponding decisions during our difficult talks, deliveries of Russian energy and, first and foremost, of gas to Europe depended on the conditions and prices for the deliveries of Russian gas to Ukraine itself. And this was something that Ukraine and Russia agreed among themselves. And if we reached no agreement, then all European consumers would sit there with no gas. Would you like to see this happen? I don't think so. And despite all the scandals, the protection of interests, and differences of opinion we were able to agree with President Yushchenko. I consider that he made a responsible, absolutely correct and market-oriented decision. We signed separate contracts for the delivery of our gas to Ukraine and for delivering Russian gas to Europe for the next five years. You should thank us, both Russia and Ukraine, for this decision. And thank you also for your question.

It would have been better if I answered your questions at once.

Regarding our perception of NATO's eastern expansion, I already mentioned the guarantees that were made and that are not being observed today. Do you happen to think that this is normal practice in international affairs? But all right, forget it. Forget these guarantees. With respect to democracy and NATO expansion. NATO is not a universal organisation, as opposed to the UN. It is first and foremost a military and political alliance, military and political! Well, ensuring one's own security is the right of any sovereign state. We are not arguing against this. Of course we are not objecting to this. But why is it necessary to put military infrastructure on our borders during this expansion? Can someone answer this question?

Unless the expansion of military infrastructure is connected with fighting against today's global threats? Let's put it this way, what is the most important of these threats for us today — the most important for Russia, for the USA and for Europe — it is terrorism and the fight against it.

Does one need Russia to fight against terrorism? Of course! Does one need India to fight against terrorism! Of course! But we are not members of NATO and other countries aren't either. But we can only work on this issue effectively by joining our forces. As such, expanding infrastructure, especially military infrastructure, to our borders is not connected in any way with the democratic choices of individual states. And I would ask that we not mix these two concepts.

You know, I wrote so illegibly here that even I cannot read my own writing. I will therefore answer what I can read and if I do not answer something, please remind me of the question.

What will happen with Kosovo and with Serbia? Only Kosovars and Serbs can know. And let's not tell them how they should live their lives. There is no need to play God and resolve all of these peoples' problems. Together we can only create certain necessary conditions and help people resolve their own problems. Create the necessary conditions and act as the guarantors of certain agreements. But we should not impose these agreements. Otherwise, we shall simply put the situation into a dead end. And if one of the participants in this difficult process feels offended or humiliated, then the problem will last for centuries. We will only create a dead end.

What does our position consist in? Our position consists in adhering precisely to this principle. And if we see that one party is clearly dissatisfied with the proposals to resolve the situation then we are not going to support this option.

I did not exactly understand what you meant when you asked about our servicemen's experience in Chechnya. Their experience is not pleasant, but it is extensive. And if you are interested in the general situation in Chechnya, then I can tell you that a parliament and a president have been elected, and that the government is functioning. All the bodies of authority and administration have been formed. Practically all the political forces in Chechnya have been involved in work in the Republic. As an example, the former Defence Minister of Aslan Maskhadov's government is now a member of parliament in Chechnya. And we made a whole series of decisions that would allow former insurgents to return not only to normal life, but also to the Republic's political activities. As such, today we prefer to act by using economic and political means and, in practice, we have transferred the responsibility for ensuring security almost 100 percent to the Chechen

people. Because the agencies of law and order that were formed in Chechnya are almost 100 percent composed of local citizens, from those living in Chechnya on a permanent basis — from Chechens.

As to Lebanon, I also did not quite understand what you meant. But, yes, the fact that we sent military construction workers to Lebanon to restore bridges and infrastructure that was destroyed in the conflict with Israel is a confirmation of a well-known situation, the one I described just now. And military units protecting these builders were made up of servicemen from Chechnya and with Chechen origins. We recognised that if our servicemen must operate in regions inhabited by Muslims, sending a contingent of Muslim servicemen would be no bad thing. And we were not mistaken. The local population really gave a warm welcome to our military builders.

Now about the energy agreement with the European Union, since this is how I understood the question. We have said many times that we are not against agreeing on the principles underlying our energy relations with the EU. Moreover, the principles contained in the Charter are generally comprehensible. But the Charter itself is not so acceptable to us. Because not only Russia but also our European partners do not adhere to its principles. It is enough to remember that the market for nuclear materials remains closed for us. Nobody has opened this market to us.

There are also other moments which I simply do not want to draw attention to now. But as to the principles themselves, we are already using these principles in our work with German companies. I shall remind you of the transaction that took place between Gazprom and BASF. As a matter of fact, this was an asset swap. We are ready to continue to work this way. We are ready. But in each concrete instance we must understand what we give, what our partners give, calculate, have an independent international expert evaluation, and then make a decision. We are ready to engage in this work. We have actually just recently done something similar with our Italian partners, with the company ENI. And we did more than simply sign an agreement about deliveries until 2035 — I think — we also talked about swapping assets. And we are studying this same type of cooperation with our Ukrainian friends. This is going ahead.

And is it necessary to fix these principles in a possible future fundamental text between Russia and the EU? It is possible to have different opinions on this issue. I consider that it is not necessary because, in addition to energy, we have other spheres in which we cooperate with the EU, including agriculture, high-tech and transportation. And all of this is very important and very interesting. And we cannot put all of this in one fundamental act that should act as a framework document. Or would you want us to put only what you need in the document and leave what we need outside of the framework? Let's discuss things honestly with one another and take mutually acceptable decisions.

"In the 1990s Russia helped Iran develop missile technologies". I think that you asked me this question. "Today Iran wants to put nuclear warheads on these missiles that could reach Europe. What is Russia going to do about the Iranian nuclear programme?" Is that so?

Well first of all, I do not have data that in the 1990s Russia helped Iran create its own missile technologies. It was other countries that worked very actively towards this. And technology was transferred through different channels. And we have proof of this. At the time I gave these proofs directly to the President of the United States. And technology also came from Europe and from Asian countries.

So Russia is hardly at fault here. I assure you. Russia is the country least involved here. Least of all. If it is involved at all. At the time I was still working in St Petersburg, but we were not involved with this. I can assure you of this. But you know that at the business level something could have happened. We trained experts in institutes and so on. And at the request and according to the information of our American partners we reacted harshly to this. Immediately and harshly. We did not observe such a reaction from our other partners, including European partners. Moreover, I do not know whether you are aware of this or not but you should know that military technology and special equipment is still coming from the United States. Until now. Until now spare parts for F-14 planes come from the armed forces and the Pentagon. As far as I know, there is even an investigation taking place in the United States on this account. And despite the fact that this investigation is proceeding and that these spare parts were seized at the border and then sent back, after a certain amount of time, according to the data I have — and if they are not correct then check them — those same cargos were again seized at the border. Even bearing a tag 'material evidence'.

You know, this stream is really hard to stop. We need to work together to do so.

About whether or not Iran has missiles that threaten Europe. You are mistaken. Today Iran has — Mr Gates is here today and certainly knows this data better than I do, and the Russian Defence Minister is also here — missiles with a range of 2,000 kilometres.

Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov: 1,600–1,700 kilometres.

Vladimir Putin: 1,600–1,700 kilometres. Only. Well, count how many kilometres there are between Munich and the Iranian border. Iran has no such missiles. They plan to develop some with a range of 2,400 kilometres. It is not known whether they have the technology to do so. And with respect to 4,000, 5,000 or 6,000 kilometres, then I think that this would simply require a different economy. So, it is improbable in general. And Iran is not threatening Europe. With regard to the idea that they are preparing to use nuclear warheads then we do not have such data. We do not have this data about nuclear warheads.

North Korea has tested a nuclear device. Iranians are constantly saying that their nuclear programme has a peaceful character. But I agree with you that the international community has concerns about the character and quality of Iran's nuclear programmes. And Mr ElBaradai recently stated these concerns in what I think were six or seven points. I agree with you about this. And I do not understand why the Iranian party has still not reacted in a positive and constructive way to the concerns that Mr ElBaradai stated and therefore assuaged these concerns. I do not understand this just as you do not understand it.

What are we going to do? I think that together we need to work patiently and carefully. And, that's right, to create incentives and show the Iranian leadership that cooperation with the international community is much better than confrontation.

Yes, and again about the deliveries of weapons to Iran. You know that there has been more talk than deliveries. Our military and technical cooperation with Iran is minimal. Simply minimal. I am not sure what minimal figures it is estimated at. In general we deliver much less arms to the Middle East than other countries, including the United States. No comparison is possible there. We recently delivered an anti-aircraft weapon system to Iran — that is true — with a medium range, approximately 30 to 50 kilometres. That is true. Why did we do this? I can explain why. We did this so that Iran did not feel it had been driven into a corner. So that it didn't feel that it was in some kind of hostile environment. Rather that Iran could understand that it had channels of communication and friends that it could trust. We very much expect that the Iranian party will understand and hear our signals.

As to our weapons in Lebanon and in the Gaza strip. I am not aware of our weapons in the Gaza strip. I have not heard of such examples. Well, Kalashnikovs are in general the most widely used small arms in the world. They are probably everywhere. And probably there are still automatic Kalashnikovs in Germany or, in any case, some that have still not been destroyed. That is one hundred percent certain.

In Lebanon it is true. Elements of our anti-tank systems really have been seen there. That is true. Our Israeli partners told me about this at once. We carried out a thorough investigation into what happened. And we determined that these systems had remained in Lebanese territory after the Syrian army left. We carried out the corresponding work with our Syrian partners. We determined that our future military and technical cooperation with Syria would exclude the possibility that weapons could fall into any hands other than the ones they were destined for. We developed such a system. Among other things, we agreed on a system of possible warehouse inspections, at any time that is convenient for Russian experts. Inspections in warehouses after deliveries of Russian weapons systems to Syria.

"The USA is not developing strategic weapons but Russia is. Will Russia use force in the future if it is not sanctioned by the UN? Russia is developing a system of strategic weapons".

Fine question, excellent! I am very grateful to you for this question. It will give me the opportunity to talk about the essence of what is happening. What are we indebted to in the past decades if there was a stand-off between two superpowers and two systems but nevertheless a big war did not take place? We are indebted to the balance of power between these two superpowers. There was an equilibrium and a fear of mutual destruction. And in those days one party was afraid to make an extra step without consulting the other. And this was certainly a fragile peace and a frightening one. But as we see today, it was reliable enough. Today, it seems that the peace is not so reliable.

Yes, the United States is ostensibly not developing an offensive weapon. In any case, the public does not know about this. Even though they are certainly developing them. But we aren't even going to ask about this now. We know that these developments are proceeding. But we pretend that we don't know, so we say that they aren't developing new weapons. But what do we know? That the United States is actively developing and already strengthening an anti-missile defence system. Today this system is ineffective but we do not know exactly whether it will one day be effective. But in theory it is being created for that purpose. So hypothetically we recognise that when this moment arrives, the possible threat from our nuclear forces will be completely neutralised. Russia's present nuclear capabilities, that is. The balance of power will be absolutely destroyed and one of the parties will benefit from the feeling of complete security. This means that its hands will be free not only in local but eventually also in global conflicts.

We are discussing this with you now. I would not want anyone to suspect any aggressive intentions on our part. But the system of international

relations is just like mathematics. There are no personal dimensions. And of course we should react to this. How? Either the same as you and therefore by building a multi-billion dollar anti-missile system or, in view of our present economic and financial possibilities, by developing an asymmetrical answer. So that everybody can understand that the anti-missile defence system is useless against Russia because we have certain weapons that easily overcome it. And we are proceeding in this direction. It is cheaper for us. And this is in no way directed against the United States itself.

I completely agree if you say that the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) is not directed against us, just as our new weapons are not directed against you. And I fully agree with my colleague and my friend about another thing. Do you know — and I will not be afraid of the word — that in spite of all our disagreements I consider the President of the United States my friend. He is a decent person and I know that today the wolves can blame the United States for everything that is being done on the international arena and internally. But I know that he is a decent person and it is possible to talk and reach agreements with him. And when I talked to him he said: "I proceed from the fact that Russia and the USA will never be opponents and enemies again". I agree with him. But I repeat once again that there are symmetries and asymmetries here, there is nothing personal. It is simply a calculation.

And now about whether Russia will use military force without the sanction of the UN. We will always operate strictly within the international legal framework. My basic education is in law and I will allow myself to remind both myself and my colleagues that according to the UN Charter peacekeeping operations require the sanction of both the UN and the UN Security Council. This is in the case of peace-keeping operations. But in the UN Charter there is also an article about self-defence. And no sanctions are required in this case.

So, what have I forgotten?

Question: My question was about multipolarity in Russia itself and about the attitude of the international community towards Russia if Russia does not observe these principles, in reference to the murder of journalists, fears, anxieties, the absence of freedom and non-governmental organisations.

Vladimir Putin: I will say a couple of words. I already answered part of the question when I talked about the structure of the Russian parliament. Look at who is represented there, the political views of the people who have leadership positions in parliament, the legitimate parties. Now, as to non-governmental organisations, they are working actively in Russia. Yes, we introduced a new system for registering these organisations. But it is not that different from registration systems in other countries. And we have not yet seen any complaints from non-governmental organisations themselves. We have not refused registration to almost any organisations. There were two or three cases that were refused on simply formal grounds and these organisations are working on correcting certain provisions in their charters and so on. Nobody has been refused registration based on substantial, fundamental issues. All are continuing to work in the most active possible way and will continue to do so in the future.

What bothers us? I can say and I think that it is clear for all, that when these non-governmental organisations are financed by foreign governments, we see them as an instrument that foreign states use to carry out their Russian policies. That is the first thing. The second. In every country there are certain rules for financing, shall we say, election campaigns. Financing from foreign governments, including within governmental campaigns, proceeds through non-governmental organisations. And who is happy about this? Is this normal democracy? It is secret financing. Hidden from society. Where is the democracy here? Can you tell me? No! You can't tell me and you never will be able to. Because there is no democracy here, there is simply one state exerting influence on another.

But we are interested in developing civil society in Russia, so that it scolds and criticises the authorities, helps them determine their own mistakes, and correct their policies in Russian citizens' interests. We are certainly interested in this and we will support civil society and non-governmental organisations.

As to fears and so on, are you aware that today Russians have fewer fears than citizens in many other countries? Because in the last few years we made cardinal changes to improve the economic well-being of our citizens. We still have a great many problems. And we still have a great many unresolved problems. Including problems linked with poverty. And I can tell you that fears basically come from this source.

As to journalists then yes, this represents an important and difficult problem. And, incidentally, journalists are not only killed in Russia, but in other countries as well. Where are most journalists killed? You are an expert and probably know in which country the most journalists died in,

say, the last year and a half? The largest number of journalists were killed in Iraq.

As to tragedies within Russia, we will certainly struggle with these phenomena in the most thorough way possible and sternly punish all criminals who try to undermine trust in Russia and damage our political system.

2007

Robert Gates

Secretary of Defense of the United States of America

Robert Gates addressed the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy one day after Vladimir Putin, emphasizing the need for "a vibrant and muscular transatlantic alliance".

I would like to thank Horst for inviting me to speak at this venerable forum to offer some thoughts on our transatlantic partnership. It's gratifying to see so many people who I've worked with on these security issues going back many years. Speaking of issues going back many years, as an old Cold Warrior, one of yesterday's speeches almost filled me with nostalgia for a less complex time. Almost. Many of you have backgrounds in diplomacy or politics. I have, like your second speaker yesterday, a starkly different background — a career in the spy business. And, I guess, old spies have a habit of blunt speaking. However, I have been to re-education camp, spending four and half years as a university president and dealing with faculty. And, as more than a few university presidents have learned in recent years, when it comes to faculty it is either "be nice" or "be gone." The real world we inhabit is a different and much more complex world than that of 20 or 30 years ago. We all face many common problems and challenges that must be addressed in partnership with other countries, including Russia. For this reason, I have this week accepted the invitation of both President Putin and Minister of Defense Ivanov to visit Russia. One Cold War was quite enough. The world has dramatically changed since May 1989, when Horst Teltschik and I sat out on the patio of the "Chancellor's Bungalow" in Bonn with Chancellor Kohl and my colleague Larry Eagleburger. At that time, the allies were trying to come together on the issue of reducing conventional forces in Europe. The way I remember that particular meeting, however, was that the tough part wasn't addressing the military balance of power in Europe, it was seeing to it that there were enough cakes and pastries on hand for both the Chancellor and the Deputy Secretary of State.

It's certainly good to be in Munich following the NATO ministerial in Seville. I should say that this trip has been quite a different experience than my so-called factfinding excursion last month to Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia. The one fact, above all, that became clear from that venture is that I am too old to visit seven countries in five days. However, I have now learned here in Munich that I am also too old to sit still for seven hours. As many of you know, the security of this continent has been of interest to me for much of my academic and professional life — for more than 40 years in fact. This was true while I was a Ph.D. candidate in Russian and Soviet history, through my career at CIA, as well as during service on the National Security Council under four different presidents. For many of those years, I worked hand in hand with colleagues from the Western European governments to help coordinate our actions and responses in the latter half of the Cold War. Many of those colleagues are here this morning. I had a ringside seat for an extraordinary run of events from the 1975 Helsinki conference to the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe a decade and a half later. During that struggle, there were times of confrontation between the superpowers. Relations among the allies were not without their stresses and strains, either. But our Atlantic partnership was strong enough to allow us to surmount the difficulties and make the right choices at the right times. For example, the decision to deploy cruise and Pershing missiles to counter the Soviet Union's new weapons in the late 1970s, for example, was politically difficult for many allies. But ultimately, the courage and leadership of statesmen and women on both sides of the Atlantic, and the actual deployment of the missiles in the early 1980s, helped set the stage for deep reductions in nuclear arms and the end of the Cold War. Looking back, it seems clear that totalitarianism was defeated as much by ideas the West championed — then and now — as by ICBMs, tanks, and warships that the West deployed. Our most effective weapon, then and now, has been Europe's and North America's shared belief in political and economic freedom, religious toleration, human rights, representative government, and the rule of law. These values kept our side united, and inspired those on the other side — in Wenceslas Square, in Gdansk, behind the wall in Berlin, and in so many other places around the world — to defeat communism from within. At the end, the peoples of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union simply stood up, shrugged off their chains, and re-claimed a future based on these same ideas. I believe these shared values and shared interests endure, as do our shared responsibilities to come to their defense. Today, they are under threat by another virulent ideological adversary and are confronted by a range of other looming geopolitical challenges. This strategic environment has challenged the mission and identity of the Atlantic Alliance — an institution and arrangement that, in my view, is the political and military expression of a deeper bond between Europe and North America.

Many of these questions are not new. I recall spending countless hours in discussions beginning in 1989 on the future of the Alliance and how it would need to change in order to remain vital and relevant after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. The question that still confronts us today is how a partnership originally formed to defend fixed borders should adapt to an era of unconventional and global threats. The European continent, of course, has been confronting the threat of terrorism for decades. I don't have to remind the citizens of Munich of this — the very city where, in 1972, the world witnessed the kidnapping and massacre of Olympic athletes not too far from where we sit today. But the challenge posed by violent extremism today is unlike anything the West has faced in many generations. In many ways it is grounded in a profound alienation from the foundations of the modern world — religious toleration, freedom of expression and equality for women. As we have seen, many of these extremist networks are homegrown, and can take root in the restless and alienated immigrant populations of Europe. The dark talent of the extremists today is, as President Bush said, to combine "new technologies and old hatreds." Their ability to tap into global communications systems turns modern advances against us and turns local conflicts into problems of potentially much wider concern. The interest they have shown in weapons of mass destruction is real and needs to be taken seriously. We have learned that from a distant or isolated place, from any failed or extremist state — such as Afghanistan during the 1990s — these networks can plan and launch far reaching and devastating attacks on free and civilized nations. No fewer than 18 terrorist organizations, many linked with al Qaeda, have pulled off bloody attacks throughout the world — in the United States, Spain, the United Kingdom, India, Algeria, Somalia, Russia, Pakistan, Jordan, Egypt, Indonesia, Tunisia, Morocco and in other countries as well. Those attacks — and other threats that have since emerged — revealed even more starkly the need to reorient the Atlantic Alliance to be able to export security beyond the borders of NATO. Although created to oppose Soviet communism, NATO's guiding principle was a broad and deep one from the very start: to build a defensive alliance against any threat to the security and interests of the transatlantic community for generations to come. And today we see that an Alliance that never fired a shot in the Cold War now conducts six missions on three continents. It has created new mechanisms for action on the international stage. It has been through

profound changes and will undergo more in the future. We see this in NATO's truly historic mission to Afghanistan, where Alliance forces have engaged in significant ground combat for the first time, in complex operations across difficult terrain, in a theater many long miles from Western Europe.

Last year in Afghanistan, the Taliban paid the price for testing the fighting mettle of NATO forces, as troops from the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands, Australia, Romania, Estonia and Denmark — along with our Afghan allies — prevailed in often fierce combat in Kandahar province. In fact, as the NATO allies just discussed in Seville, if we take the necessary steps now, the offensive in Afghanistan this spring will be our offensive — one that will inflict a powerful setback on the enemy of an elected government supported by the overwhelming majority of the Afghan people. Going forward, it is vitally important that the success Afghanistan has achieved not be allowed to slip away through neglect or lack of political will or resolve. All allies agree we need a comprehensive strategy — combining a muscular military effort with effective support for governance, economic development, and counternarcotics. But now we have to back up those promises with money and with forces. An Alliance consisting of the world's most prosperous industrialized nations, with over two million people in uniform — not even counting the American military — should be able to generate the manpower and materiel needed to get the job done in Afghanistan — a mission in which there is virtually no dispute over its justness, necessity, or international legitimacy. Our failure to do so would be a mark of shame. What has emerged in Afghanistan is a test of our ability to overcome a challenge of enormous consequence to our shared values and interests. In today's strategic environment, there are potentially others:

- The fault lines of sectarian conflict and jihadist movements radiating outward from the Middle East and Central Asia;
- An Iran with hegemonic ambitions seeking nuclear weapons; and
- The struggle over the future of Iraq, with enormous implications for our common interests in the Middle East — and beyond.

Looking eastward, China is a country at a strategic crossroads. All of us seek a constructive relationship with China, but we also wonder about strategic choices China may make. We note with concern their recent test of an anti-satellite weapon. Russia is a partner in endeavors. But we wonder, too, about some Russian policies that seem to work against international stability, such as its arms transfers and its temptation to use energy resources for political coercion. As Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer said yesterday, Russia need not fear law-based democracies on its borders. In this strategic environment, the Alliance must be willing to alter long-standing habits, assumptions and arrangements. Much progress has been made, to be sure. After almost 15 years away from government, I have been deeply impressed by the new expeditionary capabilities and institutional reforms that NATO has undertaken. The missile defense discussion the United States is having with Poland, the Czech Republic, the U.K, and Denmark to protect our homelands is another promising development. And, at the Riga Summit, allied leaders agreed to strengthen our security partnerships with like-minded nations in other parts of the globe — such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea. But in addition to pursuing new missions, capabilities and partnerships, the members of this alliance must, individually and collectively, be willing to commit the necessary resources as well — not just in Afghanistan, but across the board. The benchmark of spending 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product on defense, for example, is a commitment agreed to by each member. Such an investment by all is necessary to meet our collective obligations to ensure that when we stand together in battle — whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere — the quality, quantity and sophistication of our equipment and our capabilities are at an appropriate level. And yet, at this time, only six of NATO's 26 members have met the GDP standard. Over the years, people have tried to put the nations of Europe and of the Alliance into different categories:

- The "free world" versus "those behind the Iron Curtain;"
- "North" versus "South;"
- "East" versus "West;" and
- I am told that some have even spoken in terms of "old" Europe versus "new."

All of these characterizations belong to the past. The distinction I would draw is a very practical one — a "realist's" view perhaps: It is between Alliance members who do all they can to fulfill collective commitments, and those who do not. NATO is not a "paper membership," or a "social club," or a "talk shop." It is a military alliance — one with very serious real world obligations. It is a sad reality that today, as all through human history, there are those who seek through violence and crimes against the innocent to dominate others. Another sad reality is that, when all is said and done, they understand and bow not to reason nor to negotiation, but to superior force. This is perhaps politically incorrect and perhaps an old intelligence officer being

too blunt. But it is reality. And it is the political and military power of our 26 democracies of NATO — the most potent alliance in the history of the world — that is the shield behind which the ideas and values we share are spreading around the globe. In short, meeting our commitment to one another and to those we strive to help — from the Balkans to Afghanistan — is critical to our success and theirs. Looking back, the Cold War was an epic struggle that incurred epic costs. I believe we all agree that incurring those costs was preferable to the alternatives: catastrophic conflict or totalitarian domination. The range of challenges and threats we face today will also test our willingness to meet our commitments to spend the money and take the risks — indeed, to fully embrace our shared responsibility to protect our shared interests and values. There cannot be any doubt: The world needs a vibrant and muscular transatlantic alliance. The cooperation between our countries must continue and it must deepen. We will need to work hard at it. And we are working hard together in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, and, many of us, in Iraq. As we face these challenges as rich and powerful democracies, it is worth recalling the words of a leader of a fledgling and weak alliance of disparate provinces with:

- Disrupted economies;
- Differing issues and goals;
- Diverse allegiances;
- Mutual suspicion;
- An army comprised of soldiers often with parochial loyalties, and lacking in equipment and training; and
- With but one strong ally.

George Washington reminded his countrymen — and us — that "Perseverance and spirit have done wonders in all ages. These should be our watchwords going forward: "Perseverance" and "spirit. And, I should add — "unity."

2009

Henry Kissinger

Former Secretary of State of the United States of America

In his speech to the 45th Munich Security Conference, Henry Kissinger reflected on the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

Let me begin with one German sentence to follow Wolfgang Ischinger: Meine Muttersprache ist auch Deutsch, obwohl man das nördlich von Mainz nicht immer anerkennt.

In the presence of so many distinguished members of the Administration — of the new American Administration — I hope you all understand that I'm speaking here as an observer. I think I understand the approaches of the new Administration. Senator McCain has been my friend all my life. President Obama is my President. And like Senator McCain, I will do my utmost to bring about a bipartisan foreign policy, so that we can approach the topics we're discussing here as a unified country, and with a long sense of purpose. And I have tried to keep this in mind also in preparing my remarks.

Now the basic dilemma of the nuclear age has been with us since Hiroshima: how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that are being pursued. Any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign policy objectives. Efforts to develop a more nuanced application have never been persuasive — from the doctrine of "limited nuclear war" in the 1950s to the "mutual assured destruction" theory of later periods.

In office, I recoiled before the options produced by the prevalent nuclear strategies, especially since these prospects were generated by weapons for which there could not be any operational experience, so that calculations and limitations were largely theoretical. But I was also persuaded — and remain persuaded — that if the U.S. government adopts such considerations as its policy, it would be turning over the world's security to the most ruthless and perhaps genocidal.

In the two-power world of the Cold War, the adversaries managed to avoid this dilemma. The nuclear arsenals on both sides grew in numbers and sophistication. But except for the Cuban missile crisis, where a Soviet combat division seemed to have been initially authorized to use its nuclear weapons to defend itself, neither side approached the actual use of nuclear weapons, either against each other or in wars against non-nuclear third countries. In fact, they put in place, step-by-step, a series of safeguards to prevent accidents, misjudgments, and unauthorized launches.

But the end of the Cold War produced a paradoxical result: The threat of nuclear war between the nuclear superpowers has essentially disappeared. But the spread of technology — especially peaceful nuclear energy — has multiplied the feasibility of acquiring nuclear weapons by separating plutonium or from enriching uranium produced by peaceful nuclear reactors. The sharpening of ideological dividing lines and the persistence of unresolved regional conflicts have magnified the incentives to acquire nuclear weapons, especially by rogue states or non-state actors. The calculations of mutual insecurity that produced restraint during the Cold War do not apply with anything like the same degree to the new entrants in the nuclear field and even less so to the non-state actors. This is why proliferation of nuclear weapons has become an overarching strategic problem.

Any further spread of nuclear weapons multiplies the possibilities of nuclear confrontation and magnifies the danger of diversion. Thus, if proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues into Iran and remains in North Korea in the face of all ongoing negotiations, the incentives for other countries to follow the same path will become overwhelming.

Considerations as these have induced former Senator Sam Nunn, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, former Secretary of State George Shultz, and I — two Democrats and two Republicans — to publish recommendations for systematically reducing and eventually eliminating reliance on nuclear weapons. We have a record of strong commitment to national defense and security. We continue to affirm the importance of adequate deterrent forces, and we do not want our recommendations to diminish essentials for the defense of free peoples while a process of adaptation to new realities is going on. At the same time, we reaffirm the objective of a world without nuclear weapons that has been proclaimed by every American President since President Eisenhower.

Such a world will prove increasingly remote unless the nuclear weapons programs in Iran and the existing one in North Korea are overcome. In the case of Iran, negotiations are going on. In the case of North Korea, a six-party forum has demanded the elimination of nuclear weapons. And

North Korea has agreed to abandon its program but is so procrastinating in its implementation that it threatens to create a legitimacy for the stockpile it has already achieved.

I have long advocated negotiations with Iran on a broad front. Too many treat this as a kind of psychological exercise. In fact, it will be tested by concrete answers to four specific questions:

1. How close is Iran to a nuclear weapons capability?
2. At what pace is it moving?
3. What balance of rewards and penalties will move Iran to abandon it?
4. What do we do if, despite our best effort, diplomacy fails?

That is a task for all of us in the Western Alliance. And as somebody who was in office when we had close relations with Iran, let me say that this was not on the basis of personal preference for specific domestic institutions in Iran but on the basis of a conviction that a strong Iran, pursuing its national interests in the region, is also in the American interests, and that this option should be open to whatever government is prepared to negotiate with us.

Arresting and then reversing the proliferation of nuclear weapons places a special responsibility on the established nuclear powers. They share no more urgent common interests than preventing the emergence of more nuclear-armed states. The persistence of unresolved regional conflicts makes nuclear weapons a powerful lure in many parts of the world to intimidate neighbors and serve as a deterrent to countries who might otherwise intervene. Established nuclear powers should strive to make a nuclear capability less tempting by devoting their diplomatic efforts to diffuse unresolved conflicts that today make a nuclear arsenal so attractive.

A new nuclear agenda requires coordinated efforts on several levels: in the declaratory policy of the United States; in the U.S.-Russian relationship; in joint efforts with allies as well as other non-nuclear states relying on American deterrence; in securing nuclear weapons and materials on a global basis; and, finally, reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the doctrines and operational planning of nuclear weapons states.

The new American Administration has already signaled that a global nuclear agenda will be a high priority in preparation for the Review Conference on Nuclear — on the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty scheduled for the spring of 2010. A number of measures can be taken unilaterally or bilaterally with Russia to reduce the preemptive risk of certain alert measures and the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons.

A word about Russian relations: For over 30 years after the formation of the Western Alliance, the Russian threat was the motivating and unifying force in Western nuclear policy. Now that the Soviet Union no longer exists, it is important to warn against the danger of basing policy on self-fulfilling prophecies. Russia and the United States between them control around 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. They have it in their power to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons in their bilateral relationship. They have already done so on a limited basis for 15 years on such issues as the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program. The immediate need is, as the foreign minister has pointed out, is to start negotiations to extend the START I agreement, the sole document for the verification and monitoring of established ceilings on strategic weapons, which expires at the end of this year. That should be the occasion to explore significant reductions from the 1,700 to 2,000 permitted under the Moscow Treaty of 2002. A general review of the strategic relationship should also examine the way to enhance security at nuclear facilities in Russia and the United States.

A key issue has been missile defense — especially with respect to defenses deployed against threats from proliferating countries. The dialogue on this subject should be resumed at the point at which it was left by President George [W.] Bush and then-President Vladimir Putin in April 2008. The Russian proposal for a joint missile defense towards the Middle — Middle East, including radar sites in southern Russia, has always seemed to me a creative political and strategic approach which should be examined — of course especially for all of us in this room.

The effort to develop a new nuclear agenda must involve our allies from its inception. U.S. and NATO policy are — must be integrally linked. Key European allies are negotiating with Iran. America deploys tactical nuclear weapons in several NATO countries, and NATO declaratory policy mirrors that of the United States. There is therefore a basis and a necessity for strengthening these review processes and adapting them to the emerging realities. Parallel discussions are needed with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. And they are also imperative with China, India, and Pakistan. It must be understood that the incentive for nuclear weapons on the subcontinent are more regional than those of the established nuclear powers and their threshold for using them considerably lower.

(Before Wolfgang feels that I have lost all discipline, let me warn him... I'm aware of the [time-keeping] light and we're near the end of my remarks.)

The complexity of these issues explains why my colleagues and I have chosen an incremental, step-by-step approach. We are not able — certainly I'm not able — to describe the characteristics of the final goal: how one would determine the size of stockpiles; how to eliminate them totally and to verify the results. By affirming the desirability of the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons, we have concentrated on the steps that are achievable and verifiable. My colleague, Sam Nunn, has described the effort as akin to climbing a mountain shrouded in clouds: We cannot describe the top to be certain that there may not be unforeseen, perhaps even insurmountable, obstacles. But we are prepared to undertake the journey in the belief that the summit will never come into view unless we begin the ascent and deal with the proliferation issues immediately before us, including the Iranian and North Korean programs.

A closing word: A subject at first largely dominated by military experts has increasingly attracted the concern of advocates of disarmament. The dialogue between them has not always been as fruitful as it should be. Strategists are suspicious of negotiated attempts to limit the scope of weapons. Disarmament experts occasionally seek to preempt the outcome of the debate by legislating restrictions that achieve their preferred result without reciprocity.

The two groups must be brought together in our dialogue. So long as other countries build and improve their nuclear arsenals, deterrence of their use needs to be part of Western strategy. The program sketched here — it's not a program for unilateral disarmament. Both President Obama and Senator McCain, while endorsing a world free of nuclear weapons, also made it clear, in President Obama's words, that the United States cannot implement it alone.

The danger posed by nuclear weapons is unprecedented and it brings us back to the basic challenge of the nuclear period: Our age has stolen the fire from the gods; can we confine it to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?

HILLARY R. CLINTON
TAWWAKOL KARMAN
JOACHIM GAUCK
SERGEY LAVROV
PETRO POROSHENKO
DMITRY A. MEDVEDEV
JOHN MCCAIN
MICHAEL R. PENCE
BILL GATES
SHEIKH TAMIM BIN HAMAD AL-THANI
BENJAMIN NETANYAHU
MOHAMMAD JAVAD ZARIF
ANGELA MERKEL
ABDEL FATAH AL-SISI

Chapter 5

GROWING DISORDER

2010–2019

2012

Hillary R. Clinton

Secretary of State of the United States of America

In her speech to the 48th Munich Security Conference, Hillary R. Clinton underscored the importance of the transatlantic alliance and shared a "forward-leaning agenda" to deal with the pressing challenges—the challenges of a complex and fast-changing world.

This is a first, with both Secretary Panetta and I here together. But I think that it speaks volumes about the importance that we place on this conference, Wolfgang, and on the significance of the alliance that has grown so strong over the last 50 years. It is also a great personal pleasure for me to be back in Munich with so many colleagues and friends. I wish to thank one of them, my friend, the Foreign Minister, Westerwelle, for his important comments. And I also wish to thank the presentation by Sam Nunn and Igor Ivanov on the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative that I think holds great promise for us all if we heed the words that it contains.

This gathering, as Leon just said, founded at the height of the Cold War, has become an important symbol of our commitment to stand together as a transatlantic community. And we come to Munich each year, not only to advance our shared values, our shared security, and our shared prosperity, but to take stock of where we stand in the efforts to forge that union between us, and also to lift up our heads and look around the world at the global security situation. That calling is no less powerful today than it was 50 years ago.

Now, I have heard all the talk about where Europe fits in to America's global outlook. And I have heard some of the doubts expressed. But the reality couldn't be clearer. Europe is and remains America's partner of first resort. I have now traveled to Europe 27 times as Secretary of State. President Obama has visited 10 times. And wherever America is working to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, to fight disease, to help nations on the difficult journey from dictatorship to democracy, we are side by side with our friends in Europe.

In fact, I would argue the transatlantic community has never been more closely aligned in confronting the challenges of a complex, dangerous, and fast-changing world. The breadth and depth of our cooperation is remarkable. You know the litany. In Libya, NATO allies came together with Arab and other partners to prevent a catastrophe and to support the Libyan people. In Afghanistan, with nearly 40,000 European troops on the ground alongside our own, we have built and sustained NATO's largest-ever overseas deployment. And we will continue to support the Afghans as they assume full responsibility for their own security by the end of 2014.

As Iran continues to defy its obligations, America, Europe, and other partners have put in place the toughest sanctions yet. And we are also pursuing diplomacy through the E3+3 track, because Europe is vital to both halves of that dual-track strategy. And as a tyrant in Damascus brutalizes his own people, America and Europe stand shoulder to shoulder. We are united, alongside the Arab League, in demanding an end to the bloodshed and a democratic future for Syria. And we are hopeful that at 10:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time in New York, the Security Council will express the will of the international community.

As Secretary Panetta just made clear, our commitment to European defense is just as deep and durable as our diplomacy. At this year's NATO summit in Chicago, we will update our alliance to keep it strong for the 21st century. So when President Obama says that "Europe remains the cornerstone of our engagement with the world," those aren't just reassuring words. That is the reality.

Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to the world we hope to build together in the century ahead. Here in Munich, it is not enough to reaffirm old commitments. The world around us is fast transforming, and America and Europe need a forward-leaning agenda to deal with the challenges we face. Let me just briefly discuss five areas in particular that will require a greater collective effort.

First, we have to finish the business our predecessors started, and build a Europe that is secure, united, and democratic. And we heard the ICI Report that sets forward some very specific steps we could take together. From day one of this Administration, we have worked closely together to transform strategic relations with Russia, while standing firmly behind both our principles and our friends. This approach has yielded results, but we need work to sustain it. And this is not the only place in our community where we need to overcome mistrust. As long as important conflicts remain unresolved in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean, Europe remains incomplete and insecure. Even as we grapple with a wider global agenda, we cannot lose sight of the challenges closer to home.

And let me underscore the word "trust". We heard it from Igor Ivanov, we heard it from Guido Westerwelle, and I think it deserves repeating. We have to do more together to build a sense of trust and to overcome mistrust among us. That will have to be one of our strategic imperatives if we expect to address successfully the issues ahead.

Second, because the strength of our alliance depends on the health of our economies, security and prosperity are ultimately inseparable. That means we need a common agenda for economic recovery and growth that is every bit as compelling as our global security cooperation. We recognize that Europe's most urgent economic priority is the ongoing financial crisis. As you probably know, we have been dealing with one of our own. And although we get good news from time to time, as we did yesterday with jobs figures and drops in unemployment, we know we have a way to go, as well. We remain confident that Europe has the will and the means not only to cut your debt and build the necessary firewalls, but also to create growth, to restore liquidity and market confidence.

As Europe emerges from economic crisis, we have to work harder to reinforce each other's recoveries. As deep as our economic relationship is, it has not yet lived up to its potential. I speak often about economic statecraft, because I think we cannot talk about what must be done in the 21st century without recognizing that our economic strength lies at the core of everything we are able to do to advance our values, to protect our interest, to create the security architecture that will sustain stability, going forward. The new U.S.-EU High-Level Working Group on Jobs and Growth created by President Obama and his European counterparts should be at the forefront of our efforts to put our people back to work.

And also, America and Europe can and should be trading more with each other and with the rest of the world. That means we also need to be focused on promoting our economic values. Too often, American and European companies face unfair practices that tilt the playing field against us: favoritism for state-owned enterprises, barriers to trade emerging behind borders, restrictions on investment, rampant theft of intellectual property. Together, America and Europe need to instill that all nations must respect the rules of the road that guarantee fair competition and market access. And above all, we need to remember that our investment in global leadership is not the cause of our fiscal problems. And pulling back from the world will not be the solution.

Third, in a time of tight budgets we need to ensure that our security alliance is agile and efficient, as well as strong. That is what Secretary General

Rasmussen calls "smart defense": Joint deployment of missile defenses, the commonly-funded Alliance Ground Surveillance program, Baltic air policing, and a reinvigorated NATO response force. These are practical ways to provide security while minimizing cost to any one nation.

We also need to build our capacity to work with partners such as Sweden, Japan, Australia, members of the Arab League, and many others. And this will be a focus of our efforts in Chicago to ensure that NATO remains the hub of a global security network with a group of willing and able nations working side-by-side with us.

Fourth, our shared values are the bedrock of our community. We need to vigorously promote these together around the world, especially in this time of transformational political change. In the Middle East we have a profound shared stake in promoting successful transitions to stable democracies. We are making the Deauville Partnership a priority during America's G8 presidency this year. And to make good on its promise, we will be putting forward an ambitious agenda to promote political and economic reform, trade, investment, regional integration, and entrepreneurship to help people realize the better future they have risked so much to have.

Just as the impetus behind the Arab Spring has extended beyond the Middle East, so much our work. We have to help consolidate democratic gains in places like Cote d'Ivoire and Kyrgyzstan, and support democratic openings in Burma, and wherever people lack their rights and freedom. At the OSCE, the Community of Democracies, and elsewhere, we need to align all of the tools we have to further our values and goals.

America and Europe have more sophisticated tools than ever to support and reward those who take reforms, and to pressure those who do not. And wherever tyrants deny the legitimate demands of their own people, we need to work together to send a clear message: You cannot hold back the future at the point of a gun.

Of course, it is not credible to preach democracy elsewhere unless we protect and promote it ourselves within our community. The trappings of democracy are not enough. We need a vibrant free press, clean and transparent elections, an independent judiciary, a healthy political opposition, and protection for women, religious, and ethnic minorities. We must protect democratic rights and freedoms wherever they are endangered, including here in Europe.

Fifth and finally, we have to reach out to emerging powers and regions. The world we have worked together to build is changing. There are new centers of wealth and power, and fewer problems can be addressed decisively by America and Europe alone. So we have a challenge to make the most of this critical window of opportunity, to enlist emerging powers as partners, and strengthening a global architecture of cooperation that benefits us all.

I am glad that Europe's engagement in the Asia Pacific is on the agenda here in Munich, because we need to reach out together to regions already playing a growing role in world affairs. Now, a great deal has been said about the importance of a rising Asia Pacific for the United States. But not nearly enough has been said about its importance for Europe. America and Europe need a robust dialogue about the opportunities that lie ahead in the Pacific-Asia region. And we are building one here today. Taken together, all of these elements point to a larger enduring truth: When Americans envision the future, we see Europeans as our essential partners. There is no greater sign of our confidence and commitment than just how much we hope and need to accomplish with you.

We have not sustained the most powerful alliance in history by resting on our laurels. Our predecessors planned for the future together. They acted on the belief that America, Europe, and like-minded nations everywhere are engaged in a single common endeavor to build a more peaceful, prosperous, secure world. That is as true today as it ever was. And in this time of momentous change, let us have that same spirit guide us as we chart our path forward together.

2012

Tawwakol Karman

Nobel Peace Prize Laureate and Chairwoman of the Tawakkol Karman Foundation

Addressing the 48th Munich Security Conference, the freshly minted Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Tawwakol Karman sharply criticized the regime of President Bashar al-Assad for its atrocities against the Syrian people as well as Russia and China for obstructing actions of the United Nations Security Council.

At this very moment, while we have come together at the Munich Security Conference to discuss the future of peace and security in the world, the regime of Bashar al-Assad is slaughtering hundreds and injuring thousands of the great Syrian people — those people who are demanding freedom and democracy.

Just yesterday in the city of Homs, he perpetrated a horrendous massacre, which is a mere continuation of the daily massacres in this brave city. A city which constitutes the brave core and the heart of the peaceful Syrian revolution. Bashar al-Assad is committing these crimes, and is shamefully backed by Russia and China, two of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council that is supposed to promote peace and security in the world, and stand by the weak and those who are subjected to injustice.

Russia and China, with their refusals and obstructive conduct toward preventing international measures to protect the Syrian people and punish the atrocities of the Syrian regime, bear the moral and human responsibility for these massacres. I, under the name of Arab youth, from the Gulf to the Ocean, in the name of these brave Arab youths, unequivocally condemn the stance of these two countries that support the criminal regime of Bashar al-Assad. At the same time, I declare our appreciation of the position of the other 13 members of the Security Council, which endorsed the Arab-European draft resolution that was presented yesterday — first and foremost the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom. I urge you, in the name of your governments, to condemn this war and to spare no efforts to take the necessary measures to protect the Syrian people.

Just to remind you, ladies and gentlemen, peace between countries is not more important than peace within countries. The war of dictators on their peoples is not less criminal, not less violating than the wars led between countries. The war that Bashar al-Assad is leading against his own people is a war against humanity and his atrocities are provocative to the human conscience. This requires a firm stance by the international community.

The human conscience cannot rest, you cannot rest, when you see the blood of peaceful, patient and young Syrians shed is on the streets. Today, we look forward to the victory by the great Syrian people, who aspire to achieve democracy, justice and freedom. We have to stand by them, protect them and prove to the tyrants that international legitimacy, its conventions and values are more powerful than the weapons of the despots and greater than the oppressions of the tyrants.

You, ladies and gentlemen, are invited here as decision makers to enact fast measures in order to protect the Syrian people, and punish the criminal regime of Bashar al-Assad. I urge you, in the name of the patient and peaceful rebels, to expel Syrian ambassadors from your countries and I urge you to call back your ambassadors from Damascus — and that is the minimum that you can do to punish the Syrian regime. I also urge you to do everything in your power to protect the Syrian people.

We have to know that we cannot achieve stability in the Middle East unless we undergo a complete democratic transformation, and these societies are afforded the right to democracy and good governance. Otherwise, the Middle East is destined to face instability and a lack of security.

Security in the Middle East is dependent on the transition to democracy and good governance. The corrupt regimes and the nepotism that prevails in these countries sow the seeds for terrorism, for crises, for a lack of stability. And I stress again that stability in Arab countries is of interest to the whole international community. A dictator, who kills his own people and deprives them of their powers, is violating human values, human conventions and international agreements. As a result, what the Arab countries are exposed to now, the oppression they are experiencing, constitutes a true threat to international peace.

The new Middle East, to which the Arab youth aspire today, is based on two pillars: The first pillar is democracy. And I cannot imagine a secure and stable Middle East under dictatorships or corrupt regimes. I draw your attention to the fact that tyrants and the supporters of their regimes

are still slaughtering innocent people and standing in the way of change and reforms in more than one Arab country. In my home country, in Yemen, the family of Ali Abdallah Saleh still has the upper hand over the security and military apparatus, although he himself has already left the country. The networks of corruption, which he has built over the course of 30 years, still holds power. He and other high-ranking officials are granted immunity and the protection of the Gulf Initiative.

And this, ladies and gentlemen, has given them the opportunity to slaughter more people, stir up trouble and stand in the way of the transition which our young people have heavily paid for with their blood. Therefore I urge the United States, the European Countries and all the countries of the world to freeze the assets of Ali Abdallah Saleh and his civil and military high-ranking officials, and to refer his case to the International Criminal Court, regarding him as a criminal. He has to be braught to account for shedding the blood of innocent young people in Yemen and stealing the wealth of the country.

The second pillar for a new Middle East is justice. It is clear that a new Middle East which enjoys security and stability cannot become a reality as long as millions of Palestinians are still either seeking refuge outside their country or living under occupation, although international law and international agreements are on their side. The Palestinian wound is putting high pressure on the Arab and human conscience. This will not change until this great people achieves victory and justice, and until all the peoples in the region live in security, peace and stability, because there is no peace without justice.

Freedom inside and justice from the outside is all that the new Middle East needs — with its young peoples, glorious civilizations and immense resources — to become part of a human solution, not part of a problem.

Finally, ladies and gentlemen, we do praise the efforts of the organizers of this conference. But I would like to draw your attention to the fact that women are underrepresented in this conference, both as participants and speakers. With the exception of myself and Hillary Clinton there are almost no women in a conference that is supposed to decide upon security policies in the world. This is an example of a dominating male presence that overlooks women's participation. And this per se is the reasons for recent wars and conflicts in the world. Therefore, to achieve good security policies and a world of peace and security, I hope that women will be fairly and equally represented at the upcoming conferences.

2014

Joachim Gauck

President of the Federal Republic of Germany

In his speech at the 50th Munich Security Conference, Joachim Gauck called for a new German foreign policy based on stronger international commitments.

The five decades of the Munich Security Conference mirror a large part of the Federal Republic's history: from the defence of the West to global governance and from military science to a comprehensive security concept. What a sweeping arc! When this Conference first took place here in Munich, the country and its capital were divided and living under the shadow of the nuclear threat. Today we have to deal with new tensions and new wars: between states, within states, close to home and far away.

But that hasn't changed the raison d'être of this Conference. Security remains vitally important, both to people and to nations. One of the strengths of open societies is that difficult and complex issues can be debated in public. That's always been the tradition at the Munich Security Conference. For through all of its controversies, it helps to consolidate peace and security through dialogue.

Mr Ischinger, together with your predecessor Horst Teltschik and the founder Ewald von Kleist you have made the Security Conference an outstanding forum and it has become a fixture in the diaries of foreign and security policy-makers. I therefore gladly accepted your invitation to open the 50th Conference.

This milestone anniversary provides an opportunity to look back and, above all, to look ahead. I'd therefore like to talk today about the path Germany has taken and where it could lead in future. For we Germans are advancing towards a form of responsibility that has not yet become routine for us.

In a nutshell, I'd like to talk about Germany's role in the world.

Let me start by saying that this is a good Germany, the best we've ever known. And that's not mere rhetoric. When I was born, the National Socialists — who brought war and suffering to the world — were in power.

When the Second World War ended, I was a young boy, only five years old. Our country was in ruins, both materially and morally. Just look at where Germany stands today: it's a stable democracy, free and peace-loving, prosperous and open. It champions human rights. It's a reliable partner in Europe and the world: an equal partner with equal responsibilities. All of that fills me with gratitude and joy.

However, it's precisely because these are good times for Germany that we have to consider what we have to change today to protect what is important to us. Some people in Germany are asking what there is to think about. They say that our country is surrounded by friends and that no country is seeking to become our enemy. They believe that Germany's foreign policy has long since found the right formula. That there is not much to adjust, never mind change. Why fix something if it isn't broken?

It's undoubtedly true that Germany's foreign policy has solid roots. Its most important achievement is that Germany, with the help of its partners, has turned a past blighted by war and dominance into a present marked by peace and cooperation. This includes the reconciliation with our neighbours, our commitment to European integration as a national goal, as well as our partnership with the United States as the cornerstone of the North Atlantic Alliance. Germany advocates a security concept which is based on values and encompasses respect for human rights. In Germany's foreign policy vocabulary, free trade and peace go hand in hand. As do the exchange of goods and prosperity.

Germany is globalised more than most countries and thus benefits more than most from an open world order. A world order which allows Germany to reconcile interests with fundamental values. Germany derives its most important foreign policy goal in the 21st century from all of this: preserving this order and system and making them fit for the future.

Pursuing this core interest while the world around us is undergoing sweeping changes is one of the major challenges of our age. If there has been one constant factor during the last few years, then it's the fact that we always underestimate the speed of change. Futurologists are amazed time and again that changes in the world become reality much more quickly than they had forecast. That also has an impact on our security: at a faster pace than we had ever imagined, we are entering a world in which individuals can buy a quantity of destructive power which was the preserve of states in earlier times. A world in which economic and political power is shifting and entire regions are arming themselves. In the Middle East, there is a danger that individual crises will converge and engulf the whole region. At this very moment, the world's only superpower is reconsidering the scale and form of its global engagement. Europe, its partner, is busy navel-gazing. I don't believe that Germany can simply carry on as before in the face of these developments.

For some time now, it's been impossible to ignore the fact that this change is gradually gnawing away at German certainties. We're committed to the European idea. However, Europe's crisis has made us feel uncertain. We're also committed to NATO. However, we've been debating for years about the direction the Alliance should take, and we've done nothing to stop the depletion of its financial resources. We're not calling the alliance with the United States into question, but we have observed symptoms of stress and uncertainty about the future. We have great respect for the rules-based world of the United Nations. However, we can't ignore the crisis in multilateralism. We'd like to see the new players on the world stage participate in the global order. However, some of them are seeking a place on the margins rather than at the heart of the system. We feel surrounded by friends, but hardly know how to deal with diffuse security threats such as the privatisation of power by terrorists and cyber criminals. We rightly complain when allies overstep the mark when they use electronic surveillance to detect threats. And yet, we prefer to remain reliant on them and hesitate to improve our own surveillance capacities.

This means that simply repeating familiar mantras won't be enough in future! For the key question is: has Germany already adequately recognised the new threats and the changes in the structure of the international order? Has it reacted commensurately with its weight? Has Germany shown enough initiative to ensure the future viability of the network of norms, friends and alliances which has brought us peace in freedom and democracy in prosperity?

Some — both at home and abroad — have a quick and simplistic answer: they regard Germany as the shirker in the international community. They say that Germany is all too ready to duck difficult issues. First of all, this criticism can be countered with facts and a pinch of historical perspective.

After the Second World War, initially no-one — neither abroad nor within Germany — wanted our country to play a strong international role. Furthermore, there were two German states which were both, to differing extents, only partially sovereign. Since reunification, Germany has embarked upon a new course. Step by step, our country has transformed itself from a beneficiary to a guarantor of international security and order. First of all, I want to mention development cooperation. Germany is investing large sums in this sphere because it wants to help build stable and secure societies. Second, Germany is doing much to lead the world into a resource-efficient

future. And third, few other countries are doing more to promote international institutions. Fourth, Germany has on occasion participated in military missions. Fifth, what the Federal Republic has done to help Europe grow together and overcome the recent crisis is truly impressive.

These are the facts. And yet not all critics of German policy are quite simply unfair. Some differentiate and highlight subtle nuances, and such criticism has a core of truth. Germany has already been travelling along the road towards becoming a guarantor of the international order and security for 24 years now. It's a difficult walk along a winding road. However, those who believe that very small steps are the best will find it difficult to keep up with the rapid change in threats and the dramatic shifts in the strategic environment.

Let me ask a few leading questions. Are we doing what we can to stabilise our neighbourhood, both in the East and in Africa? Are we doing what we have to in order to counter the threat of terrorism? And, in cases where we have found convincing reasons to join our allies in taking even military action, are we willing to bear our fair share of the risks? Are we doing what we should to attract new and reinvigorated major powers to the cause of creating a just world order for tomorrow? Do we even evince the interest in some parts of the world which is their due, given their importance? What role do we want to play in the crises afflicting distant parts of the globe? Are we playing an active enough role in that field in which the Federal Republic of Germany has developed such expertise? I am speaking, of course, of conflict prevention. In my opinion, Germany should make a more substantial contribution, and it should make it earlier and more decisively if it is to be a good partner.

Germany has long since demonstrated that it acts in an internationally responsible way. But it could — building on its experience in safeguarding human rights and the rule of law — take more resolute steps to preserve and help shape the order based on the European Union, NATO and the United Nations. At the same time, Germany must also be ready to do more to guarantee the security that others have provided it with for decades.

Now, some people in my country consider "international responsibility" to be a euphemism, veiling what's really at stake. Some think that in reality Germany would have to pay more. Others think that Germany would have to send in more soldiers. And they are all convinced that "more responsibility" primarily means more trouble. You will not be surprised to hear that I see things differently.

Politicians always have to take responsibility for their actions. But they also have to live with the consequences of their omissions. He who fails to act bears responsibility, too. We would be deceiving ourselves if we were to believe that Germany was an island and thus protected from the vicissitudes of our age. For few other countries have such close links with the rest of the world as Germany does. Germany has thus benefited especially from the open global order. And it's vulnerable to any disruptions to the system. For this reason, the consequences of inaction can be just as serious, if not worse than the consequences of taking action.

In this context, I would like to repeat what I said on 3 October, the Day of German Unity. We cannot hope to be spared from the conflicts of this world. But if we contribute to solving them, we can take a hand at least in shaping the future. It is thus worth Germany's while to invest properly in European cooperation and the global order.

Of course, it's true that solving problems can cost money. But we have shown, in the European crisis and elsewhere, that we are willing to go to great lengths to fulfil Alliance commitments and provide support, because doing so is ultimately in our own interest.

Sometimes it can even be necessary to send in the troops. If there's one thing we've learned from Afghanistan, it's that the Bundeswehr mission was necessary, but it could never have been more than a single element in the overall strategy. Germany will never support any purely military solution, but will approach issues with political judiciousness and explore all possible diplomatic options. However, when the last resort — sending in the Bundeswehr — comes to be discussed, Germany should not say "no" on principle. Nor should it say "yes" unthinkingly.

I have to admit that while there are genuine pacifists in Germany, there are also people who use Germany's guilt for its past as a shield for laziness or a desire to disengage from the world. In the words of the historian Heinrich August Winkler, this is an attitude that grants Germany a questionable "right to look the other way, which other Western democracies" cannot claim for themselves. Restraint can thus be taken too far if people start making special rules for themselves. Whenever that happens, I will criticise it. For it is crystal clear to me that we need NATO. And it is precisely at times when the United States cannot keep on providing more and more that Germany and its European partners must themselves assume greater responsibility for their security.

Furthermore, it should today be natural for Germany and its allies to not simply refuse to help others when human rights violations multiply and result in genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity. Not only do all Western democracies consider respect for human rights to be one of their defining features, it is also a cornerstone of any guarantee of security, of a peaceful and cooperative world order.

Brutal regimes must not be allowed to hide behind the principles of state sovereignty and non-intervention. This is where the concept of "responsibility to protect" comes to bear. This concept transfers to the international community the responsibility to protect the people of a given country from such atrocities when their own government fails to do so. In the very last resort, military means can be used, after careful consideration and a weighing up of the consequences, upon authorisation by the UN Security Council.

I know, and like human rights defenders around the world I am pained by the fact that action is not taken everywhere where such intervention would be morally justified and necessary to protect the lives and limbs of people in danger. This dilemma has recently been highlighted again by events in Syria. And I know that the relationship between legality and legitimacy will continue to be awkward as long as the Security Council is so often divided on these issues.

There will be many reasons why the concept of responsibility to protect rarely results in an intervention. The consequences of such action are frequently difficult or even impossible to calculate, and there is no way of determining accurately enough whether the situation in the crisis area will be better after military intervention. Sometimes domestic policy considerations will also militate against action. Whatever the precise circumstances, the decision whether to intervene or not will always be a morally difficult one.

The UN General Assembly has in principle recognised the concept of responsibility to protect. However, the concept remains contentious; the international debate continues. That's a good thing, since potential abuse of the concept for expansionist or imperialist purposes has to be ruled out. I therefore welcome the fact that the German Government is helping to further develop the concept, with a focus on prevention, international cooperation and the development of early warning systems.

So, will Germany reap "more trouble" if it plays a more active role? There are indeed commentators who think that a Germany that shows initiative will inevitably experience friction with its friends and neighbours. This assumption is, in my opinion, based on a misconception. "More responsibility" does not mean "more throwing our weight around". Nor does it mean "more going it alone"! On the contrary, by cooperating with other countries, particularly within the European Union, Germany gains influence. Germany would in fact benefit from even more cooperation. Perhaps this could even lead to the establishment of a common European defence. In our interconnected world there are problems that no country can solve on its own, however powerful it may be. The ability and willingness to cooperate are becoming the defining trademark of international politics. In line with this, responsibility is always shared responsibility.

As a globally plugged-in economy, Germany has no alternative but to find partners, be considerate and make compromises. Germany has long known that it must guard against going its own special way. A democracy must, of course, have the right to remain on the sidelines on occasion. But such a step should be well considered and should remain the exception. Going it alone has its price.

Of course, if you act, you are open to criticism. We saw that during the European crisis when Germany took the initiative. Old resentments were quick to surface, both within and outside Germany. I dread to think of the wave of outrage that would have been sparked had Germany not taken action at that time of European need.

I am most firmly convinced that a Germany which reaches out more to the world will be an even better friend and ally. It will also be a yet better partner within Europe.

To find its proper course in these difficult times, Germany needs resources, above all intellectual resources. It needs minds, institutions and forums. A Security Conference once a year in Munich — that's to be welcomed, but it's not enough. I wonder if it isn't time for all the universities to mobilise more than a handful of chairs where German foreign policy can be analysed. Doesn't research on security issues need to be invigorated, to boost work on matters such as defence against cyber attacks by criminals or intelligence services?

It's not a good sign that younger members of the German Bundestag feel that focusing on foreign and security policy is not beneficial to their careers. By the way, the German Bundestag has held some 240 debates on overseas deployments of the Bundeswehr since 1994. These debates have been conducted in an exemplary manner. However, in the same period, parliament has held fewer than ten fundamental debates on German foreign and security policy. But we need such debates — in the Bundestag and everywhere: in the churches and trade unions, in the Bundeswehr, in the political parties and in all kinds of associations.

For foreign and security policy is not just a matter for the elite. Basic existential issues should be a matter for reflection in the heart of society. Matters that affect everyone should be discussed by everyone. International events keep pushing us towards such a debate — the latest examples being the events in Mali and the Central African Republic. The fact that Germany's new Foreign Minister wants to re-examine his Ministry's policies — and put them up for discussion — squares nicely with the aspiration to open this

debate. Frank-Walter Steinmeier wants to seek dialogue with academia and with civil society. This would be a step towards a new understanding of society by society. Talking about how, where and when we should seek to defend our values and our security will gradually give us greater clarity about the extent and aims of Germany's international involvement.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the foreign guests at the Munich Security Conference for the trust their countries placed in West Germany at a time when many of their contemporaries still considered it a gamble.

However, to conclude, I would like to request something of us Germans. I would like to request that, as a basic rule, we too place our trust in this fundamentally reformed country of ours.

The post-war generations had reasons to be distrustful — of the German state and of German society. But the time for such categorical distrust is past. Let me come back now to my initial remarks. The Federal Republic of Germany has lived in peace with all its neighbours for more than six decades. Civil and human rights have been upheld for six decades. The rule of law has prevailed for six decades. Prosperity and internal security are among the country's defining features. Germany is home to a vibrant civil society which identifies errors and can help to correct them.

There has never been an era like this in the history of our nation. This is also why we are now permitted to have confidence in our abilities and should trust in ourselves. For we know that people who trust in themselves gain the strength to reach out to the world. People who trust in themselves can be relied on by their partners.

In the past, when the Germans put their country above everything, "über alles", as the national anthem proclaimed, a form of nationalism evolved that progressed through all the phases of an unenlightened sense of national identity, from forced self-assurance to self-delusion to hubris. Our affirmation of our nation today is based on all the things that make this country credible and trustworthy — including its commitment to cooperation with our European and North Atlantic friends. We should not trust in ourselves because we are the German nation, but because we are this German nation.

Let us thus not turn a blind eye, not run from threats, but instead stand firm, not forget, neglect or betray universal values, but instead uphold these values together with our friends and partners. Let us be seen to be living by them, let us defend them.

2015

Sergey Lavrov

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Against the background of the invasion of Crimea and growing tensions between Russia and the USA, Sergey Lavrov used his speech to the 51st Munich Security Conference to accuse the United States of dangerous brinkmanship and to warn of further escalation.

Mr Wolfgang Ischinger has included the issue of the collapse of global development on the agenda. One has to agree that events have taken a turn which is far from optimistic. But it is impossible to agree with the arguments of some of our colleagues that there was a sudden and rapid collapse of the world order that had existed for decades.

To the contrary, the last year's developments confirmed the correctness of our warnings against profound, systemic problems in the organisation of European security and international relations in general. I would like to remind you of the speech delivered by Russian President Vladimir Putin from these stands eight years ago.

The structure of stability, based on the UN Charter and the Helsinki principles, has long been undermined by actions of the United States and its allies in Yugoslavia, which was bombed, as well as in Iraq and Libya, NATO's expansion to the east and the creation of new lines of separation. The project of building a "common European home" failed because our western partners were guided by illusions and beliefs of winners in the Cold War rather than the interests of building an open security architecture with mutual respect of interests. The obligations, solemnly undertaken as part of the OSCE and the Russia-NATO Council, not to ensure one's own safety at the expense of others' remained on paper and were ignored in practice.

The problem of missile defence is vivid evidence of the powerful destructive influence of unilateral steps in the development of military capabilities

contrary to lawful interests of other states. Our proposals on joint operation in the anti-missile field were rejected. In exchange we were advised to join the creation of global US missile defence, strictly according to Washington's templates, which, as we underlined and explained based on facts a number of times, carries real risks for Russian nuclear deterrence forces.

Any action undermining strategic stability will inevitably result in counter measures. Thus, long-term damage is inflicted upon the entire system of international treaties dealing with control over armaments, the feasibility of which directly depends on the missile defence factor.

We do not even understand what the United States' obsession with creating a global missile defence system can be connected with. With aspirations to indisputable military supremacy? With faith in the possibility to resolve issues technologically, whereas these issues are in reality political? In any case, the missile threats did not become weaker, but a strong irritant emerged in the Euro-Atlantic region, and it will take a long time to get rid of it. We are ready for this. Refusal of the United States and other NATO members to ratify the Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which buried this treaty, was another destabilising factor.

At the same time, our US colleagues are attempting to lay the blame on Russia in each complicated situation they themselves created. Let's take the discussions which have revived recently on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (the INF Treaty). Specialists are well aware of the United States' actions, which are in conflict with the spirit and the letter of this document. For instance, as part of the creation of a global missile defence system, Washington commissioned a large-scale programme of creating target missiles with characteristics similar or close to land-based ballistic missiles, prohibited by the aforementioned treaty. Unmanned fighting vehicles, widely utilised by the US, fall within the treaty's definition of intermediate-range cruise land-based missiles. The treaty directly prohibits ABM launchers, which will soon be deployed in Romania and Poland, because they can be used to launch intermediate-range cruise missiles.

While refusing to acknowledge these facts, our US colleagues assert they have some "substantiated" claims against Russia with respect to the INF Treaty, but diligently avoid specifics.

With due account of these and many other factors, attempts to narrow down the current crisis to last year's developments, to our mind, means falling into dangerous self-deception.

There is a pinnacle in the course pursued by our western colleagues in the past quarter of a century on preserving their domination in world affairs by all possible means, on seizing the geopolitical space in Europe.

They demanded of the CIS countries — our closest neighbours, connected with us by centuries economically, historically, culturally and even in terms of family ties — that they make a choice: "either with the West, or against the West." This is a zero-sum logic which, ostensibly, everyone wanted to leave in the past.

The strategic partnership of Russia and the European Union failed the test of strength, as the EU chose a path of confrontation over the development of mutually beneficial interaction mechanisms. We cannot help remembering the missed opportunity to implement Chancellor Merkel's initiative put forward in June 2010 in Meseberg, to create a EU-Russia Committee on Security and Foreign Affairs at the level of foreign ministers. Russia backed that idea but the European Union rejected it. Meanwhile, this constant dialogue mechanism, if it were to be set up, would allow for solving problems faster and more effectively, and for resolving mutual concerns in a timely manner.

As for Ukraine itself, unfortunately, at each stage of the crisis' development, our American colleagues, and under their influence the European Union too, have been taking steps leading to escalation. This happened when the EU declined to involve Russia in the discussion of the consequences of implementing the economic block of the Association Agreement with Ukraine, which was followed by direct support of a coup d'etat, and anti-government riots prior to that. This also happened when our western partners kept issuing indulgences to the Kiev authorities, who, rather than keeping their promise to launch nation-wide dialogue, began a large-scale military operation and labelled "terrorists" all those citizens who defied the unconstitutional change of power and the rule of ultranationalists.

It is very hard for us to explain why many of our colleagues fail to apply to Ukraine the universal principles of settling internal conflicts which presuppose, above all, an inclusive political dialogue between the protagonists. Why do our partners in the cases of Afghanistan, Libya, Iraq, Yemen, Mali and South Sudan, for instance, urge the governments to talk with opposition, with rebels, in some cases even with extremists, whereas in the Ukrainian crisis, our partners act differently, in fact, encouraging Kiev's military operation, going so far as to justify or attempt to justify the use of cluster munitions.

Regretfully, our western colleagues are apt to close their eyes to everything that is said and done by the Kiev authorities, including fanning xenophobic attitudes. Let me quote: "Ukrainian social-nationalism regards the Ukrainian nation as a blood-race community." Which is followed by: "The issue of total Ukrainisation in the future social-nationalist state will be

resolved within three to six months by a tough and balanced state policy." The author of those words is Andrey Biletsky, the commander of the Azov regiment, which is actively engaged in the military activities in Donbass. Some other activists who gained a position in politics and power, including Dmitry Yarosh, Oleg Tyagnibok and the leader of the Radical Party in the Verkhovna Rada Oleg Lyashko, publicly called a number of times for an ethnically clean Ukraine, for the extermination of Russians and Jews. Those statements failed to evoke any reaction in the western capitals. I don't think present-day Europe can afford to neglect the danger of the spread of the neo-Nazi virus.

The Ukrainian crisis cannot be settled by military force. This was confirmed last summer when the situation on the battlefield forced the participants to sign the Minsk Accords. It is being confirmed now as well, when the next attempt to gain a military victory is failing. Yet regardless of all that, more loud calls are being made in some western countries to step up support of the Kiev authorities' vector towards militarisation of society and the state, to "infuse" Ukraine with lethal weapons, to drag it into NATO. There is hope in the increased opposition in Europe to such plans, which can only make the tragedy of the Ukrainian people worse.

Russia will continue to strive for establishing peace. We are consistently calling for the cessation of military activities, the withdrawal of heavy weapons and the start of direct talks between Kiev and Donetsk and Lugansk on practical steps to restore the common economic, social and political space within the territorial integrity of Ukraine. Numerous initiatives by President Putin were dedicated to exactly that within the Normandy format, which helped launch the Minsk process, and our further efforts on its expansion, including yesterday's talks in the Kremlin between the Russian, German and French leaders. As you know, these talks are ongoing. We believe that there is every possibility we will reach results and agree on recommendations that will really allow the parties to untie the knot of this conflict.

It is crucial that everyone should be aware of the real magnitude of the risks. It is high time we abandoned the custom of considering every problem separately, unable to see the forest for the trees. It is time to give a comprehensive assessment of the situation. The world is now facing a drastic shift connected with the change of historical eras. The "labour pains" of the new world structure are manifested in increased proneness to conflicts in international relations. If short-sighted practical decisions in the interest of the nearest elections at home will prevail with politicians over a strategic global vision, the risk will emerge of losing global management control.

Let me remind you that at the onset of the Syrian conflict many people in the west advised not to exaggerate the danger of extremism and terrorism, stating that the danger will somehow dissipate by itself, while attaining the regime change in Damascus was a key priority. We see what has come out of it. Huge areas in the Middle East, in Africa, in the Afghan-Pakistani area are dropping out of legitimate government control. Extremism is spilling into other regions, including Europe. Risks of WMD pro-liferation are intensifying. The situation with the Middle East settlement, and in other regional conflict areas, is acquiring an explosive character. No adequate strategy on curbing those challenges has been worked out so far.

I would like to hope that today's and tomorrow's debates in Munich will bring us closer to understanding the level of efforts on searching for collective answers to threats which are common for all. The talk, if we want a serious result, can only be equal, without ultimatums and threats.

We are still confident that the overall complex of issues could be resolved much more easily, if the largest players agreed on strategic landmarks in their relations. Recently Helene Carrere d'Encausse, permanent secretary of the Academie française, whom I hold in high esteem, said that a real Europe may not exist without Russia. We would like to see if this perspective is shared by our partners, or if they are inclined to keep deepening the split in the common European space and setting its fragments in opposition to each other. Do they want to build a security architecture with Russia, without Russia, or against Russia? Of course, our American partners will also have to answer that question.

We have long been proposing the creation of a common economic and humanitarian space from Lisbon to Vladivostok based on the principles of equal and inseparable security that would encompass both members of integration unions and those nations that are not part of do them. Setting up reliable interaction mechanisms between the EAEU and the EU is especially topical. We welcome the emerging support for this idea by responsible European leaders.

On the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and the 25th anniversary of the Charter of Paris, Russia calls for infusing documents with real life, for preventing the substitution of the principles they contain, for ensuring stability and prosperity in the whole of the Euro-Atlantic space based on true equality, mutual respect and consideration for each others' interests. We wish success to the OSCE-formed "Group of Wise Men," which should reach a consensus in its recommendations.

As we mark the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, one should remember the responsibility each of us bears.

2015

Petro Poroshenko

President of Ukraine

In his much-recognized address to the 51st Munich Security Conference, Petro Poroschenko presented the passports of captured Russian soldiers as evidence of their illegal presence on Ukranian soil.

I arrived here today with very vivid memories of this conference from last year. It was just before Ukraine was to pay the bitter price of over a hundred innocent lives lost on the Maidan for the right to become a democratic and European state.

I had felt such pride for my country here in Munich. For 50 times this gathering has recognized that commitment, responsibility and values are the fundamental cornerstones of global peace and security. I felt so proud then, because Ukraine had reminded Europe and the world that democracy and values are worth fighting for.

That was a time when we believed in international law. The time when we had confidence that territorial claims, aggression, and a right of might belong to the past, at least in Europe.

But now, this confidence has been shattered. The year 2014 rolled the time back — decades, if not centuries. Our neighbor has breached international law and annexed a part of our territory.

Today, a formerly strategic partner is waging a hybrid war against a sovereign state, a co-founder of the United Nations. Mounds of lies and propaganda have been heaped into a wall of hatred erected between two once friendly nations.

The border routes, once used for transporting goods and exchange of visitors and friends, are now swarming with Russian tanks, armed personnel carriers, artillery, multiple-rocket-launchers and ammunition. How much evidence does the world still need to recognize an obvious fact — there is foreign military equipment, mercenaries, Russian military coaches and regular troops.

This last year has become a spiraling tragedy for my nation. The death toll of Ukrainian soldiers defending their land from aggressor is constantly rising.

Here are passports and documents of Russian soldiers and officers who came to us and “lost” their way. This is the best evidence of the presence of Russian troops who are killing Ukrainian soldiers and Ukrainian civilians.

Thousands of people have been killed since last April. More than ten thousand wounded. Hundreds and thousands of civilians have become innocent victims of terrorists financed, trained and equipped by Russia. 298 innocent victims of the downed MH17 flight; 16 killed in a bus shelled in Volnovakha, 8 dead in a trolleybus shelled in Donetsk; 31 civilian casualties of Mariupol shelling by Russian-provided rockets.

The children of Debaltseve will never be able to get rid of the memories of the nights they spent in freezing basements hiding from the explosions and the blasts. One million internally displaced persons have escaped the horrors of the war. But the trauma they have suffered will never be healed. I would like to thank our international partners for their humanitarian support in helping these people to start life from a new slate.

Nadia Savchenko has spent 237 days in a Russian prison and is now slowly dying in the 57th day of a hunger strike against her illegal abduction and imprisonment. This is all highly reminiscent of the Soviet repressive machine now applied to break the courage of a Ukrainian woman — an officer of the Ukrainian Air Force. We say “free Nadiya”, but we mean that every single Ukrainian who was captured and tortured just for defending their land must be released.

The war exhausts Ukraine daily affecting the lives of its citizens. We have lost 20 percent of our industrial output. 10 percent of industrial infrastructure is in ruins. The fighting in Donbas threatens a technological disaster on a global scale. One of the biggest nuclear power plants in Europe, Energodar, is just 280 kilometers from Mariupol.

The aggression against Ukraine has opened a Pandora’s Box for the international security. It must be clear that there are no temporary solutions. This conflict must be resolved, not frozen. It is now clear that if Ukraine does not succeed in restoring peace and its territorial integrity, the revision of borders, spread of terrorism, humanitarian and technological disasters, flexing of nuclear muscles will continue. It is a pleasure to share this panel with my friends — the Presidents of Bulgaria, Finland, and Lithuania.

If there are not many Finns who still remember Russian aggression, there are many Lithuanians who still mourn their loved ones lost in the fight for their independence from the Kremlin. And I am sure that the majority

of Bulgarians still remember the realities of socialism and would never go back to the Moscow orbit again.

Today Ukraine has to fight for its independence and its freedom. We must defend our land. But from the very beginning Ukraine has been committed to peace and has remained coherent and consistent on the peace process.

As a President of Peace, I presented my Plan. Its logic is laid down in the Minsk Protocol signed on September 5, 2014 by representatives of Ukraine, Russia, the OSCE and the separatists. These are very concrete steps to restore peace and facilitate the political dialogue. We immediately declared the ceasefire and signed the Memorandum on the line of disengagement and withdrawal of heavy weaponry on September 19, 2014.

We were ready to hold a political dialogue with those parties who are credible to represent the Donbass based on the democratic approach — elections. The Ukrainian Parliament passed the Law to provide wider authority to regional, municipal and local authorities of parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, and it passed the Law on Amnesty. We will never recognize fake elections held by separatists on their controlled territories on November 2 under the barrels of machine guns. I would like to stress that a non-military and diplomatic solution remains the only remedy to this situation. And I would like to reiterate that the Minsk Protocol and the Minsk Memorandum are still on the table.

We want to stop the bloodshed and are ready for an immediate — but bilateral — ceasefire, to be monitored and verified by the OSCE. We urge the withdrawal of weaponry, the closing of the border, and the release of all hostages, including Nadia Savchenko.

Once there is no threat of an offensive operation, we stand ready to hold local elections in the Donbass under Ukrainian legislation and the observation of the OSCE/ODIHR. We are committed to continuing the further political dialogue with the democratically elected representatives. We have started Constitutional reform with the aim of continuing the decentralization process and yielding wider administrative, financial and cultural authorities to the regions. We are stripping our members of parliament and judges of immunity and are conducting rigid anti-corruption reforms.

These efforts are parts of a comprehensive process to restore the confidence of the Ukrainian people in their institutions and make the world believe in Ukraine. I am very grateful to Chancellor Merkel and President Hollande for coming to Kyiv on Thursday to intensify our efforts at resuming peace.

We truly hope that these proposals stemming from the Minsk agreements will resonate in the efforts of Russia, whose commitment to peace is enshrined in the Minsk agreements.

The restoration of peace is our ultimate goal, but it will take commitment and joint effort. A few days ago, Germany and the whole world lost one of the most prominent figures in modern history.

Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker had played a decisive role not only in the process of German reunification, but in the fate of Ukraine as well. It was President von Weizsäcker who, in his letter addressed to my predecessor Leonid Kravchuk on December 26, 1991, recognized our independence. Once he said that "the German question will remain open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed."

In the spirit of these words of a great German mind, I would simply like to reiterate that the Ukrainian question will remain unsolved as long as the hearts of people and politicians in the West are closed to providing solid, practical support to strengthen Ukraine's independence politically and economically, but also militarily. Ukraine greatly needs defensive military support to ensure the ceasefire and contain the aggression.

I know many experts have argued that enhancing us militarily would provoke further aggression. On the contrary, we have seen that the lack of defense capabilities triggers offensive operation against Ukraine and spins the escalation. Over the course of the conflict we have proven to be responsible and that we will not use the defensive equipment to attack.

The stronger is our defense — the more convincing is our diplomatic voice. We stand ready for a comprehensive and immediate ceasefire. So should be Russia, without any precondition. Unfortunately, we do not see its readiness so far. In the same time, a complete and responsible road to peace in Ukraine should be part of a broader context of how to restore confidence in the international order. The trust is broken. But it is not the system that should not be trusted, but those who betrayed that trust.

They need to be stopped, contained, and placed back in a framework that is balanced and regulated on a multilateral basis. This year we will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act. I'm convinced that we need a concrete mechanism to prevent brutal violation by countries of their own international commitments taken under fundamental documents, in particular the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter. Such behavior in international relations should be no more tolerated in Europe. I am talking about a new European Responsibility Charter.

In this document, countries could reconfirm their previous international obligations. The Charter could also provide clear instruments and mechanisms to punish their violations. We are ready to present our view and proposals to this Charter for further consideration by the OSCE. As we

approach the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Treaty Review Conference is to be held in New York this May, let me also dwell on another important aspect of the current international security environment. It is related to one of the consequences of the Ukrainian crisis, which I would call "a broken promise on Ukraine".

I mean Russia's clear violation of the 1994 Budapest memorandum, in which, together with the UK and the US, it pledged to respect my country's sovereignty and territorial integrity in return for Ukraine joining the NPT and giving up nuclear weapons. It has already created a profound challenge for the existing international non-proliferation regime. Russian aggression undermines the value and credibility of negative security assurances issued by any nuclear-weapon-state.

The whole process of non-proliferation is put under question when non-nuclear-weapon-states feel safe no more while dealing with nuclear ones.

In this regard, we need to design new mechanisms to reinforce the sanctity of international law, the primary bastion of many states that lack other means of protection. Another field to draw attention to is a lack of legal responsibility under international law for cynical and aggressive propaganda used to encourage and incite ethnic, racial or religious hatred.

For just a year the number of Russian citizens who were thinking bad or very bad about Ukraine has grown from 26 to 59 per cent. We have to create legal international tools and mechanisms to counteract propaganda, to make countries behave responsibly and to maintain the principle of non-intervention into internal affairs of another state.

For over a year Ukraine has been facing dramatic consequences of undeclared hybrid warfare. It is very important that the states in the region devote more attention to hybrid threats. We need a clear strategic concept with a wide-range of response instruments to tackle this complex problem and to enhance the responsibility for applying hybrid war tactics.

In a few days, the March of Unity and Peace will take place in Kyiv to commemorate the Maidan heroes. To pay the tribute to those who perished in a struggle for freedom of their land. To pray for those who are still fighting.

Remembering the most dramatic days of the Maidan, I hope that the most difficult time of Donbass bloodshed is over. We will come out again to demonstrate that Ukraine is united in striving for peace and transformation. We still have a lot of work to do to change the country.

We look forward to the Riga EU-Eastern Partnership Summit, where we should no longer talk about the war or sanctions. I want to meet our European partners to finally talk about:

- how we cooperate to strengthen peace; how we interact to support reforms in Ukraine;
- how we introduce a visa-free regime for the Ukrainian people;
- and how we honor the goals and fulfill the dreams of the Ukrainian people in entering the European family.

Glory to Ukraine!

2016

Dmitry A. Medvedev

Prime Minister of the Russian Federation

At the 52nd Munich Security Conference, Dmitry A. Medvedev warned about the emergence of a "new cold war".

My speech will be of a more general nature, but I hope it will be useful.

The first cold war ended 25 years ago. This is not long in terms of history, but it is a considerable period for individual people and even for generations. And it is certainly sufficient for assessing our common victories and losses, setting new goals and, of course, avoiding a repetition of past mistakes.

The Munich Security Conference has been known as a venue for heated and frank discussion. This is my first time here. Today I'd like to tell you about Russia's assessment of the current European security situation and possible solutions to our common problems, which have been aggravated by the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West.

Before coming to this conference, I met with President Putin. We talked about his speech at the Munich conference in 2007. He said then that ideological stereotypes, double standards and unilateral actions do not ease but only fan tensions in international relations, reducing the international community's opportunities for adopting meaningful political decisions.

Did we overstate this? Were our assessments of the situation too pessimistic? Unfortunately, I have to say that the situation is now even worse than we feared. Developments have taken a much more dramatic turn since 2007. The concept of Greater Europe has not materialised. Economic growth has been very weak. Conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa have increased in scale. The migration crisis is pushing Europe towards collapse. Relations between Europe and Russia have soured. A civil war is raging in Ukraine.

In this context, we need to launch an intensive dialogue on the future architecture of Euro-Atlantic security, global stability and regional threats more than ever before. I consider it unacceptable that this dialogue has almost ceased in many spheres. The problem of miscommunication has been widely recognised both in Western Europe and in Russia. The mechanisms that allowed us to promptly settle mutual concerns have been cut off. Moreover, we've lost our grasp of the culture of mutual arms control, which we used for a long time as the basis for strengthening mutual trust. Partnership initiatives, which took much time and effort to launch, are expiring one by one. The proposed European security treaty has been put on hold. The idea of a Russia-EU Committee on Foreign Policy and Security, which I discussed with German Chancellor Angela Merkel in Meseberg, has not materialised. We believe that NATO's policy towards Russia remains unfriendly and generally obdurate.

Speaking bluntly, we are rapidly rolling into a period of a new cold war. Russia has been presented as well-nigh the biggest threat to NATO, or to Europe, America and other countries (and Mr. Stoltenberg has just demonstrated that). They show frightening films about Russians starting a nuclear war. I am sometimes confused: is this 2016 or 1962?

But the real threats to this small world are of an absolutely different nature, as I hope you will admit. The term "European security" is now more embracing that it used to be. Forty years ago it concerned above all military and political relations in Europe. But new issues have come to the fore since then, such as sustainable economic development, inequality and poverty, unprecedented migration, new forms of terrorism and regional conflicts, including in Europe. I am referring to Ukraine, the volatile Balkans, and Moldova that is teetering on the brink of a national collapse.

The cross-border threats and challenges, which we for a while believed to have been overcome, have returned with a new strength. The new threats, primarily terrorism and extremism, have lost their abstract form for the majority of people. They have become reality for millions in many countries. As Mr. Valls has just mentioned, they have become a daily threat. We can expect an airplane to be blown up or people in a café to be shot every day. These used to be everyday events in the Middle East, but now it's the same the world over.

We see that economic, social and military challenges have become mutually complementary. But we continue to act randomly, inconsistently, and in many cases exclusively in our own national interests. Or a scapegoat is appointed in an arbitrary manner.

I am offering you five theses on security as such.

First, the economy.

We have approached a change in paradigm in international economic relations. The traditional schemes are no longer effective. Political expediency is taking priority over simple and clear economic reason. The code of conduct is revised ad hoc to suit a specific problem or task or is bluntly

ignored. I'll just point out how the International Monetary Fund adjusted its fundamental rules on lending to countries with overdue sovereign debt when the issue concerned Ukraine's sovereign debt to Russia.

Talks on creating economic mega-blocs could result in the erosion of the system of global economic rules.

Globalisation, which was a desired objective, has to a certain extent played a cruel joke on us. I personally talked about this with my colleagues at the G8 meetings when everyone needed them. But times change rapidly. Even a minor economic shift in one country now hits whole markets and countries almost immediately. And global regulation mechanisms cannot effectively balance national interests.

The energy market remains extremely unstable. Its volatility has affected both importers and exporters.

We regret that the practice of unilateral economic pressure in the form of sanctions is gaining momentum. Decisions are taken arbitrarily and at times in violation of international law. This is undermining the operating foundations of international economic organisations, including the World Trade Organisation. We have always said, I have always said that sanctions hit not only those against whom they are imposed but also those who use them as an instrument of pressure. How many joint initiatives have been suspended because of sanctions! I have just met with German businessmen and we discussed this issue. Have we properly calculated not only the direct but also the indirect costs for European and Russian business? Are our differences really so deep, or are they not worth it? All of you here in this audience — do you really need this?

This is a road to nowhere. Everyone will suffer, mark my words. It is vitally important that we join forces to strengthen a new global system that can combine the principles of effectiveness and fairness, market openness and social protection.

Second, the crisis of the global economic development model is creating conditions for a variety of conflicts, including regional conflicts.

European politicians thought that the creation of the so-called belt of friendly countries on the outer border of the EU would reliably guarantee security. But what are the results of this policy? What you have is not a belt of friendly countries, but an exclusion zone with local conflicts and economic trouble both on the eastern borders (Ukraine and Moldova) and on the southern borders (the Middle East and North Africa, Libya and Syria).

The result is that these regions have become a common headache for all of us.

The Normandy format has helped us launch negotiations on Ukraine. We believe that there are no better instruments for a peaceful settlement than the Minsk Agreements.

We welcome France's balanced and constructive stance on Ukraine and on all other acute international issues. I fully agree with Mr. Valls that the Russian-French dialogue never stopped, and that it has produced concrete results.

It is true that all sides must comply with the Minsk Agreements. But implementation primarily depends on Kiev. Why them? Not because we are trying to shift responsibility, but because it's their time.

The situation is very unstable, despite progress made in a number of areas (heavy weaponry withdrawal, the OSCE mission and other issues).

What is Russia's biggest concern?

First and most important, a comprehensive ceasefire is not being observed in southeastern Ukraine. Shooting is routinely reported at the line of contact, which should not be happening. And we must send a clear signal to all the parties involved, in this regard.

Second, amendments to the Ukrainian Constitution have not been approved to this day, although this should have been done by the end of 2015. And the law on a special status for Donbass has not been implemented.

Instead of coordinating specific decentralisation parameters with the regions, and this is the crucial issue, Ukraine has adopted so-called "transitional provisions," even though the above requirements were put in black and white in the Minsk Agreements.

Third, Kiev continues to insist that local elections be based on a new Ukrainian law. Furthermore, Kiev has not implemented its commitment on a broad amnesty that should embrace all those who were involved in the developments in Ukraine in 2014–2015. Without being amnestied, these people will be unable to participate in elections, which will make any election results questionable. The OSCE will not endorse this.

As I said, the Minsk Agreements must be implemented in full and this is Russia's stance on the issue. At the same time, being reasonable people open to discussing various ideas, including a compromise, we, for instance, accepted the initiative of Mr. Steinmeier on the temporary application of the law on special status as soon as the election campaign begins. After the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights recognises the election results, this law must be applied permanently. But there's still no progress here, despite the compromise suggested.

Of course, the humanitarian situation is extremely alarming. The economy of southeastern Ukraine is deteriorating, that part of Ukraine is blockaded, and the German Chancellor's initiative on the restoration of the banking system in the region there has been rejected. Tens of thousands of people are living on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe.

Oddly, Russia seems to be more concerned about this than Ukraine, why is this so? We have been sending and will have to continue sending humanitarian convoys to southeastern Ukraine.

I must say that Russia has shown and will continue to show reasonable flexibility in the implementation of the Minsk Agreements where this doesn't contradict their essence. But we can't do what is not in our competence. That is, we cannot implement the political and legal obligations of the Kiev government. This is under the direct authority of the President, the Government and the Parliament of Ukraine. But unfortunately, it appears that they don't have the will or a desire to do it. I think this has become obvious to everyone.

As for Syria, we have been working and will continue to work to implement joint peace initiatives. This is a difficult path, but there is no alternative to an interethnic and interreligious dialogue. We must preserve Syria as a union state and prevent its dissolution for denominational reasons. The world will not survive another Libya, Yemen or Afghanistan. The consequences of this scenario will be catastrophic for the Middle East. The work of the International Syria Support Group gives us a certain hope. They gathered here the day before yesterday and coordinated a list of practical measures aimed at implementing the UN Security Council Resolution 2254, including the delivery of humanitarian aid to civilians and outlining the conditions for a ceasefire, except for terrorist groups, of course. The implementation of these measures is to be led by Russia and the United States. I would like to emphasise that the daily work of the Russian and American militaries is the key here. I'm talking about regular work without the need to seek incidental contacts, day-to-day work, everyday work.

Of course, there should be no preliminary conditions to start the talks on the settlement between the Syrian government and opposition, and there is no need to impend anyone with a land military operation.

Third, we sincerely believe that if we fail to normalise the situation in Syria and other conflict areas, terrorism will become a new form of war that will spread around the world. It will not be just a new form of war but a method of settling ethnic and religious conflict, and a form of quasi-state governance. Imagine a group of countries that are governed by terrorists through terrorism. Is this the 21st century?

It is common knowledge that terrorism is not a problem within individual countries. Russia first raised this alarm two decades ago. We tried to convince our partners that the core causes were not just ethnic or religious differences. Take ISIS, whose ideology is not based on Islamic values but on a blood-thirsty desire to kill and destroy. Terrorism is civilisation's problem. It's either us or them, and it's time for everyone to realise this. There are no nuances or undertones, no justifications for terrorist actions, no dividing terrorists into ours or theirs, into moderate or extremist.

The destruction of the Russian plane over Sinai, the terrorist attacks in Paris, London, Israel, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Mali, Yemen and other countries, the grisly executions of hostages, thousands of victims, and endless other threats are evidence that international terrorism defies state borders. Terrorists and extremists are trying to spread their influence not only throughout the Middle East and North Africa but also to the whole of Central Asia. Unfortunately, they have so far been successful, mostly because we are unable to set our differences aside and to really join forces against them. Even cooperation at the security services level has been curtailed. And this is ridiculous, like we don't want to work with you. Daesh should be grateful to my colleagues, the leaders of the Western countries who have suspended this cooperation.

Before coming to this conference, I read much material, including some by Western experts. Even those who don't think positively about Russia admit that, despite our differences, the "anti-terrorist formula" will not be effective without Russia. On the other hand, they sometimes frame this conclusion in an overall correct, but slightly different way, saying that a weak Russia is even more dangerous than a strong Russia.

Fourth, regional conflicts and terrorism are closely related to the unprecedentedly large issue of uncontrolled migration. This could be described as a great new transmigration of peoples and the culmination of the numerous problems of modern global development. It has affected not only Western Europe but also Russia. The inflow of migrants from Syria to Russia is not very large, but the inflow of migrants from Ukraine has become a serious problem. Over a million Ukrainian refugees have entered Russia over the past 18 months.

Wars and related deprivations, inequality, low standards of living, violence, and fanaticism force people to flee their homes. Unsuccessful attempts to spread Western models of democracy to a social environment that is not suited for this have resulted in the demise of entire states and have turned huge territories into zones of hostility. I remember how my colleagues

once rejoiced at the so-called Arab Spring. I literally witnessed it. But has modern democracy taken root in these countries? Looks like it has, but in the form of ISIS.

Human capital is degenerating in the countries the refugees are leaving. And these countries' development prospects have taken a downward turn. The ongoing migration crisis is rapidly acquiring the features of a humanitarian catastrophe, at least in some parts of Europe. Social problems are growing too, along with mutual intolerance and xenophobia. Not to mention the fact that hundreds and thousands of extremists enter Europe under the guise of being refugees. Other migrants are people of an absolutely different culture who only want to receive monetary benefits without doing anything to earn them. This poses a very real danger to the common economic space. The next targets will be the cultural space and even the European identity. We watch with regret how invaluable mechanisms, which Russia also needs, are being destroyed. I am referring to the actual collapse of the Schengen zone.

For our part, we are willing to do our best to help address the migration issue, including by contributing to efforts to normalise the situation in the conflict regions from which the majority of refugees come, Syria among them.

And fifth, let's be as honest as possible. The majority of these challenges did not develop yesterday. And they were definitely not invented in Russia. Yet we haven't learned to react to these challenges properly or even proactively. This is why the bulk of resources go into dealing with the consequences, often without identifying the root cause. Or we invest our energy not in fighting the real evil, but in deterring our neighbours, and this problem has just been voiced here The West continues to actively use this deterrence doctrine against Russia. The fallacy of this approach is that we will still be debating the same issues in 10 and even 20 years. Provided there will be anything to debate about, of course, as discussions are not on the agenda of the Great Caliphate.

Opinions on the prospects for cooperation with Russia differ. Opinions also differ in Russia. But can we unite in order to stand up against the challenges I mentioned above? Yes, I am confident that we can. Yesterday we witnessed a perfect example in the area of religion. Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia and Pope of the Catholic Church Francis met in Cuba following hundreds of years when the two churches did not communicate. Of course, restoring trust is a challenging task. It's difficult to say how long it would take. But it is necessary to launch this process. And this must be done without any preliminary conditions. Either all of us need to do this or none of us. In the latter case, there will be no cooperation.

We often differ in our assessments of the events that took place over the past two years. However, I want to emphasise that they don't differ as much as they did 40 years ago when we signed the Final Helsinki Act and when Europe was literally divided by The Wall. When old phobias prevailed, we were deadlocked. When we managed to join forces, we succeeded. There is much evidence to support this. We managed to agree on the reduction of strategic offensive weapons, which was a breakthrough achievement. We have worked out a compromise solution regarding Iran's nuclear programme. We have convinced all sides in the Syrian conflict to sit down at the negotiating table in Geneva. We have coordinated actions against pirates. And the Climate Change Conference was held in Paris last year. We should replicate these positive outcomes.

The current architecture of European security, which was built on the ruins of World War II, allowed us to avoid global conflicts for more than 70 years. The reason for this was that this architecture was built on principles that were clear to everyone at that time, primarily the undeniable value of human life. We paid a high price for these values. But our shared tragedy forced us to rise above our political and ideological differences in the name of peace. It's true that this security system has its issues and that it sometimes malfunctions. But do we need one more, third global tragedy to understand that what we need is cooperation rather than confrontation?

I'd like to quote from John F. Kennedy, who used very simple but the most appropriate words, "Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us." In the early 1960s the world stood at the door of a nuclear apocalypse, but the two rivalling powers found the courage to admit that no political confrontation was worth the human lives.

I believe that we have become wiser and more experienced and more responsible. And we are not divided by ideological phantoms and stereotypes. I believe that the challenges we are facing today will not lead to conflict but rather will encourage us to come together in a fair and equal union that will allow us to maintain peace for another 70 years, at least.

2017

John McCain

Senator and Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services of the United States of America

Introducing a panel discussion on the "The Future of the West: Downfall or Comeback?" at the 53rd Munich Security Conference, John McCain made an emotional plea to the West not "to be paralyzed by fear" and not to "give up on ourselves and on each other".

Not every American understands the absolutely vital role that Germany and its honorable Chancellor, Chancellor Merkel, are playing in defense of the idea and the conscience of the West. But for all of us who do, let me say thank you.

My friends: In the four decades I have attended this conference, I cannot recall a year where its purpose was more necessary or more important.

The next panel is going to ask us to consider whether the West will survive. In recent years, this question would invite accusations of hyperbole and alarmism. Not this year. If ever there was a time to treat this question with a deadly seriousness, it is now.

This question was real half a century ago [for] Ewald von Kleist and the founders of this conference. Indeed, it's why they first started coming to Munich. They did not assume the West would survive because they had seen its near annihilation. They saw open markets give way to beggar-thy-neighbor protectionism and the poverty that imposed. They saw a world order fracture into clashing ethnic and nationalist passions, and the … misery that brought. They saw the rise of hostile great powers, and the failure of deterrence, and the wars that followed.

From the ashes of the most awful calamity in human history was born what we call the West — a new and different and better kind of world order, one based not on blood-and-soil nationalism, or spheres of influence, or conquest of the weak by the strong, but rather on universal values, rule of law, open commerce, and respect for national sovereignty and independence. Indeed, the entire idea of the West is that it is open to any person or any nation that honors and upholds these values.

The unprecedented period of security and prosperity that we have enjoyed for the past seven decades didn't happen by accident. It happened not only because of the appeal of our values, but because we backed them up with our power and persevered in their defense. Our predecessors did not believe in the end of history, or that it bends inevitably towards justice. That's up to us. That requires our persistent, painstaking effort, and that's why we come to Munich year after year after year.

What would von Kleist's generation say if they saw our world today? I fear that much about it would be all-too-familiar for them, and they would be alarmed by it.

They would be alarmed by an increasing turn away from universal values and toward old ties of blood and race and sectarianism.

They would be alarmed by the hardening resentment we see towards immigrants and refugees and minority groups, especially Muslims.

They would be alarmed by the growing inability, and even unwillingness, to separate truth from lies.

They would be alarmed that more and more of our fellow citizens seem to be flirting with authoritarianism and romanticizing it as our moral equivalent.

But what would alarm them most, I think, is a sense that many of our peoples, including in my own country, are giving up on the West; that they see it as a bad deal that we may be better off without; and that while Western nations still have the power to maintain our world order, it's unclear whether we have the will.

All of us must accept our share of blame for this turn of events. We grew complacent. We made mistakes. At times we tried to do too much, and at others we failed to do enough. We lost touch with many of our people. We've been too slow to recognize and respond to their hardships. We need to face up to these realities, but this does not mean losing hope and retreating. That we must not do.

I know there is profound concern across Europe and the world that America is laying down the mantle of global leadership. I can only speak for myself, but I do not believe that that is the message you will hear from all of the American leaders who cared enough to travel here to Munich this weekend.

That's not the message you heard today from Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis.

That's not the message you will hear today from Vice President Mike Pence.

That's not the message you will hear from Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly.

And that is certainly not the message you will hear tomorrow from our bipartisan Congressional delegation.

Make no mistake, my friends: These are dangerous times, but you should not count America out, and we should not — and we should not count each other out. We must be prudent but we cannot wring our hands and wallow in self-doubt. We must appreciate the limits of our power, but we cannot allow ourselves to question the rightness and goodness of the West. We must understand and learn from our mistakes, but we cannot be paralyzed by fear. We cannot give up on ourselves and on each other. That is the definition of decadence. And that's how world orders really do decline and fail.

This is exactly what our adversaries want. This is their goal. They have no meaningful allies, so they seek to sow dissent among us and divide us from each other. They know that their power and influence are inferior to ours, so they seek to subvert us, and erode our resolve to resist, and terrorize us into passivity. They know they have little to offer the world beyond selfishness and fear, so they seek to undermine our confidence in ourselves and our belief in our own values.

We must take our own side in this fight. We must be vigilant. We must persevere. And through all — it all, we must never, never cease to believe in the moral superiority of our own values: that we stand for truth against falsehood, freedom against tyranny, right against injustice, hope against despair — and that even though we will inevitably take losses and suffer setbacks, through it all, as long as people of goodwill and courage refuse to lose faith in the West, it will endure.

That's why we come to Munich.

That's why we come to Munich, year in and year out — to revitalize our common moral purpose, our belief that our values are worth the fighting for. Because in the final analysis, the survival of the West is not just a material struggle; it is now, and it's always been a moral struggle. Now more than ever we must not forget this.

During one of the darkest days of the early Cold War, the great American novelist, William Faulkner, delivered a short speech in — in Stockholm upon receiving the Nobel Prize for Literature. "I decline to accept the end of man," Faulkner said.

I believe that man will not merely endure: he will prevail. He is immortal, not because he alone among creatures has an inexhaustible voice, but because he has a soul, a spirit capable of compassion and sacrifice and endurance.

Even now, when the temptation to despair is greatest, I refuse to accept the end of the West.

I refuse to accept the demise of our world order.

I refuse to accept that our greatest triumphs cannot once again spring from our moments of greatest peril, as they have so many times before.

I refuse to accept that our values are morally equivalent to those of our adversaries.

I am a proud, unapologetic believer in the West.

I believe we must always, always stand up for it.

For if we do not, who will?

2017

Michael R. Pence

Vice President of the United States of America

Just four weeks after the inauguration of the new U.S. administration, Michael R. Pence used his address to the 53rd Munich Security Conference to convey the expectation of President Donald Trump of greater transatlantic burden sharing.

I bring greetings on behalf of the 45th President of the United States, Donald Trump. In my still-new capacity as Vice President, I am honored and humbled to have the privilege to address this important annual forum. I'm also pleased to have with me two members of the President's cabinet, one of whom you've already heard from: our Secretary, James Mattis, of the Department of Defense, and Secretary John Kelly of Homeland Security. We're also joined by a distinguished delegation of United States senators and congressmen, led by Senator John McCain. Please join me in welcoming my fellow Americans here with us today.

It's an honor to be with you all.

Founded in 1963, the Munich Security Conference has long played an important role in international affairs, bringing together political, economic, and social leaders from both sides of the Atlantic to promote peace and prosperity for our nations and our peoples. History will attest that when the United States and Europe are peaceful and prosperous, we advance the peace and prosperity of the entire world.

Now, the President asked me to be here today to bring his greetings — and a message. Today, on behalf of President Trump, I bring you this assurance: The United States of America strongly supports NATO and will be unwavering in our commitment to this transatlantic alliance. We've been faithful for generations — and as you keep faith with us, under President Trump we will always keep faith with you.

Now, the fates of the United States and Europe are intertwined. Your struggles are our struggles. Your success is our success, and ultimately, we walk into the future together. This is President Trump's promise: We will stand with Europe, today and every day, because we are bound together by the same noble ideals — freedom, democracy, justice, and the rule of law.

So strong is our bond that over the past century, Americans have poured forth from our land to help defend yours. It's remarkable to think that this year marks the 100th anniversary of the United States' entry into World War I. More than two decades later, in the fires of World War II, we fought to defeat dictatorship and keep the flame of freedom alive in Europe and across the entire world. Tens of thousands of my fellow countrymen now rest here for eternity. Tens of thousands more still stand guard here in Europe to this day.

So lest anyone doubt the United States' commitment to Europe and the importance of your defense, they need only look to our nation's investment in your peace and prosperity, in your safety and security, yesterday and today. And it's been an investment of treasure, yes, but so much more than that: America has sent you our best and bravest. Our shared values and our shared sacrifices are the source of the United States' enduring bond to the nations and peoples of Europe. We honor that history by doing our part — all of us — to ensure that the horrors of war never return to this continent.

For generations, we have worked side by side with you to strengthen and defend your democracies. Together, we formed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949 to defend our shared heritage and shared principles, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and self-determination. We confronted the menace of Communism, which threatened to overwhelm Europe and the world in its heartless, inhuman embrace. We stood together in 1990 as this very nation reunited and Eastern Europe chose freedom, free markets, and democracy.

You know, I saw that choice firsthand as a young man. In 1977, at the age of 18, I traveled through Europe with my older brother, and we found ourselves in West Berlin. I marveled at the streets, the people, and the bustling commerce of a city renewed just 30 years after the ravages of war. Then we crossed through Checkpoint Charlie. The vibrant color of the free world fell away, replaced by the dour greys of still-bombed-out buildings and the shadow of repression hanging over the people. In that moment, I came face to face with the choice facing the Western World — the choice between freedom and tyranny.

By the grace of God, through the leadership of Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl, Mitterrand, Havel, and Walesa, the Wall fell, communism collapsed, and

freedom prevailed. The fall of the Soviet Union ushered in an opportunity for unprecedented peace and prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. But the end of that era only marked the beginning of another.

The collapse of communism has been followed by the rise of new adversaries and new threats. Rogue nations developing nuclear weapons now jeopardize the safety of the entire world. Radical Islamic terrorism has fixated on the destruction of Western civilization. In the early days of this new century, that enemy struck ruthlessly at our nation's capital and our greatest city. With the smoke still rising from Ground Zero and the Pentagon, the strength of our alliance shone forth. Just as the United States stood with Europe through the end of the 20th century, Europe stood tall with the United States at the outset of the 21st. And the American people will be forever grateful.

Again I had the privilege to see our bond firsthand. Only two weeks after those horrific attacks on 9/11, as a member of Congress I — I traveled to Germany to participate in an international conference on terrorism. I'll never forget what I saw as we arrived at the American Embassy in Berlin — a wall of flowers, 10-feet high, surrounded it; fragrant tokens of condolences, support, and prayers of your people for ours. That image will forever be etched in my heart and mind. But the support of the European community went well beyond acts of kindness. For the first and only time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, fulfilling our commitment to confront our common enemies together, and the American people will never forget it.

In the global war against radical Islamic terrorists, we've been bound by shared sacrifice. For the past decade and a half, the nations of NATO and many other allies have answered the call to rid the world of this great evil. From Afghanistan to Iraq to many other conflicts across the globe, our sons and daughters have served together, fought together on the field of battle. Thousands of our citizens, coming from every corner of this alliance and beyond, have given their lives in this struggle. Fighting alongside U.S. service members under NATO's mandate, more than 1,100 brave men and women from allied nations have fallen in Afghanistan since 2001. The Afghanis have lost many more in order to free their homeland and keep it free today.

No matter which country they hailed from, these heroes gave the last full measure of their devotion in the cause of our peace and our security. And I hope each one of you will assure their families, the families of their fallen, that the American people will never forget their service and sacrifice on our behalf.

Now, those sacrifices, which continue to this day, are the surest sign of our enduring commitment to each other and our future together. On President Trump's behalf, that future is exactly what I came here to address. If the past century has taught us anything, it's that peace and prosperity in Europe and the North Atlantic can never be regarded as achieved; it must be continually maintained through shared sacrifice and shared commitment.

Peace only comes through strength.

President Trump believes we must be strong in our military might, able to confront any and all who would threaten our freedom and our way of life. We must be strong in our conviction that our cause is just and that our way of life is worth defending. If we lose the will to do our part to defend ourselves, we jeopardize our shared heritage of freedom.

Under President Trump's leadership, I can assure you, the United States will be strong — stronger than ever before. We will strengthen our military, restore the arsenal of democracy, and working with many of the members of the Congress who are gathered here today, we're going to provide our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, and Coast Guard with renewed resources to defend our nation and our treaty allies from the known threats of today and the unknown threats of tomorrow.

As we speak, the United States is developing plans for significant increases in military spending to ensure that the strongest military in the world is stronger still. We will meet our obligations to our people to provide for the common defense, and we'll continue to do our part to support our allies in Europe and in NATO. But Europe's defense requires your commitment as much as ours. Our transatlantic alliance has at its core two principles that are central to its mission. In Article 5, we pledged to come to each other's aid in the event of an attack. And [to] be ready, if and when that day comes, in Article 3 we vowed in that treaty to contribute our fair share to our common defense.

The promise to share the burden of our defense has gone unfulfilled for too many for too long, and it erodes the very foundation of our alliance. When even one ally fails to do their part, it undermines our ability to come to each other's aid. At that Wales summit in 2014, all 28 members of NATO declared their intention to move towards a minimum security commitment of two percent of their gross domestic product on defense within the decade. In the words of the summit's declaration, such investments were necessary in "meeting NATO's capability targets and filling NATO's capability shortfalls."

As of this moment, the United States and only four other NATO members meet this basic standard. Now, while we commend the few nations that are on track to achieve that goal, the truth is that many others, includ-

ing some of our largest allies, still lack a clear and credible path to meeting this minimum goal. Let me be clear on this point: The President of the United States expects our allies to keep their word to fulfill this commitment, and for most that means the time has come to do more.

We must shoulder this responsibility together because the dangers we face are growing and changing every day. The world is now a more dangerous place than at any point since the collapse of communism a quarter century ago. The threats to our safety and security span the globe, from the rise of radical Islamic terrorism, to the threats posed by Iran and North Korea, and to many others who threaten our security and our way of life.

The rise of adversaries new and old demands a — a strong response from all of us. In the east, NATO has markedly improved its deterrent posture by stationing four combat-ready multinational battalions in Poland and the Baltic States. In the wake of Russian efforts to redraw international borders by force, rest assured the United States, along with the United Kingdom, Canada, and Germany, will continue its leadership role as a framework nation in the Enhanced Forward Presence Initiative, and we will support other joint critical actions to support this alliance. And with regard to Ukraine — And with regard to Ukraine, we must hold Russia accountable and demand that they honor the Minsk Agreements, beginning by de-escalating the violence in eastern Ukraine.

And know this: The United States will continue to hold Russia accountable, even as we search for new common ground, which, as you know, President Trump believes can be found.

To the south, upheavals in Africa and the Middle East have sent violence rippling in every direction, reaching not only Europe but also the United States. Today, the leading state sponsor of terrorism continues to destabilize the Middle East, and thanks to the end of nuclear-related sanctions under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, Iran now has additional resources to devote to these efforts. Let me be clear again: Under President Trump, the United States will remain fully committed to ensuring that Iran never obtains a nuclear weapon capable of threatening our countries, our allies in the region, especially Israel.

Throughout the Middle East, radical Islamic terrorists have found safe havens and secured vast resources they have — that have allowed them to launch attacks here in Europe and inspire attacks in the United States. Driven by evil, they target their own communities, their fellow Muslims, indiscriminately killing or enslaving those who reject their apocalyptic mania. From Yemen to Libya, Nigeria to Syria, the rise of extremist groups ranging from ISIS and al-Qaeda, to al-Shabaab and Boko Haram endanger millions, including many faith-based peoples whose roots in their homelands extend into the mists of history.

ISIS is perhaps the greatest evil of them all. It showed a — a savagery unseen in — in the Middle East since the Middle Ages. As President Trump has made clear, the United States will fight tirelessly to crush these enemies, especially ISIS and its so-called caliphate, and consign them to the ash-heap of history where they belong. Now, last month the President ordered the development of a comprehensive plan to utterly defeat ISIS. President Trump has no higher priority than the safety and security of the American people and ensuring the security of our treaty allies.

To confront the threats facing our alliance today, NATO must build upon its 20th century tactics and continue to evolve to confront the crises of today and tomorrow. Last summer President Trump called on NATO to step up its efforts to disrupt terrorist plots before they ever reach our borders. And we've made great progress in expanding cooperation and information sharing between our intelligence and security services in recent years. But we must do more — much more.

Consistent with the President's call, we're heartened to see that NATO has taken steps to increase focus on counter-terrorism and collaboration. The appointment of a new intelligence chief, charged with facilitating collaboration on counterterrorism, marks a positive strategic shift in NATO's ability to fulfill its mission. Going forward, we must intensify our efforts to cut off terrorists' funding, increase our cyber capabilities. We must be as dominant in the digital world as we are in the physical world. We must always stay at least one step ahead of our adversaries. For our shared goal of peace and prosperity can only be achieved through superiority and strength.

For our part, thanks to President Trump, the United States will be stronger than ever before. Our leadership of the free world will not falter, even for a moment. Our strength, and that of this alliance, is not derived solely from our strength of arms, though. It's borne of our shared principles, the principles and ideals that we cherish — freedom, democracy, justice, and the rule of law. These are the wellspring of the United States' strength and of Europe's strength. They spring from that timeless notion that our unalienable rights of life and liberty are not granted to us by sovereigns, or governments, or kings. They are, as the American Founders observed, endowed by our Creator.

Marshalling the will to confront the evils of the 21st century will require faith, faith in these timeless ideals. And as President Trump has said in his Inaugural Address, it's important to know (and I quote): "We do not seek to impose our way of life on anyone, but rather to let it shine as an example...

for everyone to follow." This then is our cause. It's why NATO exists. It's why, after so many centuries of strife and division, Europe is unified. The United States has been faithful to Europe for generations, and we will keep the faith that drove our forefathers to sacrifice so much in defense of our shared heritage. We share a past, and after all we've been through, we share a future.

Today, tomorrow, and every day hence be confident that the United States is now and will always be your greatest ally.

Be assured, President Trump and the American people are fully devoted to our transatlantic union. Our choice today is the same as it was in ages past: security through shared sacrifice and strength, or an uncertain future characterized by disunity and faltering will. Well, the United States chooses strength. The United [States] chooses friendship with Europe and a strong North Atlantic alliance. And in the name of all the sacrifices of the generations who have gone before, who have fought and bled and died for this alliance, with confidence in all of you, and firm reliance on Providence, I know the best days for America, for Europe, and for the free world are yet to come.

2017

Bill Gates

Founder and Co-Chair of the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation

Contributing to a panel discussion on global health risks at the 53rd Munich Security Conference, Bill Gates highlighted the link between health and security and warned of the growing risk of a global pandemic.

When I decided 20 years ago to make global health the focus of my philanthropic work, I didn't imagine that I'd be speaking at a conference on international security policy. But I'm here today because I believe our worlds are more tightly linked than most people realize.

Here's one example. I spend a lot of my time on the effort to eradicate polio. We've made incredible progress. Of the 125 countries where polio was endemic, 122 countries have eliminated the disease. Only Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Nigeria have never been polio-free. And that's no coincidence.

War zones and other fragile state settings are the most difficult places to eliminate epidemics. They're also some of the most likely places for them to begin — as we've seen with Ebola in Sierra Leone and Liberia, and with cholera in the Congo Basin and the Horn of Africa. So, to fight global pandemics, we must fight poverty, too.

It's also true that the next epidemic could originate on the computer screen of a terrorist intent on using genetic engineering to create a synthetic version of the smallpox virus ... or a super contagious and deadly strain of the flu.

The point is, we ignore the link between health security and international security at our peril.

Whether it occurs by a quirk of nature or at the hand of a terrorist, epidemiologists say a fast-moving airborne pathogen could kill more than 30 million people in less than a year. And they say there is a reasonable probability the world will experience such an outbreak in the next 10–15 years.

It's hard to get your mind around a catastrophe of that scale, but it happened not that long ago. In 1918, a particularly virulent and deadly strain of flu killed between 50 million and 100 million people.

You might be wondering how likely these doomsday scenarios really are. The fact that a deadly global pandemic has not occurred in recent history shouldn't be mistaken for evidence that a deadly pandemic will not occur in the future.

And even if the next pandemic isn't on the scale of the 1918 flu, we would be wise to consider the social and economic turmoil that might ensue if something like Ebola made its way into a lot of major urban centers. We were lucky that the last Ebola outbreak was contained before it did.

The good news is that with advances in biotechnology, new vaccines and drugs can help prevent epidemics from spreading out of control. And, most of the things we need to do to protect against a naturally occurring pandemic are the same things we must prepare for an intentional biological attack.

First and most importantly, we have to build an arsenal of new weapons — vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics.

Vaccines can be especially important in containing epidemics. But today, it typically takes up to 10 years to develop and license a new vaccine. To significantly curb deaths from a fast-moving airborne pathogen, we would have to get that down considerably — to 90 days or less.

We took an important step last month with the launch of a new public-private partnership called the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations. The hope is that CEPI will enable the world to produce safe, effective vaccines as quickly as new threats emerge.

The really big breakthrough potential is in emerging technology platforms that leverage recent advances in genomics to dramatically reduce the time needed to develop vaccines.

This is important because we can't predict whether the next deadly disease will be one we already know, or something we've never seen before.

Without getting too technical, these new platform technologies essentially create a delivery vehicle for synthetic genetic material that instructs your cells to make a vaccine inside your own body. And the great thing is that once you've built a vaccine platform for one pathogen, you can use it again for other pathogens. You only need to substitute a few genes.

That flexibility and reusability would cut the vaccine development and approval timeline significantly. And we can apply this new vaccine technology to other hard-to-treat diseases like HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis.

The $550 million that launched CEPI is just a down payment. We will need considerably more support from governments to fund the R&D necessary to realize the promise of this new technology.

Of course, the preventive capacity of a vaccine won't help if a pathogen has already spread out of control. Because epidemics can quickly take root in the places least equipped to fight them, we also need to improve surveillance.

That starts with strengthening basic public health systems in the most vulnerable countries. This has a double benefit.

It improves our ability to prevent, detect, and respond to epidemics. And it enables us to break the cycle of poverty and disease that is at the root of so much instability in the world.

We also have to ensure that every country is conducting routine surveillance to gather and verify disease outbreak intelligence.

And we must ensure that countries share information in a timely way, and that there are adequate laboratory resources to identify and monitor suspect pathogens. We can build on the lab network that's in place now for polio, as well as a new network of field sites and labs that will help us better understand the causes of child mortality in poor countries.

The third thing we need to do is prepare for epidemics the way the military prepares for war. This includes germ games and other preparedness exercises so we can better understand how diseases will spread, how people will respond in a panic, and how to deal with things like overloaded highways and communications systems.

We also need trained medical personnel ready to contain an epidemic quickly, and better coordination with the military to help with logistics and to secure areas.

The Ebola epidemic might have been much worse if the U.S. and UK governments had not used military resources to help build health centers, manage logistics, and fly people in and out of affected countries.

It is encouraging that global alliances like the G7 and the G20 are beginning to focus on pandemic preparedness, and that leaders like Chancellor Merkel and Prime Minister Solberg are championing health security.

By the end of this year, 67 countries are expected to have completed independent assessments of their epidemic readiness. But there isn't enough money to help the poorest countries with epidemic preparation.

The irony is that the cost of ensuring adequate pandemic preparedness worldwide is estimated at $3.4 billion a year — yet the projected annual loss from a pandemic could run as high as $570 billion.

Pandemics are everyone's problem — and as leaders, we cannot ignore it.

Imagine if I told you that somewhere in this world, there's a weapon that exists — or that could emerge — capable of killing tens of thousands, or millions, of people, bringing economies to a standstill, and throwing nations into chaos.

You would say that we need to do everything possible to gather intelligence and develop effective countermeasures to reduce the threat.

That is the situation we face today with biological threats. We may not know if that weapon is man-made or a product of nature. But one thing we can be almost certain of. A highly lethal global pandemic will occur in our lifetimes.

When I was a kid, there was really only one existential threat the world faced. The threat of a nuclear war.

By the late 1990s, most reasonable people had come to accept that climate change represented another major threat to humankind.

I view the threat of deadly pandemics right up there with nuclear war and climate change. Getting ready for a global pandemic is every bit as important as nuclear deterrence and avoiding a climate catastrophe.

Innovation, cooperation, and careful planning can dramatically mitigate the risks presented by each of these threats.

Indeed, the fact that fewer people die in conflicts now than at any time in human history is the direct result of choices made together by the international community — including through efforts like the Munich Security Conference.

The global good will evidenced at the historic Paris Climate talks a year ago gives us a chance to prevent the worst effects of climate change.

The opportunity now is to extend that cooperation to pandemic preparedness. We've gotten a good start on innovation with the launch of CEPI. Reflecting on the lessons learned with Ebola, there is a shared consensus about the things we need to invest in.

I'm optimistic that a decade from now, we can be much better prepared for a lethal epidemic — if we're willing to put a fraction of what we spend on defense budgets and new weapons systems into epidemic readiness.

When the next pandemic strikes, it could be another catastrophe in the annals of the human race. Or it could be something else altogether. An extraordinary triumph of human will. A moment when we prove yet again that, together, we are capable of taking on the world's biggest challenges to create a safer, healthier, more stable world.

Ultimately, the choice is ours.

2018

Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani

Emir of the State of Qatar

In his speech to the 54th Munich Security Conference, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al-Thani urged the countries in the Middle East region to shift from feuds to cooperation and agree on basic security principles and rules of governance.

It gives me great pleasure to address this distinguished audience. Germany is an especially appropriate venue for a meeting to discuss the present-day global order, and the threats to it. A nation that stands for the values of freedom and the rule of law, Germany is also a major pillar for the European Union, seen by many as a bastion of coexistence and trans-national cooperation. While all of us are aware of the challenges facing the European Union, we in the Middle East — and I'm sure this is true elsewhere — see the EU as proving that peaceful coexistence and collective prosperity are possible in the aftermath of horrific conflicts.

As a body, the EU demonstrates that a union can establish shared security based on mutual interests, even amongst people who tore themselves apart in war. Like it or not, Brexit is an example of a peaceful resolution of differences. No diplomatic ties were cut, and no blood was shed. There is a lesson here for us in the Arab region. The European Union provides a framework for regional governance, and the peaceful arbitration of disputes. This framework is sorely needed in the Middle East. Today, many governments and international powers act with impunity, without regard for human rights.

The lack of accountability for good governance is widespread. It's no wonder that people are losing hope ... individuals who would otherwise have stood trial for war crimes against their own people are possible candidates in presidential elections. An audience such as yourselves must be able to see why many people, even entire nations, are losing faith in international accountability. They think — arguably right — that many of the

global mechanisms for conflict resolution, and the maintenance of rights have been paralyzed and sidelined. My region provides many examples: Palestinians since the Nakba, seventy years ago; the situation in Syria, Libya, Somalia, Afghanistan and Yemen. The suffering of people in my region may appear distant to an audience in Munich, but the waves of refugees make these injustices a European concern. And the darkness of terrorism now casts a shadow on the entire world. Suffering and injustice pave the way for terrorism to flourish. Evil actors will twist religious dogmas to poison the minds of desperate people. Extremist religious doctrines pose an undeniable challenge to all of us. They exist in every culture, and Islam has no monopoly on them.

It is clear that we are obliged to combat religious extremism. But, having said that, attributing violent terrorism to extremist ideologies is too simplistic. It does not explain why violent extremism has become a major threat in my region, while extremist ideologies can be found anywhere. The patterned failure of states in my region, to provide basic needs to its people, paves the way for extremism. So often, the very states which neglect basic needs also block every possible pathway for peaceful reform. Huge sections of the population in many Arab countries have been marginalized, giving oppressive regimes the chance to use sectarianism as a tool to dominate multi-faith societies. To this, we must add the growing sense, that the youth in my region hold: that the world is defined by hypocrisy and injustice.

To many in the Middle East, there is a feeling that the "universality" of human rights of post-War order always rang hollow. This is one of the most glaring consequences of failure to resolve regional conflicts and address grievances: people lose faith in their government, and have no way to peacefully affect change. Today as we speak, ISIS is militarily defeated in Iraq and will soon be defeated in Syria; but the real battle, laying the foundations for peaceful coexistence, has yet to begin. We must turn our attention to ending the circumstances which afforded ISIS a continuous stream of willing recruits in the first place. These circumstances are complicated. In the Arab region, a group of leaders rising to power after independence had promised to deliver freedom, social justice and Arab unity to their people.

Instead of fulfilling those promises, the Arab state has degenerated to become one in which the people have to choose between, "security" in a basic physical sense, and on the other hand, their dignity, freedom, and aspirations for social justice. Instead of wise leadership facilitating gradual reform, regimes corner people into fighting for their dignity. The carnage which followed the counter-revolutions, after the Arab uprisings of 2011, has shown all of us what end results of this stark choice is. The people called out for dignity, and they were answered with violent silencing. This cycle needs to end. This gathering together here in Munich needs to bear fruit. We need to walk away with a clear picture of how to end conflict, and provide basic rights and security to our people. After noting that eight of the 10 most lethal conflicts are rooted in the wider Middle East, this year's Munich Security Report attributed these conflicts to a definite set of factors:

- Lack of Social and Economic Progress
- Growing Sectarian Divisions
- Regional Rivalries, and
- Shifting Engagement from External Powers.

I would also add two factors:

- Recklessness, and
- No framework for providing shared security.

It is no secret that during the most recent GCC crisis, my own country was able to experience some of the factors in full-force. It has been a futile crisis manufactured by our neighbors, some of whom are major regional players, once believed to be stabilizing factors on the world stage. That is no longer the case. The adventurous policies have undermined regional security and the economic outlook for the GCC as a strategic bloc. Had regional relations been guided by a set of solid governance and the rule of law, we would not have seen nations with limited resources being blackmailed into bartering their foreign policies for external aid. Other nations, who also needed financial aid, refused the offer, and stood for their values. Had regional relations been guided by a set of solid governance principles and rule of law, we would not have seen the exploitation of wealth, power or geographical constraints to satisfy the thirst for power.

Even with the regional turmoil, Qatar remains one of the most peaceful countries in the world. Despite the obstacles imposed upon us, including a full land, air and sea blockade beginning 5th of June of last year, Qatar secured new trade routes, accelerated economic diversity, and bonded together in unity. Qatar emerged stronger. We have continued to trade with the wider world. We have not missed a single shipment of liquefied natural gas during this time. This is vital to the rest of the world, as we are the world's second-largest exporter of natural gas and our exports ensure the stability of global energy supplies. By diffusing the impact of the illegal and aggressive measures imposed on our people, Qatar preserved its sovereignty.

This failed blockade shows how small states can use diplomacy and strategic economic planning to weather the storms of aggression from larger, ambitious neighbors. Those aggressive actors wish to use small states as pawns within their power games and sectarian conflicts. It is vital to the interests of the people of the Middle East to guarantee the independence and sovereignty of states like Qatar, which refuses to be forced to take sides in the stand-off between two entrenched camps. Preserving the sovereignty and the independent decision-making of countries like Qatar ensures accelerated development ... development like free media and free speech that the "blockading countries" insist we surrender. In front of this distinguished audience, I believe that it is time for wider regional security in the Middle East. It is time for all nations of the region to forget the past — including us — and agree on basic security principles and rules of governance, and at least a minimum level of security to allow for peace and prosperity.

All nations in the Middle East, small and large, need to agree on a baseline of co-existence, backed by binding arbitration mechanisms, and enforced by the collective body of the region. We can mirror the efforts of the European Union's ability to find common ground to rebuild and prosper. Shifting from feuds to cooperation will require that we each be held accountable, like: allowing the flow of humanitarian aid to pass across borders, allowing safe and free passage for families, providing access to religious sites to all faiths, preventing the desecration of historic and religious sites, and respecting common trade routes. This should not be a pipedream. Too much is at risk. The Middle East is at the brink ... it is time to bring it back.

All of us here, especially those who enjoy more power and wealth, have a responsibility to solve the conflict. The Middle East will need help, from the larger international community to succeed in such a mission. I ask all nations in the Middle East to accept an invitation to participate in such a holistic security agreement. I urge all nations to continue putting diplomatic pressure get this done. on my region to We must start with a regional security agreement before the Middle East can put the turmoil in the past. With the greater good in mind, we remain hopeful for a future where true security, both for the state and for the individual, is established for all nations.

2018

Benjamin Netanyahu

Prime Minister of the State of Israel

In his address to the 54th Munich Security Conference, Benjamin Netanyahu called for immediate action to contain Iranian aggression in the Middle East. He sent a warning to Iran to "not test Israel's resolve" while holding up a fragment of what he claimed was an Iranian drone that had been intercepted in Israeli airspace.

This is a beautiful city. It's filled with impressive monuments, richly endowed museums, beautiful architecture. And due to this conference, over the past four decades, Mr. Chairman, Munich has become synonymous with security. That's important, because, as I said last night, without security, nothing is really possible — not freedom, not prosperity, not the peace we cherish and crave.

But for the Jewish people, two infamous things occurred in this city. In 1972, 11 of our Olympic athletes were massacred at the Munich airport. In many ways, this act of savagery heralded the rise of international terrorism, and we've all been battling it ever since.

And 80 years ago, another event took place here, with far ranging consequences. A disastrous agreement was signed here that set the world on a course towards history's most horrific war. Two decades after World War I, two decades after a war that claimed 60 million lives, the leaders who met in Munich chose to appease Hitler's regime rather than confront it. Those leaders were noble men. They thought they were fulfilling their highest responsibility to keep the peace. But the price of their action would soon become apparent.

The concessions to Hitler only emboldened the Nazi regime and facilitated its conquest of Europe. Rather than choosing a path that might have prevented war, or at the very least limited its scope and its scale, those well-intentioned leaders made a wider war inevitable and far more costly.

Sometime after the war Roosevelt asked Churchill how would he call this war? And he answered immediately without hesitation, the Unnecessary War. He said there was never a war more easy to stop.

In the wake of the Munich agreement, 60 million people would die in World War II, including a third of my own people, six million Jews murdered in the Holocaust by the Nazis and their collaborators. We will never forget and we will never allow the rewriting of the historical truth.

[Hebrew] We will not forget; we will not forgive; we will always fight for the truth.

Today we gather two-and-a-half years after another agreement was signed in another city in the heart of Europe. There too, noble men and women, high-minded leaders hoping to avoid war, signed an agreement that brutalizes its own people and terrorizes its neighbors. Let me be clear.

Iran is not Nazi Germany. There are many differences between the two. Well, for one, one advocated a master race, the other advocates a master faith. Jews in Iran are not sent to the gas chambers, although religious and ethnic minorities are denied basic freedoms. And there are obviously many other differences. But there are also some striking similarities. Iran openly declares its intention to annihilate Israel with its six million Jews. It makes absolutely no bones about it. Iran seeks to dominate our region, the Middle East, and seeks to dominate the world through aggression and terror. It's developing ballistic missiles to reach deep into Europe and to the United States as well.

Henry Kissinger said that Iran must choose between being a country or a cause. Well, the regime in Iran has chosen to be a cause. The commander of the Revolutionary Guard, Ali Jafari, said we're on the path to the rule of Islam worldwide. That means right here too. This is, in my judgement, the greatest threat to our world. Not just to Israel, not just to our Arab neighbors, not just to Muslims far and wide, but to you as well. Because once armed with nuclear weapons, Iran's aggression will be unchecked and it will encompass the entire world. Look at what they are doing now, before they have nuclear weapons. Imagine what they will do later if G-d forbid they'll have them.

Just as was true 80 years ago, an agreement that was seen as appeasement has only emboldened the regime and brought war closer. The nuclear agreement with Iran has begun the countdown to an Iranian nuclear arsenal in little more than a decade. And the sanction relief that the deal provided has not moderated Iran. It's not made them more moderate internally and it's not made them more moderate externally. In fact, it's unleashed a dangerous Iranian tiger in our region and beyond.

Through its proxies, Shiite militias in Iraq, the Houthis in Yemen, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Iran is devouring huge swaths of the Middle East. Now, there has been one positive consequence of Iran's growing aggression in the region. It's brought Arabs and Israelis closer together as never before. In a paradoxical way, this may pave the way for a broader peace and ultimately also for a Palestinian-Israeli peace. This could happen. But it will not happen if Iran's aggression continues to grow, and nowhere are Iran's belligerent ambitions clearer than in Syria.

There Iran hopes to complete a contiguous empire, linking Tehran to Tartus, the Caspian to the Mediterranean. For some time I've been warning about this development. I've made clear in word and deed that Israel has red lines it will enforce. Israel will continue to prevent Iran from establishing a permanent military presence in Syria. Israel will continue to act to prevent Iran from establishing another terror base from which to threaten Israel. But Iran continues to try to cross those red lines. Last week its brazenness reached new heights, literally new heights. It sent a drone into Israeli territory, violating Israel's sovereignty, threatening our security. We destroyed that drone and the control center that operated it from Syria, and when our places were fired upon, Israel destroyed Syrian anti-aircraft batteries. Israel will not allow Iran's regime to put a noose of terror around our neck. We will act without hesitation to defend ourselves. And we will act, if necessary, not just against Iran's proxies that are attacking us, but against Iran itself.

Later today you will hear from Mr. Zarif. He's the smooth-talking mouthpiece of Iran's regime. I give Mr. Zarif credit. He lies with eloquence. Last year at this conference, Zarif said that, I'm quoting: "Extremism is driven by lack of hope and respect."

Well, if that's true, why does the Iranian regime deny its people hope and respect by jailing journalists and activists? Zarif said it was erroneous to label Iran radical. If that's true, what do you call a regime that hangs gays from cranes in town squares? Zarif said that conflicts in Syria and Yemen do not have a military solution. If that's true, why does Iran send fighters and arms to fuel violence precisely in those places? No doubt, Mr. Zarif will brazenly deny Iran's nefarious involvement in Syria.

Iran also denies that it committed an act of aggression against Israel last week, that it sent a drone into our airspace to threaten our people. Well, here's a piece of that Iranian drone, or what's left of it after we shot it down. I brought it here so you can see for yourself. Mr. Zarif, do you recognize this? You should. It's yours. You can take back with you a message to the tyrants of Tehran: Do not test Israel's resolve.

And I have a message for everyone gathered here today too. I want you to support the people of Iran. I want you to support those in the region who want peace by confronting an Iranian regime that threatens peace.

I've been speaking to the people of Iran with video messages. The response is amazing. I saw this before the recent demonstrations. I asked our intelligence people to explain to me how it is that we were getting names of people supporting what I said, from Iran, risking their lives, their families. I said something is happening there. Those people want freedom. They want a different life. They want economic prosperity. They want peace. They don't want this far-flung Iranian aggression. And I've explained we have no quarrel with the people of Iran, only with the regime that torments them. And I take this opportunity to send our condolences to the families of the 66 Iranian civilians that lost their lives in the plane accident today. We have no quarrel with the people of Iran, but we are absolutely resolute in our determination to stop and roll back the aggression of Iran's regime.

Let us pledge today, Ladies and Gentlemen, here in Munich, not to repeat the mistakes of the past. Appeasement never works. The hour to prevent war is getting late, but it is not too late. I am convinced that one day this regime will fall, and when it does, the great peace between the ancient Jewish people and the ancient Persian people will flourish once again. When that happens, the people of Iran will breathe free, and the people in the region will breathe a sigh of relief. But today we must speak clearly, we must act boldly. We can stop this dangerous regime. We can roll back its aggression and by doing so, create a more peaceful, a more prosperous and a more secure world for our region and for our future.

2018

Mohammad Javad Zarif

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran

Mohammad Javad Zarif dedicated his appearance on the podium of the 54th Munich Security Conference to a call for a fresh security architecture in the Persian Gulf.

I am very happy to be able to make it to this final day of the Munich Security Conference, having just arrived from a historic state visit of President Rouhani to India.

Last year, I repeated before this forum Iran's proposal for a security arrangement in the Persian Gulf, founded on dialogue, common principles and confidence building measures. Some of our neighbors used their opportunity here last year to level accusations against Iran. Some have, and others will, do the same this year. You were the audience for a cartoonish circus just this morning which does not even deserve the dignity of a response. So let's move to more serious issues.

I'm happy that in contrast to the approach of some, the UN Secretary General chose to endorse the forward-looking approach that I outlined here last year. I am here to expand on that, and to tell you that unless there is a collective effort to bring inclusive peace and security to the Persian Gulf region, we will be engulfed in turmoil and potentially far worse for generations to come. And our turmoil, in this interconnected world, is *everyone's* turmoil, as evidenced by events in both our region and in the West since the turn of this century.

Today, the territorial defeat of ISIS has heralded the return of some sense of stability to the territory it once occupied. But the defeat of one of the world's most evil organizations does not mean that the threat of extremism has been removed from the region and beyond. The root causes — particularly its ideology of hate and exclusion — continue and may erupt somewhere else.

For too long, military powers have had multiple strategies to win wars. And for too long, they have ignored any strategy to win the peace. For too

long, major powers and their regional allies have made the wrong choices in our region and then have blamed others, particularly Iran, for the consequences of their own short-sighted and trigger-happy strategic blunders:

From supporting Saddam Hussein's invasion of my country in 1980 to aiding and abetting his use of chemical weapons; from the wars to evict him from Kuwait and then to remove him altogether; from first supporting Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, to waging a war to remove them from Afghanistan; from supporting the same brand of extremist terrorists bringing ruin to Syria to dangerously occupying parts of Syria under the guise of fighting the groups they have armed and financed; from Israel's invasion and subsequent aggressions on Lebanon and its illegal occupation of Palestine to its routine incursions into Syrian airspace; and from the bombing of Yemen with Western-supplied planes. What have these actions brought the world?

The U.S. and its local clients in our region are suffering from the natural consequences of their own wrong choices. But they use this and other fora to revive the hysteria on Iran's foreign policy and obscure its reality. But did Iran force them to make all those wrong choices as some of them ridiculously claim? Are we to blame because we were on the right side of history, fighting Saddam Hussein, Al-Qaeda, Taliban, ISIS, Nusrah and the like, while the US and company were financing, arming and supporting them?

As I said before this forum last year, Iran believes that our Persian Gulf region requires a fresh regional security architecture. We believe in, and have proposed, creating what we call a "strong region" as opposed to a "strong man in the region." A strong region where small and large nations — even those with historical rivalries — contribute to stability.

This is simply recognizing the need to respect the interests of *all* stakeholders, which by its very nature will lead to stability, while hegemonic tendencies by any regional — or global power will, by its very nature, lead to insecurity. The arms race in our region — and no country represented in this forum is completely innocent in perpetuating it — is an example of the destructive and unnecessary rivalry that has made our neighborhood unsafe and insecure.

In a quest to create our "strong region", we need to be realistic and accept our differences. We need to move from collective security and alliance formations to inclusive concepts such as security *networking* which can address issues that range from divergence of interests to power and size disparities. Security networking is a non-zero-sum approach that accepts that security is indivisible, as opposed to alliances and blocks, which are fundamentally based on the defunct zero-sum approach of gaining security at the expense of the insecurity of others.

The nuclear deal was an example of such non-zero-sum thinking. Recognizing differences but also recognizing a common goal, and maintaining respect for the interests of all parties guided the difficult negotiations that led to the successful conclusion of the JCPOA. And that may be why those who see everything in terms of one-sided profiteering are so intrinsically opposed to it.

Immediately after the conclusion of JCPOA, Iran sought to use the same approach for the Persian Gulf and proposed to create a 'Regional Dialogue Forum'. That proposal fell on deaf ears, but is still on the table. It is the only way out. It could become, if our neighbors join us, a forum that will be used as an instrument for helping organize and advance dialogue at all formal and informal levels in our region, and while encouraging intergovernmental and formal dialogue, it can also promote dialogue between scholars, thinkers, and the general public.

The parameters of Iran's proposed regional architecture are simple but effective: rather than trying to ignore conflicts of interests, it will accept differences. Being premised on inclusivity, it can act as a firewall to prevent the emergence of an oligarchy among big states, and importantly, it allows smaller states to participate and have their interests protected.

Like the Helsinki process, the future security architecture in the Persian Gulf should be based on the "ticket principles" and "CBM baskets". All countries around this strategic yet volatile waterway should be able to enter by committing to a series of common standards enshrined in the UN Charter, such as sovereign equality of states; refraining from the threat or use of force; peaceful resolution of conflicts; respect for the territorial integrity; inviolability of borders; non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states; and respect for self-determination within states.

We also recognize that we need confidence-building measures in the Persian Gulf: from joint military visits to pre-notification of military exercises; and from transparency measures in armament procurements to reducing military expenditures; all of which could eventually lead to a regional non-aggression pact. We can begin with easier to implement issues such as the promotion of tourism, joint investments, or even joint task forces on issues ranging from nuclear safety to pollution to disaster management.

At a time when we are dangerously close to escalating conflicts that will affect our children and grandchildren, I encourage my counterparts in the Persian Gulf to join Iran in making these proposals a reality.

2019

Angela Merkel

Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

In her speech to the 55th Munich Security Conference, Angela Merkel openly criticised President Donald Trump's foreign policy and pleaded for a stronger commitment to multilateralism.

I believe that Munich is an excellent city to host this conference. Bavaria's strength is on display in a very special way here. We have other beautiful cities in Germany, but Munich is taking centre-stage today.

We are marking the 250th anniversary of Alexander von Humboldt's birth in 2019. Alexander von Humboldt lived on the threshold of industrialisation. He was a scholar and traveller who was driven by the urge to understand and see the world as a whole, a passion that yielded a great deal of success. His motto, as his Mexican travel diary from the year 1803 reveals, was "everything is interaction".

About 200 years later, in 2000, after researching the hole in the ozone layer and its chemical interactions, Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen concluded that we were embarking upon a new geochronological age. The Ice Age and the interglacial period are over, and we have now entered the Anthropocene. In 2016, this definition was subsequently adopted by the International Geological Congress. This means that we are living in an age in which humankind's traces penetrate so deeply into the Earth that future generations will regard it as an entire age created by humans. These are traces of nuclear tests, population growth, climate change, exploitation of raw materials, and of microplastics in the oceans. And these are but a few examples of the things that we are doing today.

All of this has implications for global security and for the issues that are being discussed right here, right now. It therefore makes sense to take a look at how this conference started life in 1963 — as a conference on military science, or "Wehrkunde" in German, still dominated by the aftermath of the Second World War and National Socialism in Germany; an event with a particularly pronounced transatlantic focus. This is why I'm also delighted that so many representatives from the US are with us here today. We are meeting today at a comprehensive security conference where we are discussing the energy supply, development cooperation and, of course, defence issues and a comprehensive approach to security. This is precisely the right response.

We must think in terms of interlinked structures, of which the military component is only one. But what we sense at the beginning of the 21st century — we are now in the second decade of the 21st century — is that the structures in which we operate are essentially those that emerged from the horrors of the Second World War and National Socialism, but that these structures are coming under incredible pressure because developments require them to undergo reform. However, I don't think that we can simply take an axe to these structures. This is why the heading of this security conference is "The Great Puzzle". Allow me to start with the first part of this topic. Rivalry between great powers — this alone offers us an insight into the fact that something that we regarded as a whole, as an architecture of the world, is under pressure, and is even likened to a puzzle, i. e. something that breaks up into pieces.

Thirty years ago — an anniversary that we are set to mark this year — the Berlin Wall fell, and with it the Iron Curtain disappeared. The Cold War came to an end. Back then, people asked themselves whether we still need an organisation like NATO. Today, we know that, yes, we need NATO as an anchor of stability in turbulent times. We need it as a community of shared values, because we should never forget that we established NATO not only as a military alliance, but also as a community of shared values in which human rights, democracy and the rule of law are the guiding principles of joint action.

The fact that NATO continues to be immensely attractive to this day became apparent to us in recent months during the wrangling over whether North Macedonia, as we can fortunately now all call this country, can also become a NATO member. I would simply like to thank the two principal players, Prime Minister Zoran Zaev from North Macedonia and Alexis Tsipras, the Greek Prime Minister, most sincerely for their courage. They will be presented with the Ewald von Kleist Award this evening for their efforts. In view of the many conflicts that we face today and for which we have yet to find a solution, this is a good example of how solutions can be found if we take a courageous approach. I had already given up thinking about further combinations of names in the meantime, because I thought it was a lost cause anyway. Now you have met with success. Permit me to offer you my most sincere congratulations on this achievement!

There are, however, a great number conflicts that challenge us, and this is the subject of the discussions that we are holding here. I would like to start with one issue that is a particular focus of my work, and also for many others among us, namely our relationship with Russia. Russia, in the form of the Soviet Union, was, in a manner of speaking, the antagonist during the Cold War. After the Berlin Wall fell, we certainly hoped — the NATO-Russia Founding Act came into being at that time — that we could make improvements to our coexistence. When I recall now how in 2011, on the fringes of this security conference, the instruments of ratification for the New START disarmament treaty were exchanged between Hillary Clinton and Sergey Lavrov, then today, in 2019, this feels like quite a long time ago. But back then, both Clinton and Lavrov hailed this as a milestone of the strategic partnership. I say this to illustrate what has happened in recent years and to point out that, on the other hand, things may look completely different again in a few years from now if the different sides work with each other. I would therefore like to thank Jens Stoltenberg most sincerely for not only invoking the NATO-Russia Founding Act time and again during the most difficult times we have had in recent years, but also for seeking dialogue. Thank you very much indeed for this!

Crimea was annexed in March 2014 — in what was a clear violation of international law — and then — Petro Poroshenko is here today — came the attack on eastern Ukraine, which was followed by a painstakingly negotiated ceasefire that was fragile but kept stable by the Minsk Agreement, with which Germany and France together with Russia and Ukraine are endeavouring to resolve the conflict. However, we must admit that we are far from achieving a solution; we must continue to work on this at all costs.

For us Europeans, if I may say so, the really bad news this year was the termination of the INF Treaty. After not decades, but years of violations of the terms of the treaty by Russia, this termination was inevitable. We all supported this as Europeans. Nevertheless, this is — and I say this to our American colleagues – a most interesting constellation. The US and Russia, as the legal successor to the Soviet Union, are terminating a treaty that was essentially agreed for Europe's sake, a disarmament treaty that affects our security, and we, of course, with our elementary interests, will do everything in our power to facilitate further steps towards disarmament. Blind rearmament cannot be our response to this.

However, since a representative from China is here today, I would say that disarmament is something that concerns us all, and we would, of course, be pleased in this regard if such negotiations were held not only between the US, Europe and Russia, but also with China. I know that there

are many reservations about this, and I don't want to go into details about this right now. But we would welcome this.

In response to the events in Ukraine, we said in Wales in 2014 that not only the fight against terrorism, such as in Afghanistan, but also Alliance defence was once again at the forefront of our efforts. Back then, the objective of developing the military expenditure of each country towards two percent of its respective GDP was updated once again. I never tire of pointing out that this was already a goal at the beginning of the 2000s. All those who wanted to become new members of NATO were told at the outset that if they did not take steps in the direction of two per cent, then they would not be admitted to NATO in the first place. — That was before my time as Federal Chancellor.

Germany is now facing criticism in this regard. I will address this matter later on. We have, however, increased our defence expenditure from 1.18 percent in 2014 to 1.35 percent. We aim to reach 1.5 percent by 2024. For many this is not enough, but for us it is an essential leap.

Of course, we must also ask ourselves what we're doing with this money. Let me put it this way: if we all fall into recession and have no economic growth, then defence spending will be easier. But I'm not so sure that this will stand to benefit the Alliance. This is why it is important that we have such benchmarks. However, we must also consider what tangible contribution we are making.

Germany is doing its part. We have now been in Afghanistan for 18 years and have around 1,300 German servicewomen and -men stationed there. We are working with 20 partner countries in northern Afghanistan. My most sincere request is that we — this is the first and only deployment under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty which we have been engaged in together for a very long time — also discuss the issues of further development together. We have had to work hard to convince our people that our security is indeed being defended on the Hindu Kush. I really do not want to see us one day having to turn our backs on this and walk away as we have extremely interconnected capacities in the region.

We are a framework nation in Lithuania and have for the second time assumed the leadership of NATO's spearhead force. I don't want to list everything here. However, all of these are things that are very useful, especially as far as Alliance defence is concerned. We are therefore also prepared to do our part.

We are now playing an active role also outside NATO, for instance in Mali. For Germany, this is a giant step and one to which we are, culturally speaking, not as accustomed as our French friends. It was no coincidence

that a discussion took place this morning between the President of the European Union during the rotating Presidency of the Council and the new President of the African Union, the Egyptian President Abdel Fatah al-Sisi — congratulations on your election, which was just a few days ago.

The questions surrounding development in Africa and relations with Africa will challenge us as Europeans in a different way than, for example, the US. There will not always be NATO missions here. I would therefore ask you not to think of our efforts to achieve a coherent European defence policy as something that is directed against NATO, but as something that makes cooperation within NATO more efficient and feasible, because we can overcome many of the inefficiencies that exist among the many member states that are in the European Union and in NATO if we also develop a common military culture and if we improve the way in which our weapons systems are organised.

Germany is set to face a mammoth task in this regard, I can tell you. We now want to develop joint weapons systems. The issue of arms exports naturally also played a role in connection with the Treaty of Aachen, which we signed with France. If we in Europe do not have a common culture of arms exports, then the development of common weapons systems is, of course, at risk. In other words, we cannot talk about a European army and a common arms policy or arms development if we are not prepared at the same time to pursue a common arms export policy. We still have many complicated discussions on this subject ahead of us in Germany. I don't think I'm telling you anything that you don't already know here.

Alongside relations with Russia, the fight against terrorism is a major challenge for us, also in addition to the euro crisis, of course. In 2014/2015, we conducted very intensive negotiations with Greece about remaining in the euro zone. We then had to grapple with the refugee issue on a massive scale. The refugee issue has been fuelled by the situation in Syria, a civil war that has also been beset with terrorist challenges. The security issues that we faced were therefore of a very different nature compared with the ones that we face, for example, in the context of Alliance defence. Europe was forced to ask itself whether or not we are prepared to assume responsibility in an all-consuming humanitarian drama. That so many refugees came to Europe had to do with the fact that we had not previously addressed the situation of the refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, where three million or more had already arrived. The stability of these countries was genuinely at risk. The upshot was refugees placing their trust in smugglers and traffickers and deciding to take their fate into their own hands.

Against this backdrop, Europe then embarked on a task — not just Germany, incidentally, but also Sweden, Austria and other countries: we provided assistance in a humanitarian emergency. But I think we all agree that states' response to humanitarian emergencies cannot be for human traffickers and people smugglers to take control and for the refugees to be exposed to countless dangers, but that the right response was to create the EU-Turkey agreement.

For Germany, it was the right response to then also increase its expenditure on development assistance. During the same period — during the time when the Wales decisions to move towards two percent within NATO were adopted — we increased our development assistance expenditure to the same degree, because we are convinced that this, too, is a security issue. If we do not finally undertake sufficient payments for humanitarian assistance, for Welthungerhilfe and the UNHCR — and we are already one of the largest international donors — so that people's livelihoods can be improved with their help, the refugee crisis will continue. The willingness of the German people, for example, to help, was outstanding, but we nonetheless need to solve the problems on the ground. That is what we are in the process of learning. So that was a parallel challenge that I consider as important from a security policy perspective as boosting our ability to honour our commitments within the Alliance.

Developments in Libya — also with regard to Europe or in this case Italy — have given us a foretaste of an issue that is becoming increasingly relevant: What direction will developments on the African continent take? In Libya, the instability of the state has resulted in this Libya becoming the starting point as it were for many African refugee flows, although our Spanish friends faced these challenges in connection with Morocco much earlier, ten or 15 years previously. That prompted the European Union to be much more consistent and resolute in developing the Partnership for Africa.

But let's be honest: we are still in the early stages of this partnership. For if development in sub-Saharan Africa, but also in Egypt, in Morocco, in Tunisia and in Algeria does not progress in a way that gives young people opportunities and hope, that gives them prospects for a life in these countries, we will not be able to tackle the prosperity gap between Europe and Africa.

We can see that in recent years China has pursued development policy in Africa on a large scale in the form of investment. We can see that we in Europe have implemented traditional development policy to a considerable extent. I have often talked with President Xi Jinping about how we can learn from one another with regard to what each of us does well. But we

have not yet drawn up a development policy agenda with which we could say that investment will ultimately create enough jobs to ensure security, peace and stability in these countries, too.

Again Germany has said the following, which in the early days of the Federal Republic of Germany was not an essential part of our historical understanding: Okay, we will support the G-5 Sahel troops, which are striving to fight terrorism. We are engaged in Mali and are working to tackle terrorism there in cooperation with the United Nations. We are on the ground in Mali working to train the armed forces. But all that will be in vain if these countries don't have any economic prospects. And that is why we have increased our development assistance. But I want to reiterate that the methodology behind this development assistance has so far not been worked out in detail; that is something we can only do together with the African Union.

I am very pleased that the African Union now has clear strategic ideas — the Agenda 2063 and other plans — in which Africa is stating what it wants. For we need what these days is described as "ownership" in what has almost been adopted as a German word. People in Africa need to feel themselves: "These are our programmes." If multilateral cooperation has improved in recent years, I have to say that in my view the African Union is certainly a good example of it.

So, ladies and gentlemen, those are the problems I wanted to outline for you and on which Germany is working. Now I want to turn to the question of the methodology of our cooperation. For the transatlantic alliance is, of course, in essence a defence alliance. The Foreign Ministers meet very frequently, but for many years we have discussed with France whether it is permissible also to discuss political issues. My theory is that NATO will only do justice to its responsibilities if it keeps its focus on the concept of networked security. I think that is happening to some extent. For none of these numerous conflicts can be resolved by military means alone.

Tensions, of course, run high in connection with what the answers should look like. What are the answers with regard to Ukraine? As far as the Minsk agreements are concerned, we are united. My heartfelt request is that implementation of sanctions against Russia be properly coordinated again if the situation escalates further — soldiers are now in the Kerch Strait. We won't achieve anything if everyone implements their own sanctions. The third point is that we continue to support the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Communication channels need to remain open.

Then there is a fourth point: economic cooperation. There is already a wide range of discussions taking place on this issue — take the example of

Nord Stream 2. I can understand Petro Poroshenko, who is sitting here and saying: Ukraine is a transit country for Russian natural gas, and wishes to remain so. I have assured him time and again that we will give him every possible support and conduct negotiations on this issue, and we will continue to do that, the election campaign notwithstanding. A Russian gas molecule is a Russian gas molecule, whether it comes via Ukraine or via the Baltic Sea. That means that the question of how dependent we are on Russian gas cannot be resolved by asking which pipeline it flows through. There, too, I say: I am ready. Nobody wants to become totally and unilaterally dependent on Russia. But if we even imported Russian gas during the Cold War — I was still in the GDR then and we consumed Russian gas there anyway, but the former Federal Republic then started importing large amounts of Russian gas — then I don't know why the situation today should be so much worse that we can't say that Russia remains a partner.

Let me ask you — again, it isn't easy to say this in the presence of President Poroshenko on the left from where I'm standing and the Chinese representative on the right: Do we want to make Russia dependent on China or rely on China to import its natural gas? Is that in our European interests? No, I don't think so, either. We also want to be involved in trade relations. That, too, is something we need to discuss frankly.

Although there is already very high LNG capacity in Europe — basically we have many more LNG terminals than we have LNG gas — we have made the strategic decision to continue to invest in LNG in Germany, too, in view of the predicted increase in gas consumption and LNG production particularly also in the United States of America. As we are phasing out nuclear energy as well as lignite and black coal, Germany will be a very safe market as far as natural gas is concerned, regardless of who is selling it.

Then we have the issue of Iran, which is currently a source of contention. We need to be very careful with regard to this division, which concerns me greatly. In a speech to the Knesset, I expressed my assurance that Israel's right to exist is a fundamental guiding principle of Germany. And I mean exactly what I said. I am observing the ballistic missile programme, I am observing Iran in Yemen and above all I am observing Iran in Syria. The only question that divides us, the United States and the Europeans, on this issue, is: Does it serve our common cause, our common goal of reducing the harmful and difficult influence of Iran by terminating the only agreement still in force, or would we help our cause more by keeping hold of the small anchor we have in order to perhaps be able to exert pressure in other areas? That is the tactical issue over which we do not see eye to eye. But our goals are, of course, the same.

But I'll also ask, as I am on the receiving end of criticism every day myself: Is it good for the Americans to want to pull out of Syria immediately and quickly, or is that not also a way to strengthen the opportunities for Iran and Russia to gain influence there? We need to talk about that, too. Those are issues that are on the table and that we need to discuss.

There is, of course, also the question of how economic relations between China, the United States and Europe should develop. That is a huge problem. We are observing that China is an up and coming country. When I visit China, its representatives say: for 1,700 of the two thousand years AD, we were the leading economy. Don't get upset, all that's going to happen is that we will return to the place where we always were. It's just that you haven't experienced it in the past 300 years. And we say: in the past 300 years we were the leaders, first the Europeans, then the United States, and then all of us together. Now, however, we need to deal with the situation as it is and find sensible solutions so that it doesn't descend into a struggle that weakens all sides.

In this context I want to say quite clearly that I support all efforts to promote fairness and trade. I am talking about reciprocity. We need to talk about that. We need to do so in a spirit of partnership and in view of the fact that we have so many other problems to resolve in the world that it would be helpful if we could reach an understanding. I place great hope in the negotiations that are now being conducted with the United States of America in the area of trade.

I will say quite frankly that if we are serious about the transatlantic partnership, for me as German Chancellor it is a little disturbing to say the least to read that apparently — I haven't yet seen it in writing — the US Department of Commerce has said that European cars are a threat to the national security of the United States of America. You see, we are proud of our cars, and we are entitled to be so. These vehicles are also built in the United States. The largest BMW factory is in South Carolina, not in Bavaria, in South Carolina. South Carolina in turn exports to China. If these vehicles, which are no less of a threat by being built in South Carolina than they would be by being built in Bavaria, suddenly pose a threat to US national security, then this comes as a shock to us. In that case, I can only say that I think it would be good for us to engage in proper talks. Whenever anyone has a grievance, we need to talk about it — that is how things work in the world. And then we will be able to find solutions.

All these issues that are coming at us like puzzle pieces and which are too many for me to refer to here, are ultimately the expression of a fundamental question. Because we are noticing how great the pressure is on our

traditional and, to us, familiar order, this raises the question of whether we are going to break up into a lot of individual puzzle pieces and think that each of us can best solve the problem single-handedly. As German Chancellor, I can only respond: if so, our chances are poor. For the United States of America has so much more economic clout and the dollar as a currency is so much stronger that I can only say: obviously it holds the better hand. China, with more than 1.3 billion people, is so much larger. We can be as hard-working, as impressive, as super as we like — but with a population of 80 million we won't be able to keep up if China decides that it no longer wants to maintain good relations with Germany. That's how it will be all over the world.

So the one big question is this: Are we going to stay with the principle of multilateralism, which was the lesson we learned from the Second World War and the National Socialism caused by Germany, even when multilateralism is not always fun, but often difficult, slow, complicated? I am firmly convinced that it is better to put ourselves in one another's shoes, to look beyond our own interests and to see whether we can achieve win-win solutions together rather than to think we can solve everything ourselves.

That is why, ladies and gentlemen, I was so pleased yesterday evening when I was preparing my speech and read a quotation by Lindsey Graham, who declared yesterday evening: "Multilateralism may be complicated, but it's better than staying at home alone." I think that is the right response to the motto of this conference "The Great Puzzle: Who Will Pick Up the Pieces?": Only all of us together.

2019

Abdel Fatah al-Sisi

President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

In his address to the 55th Munich Security Conference, Abdel Fatah al-Sisi shared his positions on the most pressing challenges in the Middle East and Africa.

Allow me at the outset to express my sincere thanks to Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, Chairman of the Munich Security Conference, for inviting me to participate in this outstanding forum, not only as the president of a country that dynamically interacts with its African and Arab surroundings and effectively plays such a pivotal role in the pursuit of realizing security, stability and development in both the Middle East and African Continent, but also in view of the fact that Egypt, few days ago, was handed over the one-year rotating presidency of the African Union; henceforth, it seeks as usual to highlight the concerns of the sisterly African peoples yearning to achieve stability and progress on one hand and provide impetus to development on the other hand.

The conference is held this year amid growing challenges and manifold dangers, namely the continued existence of conflict and tension hotbeds, prevalence of terrorism and extremism hazards and escalating rates of the organized crime. All these challenges not only pose intense pressures as regards the concept of the state of nation but also cause collapse of its institutions in a way that renders the whole situation more complicated and endangers peoples' resources, security and stability. These challenges have been compounded by the state of polarization and intensification of political confrontations engulfing the international order, not to mention the impact of natural hazards, namely climate change, desertification, water shortage, among others. This requires strengthening international efforts in view of the fact that the present-day challenges are far beyond the capacities of any single state to confront or contain and no longer recognize geographical boundaries but rather extend to affect all with no exception.

These challenges are manifested clearly in the Middle East as well as the African Continent; we witness nowadays armed conflicts, civil wars, ethnic clashes and terrorist attacks, not to mention the problems of poverty, unemployment, low productivity and the declining standard of services provided and the related economic crises, financial market instability, capital inflows conditionality and exacerbating debt phenomenon. Henceforth, handling such problems requires genuine international cooperation based on reviewing and evaluating patterns of traditional cooperation so as to help put an end to conflicts and enhance a number of fields of priority, namely entrenching the concepts of good governance, protecting human rights in their comprehensive concept, empowering women who make up half of society, upgrading education and health, developing infrastructure and agriculture, boosting rural development, creating job opportunities, increasing investments, promoting trade and strengthening regional integration and incorporation.

Under such challenges, the priorities of the African Union's agenda in 2019 revolve around boosting regional economic incorporation across the Continent. This target can be attained by increasing investments in the field of infrastructure, facilitating the intra-trade movement via speeding up the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AFCFTA) as well as continuing to devise sustainable development programmes and plans within the framework of Africa's Agenda 2063 and put such plans into practice based on the phased and effective implementation side by side with national capacity-building in this vein.

In this context, it would be important to note that while being on the threshold of the year of "Silencing the Guns" in the Continent in 2020, one of the priorities of the states of the African Union is post-conflict reconstruction and development, thus realizing stability across the Continent through building and empowering the state of nation's institutions to be able to effectively undertake their duties. In this vein, Egypt is working with the African Union Commission to launch the African Union Center for Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development that will be hosted in Cairo. We hope that this center would be an effective regional tool to help the countries that have recently ended their armed conflicts to evaluate their needs and crystallize their national vision as regards the process of reconstruction. Out of this concept, Egypt welcomes cooperation with all international partners so as to lay the foundations of security system and achieve sustainable development in the African Continent through strengthening cooperation based on mobilizing resources and benefiting from extended expertises on both the African and international levels. Investment

in the African continent represents an investment for the future of all of us, as its population that exceeds one billion and its resources, potentials and wealth that, if properly utilized, can make Africa a locomotive of international economic growth over the coming decades.

There is no doubt that terrorism has become an international phenomenon with increasing risks that lead to the destabilization of societies. This requires everyone to make assiduous and genuine efforts to uproot this abhorrent phenomenon, which is the first threat to the pursuit of development, including tightening the noose around terrorist groups and organizations , or the countries that whether turn a blind eye to it, or even flagrantly support it as a means to achieve political goals and regional ambitions.

It is worth emphasizing, in this context, that the failure to settle the Palestinian Question in a just and final way is the main source of instability in the Middle East. This Question is the oldest political conflict, a heavy legacy on our consciences, which we have been carrying since the early 20th century. There must be real collaborative efforts of the international community to put an end to this long-awaited conflict in accordance with the relevant and agreed upon international references, and in enforcement of the principle of the two-state solution as well as the right of the Palestinians to establish their independent state on the borders of 4 June 1967 with East Jerusalem as its capital, and alleviate their daily suffering as this will form the nucleus of the actual start to reach successful solutions to the other conflicts.

One of the most pressing issues on the African arena is the security situation in Libya, which requires all of us to provide the necessary support for the political process and the efforts of the UN envoy to back and empower the state institutions, including the military. In this respect, Egypt has been keen to provide support to its brothers in Libya to help them regain their strength, unify the military and build a sustainable political process, which will reflect positively on the Libyan people as well as the regional situation in the North African and African Sahel areas.

In this context, also, I would like to talk about the issue of migration and refugees, which necessitates a comprehensive and innovative solution that takes into account the roots of the crises causing it and seeks to alleviate the human suffering associated with that issue; especially that the greatest burden of the consequences of displacement and asylum lies on the shoulders of the neighboring countries, which receive the bulk of migrants and displaced people in Africa. In recognition of the importance of dealing effectively with this phenomenon, the African countries have engaged in the Valletta and Khartoum Processes. Some of them have contributed to laying down the International Covenant on Migration as a framework for cooperation and joint action to find constructive solutions to this challenge.

The national efforts and initiatives in many African countries have also contributed to enhancing dealing with this phenomenon, including that exerted by Egypt, which succeeded in stopping any attempts of illegal migration across its shores since September 2016. It also held bilateral dialogues with a number of European countries seeking a bilateral cooperation to deal with this phenomenon, not only in terms of its repercussions, but also to discuss ways of overcoming it and its causes. Besides, it hosts millions of refugees, who are living in full merger with Egyptian society without any tangible external support, and fully keen not to trade on this issue which is related to humanitarian aspects in the first place.

Egypt's belief in the importance of international dialogue in relation to issues of peace and security has motivated us to launch the first Aswan Forum on Security and Sustainable Development in late 2019, to be an international platform to discuss ways to strengthen the interdependence between peace and development and to crystallize conceptual perceptions and practical ideas for transitional development programs aiming to promote the culture of peace and push the post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

In conclusion, we can affirm that security and policies axis, which we aim to achieve in its comprehensive sense: politically, economically and culturally, will remain the common ground on which we all have to focus and cooperate in the years to come.

FRANK-WALTER STEINMEIER
JUSTIN TRUDEAU
TEDROS ADHANOM GHEBREYESUS
ZUZANA ČAPUTOVÁ
JOSEPH R. BIDEN
BORIS JOHNSON
URSULA VON DER LEYEN
VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYY
JENS STOLTENBERG
EMMANUEL MACRON
WANG YI
ANTÓNIO GUTERRES
KAMALA D. HARRIS
YULIA NAVALNAYA
JD VANCE

Chapter 6

ZEITEN-WENDE?

2020 – present

2020

Frank-Walter Steinmeier

President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Frank-Walter Steinmeier delivered the opening speech at the Munich Security Conference 2020, addressing the challenges of an increasingly fragmented global order.

The world today is not the same as it was in 2014. Six years ago exactly, you see, I spoke here in this room about Germany's foreign policy responsibility and how it had to prove its validity. Much has changed since then. Above all, though — and this is probably the reason for this year's conference theme — the we of the West that was once a given is clearly no longer something that can be taken entirely for granted. This is true both within our societies, but also in relation to the existential issues of foreign and security policy on which this conference focuses.

As you are unlikely to have invited me here today to weave a few more diplomatic threads, I would like to talk about how today's world appears from the German vantage point. Now, I am no longer a regular guest at this meeting, and diplomacy is no longer my bread and butter. So I hope you will not only forgive me for speaking plainly on some points, but that you might in fact even be expecting me to do so.

This year we are commemorating the end, 75 years ago, of that most destructive of all wars. A war which Germany unleashed and waged, particularly in Eastern Europe, as a war of annihilation. Two weeks ago, at Yad Vashem and then at Auschwitz, we commemorated the liberation 75 years ago of the most murderous of the concentration camps. Without that war and without Auschwitz, the inner and outer face of today's Germany would be inconceivable. Germany's view of the world cannot be explained without reference to those experiences.

I wish I could say that the lesson we Germans have learnt from history is a lesson that will last forever. But I cannot say that when hatred and hate speech are spreading. That is what I said at Yad Vashem. Today the evil spirits of the past — ethnocentric thinking, racism, antisemitism — are emerging

in a new guise, in our country too. And they are starting to poison public debate once again. So we — in Germany, but by no means only in Germany — are called upon as a society once again. We are called upon to defend our elementary understanding of the dignity of the individual and actually to fight for our open societies.

This year we will be reflecting on another 75th anniversary. The constituent assembly of the United Nations was held in San Francisco 75 years ago. The catastrophe of excessive nationalism afforded lessons and conclusions, not only for my country: a joint organisation of all states to assume responsibility for peace and security; then a system of free trade and financial support in the newly established institutions of the Bretton Woods system. There followed a Universal Declaration of Human Rights which imposed high standards on all states, also in relations with their own citizens. Standards which were then extended over the ensuing decades to include civil, economic and social rights. True, much of this remained a lofty goal, far removed from reality. Nonetheless, the international order we built up from that foundation — in Helsinki in 1975, in the midst of the Cold War, and with the Charter of Paris following the end of the Cold War 30 years ago — all this offered stability, orientation and hope in what had long been an anarchical assortment of states.

I wish I could say that as an international community, too, we have learnt an enduring lesson from history, after 1945 and after 1989. But I fear we are currently witnessing an increasingly destructive dynamic in international politics. Year by year, we are moving further and further away from the goal of international cooperation in order to create a more peaceful world. The idea of great power competition is not only influencing the strategy papers of today; it is also shaping the new reality all across the world, and the tracks can be followed right to the unending wars with huge loss of life in the Middle East and Libya.

Russia, rightly or wrongly offended and alienated, not only annexed Crimea in total disregard of international law. It turned military force and the violent redrawing of borders on the European continent into political instruments again. The result is uncertainty and unpredictability, confrontation and lost trust.

Thanks to its impressive rise, China has become an important actor in the international institutions as well, becoming indispensable for the protection of global public goods. At the same time, it is selective in accepting international law only where it does not run counter to its own interests. Its actions in the South China Sea are unsettling the neighbours in the region. Its actions against minorities in the country disturb us all.

And under its current Administration, our closest ally, the United States of America, rejects the very concept of an international community. As if the let everyone tend his own garden attitude were enough as global policy. As if everyone thinking of himself meant that everyone were being considered. Great again — if necessary, even at the expense of neighbours and partners. At least that's how it looks.

It is indeed true that international law primarily protects the small. The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must. Not my words, but a comment on the ancient world from Thucydides over 2,000 years ago. In other words: whilst laws and rules are of extreme importance to the little man, they are always merely an option for the great. They, it appears, have other ways to survive.

But, if you look closely, that's not entirely true. Because thinking and acting this way hurts us all. Firstly, it casts us back to an age in which everyone sought to ensure his own security at the expense of others. In this scenario, the security of one is the insecurity of the other. We fall back into the classic security dilemma familiar to us all. The inevitable result? More mistrust, more armament, ultimately less security. Possibly even a new nuclear arms race that will produce not only more weapons, but above all more nuclear powers, with all the risks that entails for an already precarious nuclear stability. In addition, there are countless regional conflicts which medium sized and small powers believe they can resolve themselves, because the large powers don't take the rules so seriously any more and no longer act as guarantors and guardians of the old world order.

But the damage goes much further than that. This withdrawal to concentrate on a narrowly defined national interest prevents us from taking joint action and coming up with convincing answers to the issues and problems that no one, not even the biggest nation state on Earth, can solve alone. This way of thinking is worse than a return to the past: it is worse because it robs us of our future in this closely interconnected world. It damages the institutions and instruments we absolutely need to tackle the major issues facing humanity. Climate change mitigation is but one of them. But climate change mitigation in particular makes it clearer by the day that the repercussions aren't just felt by small states. A blinkered or short sighted national view will eventually cost even the biggest of us dear. All over the world, our children's and grandchildren's generation will pay a high price for our failure to act and for nations going it alone, undermining joint action to combat climate change.

That is why we must be so worried by a phenomenon that is obvious to everyone in this, the 75th anniversary year of the end of the Second World

War: the institutions and authorities which were supposed to help us overcome our different traditions and interests and translate them into viable compromises are being deliberately weakened — in particular, the authority of these institutions is being deliberately weakened. Because the United Nations Security Council is deadlocked on central issues; agreed and ratified conventions are simply being terminated; dispute settlement bodies are being paralysed as no new judges are being appointed. In short: trust that will take years and decades to be re-established is being put at risk and eroded. This is not a new way of thinking, I may say, but a relapse into old patterns of thinking. And let me add this: it is extremely dangerous.

I am well aware that international community is not something that can be taken for granted. In most instances it is more goal than reality. Nevertheless, I firmly believe that the idea of international community is not outmoded. For we are the first generation to live in an age in which humanity can irreversibly change the living conditions on the planet. At a time like this, withdrawing into our national shells leads us into a dead end, into a truly dark age. Only the concept of a global order — and only that — offers the opportunity to formulate persuasive answers to the challenges of the Anthropocene. That is why we must continue our efforts to create, to further develop, a supranational legal order. It would be dangerous for all of us, big and small, to abandon this ambition or to shrug it off as an idealistic fantasy. And if you don't believe me, then believe Henry Kissinger: years ago he gave the sum of his experience and said that today's world needs a concept of order that goes beyond the perspectives and ideals of individual regions and nations. A more precise, apposite or modern description of the job of foreign and security policy today would be impossible to find. That sums it up exactly.

Let me turn now to Germany. Today many Germans observing international politics feel irritated, unsettled, anxious. We Germans like to think that if everyone was as just sensible as us, then everything would be fine. That, however, is, I know, overly simplistic. Germany, too, is being tested now.

This year, we will be celebrating the 30th anniversary of reunification — at the time, an unbelievable and unexpected stroke of good fortune, particularly as it was associated with the reunification of Europe, which had been divided by the Iron Curtain. Felix Germania — at one with the world, surrounded by friends, secure in the global Pax Americana. That's how it was. And that is the framework at risk of crumbling before our very eyes. As yet, there is no indication of what might replace it. But it is clear that the hope that others will somehow sort it out for us is a vain one, for us Germans at least.

For the first time in its history, Germany is surrounded solely by friends. That's true. And it is a source of happiness. But sometimes happiness can also make one blind. That true sentence, dating from the early 1990s, has occasionally blinded us to the fact that our neighbours see the world differently from us, that they are closer to very acute troublespots than we are, that they feel an existential danger.

We Germans, perhaps like others as well, like to think of ourselves as the best Europeans. We tell ourselves that we are particularly generous towards our partners and that we do our utmost to take their interests into account. We also like to believe that we have learned the lessons of European history more thoroughly than anyone else. But when we look at the European Union today, what we see is economic divergence, not convergence. We see political, and increasingly also ideological, divides within the European Union. If I am seeing correctly, Europe has not grown closer together. And presumably the responsibility for that doesn't lie only with everyone else.

And so the question we too are asking is this: Do we really always behave in the way our speeches on Europe, a community with a common destiny, would in fact require? Is this how we behave in security and defence policy, or in the economic and monetary union? In many issues, we see ourselves differently from how others see us. Germany often believes that it is being helpful and demonstrating solidarity, whereas others reproach us for tending to pursue our national interests. This is true of dealing with external threats as well as for issues relating to solidarity and consensus building within the European Union.

And it is not only internal differences that are causing difficulties for Europe. In the year 2020, unlike before, we can no longer assume that the great powers have an interest in seeing successful European integration. On the contrary. If I might speak plainly: each of the major players is pursuing its own advantage, if necessary even at the expense of Europe's unity — and that is not a good development for us.

Or, to come at it from the other direction: this Europe must not be allowed to fail. For what is Germany's national interest today, 30 years after the most important constitutional goal — reunification — became reality? The answer, for us Germans, is actually still to be found in the Basic Law, our constitution: to promote world peace as an equal partner in a united Europe.

For Germany, Europe is not something that is merely nice to have or important when other partnerships wilt. No, it is our strongest, our most fundamental national interest. Today and tomorrow, Europe is the indispensable framework for us to assert ourselves in the world. At the same time, 75 years on from the end of the war, Europe is and will remain the

only successful response to the challenges posed by our history and by geography. If the European project fails, the lessons of German history, but perhaps also European history, will be called into question.

It is these two considerations taken together that make Europe so vitally important for us. Only in and through Europe was Germany able to stop oscillating over centuries between rampant power politics and cultural hubris. This united Europe will only survive if we regard it as the most concrete repository for German responsibility. Here at this conference, which is devoted to security issues, I wish to say this quite openly: of all the dangers I sense facing Germany, I see none greater than that our German narrative of the future dispenses with the united Europe, whether as a result of a lack of insight, because of indifference, or in some cases even intentionally.

Now you are wondering, and rightly so: what does this mean? How should we approach Europe and the world? Above all else — this is my advice to ourselves — we need to adapt mentally to a changing reality, to a new reality. Otherwise we will lose touch with Europe and thus also our ability to shape events. The realistic view of the world I am advocating does not call for resignation, and certainly not cynicism; rather, I am advocating realism and curiosity, occasionally also a touch of humility.

In Germany in particular, we believed, supposedly with good reason, that the post Cold War world revolved around the European sun, that the legacy of the European Enlightenment must in fact be the focal point for all social development, and that some were perhaps just a bit late in getting there. But some of these assumptions have, as we know, proven overly optimistic. They have led us to overestimate ourselves. They have led to a stance that too often manifests itself in moral condemnation, a stance in which morally guided positions are sometimes more likely to close rather than open our eyes to the necessity and actual possibilities of our actions. One important lesson here lies in realising that even our possibilities are limited, but not sinking into despair. We, Germany, and we, the West, cannot shape the world in our own image. And so we must not overburden our foreign policy with the expectation that it will bring salvation. When I talk of humility, however, I certainly do not mean a reluctance to take on responsibility — anything but. On the contrary. The job of a prudent foreign policy is and must be to prevent wars, defuse conflicts and lessen suffering through courage and drive. Its task is also to seek normative understanding to safeguard humanity's key life resources — but without expecting ever to be able to ensure complete global harmony.

The second virtue we Germans should rediscover is curiosity. If everyone supposedly is becoming like us — or at least wants to become like us — then we might wonder why should we care about others' particular qualities, history and traditions, fears and priorities? Today, at a time when internal and external are becoming increasingly intermeshed in all societies, when domestic debate determines the room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, we must once again rediscover a far greater interest in what drives our partners, our competitors and, yes, even our opponents, in the roots of their ambition, but also in the reasons for their fears.

It is after all true that countless Germans are committed to and engaged in international cooperation. On many trips, I have been able to witness a great degree of personal commitment to fighting poverty and inequality and to building a better world. That goes particularly of course for the young generation. And yet, what I miss in many of our national debates is a genuine openness to the outside, a desire to make the effort to understand others. Instead, we often resort to the very human but nonetheless unrealistic longing for clarity, often with a straightforward black/white or friend/enemy scheme of things: others do things differently from us — wrongly, in other words. I am certainly not advising naivety. But conflicts cannot be resolved if we are not familiar with the other side's perspectives or interests, especially where they run counter to our own ideas. Without such an understanding, it will be impossible in future to negotiate a nuclear agreement with Iran, and there will be no peace in eastern Ukraine. If you want to make peace in Libya, you have to shake a great many hands, not all of them clean. Whoever wants to combat terrorism in the Sahel region — and Germany has a few years' experience in Mali — cannot simply make it a case of military — yes or no?, but must above all tackle the complex causes of the conflict on the ground to successfully ensure stability. There can be no conflict resolution, far less understanding, otherwise.

With this realism, openness and curiosity about others' thinking, Germany should face up to the biggest responsibility resting on our country: namely to hold the united Europe together.

With regard to security policy, I regard our country as having a dual responsibility. For Germany, the development of an EU capable of action in defence policy is as crucial as the expansion of the European pillar of NATO. Future scenarios often suggest that Germany needs to choose one or the other. Frankly, I believe that would be a short sighted strategy.

To put it quite clearly: if we want to keep this Europe together, on security issues too, then it is not enough to make the European Union alone stronger in terms of security policy and the military; rather, we must, I am convinced, also continue to invest in our transatlantic links. Or I could echo the French President in saying that it is not a question of whether we want

to defend ourselves with or without Washington and that Europe's security is based on a strong alliance with America. Furthermore, many of our Central and Eastern European partners see their existential security there first and foremost in the transatlantic relationship. Irrespective of all the progress made — and I am not disputing that there has been progress — the European Union is a long way from being able to guarantee the security of all its members by itself. And to count solely on the EU would be to drive a wedge through Europe. Conversely, however, only a Europe that can and wants to protect itself credibly will be able to keep the US in the Alliance. I feel that this insight is lacking in some of the debates here in Germany, but also elsewhere in Europe. One aspect of our German responsibility is to take seriously the worries and interests of the nations of Central Europe, to attach importance to them, and to act accordingly. At the same time, irrespective of how or where we attribute the causes, Europe cannot and must not accept Russia's increasing alienation in the long term. We need a different relationship, a better relationship, between the EU and Russia and between Russia and the EU. But I say this here because the necessary reflection on our future relations with Russia cannot take place without or at the expense of the countries and peoples of Central Europe. But this reflection really does need to take place, and I ask that it does.

Another thing that has to be said is that Europe is no longer as vital to the US as it used to be. We must guard against the illusion that the United States' dwindling interest in Europe is solely down to the current Administration. This accusation from Europe would be unjustified. For we know that this shift began a while ago, and it will continue even after this Administration. The new centre of gravity for American interests, or perhaps I should say American challenges, lies in Asia.

However, I want to take this opportunity to say this: we in Germany are hoping for an America that once again regards European integration — as it did over the past few decades, and rightly so — as an extremely valuable and above all connective project. That's what counts. That is the view I advocate for on my trips to the US and in many conversations with Americans in Germany. And I am delighted that this year again such a strong American delegation has come to Munich, to this conference which has always been a forum for transatlantic debate.

Germany must contribute more to European security, also within NATO, including financially. The Alliance has agreed a joint goal to this end. I believe it is correct and necessary to try to attain this goal. But let's be honest, in this forum too — let's be honest: even if every country in Europe, including Germany, were to spend far more than two percent of its GDP on defence, we would not be able to stop, far less reverse, the erosion of the international order we have been seeing over the past couple of years. Again, to prevent any misunderstanding: I am not criticising the benchmark. I am not criticising the two percent mark. Far from it. I think it is correct. But do let's make sure we don't make that the be all and end all for peace and security in our future. We cannot compensate for the loss of diplomacy, of essential pillars of our security architecture, of arms control agreements and international agreements, with tanks, fighter jets and intermediate range missiles. We should abandon these overly simple categories from debates in the recent past. At this conference, too, I hope. For the opposite is true: if we do not find our way back to a situation where everyone respects international law; if we do not repair the damage done to the world order, a world order we set up ourselves; if we do not learn again to integrate others' security into our own security strategies; if we do not orient foreign policy precisely to these tasks — then in a few years we will have armed ourselves globally to the hilt, to the detriment of all. Finding and taking another, wiser path is the task of each and every one of us, it is our common responsibility.

No one must be allowed to refuse to join in seeking a better path. However, as a result of the post war order, the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council share a special privilege, but also a special responsibility, a special responsibility for peace, security and disarmament. Emmanuel Macron is right in calling with his initiative for their — the P5's — resolve, their action, to meet precisely this responsibility again in this dramatically changing world. And returning to these tasks is a matter of urgency, because the P5 have privileges that are justified, as long as they preserve or promote a world order that goes beyond their own interests. But not if they are indifferent or hostile to this order, or if they consistently undermine it in pursuing their foreign policy.

Germany's responsibility has a different basis. But we must be measured by it as well. What we need, alongside improved capabilities, is an honest analysis of Germany's security situation and a credible desire actually to help Europe to assert its interests. Only a European foreign and security policy designed for effective action will allow us to make a credible contribution towards preserving the international order. The military instrument is indispensable for our security, but is neither the first choice nor the most likely to deliver success when it comes to the diplomatic and political capability to act. Europe must invent its own answer to the seminal shifts in spheres of power and influence I have described, to the new political and military heavyweights on the international stage. It must for-

mulate a truly European policy on Russia that is not restricted merely to condemnatory statements and sanctions. It must find its own balance with China, finding an equilibrium between increasing inter system competition and the necessary cooperation, while also — and this is even harder — taking the many other strong partners in Asia seriously. It must develop its own initiatives to contain and end the conflicts on the fringes of our Union, in both east and south. The diplomatic initiative launched by the Federal Chancellor and Foreign Minister Maas to push Europe's interest in stabilisation in Libya — together with and in support of the United Nations, naturally — is, in my view, a really good example here The Sahel region in northern Africa requires just as much attention. As — obviously — does the explosive situation around Iran in the Middle East, which affects Europe directly. Let me say this: I believe terminating the JCPOA was a mistake. The Middle East has become an even more dangerous, definitely not a safer, place. However, we have to deal with the new realities. And the new realities tell me that it remains the Europeans' task to introduce new initiatives and courses of action to help prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and to ward off a nuclear arms race throughout the region. As these few examples show, there is no shortage of huge challenges facing European foreign and security policy.

But we Germans must also answer the question of how we are going to talk seriously and in a spirit of confidence with France, our closest partner, about the European security issues President Macron mentioned in his important speech at the École de Guerre in Paris a week ago. We should take up his invitation to engage in dialogue. However, that also means seeing things from France's perspective and making our own contribution towards developing a joint strategic culture, without which Europe will not really work as a security-policy actor.

We Germans must measure ourselves by whether we are able not only to withstand the tension between Germany's growing responsibility and our realisation of our own limitations, but to use it for the benefit of Europe. It is not a matter of either or, of intervening or standing back. And it is certainly not a matter of engaging in courtesies with others. Rather, and this is a point I am really very serious about, it is a question of our own well considered interests. From these derives the responsibility — putting it bluntly — not just to state everything we cannot do, with reference to the historical roots of our restrictive export policy on the one hand and parliamentary army on the other. Instead, we must state more clearly where and what we can contribute to strengthening the European pillar in security policy. Then, and only then, will our limitations be understood.

Are we really serious about Europe? Then there must be no timid heart beating at the centre of Europe. Then we need the courage to keep on re-examining the substance of our responsibility, not least in the light of the times.

A few thoughts in conclusion. I know from many conversations I have had across the country that there is a fundamental, widespread need for simplicity and certainty. Given the state of the world today, this is a promise no one who engages in honest and open analysis, no one who is aware of what is happening before our eyes, can in fact make. The world is, rather, becoming even more ambiguous, even more complex, even more contradictory.

And I know this does not make everything easier. I know that many people, at least in Germany, are already worried that the word responsibility is being used to hide, first and foremost, military missions abroad. This assumption is wrong. In today's world, responsibility means, above all, facing up to reality, not becoming fatalistic, and continuing to look for practical ways in which to change and improve the world. We just have to be clear, it needs to be clear to us in Germany, that we will not succeed in this from a position of weakness. Germany, however, can only gain its strength from a shared community with others. That, and only that, is why we must contribute more towards this strength.

So let us not be driven by fear and anxiety. Franklin D. Roosevelt, the US President under whom America freed Europe, said this: the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. This is true with an eye to the future of our democracy here at home. And it is true of our role in Europe and the world. Again and again, an open view of the world reveals developments that are astonishing and encouraging: progress in the fight against poverty, hunger and child mortality; countries undergoing transformation, such as Ethiopia; societies that are opening up, having been shut off for so long, like the Sudan or Uzbekistan; millions of people in many countries of the world calling for recognition and dignity, participation and opportunities to develop their personalities.

Meeting this primeval human need is the normative project the West once set itself. Europe, and, I believe, Germany in particular, would do well to take a less missionary approach to the world. Our political agenda cannot be to westernise the world. However, we cannot and must not abandon the normative project of creating a world which makes the dignity of the individual — one of the overarching goals laid down 75 years ago in the preamble to the Charter of the United Nations, alongside peace and security, putting the strength of the law before the law of the strong — the standard for state action. This is the open project that persists, without geographical borders, without skin colour. If we ourselves keep it alive, if we

again breathe life into our ideas and institutions, then it will have an impact far beyond our own borders and be able once again to set an example. It will build trust and develop new power. Self confidently, not with a sense of mission. It is our task, for our country, to make a contribution. And we will do so. With realism and curiosity, with drive, courage and confidence.

2020

Justin Trudeau

Prime Minister of Canada

Justin Trudeau delivered this speech at the Munich Security Conference 2020, emphasizing Canada's commitment to addressing global challenges through collaboration and shared values.

It's a pleasure to be here in Munich for this important conference. I must say, your invitation comes at a key moment.

Just a few weeks ago, we marked the beginning of a New Year, of a new decade.

And for people around the globe, January is usually a chance to start fresh. To look to the future with optimism. With hope.

But 2020 got off to a sombre start not just for Canadians, but for the people of Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. On January 8th, we all learned that a plane had crashed just outside Tehran.

A few days later, we would learn that Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752 had been shot down by Iranian missiles. 176 innocent people lost their lives in this tragedy. For 138 of them, Canada was their intended destination.

Over the past few weeks, I've met many of their families and friends, and heard their stories.

These were ordinary people.

Newlyweds. Classmates and colleagues. Friends and families. Parents on their way home to their children. Children who had their whole lives ahead of them.

These were ordinary people, doing an ordinary thing, on what should have been an ordinary day.

Around the world, citizens suffer the consequences both big and small of decisions they do not make — of global trends they do not control. They should find reassurance from their leaders. They should be able to look to the people in this room for action. For real solutions.

But increasingly, people are losing faith that their leaders and institutions can protect them and support them in a rapidly changing world. Increasingly, citizens doubt the benefits of our integrated world. They believe that globalization benefits only those who are already rich. They feel drawn to populist movements that prey on their fears and preach isolation.

The result is that more and more countries are turning inward. We live in a world in which more leaders are challenging longstanding principles of international relations.

Protectionism is on the rise. Trade is being weaponized. The benefits of democratic governance are being questioned. Basic freedoms are being suppressed and authoritarian leaders are being emboldened. Political anxieties are adding turbulence to a world that is already facing unprecedented change. The global balance of power is shifting, with new powers rapidly rising and others becoming more assertive in their regions.

Climate change is an existential threat to humanity, with science telling us we have just over a decade to find solutions for our planet. And while the breakneck pace of technological change has created new opportunities for people everywhere, it also poses new challenges for governance.

When I think about these issues and the impact they are having on people, I ask myself what can Canada do. Canada is an influential nation, but I won't pretend it is big enough to move the dial on world affairs on its own. But in this connected world, where our economies are linked, where our destinies are tied — I know that retreating within our borders will not make our people safer or our nations more prosperous.

In my time as Prime Minister, I have seen firsthand how forums like this one and international cooperation can make a real difference in people's lives. The solutions we build at meetings like these can mitigate tensions, address inequality, create new opportunities, and solve shared challenges. But the fact remains that for too many people, multilateralism has not been delivering the kind of change they seek.

While we should not abandon these longstanding principles of international cooperation, we must recognize the need to reform and modernize our institutions.

Some aspects of the international architecture reflect old ideas and old power structures. Institutions that should play complementary roles instead overlap or operate alone in silos.

We need to address that.

At the same time, it's not enough to apply old solutions to new problems.

Today, we are confronting issues that defy established forms of global governance.

We have to look beyond existing frameworks to deliver real results for citizens.

We have to bring together old friends, new partners, the private sector, and civil society to address emerging problems.

That means that we can't always wait for a perfect consensus to be reached within the bounds of established bodies. Delivering results requires us to take action with those who are ready to move.

Working with partners, Canada has been applying this pragmatic approach in a number of areas, most notably on trade, on advancing democracy, and on fighting climate change.

The progress we've made has reinforced my belief in the power of collaboration and the promise of our institutions. And that's why Canada will continue to step up at a time when others may be stepping away.

Take trade. In the last four years, Canada has renegotiated NAFTA, signed the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement with the European Union, and joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. We are the first and only G7 country to have a free trade agreement with every other G7 country. But had we chosen to ignore the real concerns of people across the political spectrum on free trade and globalization, we might not have preferential access to two-thirds of the global economy today. We made the conscious decision to address those concerns directly in three major global trade agreements with landmark standards to protect the environment, labour, human rights, gender equality, Indigenous rights, and our culture. But this vision of international trade is only possible if it is governed by rules and principles. That is why Canada has launched a new international trade initiative, the Ottawa Group. The goal is to help modernize the World Trade Organization to facilitate trade and improve dispute resolution.

At the same time, Canada and the European Union are working together to establish a new appeal mechanism that will allow the arbitration of trade disputes to continue, pending WTO reforms. A few weeks ago, 16 other countries supported this approach. Clearly, there is more work to do, but it's a good example of the positive contribution that Canada is looking to bring to the world. At the turn of this new decade, we are facing big, inescapable challenges, and many of them strike at the core of our democratic principles.

The values we hold dear are coming under threat, and our commitment to uphold them is being tested. Journalists are being jailed.Free speech is being restricted and calls for democracy are being suppressed. That's why we worked with the United Kingdom to establish a Global Pledge on Media Freedom. And with France and 33 other countries, we're supporting the

Declaration on Information and Democracy, which commits countries to protect freedom of opinion and expression around the world. We cannot forget that it is innocent men, women, and children who suffer the devastating consequences of the international community's failings. The conflict in Syria and the tragic situation in Idlib are prime examples. We cannot close our eyes to the failures of multilateralism. Instead, we must learn from them.

Without constructive international engagement, prolonged local crises harm vulnerable people and expand into regional emergencies with global implications. That's why Canada has worked more closely than ever with our Latin American allies as part of the Lima Group to defend democracy in Venezuela. That's also why we remain committed to supporting peace and stability in Iraq, particularly through our leadership of the NATO mission there.

Together, as a community of nations, we are making progress —

Progress that simply would not have been achieved had we decided to take on these challenges on our own. And the threat of climate change is perhaps the best example of why we must continue to choose collaboration.

It is the defining issue of our time. It will reshape our societies and the global economy.

And above all, it threatens not only our way of life, but our very existence. When I joined other world leaders in signing the Paris Agreement, I pledged that Canada would do its part to meet this challenge.

More than four years later, I stand before you more determined than ever to be a full partner in the international fight against climate change. Ahead of COP26 in Glasgow, I will continue to champion a price on pollution at home and abroad because a world where it is no longer free to pollute anywhere is a world ready to defeat the climate crisis and seize the opportunities of this new era. Let's be clear: I am not listing these examples because I believe that Canada is the only country making a positive contribution to our world. On the contrary — we have made progress precisely because we have been able to count on partners who are also taking a pragmatic approach to the challenges we face.

Partners who, like us, are ready to act.

You know, on Ukraine International Airlines Flight 752, people of six different nationalities with ties to many more countries were on board. This is the interconnected world in which we live. There is great promise in that world. A place where we benefit from the free exchange of ideas. Where our differences enrich us. Where our connections across borders make our communities a better place to call home. This is a world worth fighting for. When I first heard about the tragedy, one of the very first people I called was my friend, Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

The Netherlands, along with 10 other countries, was struck by a tragedy all too similar six years ago when Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 was shot down. While the loss of life is heartbreaking, the fact that this could happen more than once is appalling. So, we must take action. Working with partners and building on the important work of the Netherlands following the downing of Flight MH-17, we are developing a safer skies initiative. By changing how countries work and share information together, we can improve aviation safety over and near conflict zones and prevent tragedies from happening again. Millions of people board a plane every day, and they shouldn't have to wonder whether they could become inadvertent targets.

This is something we, as leaders, can do to make the world safer. But it shouldn't take tragedies for leaders and governments to act. Just like it shouldn't take dire warnings of scientists or devastating wildfires for us to act on climate change. These forums bring together people who not only share challenges, but have the power to act on them. For multilateralism to work, people have to be able to count on us to take on the problems, both big and small, that they cannot solve alone. Canada is ready to partner with old friends and new allies to do just that — and I know you are too.

So, let's show the people we serve that we hear them and that we'll work together, because they deserve no less from all of us.

2020

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus

Director General of the World Health Organization

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus delivered this "Update on the Coronavirus" at the Munich Security Conference 2020 shortly after the first outbreak and at a time of great uncertainty. The conference took place just days before the first lockdowns.

Thank you for the opportunity to address you today. And especially my appreciation to my friend Ambassador Ischinger.

Yesterday I was in Kinshasa, in the Democratic of the Congo, meeting with the President and other senior ministers to review progress against the Ebola outbreak and work together on a plan to strengthen DRC's health system so that it never sees another outbreak like this again.

I'd like to thank the President for his leadership, and for his vision of a healthier and safer DRC.

We are finally starting to see the possibility of ending this outbreak, after more than 18 months and the loss of 2,249 lives. In the past week there has been just 1 case of Ebola, compared with 120 cases a week at the peak in April.

This epidemic stands in stark contrast to the previous Ebola outbreak in the western part of DRC in 2018, an area that is relatively stable and peaceful. That outbreak was controlled in just three months. This experience illustrates a key lesson of history: disease and insecurity are old friends.

It was no coincidence that the 1918 flu pandemic erupted in the middle of the First World War, and killed more people than the First World War itself. It's no coincidence that the final frontier for eradicating polio is in the most insecure regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan. It's no coincidence that Ebola has spread in the most insecure region of the DRC. Without peace, health can be an unattainable dream. But the opposite can also be true: epidemics have the potential to cause severe political, economic and social instability and insecurity. Health security is therefore not just the health sector's business. It's everybody's business.

There are three main scenarios in which a coordinated response between the health and security sectors is essential:

First, high-impact epidemics in situations of conflict and insecurity, such as Ebola. In the last few years, 80% of outbreaks requiring an international response have occurred in countries affected by fragility, conflict and insecurity.

Second, the emergence of a pathogen with pandemic potential, moving rapidly from country to country and requiring an immediate and large-scale response in countries.

And third, the deliberate or accidental release of biological agents — a hopefully rare event for which we must nonetheless be prepared. The second of these three scenarios is what we are seeing now with the outbreak of COVID-19. Although PHEIC (Public Health Emergency of International Concern) is declared, with 99% of cases in China, this is still very much an emergency for that country. Because in the rest of the world we only have 505 cases and in China we have more than 66,000 cases.

Let me be clear: it is impossible to predict which direction this epidemic will take.

What I can tell you is what encourages us, and what concerns us. We are encouraged that the steps China has taken to contain the outbreak at its source appear to have bought the world time, even though those steps have come at greater cost to China itself. But it's slowing the spread to the rest of the world. We're encouraged that outside China, we have not yet seen widespread community transmission.

We're encouraged that the global research community has come together to identify and accelerate the most urgent research needs for diagnostics, treatments and vaccines.

We're encouraged that we have been able to ship diagnostic kits, as well as supplies of masks, gloves, gowns and other personal protective equipment to some of the countries that need it most. We're encouraged that an international team of experts is now on the ground in China, working closely with their Chinese counterparts to understand the outbreak, and to inform the next steps in the global response.

But we also have concerns. We're concerned by the continued increase in the number of cases in China. We're concerned by reports from China yesterday of the number of health workers who have been infected or have died. We're concerned by the lack of urgency in funding the response from the international community.

We're concerned about the severe disruption in the market for personal protective equipment, which is putting front line health workers and carers at risk. We're concerned about the levels of rumours and misinformation that are hampering the response. And most of all, we're concerned about the potential havoc this virus could wreak in countries with weaker health systems.

The outbreaks of Ebola and COVID-19 underscore once again the vital importance for all countries to invest in preparedness and not panic. Two years ago, WHO and the World Bank founded the Global Preparedness Monitoring Board, an independent body to assess the state of the world's readiness for a pandemic. My sister Gro Bruntland, the co-chair of the Board, is actually here. Last year the board published its first report, which concluded the world remains badly prepared.

For too long, the world has operated on a cycle of panic and neglect. We throw money at an outbreak, and when it's over, we forget about it and do nothing to prevent the next one.

The world spends billions of dollars preparing for a terrorist attack, but relatively little preparing for the attack of a virus, which could be far more deadly and far more damaging economically, politically and socially. This is frankly difficult to understand, and dangerously short-sighted.

Today, I have three requests for the international community. First, we must use the window of opportunity we have to intensify our preparedness. China has bought the world time. We don't know how much time. All countries must be prepared for the arrival of cases, to treat patients with dignity and compassion, to prevent onward transmission, and to protect health workers.

WHO is working with manufacturers and distributors of personal protective equipment to ensure a reliable supply of the tools health workers need to do their job safely and effectively.

But we're not just fighting an epidemic; we're fighting an infodemic. Fake news spreads faster and more easily than this virus, and is just as dangerous. That's why we're also working with search and media companies like Facebook, Google, Pinterest, Tencent, Twitter, TikTok, YouTube and others to counter the spread of rumours and misinformation.

We call on all governments, companies and news organizations to work with us to sound the appropriate level of alarm, without fanning the flames of hysteria.

Second, this is not a job for health ministers alone. It takes a whole-of-government approach.

But that approach must be coherent and coordinated, guided by evidence and public health priorities.

In many countries, measures have been taken by one part of government without appropriate consultation with the health ministry, or consideration of the impact of these measures.

Now more than ever is the time for us to let science and evidence lead policy.

If we don't, we are headed down a dark path that leads nowhere but division and disharmony.

And third, we must be guided by solidarity, not stigma. I repeat this: we must be guided by solidarity, not stigma.

The greatest enemy we face is not the virus itself; it's the stigma that turns us against each other. We must stop stigma and hate! Much has been written and said about my praise for China. I have given credit where it's due, and I will continue to do that, as I would and I did for any country that fights an outbreak aggressively at its source to protect its own people and the people of the world, even at great cost to itself.

It's easy to blame. It's easy to politicize. It's harder to tackle a problem together, and find solutions together. We will all learn lessons from this outbreak. But now is not the time for recriminations or politicization. We have a choice. Can we come together to face a common and dangerous enemy? Or will we allow fear, suspicion and irrationality to distract and divide us?

In our fractured and divided world, health is one of the few areas in which international cooperation offers the opportunity for countries to work together for a common cause.

This is a time for facts, not fear.
This is a time for rationality, not rumours.
This is a time for solidarity, not stigma.

2020

Zuzana Čaputová

President of the Slovak Republic

In her speech to the Munich Security Conference 2020, Zuzana Čaputová called on political leaders to live up to the responsibility of abiding by the rule of law and to protect it.

The theme of today's discussions is a Europe that protects. Europe that protects our citizens, but also our values. I come from a region where — judged by numbers alone — we live better than we ever have. Central Europe's economic output is growing and unemployment is down. This is a result of reforms we carried out over the past 30 years.

Yet despite these economic successes, we are hearing questions about where is Central Europe headed. Does the region really contribute to European unity? Does it really help create a Europe that protects? Increasingly, I am asked why some countries in our region focus on improving standards of living — but somehow forget about the standards of democracy. Why can we protect our economies but lack the same determination to defend our values?

I have no clear answer. But it may have something to do with the fact that we grasped democracy, progress or reforms over the past thirty years in a rather technical way. Economic growth expressed in numbers. Reforms translated into a number of new institutions. A set of criteria to be fulfilled.

As if we have forgotten that democracy — and may I say Europe and the West as such — are mainly about the spirit of freedom, justice, tolerance, and solidarity. These are bound together by the rule of law. That democracy is about everyday respect and observance of rules, not about bypassing them. Simply put, it is about responsibility.

To understand why there is so much talk about the crisis of the West and "Westlessness", we need to start with ourselves and answer these questions: who are we as Europe or the West? What unites us and what threatens us? For me, the answer is clear: we are a community of values whose strength stems from our ability to live by these values and to defend them.

We cannot do so without the rule of law, which in its turn requires strong institutions and active citizens. But it also requires political leaders who abide by the rule of law themselves and protect it. If we, political leaders, resign on this duty and responsibility, a Europe that protects will cease to exist. Let me explain what I mean by this. I see political responsibility at three different levels.

At the first level comes the responsibility to set the rules. Political leaders should help create laws that guarantee freedom, security and stability. Central Europe is a good example: after our democratic revolutions thirty years ago, we invested a lot into building a proper justice system. Some of the components had to be built anew but that turned out to be a good thing. Because today they are contemporary, flexible and, relatively progressive.

Nonetheless, when it comes to the judiciary, the Visegrad Four share several challenges. These are all legacies of our communist past and could be labelled as "defensive formalism of post-communist justice". Simply put: the combination of ignorance of the spirit of the law and the lack of courage. When it comes to the judiciary in Central Europe, our biggest challenge is reforming those who are still the preservers of past deformations.

That is why disciplinary justice — which should ensure professionalism and moral integrity of the judges — is on the agenda not just in Poland but elsewhere in the region. Each country has addressed the challenge differently — but we must all stick to one principle: the judiciary must always stand on two pillars: independence and personal accountability. One pillar must reinforce — and not endanger — the other.

The second aspect of leaders' responsibility is personal, or moral. Defending the rule of law means not just acting in line with the laws of the day. These can be changed through a simple majority. It implies a voluntary limitation of power, through separation and checks and balances. Power is by default expansive. It requires leaders who know that defending the rule of law and democracy also means self-restriction. And it also requires ability of the leaders to resist the temptations of power and to foster respect for the rules.

Finally, the third level of political leaders' responsibility is societal. Today, concerns about the rule of law in Europe or the West in general go far beyond the question marks about the state of the judiciary in a particular region. We are all facing the rise of populism, extremism and irresponsible narratives that divide our societies and attack our rules and values.

This is the biggest challenge we face today as the West. Political leaders have a responsibility to call out and reject all forms of extremism and radicalism. To protect minorities, to defend and express solidarity with those targeted by extremists and populists. To call out lies and manipulation

wrapped in empty promises. They have a responsibility to unite, not to divide societies into "us" and "them", "east" and "west", "north" and "south", "city" and "countryside", or "elites" and the "people".

Respect for truth is the essence of the rule of law. We must protect societies from false statements, if these violate our fundamental rights. Paradoxically, today, the rule of law can be undone by false narratives about the rule of law. When someone promises to bring or restore order, let us also look if they want to deliver it through authoritarian means. And whether they don´t see democracy or pluralism as an obstacle to their goal.

This is the challenge to the rule of law in the West, not just the quality of our laws or the independence of the judiciary. Political leaders have a special responsibility to promote respect for rules, to resist populism and to avoid singling out someone just because it brings political scores. What we learned about our climate applies elsewhere too: short-term benefits can inflict irreparable damage on future generations. This is why we must promote and protect key ingredients of a healthy democracy: independent media and civil society.

If we give up on this duty, there will be no West or Europe that protects. In our EU context, justice implies a balance between rights and obligations, benefits and commitments. Debates about a stronger link between our EU budget and the respect for shared values are therefore legitimate. The link must be appropriate and fair, and based on a clear set of criteria. But it should also be guided by empathy — not to relativize the challenge but to consider different historical, societal and legal starting points.

Let me conclude by saying one thing. Europe's strength lies in our joint determination to protect freedom, democracy and mutual respect. In our commitment to personal and political integrity. And in our shared understanding that the rule of law and the spirit of law must remain untouchable. Only then we can have a Europe that fully protects.

2021

Joseph R. Biden

President of the United States of America

Joseph R. Biden delivered this "America is back" speech during the MSC Special Edition 2021, which was held online due to the coronavirus pandemic and the resulting lockdown.

Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. And it's great to be with Angela and Emmanuel. We just spent part of — from Washington's perspective — the morning together. But I want to say hello and thank you to everyone at the Munich Security Conference for hosting this special session.

For decades, as you pointed out, I've participated in the Munich Security Conference — as a U.S. senator, joining my colleagues on both sides of the aisle to affirm the importance of the transatlantic partnership; three times as the Vice President of the United States, including delivering the first international foreign policy address of the Obama-Biden administration in the first months we were in office.

And two years ago, as you pointed out, when I last spoke at Munich, I was a private citizen; I was a professor, not an elected official. But I said at that time, "We will be back." And I'm a man of my word. America is back. I speak today as President of the United States at the very start of my administration, and I'm sending a clear message to the world: America is back. The transatlantic alliance is back. And we are not looking backward; we are looking forward, together.

It comes down to this: The transatlantic alliance is a strong foundation — the strong foundation — on which our collective security and our shared prosperity are built. The partnership between Europe and the United States, in my view, is and must remain the cornerstone of all that we hope to accomplish in the 21st century, just as we did in the 20th century.

The challenges we face today are different. We're at an inflection point. When I spoke to you as a senator and as even as Vice President, the global dynamics have shifted. New crises demand our attention. And we cannot focus only on the competition among countries that threaten to divide the world,

or only on global challenges that threaten to sink us all together if we fail to cooperate. We must do both, working in lockstep with our allies and partners.

So let me erase any lingering doubt: The United States will work closely with our European Union partners and the capitals across the continent — from Rome to Riga — to meet the range of shared challenges we face.

We continue to support the goal of a Europe whole and free and at peace. The United States is fully committed to our NATO Alliance, and I welcome Europe's growing investment in the military capabilities that enable our shared defense. You know, to me and to the United States, and to us, we'll keep article — we'll keep faith with Article 5. It's a guarantee. An attack on one is an attack on all. That is our unshakable vow. And the only time Article 5 has been invoked was after the United States was attacked on 9/11. You, our allies, joined us to fight al Qaeda, and the United States committed to consulting closely with our NATO Allies and partners on the way forward in Afghanistan.

My administration strongly supports the diplomatic proc- — process that's underway and to bring an end to this war that is closing out 20 years. We remain committed to ensuring that Afghanistan never again provides a base for terrorist attacks against the United States and our partners and our interests.

Our European partners have also stood with us to counter ISIS. Just this week, NATO Defense Ministers endorsed a significantly expanded training and advisory mission in Iraq, which will be vital to the ongoing fight against ISIS. We cannot allow ISIS to reopen and regroup and threaten people in the Middle East, in Europe, in the United States, and elsewhere.

And while the United States is undergoing a thorough review of our own force posture around the world, I've ordered the halting of withdrawal of American troops from Germany. I'm also lifting the cap imposed by the previous administration on the number of U.S. forces able to be based in Germany.

I know — I know the past few years have strained and tested our transatlantic relationship, but the United States is determined — determined to reengage with Europe, to consult with you, to earn back our position of trusted leadership.

Earlier today, as was referenced, I participated in the first meeting of the G7 leaders, where I spoke about the dire need to coordinate multilateral action to address COVID-19, the global economic crisis, and the accelerating climate crisis, and so much else.

Achieving these goals is going to depend on a core strategic proposition, and that is: The United States must renew America's enduring advantages so that we can meet today's challenges from a position of strength. That means building back better our economic foundations; reclaiming our place in international institutions; lifting up our values at home, and speaking out to defend them around the world; modernizing our military capabilities while leading with diplomacy; revitalizing America's network of alliances and partnerships that have made the world safer for all people.

You know, I hope our fellow democracies are going to join us in this vital work. Our partnerships have endured and grown through the years because they are rooted in the richness of our shared democratic values. They're not transactional. They're not extractive. They're built on a vision of a future where every voice matters, where the rights of all are protected and the rule of law is upheld.

None of this has fully succeeded in this — none of us has fully succeeded in this division [vision]. We continue to work toward it. And in so many places, including in Europe and the United States, democratic progress is under assault. I have known for — I've known many of you for a long, long time, and you know that I speak my mind, so let me be straightforward with you all: We are in the midst of a fundamental debate about the future and direction of our world. We're at an inflection point between those who argue that, given all the challenges we face — from the fourth industrial revolution to a global pandemic — that autocracy is the best way forward, they argue, and those who understand that democracy is essential — essential to meeting those challenges.

Historians are going to examine and write about this moment as an inflection point, as I said. And I believe that — every ounce of my being — that democracy will and must prevail. We must demonstrate that democracies can still deliver for our people in this changed world. That, in my view, is our galvanizing mission.

Democracy doesn't happen by accident. We have to defend it, fight for it, strengthen it, renew it. We have to prove that our model isn't a relic of our history; it's the single best way to revitalize the promise of our future. And if we work together with our democratic partners, with strength and confidence, I know that we'll meet every challenge and outpace every challenger.

You know, we must prepare together for a long-term strategic competition with China. How the United States, Europe, and Asia work together to secure the peace and defend our shared values and advance our prosperity across the Pacific will be among the most consequential efforts we undertake. Competition with China is going to be stiff. That's what I expect, and that's what I welcome, because I believe in the global system Europe and the United States, together with our allies in the Indo-Pacific, worked so hard to build over the last 70 years.

We can own the race for the future. But to do so, we have to be clear-eyed about the historic investments and partnerships that this will require. We have to protect — we have to protect for space for innovation, for intellectual property, and the creative genius that thrives with the free exchange of ideas in open, democratic societies. We have to ensure that the benefits of growth are shared broadly and equitably, not just by a few.

We have to push back against the Chinese government's economic abuses and coercion that undercut the foundations of the international economic system. Everyone — everyone — must play by the same rules.

U.S. and European companies are required to publicly disclose corporate governance — to corporate governance structures and abide by rules to deter corruption and monopolistic practices. Chinese companies should be held to the same standard.

We must shape the rules that will govern the advance of technology and the norms of behavior in cyberspace, artificial intelligence, biotechnology so that they are used to lift people up, not used to pin them down. We must stand up for the democratic values that make it possible for us to accomplish any of this, pushing back against those who would monopolize and normalize repression.

You know, this is also — this is also how we're going to be able to meet the threat from Russia. The Kremlin attacks our democracies and weaponizes corruption to try to undermine our system of governance. Russian leaders want people to think that our system is more corrupt or as corrupt as theirs. But the world knows that isn't true, including Russians — Russia's own citizens.

Putin seeks to weaken European — the European project and our NATO Alliance. He wants to undermine the transatlantic unity and our resolve, because it's so much easier for the Kremlin to bully and threaten individual states than it is to negotiate with a strong and closely united transatlantic community.

That's why — that's why standing up for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine remains a vital concern for Europe and the United States. That's why addressing recklessness — Russian recklessness and hacking into computer networks, in the United States and across Europe and the world, has become critical to protecting our collective security. The challenges with Russia may be different than the ones with China, but they're just as real.

And it's not about pitting East against West. It's not about we want a conflict. We want a future where all nations are able to freely determine their own path without a threat of violence or coercion. We cannot and must not return to the reflective [reflexive] opposition and rigid blocs of the Cold War. Competition must not lock out cooperation on issues that affect us all. For example, we must cooperate if we're going to defeat COVID-19 everywhere.

My first presidential national security memorandum focused on surging health and humanitarian responses to defeat COVID-19 and to better prevent and prepare for the next pandemic. Today, I'm announcing that the United States is making a $2 billion pledge to COVAX, with the promise of an additional $2 billion to urge others to step up as well.

Yet, even as we fight to get out of the teeth of this pandemic, the resurgence of Ebola in Africa is a stark reminder that we must simultaneously work to finally finance health security; strengthen global health systems; and create early warning systems to prevent, detect, and respond to future biological threats, because they will keep coming. We have to work together to strengthen and reform the World Health Organization. We need a U.N. system focused on biological threats that can move quickly to trigger action.

Similarly, we can no longer delay or do the bare minimum to address climate change. This is a global, existential crisis, and we'll all suffer — we'll all suffer the consequences if we fail.

We have to rapidly accelerate our commitments to aggressively curb our emissions and to hold one another accountable for meeting our goals and increasing our ambitions.

That's why, as President, I immediately rejoined the Paris Agreement, and as of today, the United States is officially once again a party to the Paris Agreement, which we helped put together.

On Earth Day, I will host a leaders summit to help drive more ambitious actions among top emitters, including domestic climate action here in the United States. I am grateful — I'm grateful for Europe's continued leadership on climate issues over the last four years. Together, we need to invest in the technological innovations that are going to power our clean energy futures and enable us to build clean energy solutions to global markets.

The threat of nuclear proliferation also continues to require careful diplomacy and cooperation among us. We need transparency and communication to minimize the risk of strategic misunderstanding or mistakes. That's why the United States and Russia, notwithstanding other competition, extended the New START Treaty for an additional four [five] years once I came — I was sworn in.

That's why we have said we're prepared to reengage in negotiations with the P5+1 on Iran's nuclear program. We must also address Iran's destabilizing activities across the Middle East, and we're going to work in close cooperation with our European and other partners as we proceed. We'll

also work together to lock down fissile and radiological material to prevent terrorist groups from acquiring or using them. Look, the range of challenges Europe and the United States must take on together is broad and complex. And I'm eager to hear — I'm eager to hear — I'm eager to hear next from my good friends and outstanding leaders, Chancellor Merkel, about her thoughts on the way forward together.

So let me conclude with this: We cannot allow self-doubt to hinder our ability to engage each other or the larger world. The last four years have been hard. But Europe and the United States have to lead with confidence once more, with faith in our capacities, a commitment to our own renewal, with trust in one another and the ability of Europe and the United States to meet any challenge to secure our futures together.

I know we can do this. We've done it before. Just yesterday — after a seven-month, 300-million mile journey — NASA successfully landed the Perseverance Rover on Mars. It's on a mission of exploration, with elements contributed by our European partners to seek evidence of the possibility of life beyond our planet and the mysteries of the universe. Over the next few years — "Percy" is (inaudible) call — but Perseverance will range and collect samples from the Red Planet and pile them up so another mission and rover, envisioned as a joint effort between NASA and the European Space Agency, will retrieve this trove of scientific wonders and bring it home to all of us. That's what we can do together. If our unbound capacity to carry us to Mars and back don't tell us anything else, they tell us we can meet any challenge we can face on Earth. We have everything we need. And I want you to know the United States will do — we'll do our part. We'll stand with you. We'll fight for our shared values. We'll meet the challenges of this new moment in history.

America is back. So let's get together and demonstrate to our great, great grandchildren, when they read about us, that democracy — democracy — democracy functions and works, and together, there is nothing we can't do. So let's get working.

2021

Boris Johnson

Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

At the MSC Special Edition 2021, Boris Johnson emphasised the importance of global cooperation to address challenges like climate change, cybersecurity, and COVID-19. He reaffirmed the UK's commitment to NATO and transatlantic partnerships, calling for unity among democracies to strengthen global security.

There is a habit of turning up at occasions such as these and announcing portentously that the West is locked in terminal decline, the Atlantic alliance is fractured, and NATO is in peril, and everything we hold dear risks being cast into oblivion.

And that industry of pessimism has thrived recently, perhaps even in Munich. So without wishing for a moment to downplay the challenges and dangers we face, in the teeth of a global pandemic, let me respectfully suggest that the gloom has been overdone and we are turning a corner, and the countries we call the "West" are drawing together and combining their formidable strengths and expertise once again, immensely to everybody's benefit.

As you've seen and heard earlier, America is unreservedly back as leader of the free world and that is a fantastic thing. And it's vital for our American friends to know that their allies on this side of the Atlantic are willing and able to share the risks and the burdens of addressing the world's toughest problems.

That is why Global Britain is there and that is exactly what Global Britain is striving to achieve.

I'm delighted to report that I detected precisely that willingness among my fellow G7 leaders when I chaired a virtual meeting earlier today. The shared goals of the UK's presidency of the G7 are to help the world to build

back better and build back greener after the pandemic and minimise the risk of a catastrophe like this happening again.

We all have lessons to learn from an experience that none of us would want to repeat. At the last UN General Assembly, I proposed a five-point plan to protect the world against future pandemics and today the G7 agreed to explore a Treaty on Pandemic Preparedness, working through the World Health Organization, which would enshrine the actions that countries need to take to safeguard everyone against another Covid.

I intend to bring together my fellow leaders, scientists and international organisations for collective defence against the next pathogen, just as we unite against military threats.

The heroic endeavours of the world's scientists produced safe and effective vaccines against Covid in barely 300 days. In future we should aim to telescope that even more: by drawing together our resources, we should seek to develop vaccines against emerging diseases in 100 days.

Even in the early weeks of the pandemic, I hope that we in the UK resisted the temptations of a sauve qui peut approach and tried to keep the flame of global cooperation alive.

We helped to establish COVAX, the global alliance to bring Covid vaccines to developing countries, and today Britain ranks among COVAX's biggest donors, with the aim of supplying a billion doses to 92 nations, and we will also share the majority of any surplus from our domestic vaccination programme.

When Oxford University and AstraZeneca began their momentous effort against Covid, their express aim was to design a vaccine that would be cheap to obtain and easy to store, so that it could be speedily administered by every country. Protecting ourselves also means tracking the virus's mutations, and nearly half of all the genome sequencing of possible Covid variants, anywhere in the world, has taken place in the UK.

Now we need to mobilise our shared expertise to create an early warning system for the next pathogen, enabled by a worldwide network of pandemic surveillance centres, and the UK intends work alongside the WHO and our friends to bring this about. If anything good can possibly come from this tragedy, we have at least been given the chance to build a global recovery on new and green foundations, so that humanity can prosper without imperilling the planet.

To that end, as you've just been hearing from John Kerry, Britain will host COP-26 in Glasgow in November and I'm delighted that America under President Biden's leadership has rejoined the Paris Agreement. The UK's aim will be to help to rally as many countries as possible behind the target of Net Zero by 2050.

We were the first industrialised nation to adopt this goal and we have made it legally binding and published our plan for a Green Industrial Revolution to show how we will get there, so I hope that other countries will follow the UK's example. But we can only address global problems alongside our friends, and extend Britain's influence around the world, if the UK itself and our own citizens are safe, including from the terrorist threat we all face.

The starting point of our Integrated Review of foreign, defence and development policy — which will be published next month — is that the success of Global Britain depends on the security of our homeland and the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area. If climate change and pandemics are silent and insidious threats, hostile states may seek to harm our people in direct and obvious ways, as the Russian state did with reckless abandon in Salisbury three years ago, only to collide with the immovable rock of trans-Atlantic solidarity, sanctions and coordinated diplomatic expulsions, an outstanding act of collective security, for which I once again thank our friends.

If we are to assure our safety, our democracies need to strengthen their capabilities to meet the rigours of an ever more competitive world. And it is precisely for that reason, so that we can keep our people safe, by fulfilling our obligations to NATO and enhancing the UK's global influence, that is the reason I have decided to bolster our armed forces with the biggest increase in our defence budget since the Cold War.

The UK's defence spending will rise by £24 billion over the next four years, comfortably exceeding the NATO pledge to invest 2 per cent of GDP, and ensuring that we retain the biggest defence budget in Europe and the second largest in NATO, after the United States.

We will focus our investment on the new technologies that will revolutionise warfare — artificial intelligence, unmanned aircraft, directed energy weapons and many others — so that we stand alongside our allies to deter any adversary and preserve the peace. This year, the Royal Navy's new aircraft carrier, HMS Queen Elizabeth, will embark on her maiden deployment, sailing 20,000 nautical miles to the Indo-Pacific and back.

On her flight deck will be a squadron of F35 jets from the US Marine Corps; among her escorts will be an American destroyer, showing how the British and American armed forces can operate hand-in-glove — or plane-on-flightdeck — anywhere in the world. But investing in new capabilities is not an end in itself. The purpose of the military instrument is to strengthen diplomacy and therefore maximise the chances of success.

We do not wish to live in a world of unchecked rivalry or decoupling or obstacles to sensible cooperation and global economic growth. Nor are we concerned solely with trade: I hope the UK has shown by our actions that

we will defend our values as well as our interests. In leaving the European Union we restored sovereign control over vital levers of foreign policy.

For the first time in nearly 50 years, we now have the power to impose independent national sanctions, allowing the UK to act swiftly and robustly. Our first decision was to create a Magnitsky regime designed to punish human rights offenders. The UK then became the first European country to sanction senior figures in Belarus after the stolen election. We have now imposed sanctions on over 50 human rights violators, including from Russia, Myanmar and Zimbabwe.

We have consistently spoken out against China's repression of the Uighur people in Xinjiang province — and we will continue to do so. We have introduced new measures to ensure that the supply chains of UK companies are not tainted by the violations in Xinjiang. After China broke a treaty and imposed a repressive national security law on Hong Kong, the UK offered nearly 3 million of the territory's people a route to British citizenship. We acted quickly and willingly — with cross-party support at home — to keep faith with the people of Hong Kong.

Now that we have left the EU, Parliament has a greater say over foreign policy and this has only reinforced our national determination to be a Force for Good in the world. Britain is working alongside France, Germany and the United States in a trans-Atlantic quad to address the most pressing security issues, including Iran.

And I sense a new resolve among our European friends and allies to come together and act again with unity and determination, and we witnessed that spirit after the attempted murder of Alexei Navalny, as he recovered in a hospital bed in Berlin. While NATO was being written-off in some places, the supertanker of European defence spending was quietly beginning to turn, and while this delicate high seas manoeuvre is far from complete, and the vessel needs to alter course a good deal more, the fact is that NATO defence spending — excluding the United States — has risen by $190 billion since the Wales summit in 2014.

When our allies on the eastern flank sought reassurance about their security, NATO responded by deploying a multinational force in Poland and the Baltic states and the UK was proud to make the biggest single contribution, leading the battlegroup in Estonia, showing that we mean it when we say that our commitment to European security is unconditional and immoveable.

I believe that Europe increasingly recognises the necessity of joining our American friends to rediscover that far-sighted leadership and the spirit of adventure and trans-Atlantic unity, that made our two continents great in the first place.

A new world is rising up around us, patterns of trade and commerce are changing, the global centre of gravity is moving eastwards, the technological revolution proceeds with blistering speed. But none of us should fear or resent these changes.

Free societies are united by their faith in liberal democracy, the rule of law and free markets, which surely comprise the great trinity of human progress. Free countries — many of them located far beyond the geographical "West", by the way — possess a boundless and inherent ability to release the talents and enterprise of their people to master and adapt to change.

It is no coincidence that of the 10 most innovative nations in the world — as ranked by the Global Innovation Index in 2020 — all but one are liberal democracies.

There is no reason why our countries should not be stronger and safer in 2030 — or indeed 2050 — than today, provided we share the burdens, compete successfully and seek out friends and partners wherever they may be found. I have invited South Korea, and Australia and India to attend the next G7 summit as guests, alongside leading international organisations.

So let's resist any temptation to bemoan the changes around us. Let's build a coalition for openness and innovation, reaching beyond established alliances and the confines of geography, proud of our history, but free of any temptation to turn back the clock, and harnessing the genius of open societies to flourish in an era of renewed competition.

Let's respectfully dispel the air of pessimism that has sometimes attended our conferences.

America and Europe, side by side, have the ability to prove once again the innate advantages of free nations, and to succeed in forging our own destiny.

2022

Ursula von der Leyen

President of the European Commission

In her laudatory remarks for Jens Stoltenberg at the Munich Security Conference 2022, Ursula von der Leyen reflected on "the largest build-up of troops on European soil since the darkest days of the Cold War".

The very reason why our Union was created is to put an end to all European wars. Thus, the world has been watching in disbelief as we face the largest build-up of troops on European soil since the darkest days of the Cold War. Because the events of these days could reshape the entire international system. Ukraine has just celebrated 30 years of independence. There is an entire generation of Ukrainians born and bred in a free country. They are children of democracy. But now, they are confronted, on a daily basis, with external aggression and interference. Some of them have lost relatives or classmates in the Donbas war. They are faced again with the prospect of conscription, to fight a war that they do not want, but that Moscow might impose on them. This is what the Kremlin's policies mean in practice: to instil fear, and call it security; to deny 44 million Ukrainians from deciding freely about their own future; to deny a free country's right to independence and self-determination. And the consequences of this approach matter well beyond Ukraine.

The Kremlin is not only trying to undermine the entire European security architecture, the Helsinki principles that have made all European countries safer, including Russia. It is also violating the UN Charter, where it states that countries 'shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.' We cannot let this stand.

We are facing a blatant attempt to rewrite the rules of our international system. One only has to read the recent communiqué issued by Russian and Chinese leaders. They seek a 'new era', as they say, to replace the existing international order. They prefer the rule of the strongest to the rule of law, intimidation instead of self-determination, coercion instead of cooperation. We still hope that peace will prevail and that diplomacy will take us there.

Allow me to address how Europe can support this work. First, we should be ready to respond. We — the EU and its transatlantic partners — have been preparing a robust package of financial and economic sanctions, including on energy and cutting-edge technology. If the Kremlin strikes, we can impose high costs and severe consequences on Moscow's economic interests. The Kremlin's dangerous thinking, which comes straight out of a dark past, may cost Russia a prosperous future.

Second, diversification. A strong European Union cannot be so reliant on an energy supplier that threatens to start a war on our continent. Gazprom is deliberately trying to store and deliver as little as possible while prices and demand are skyrocketing. A strange behaviour for a company. We must diversify both our suppliers and our energy sources. This work is already underway. We have reached out to our partners and friends across the globe. And today, I can say that even in case of full disruption of gas supply by Russia we are on the safe side for this winter. And in the medium and long term, we are doubling-down on renewables. This will increase Europe's strategic independence on energy.

Third, supporting democracy in Ukraine. For seven years now, the Russian leadership has tried to destabilise Ukraine: Hybrid war, cyberattacks, disinformation — you name it. Yet, the country is now stronger than seven years ago. Because it has chosen the path of democracy and the friendship of other democracies. Think again about the youth of Ukraine, the post-Soviet generation. They know that their democracy is not perfect. But it is perfectible, and is getting stronger year after year. This is what makes it stand out from autocracy. Thriving democracies are the autocrats' greatest fear. Because their propaganda fails when citizens are empowered by the reporting of independent media and the free exchange of ideas. Because free citizens speak truth to power. Because trust and confidence are more sustainable than control and coercion. And this is exactly why Europe is supporting Ukraine's path to democracy. It makes Ukraine a better place to live for its people and a better neighbour for both the European Union and Russia.

My fourth and final point is about unity. Since the start of this Kremlin-made crisis, the European Union and the transatlantic community are fully aligned and united. We are supporting Ukraine to withstand the enormous pressure from Moscow. When the Russian government tried to divide us, over and over again, we have responded with one voice and a common

message. This has been possible also thanks to you, dear Jens. You always pushed us to focus on what we have in common. You have shown that the European Union and NATO stand side by side. Not only because we share members and allies, but because we share values: freedom, democracy, independence. The very values that are at stake in this crisis.

And this is why it makes me very proud and happy to announce that you are this year's Kleist award winner. You have come a long way to reach this high office. When you were young, you were the head of the Young Socialists in Norway, an organisation that — at the time — was certainly not known as a supporter of NATO. Young Jens used his charm and leadership to turn the Young Norwegian Socialists around. As Prime Minister of Norway, you, Jens, had to deal with Russia on a regular basis. Actually, by then, Lavrov was already being Lavrov. And yet, you managed with skill to resolve a decades-long territorial dispute in the Barents Sea.

Dear Jens,
You have always been a man of dialogue and a believer in the transatlantic bond. In almost ten years at the helm of NATO, you always carried the flame of this unique alliance. Nobody worked harder than you for the transatlantic alliance. You have pushed relentlessly to strengthen our unity. This is why no one deserves this year´s Kleist award more than you do.

Congratulations, dear Jens.

2022

Volodymyr Zelenskyy

President of Ukraine

Just days before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy delivered this speech on "Europe's Permacrisis" at the Munich Security Conference 2022.

Two days ago I was in Donbas, on the delimitation line. Legally — between Ukraine and the temporarily occupied territories. In fact, the delimitation line between peace and war. Where on the one side there is a kindergarten, and on the other side there is a projectile that hit it. On the one side there is a school, on the other side there is a projectile hitting the school yard.

And next to it there are 30 children who go … no, not to NATO, but to school. Someone has physics classes. Knowing its basic laws, even children understand how absurd the statements that the shelling is carried out by Ukraine sound.

Someone has math classes. Children can calculate the difference between the number of shelling occasions in these three days and the occasions of mentioning Ukraine in this year's Munich Security Report without a calculator. And someone has history classes. And when a bomb crater appears in the school yard, children have a question: has the world forgotten its mistakes of the twentieth century?

What do attempts at appeasement lead to? As the question "Why die for Danzig?" turned into the need to die for Dunkirk and dozens of other cities in Europe and the world. At the cost of tens of millions of lives. These are terrible lessons of history. I just want to make sure you and I read the same books. Hence, we have the same understanding of the answer to the main question: how did it happen that in the twenty-first century, Europe is at war again and people are dying? Why does it last longer than World War II? How did we get to the biggest security crisis since the Cold War? For me, as the President of a country that has lost part of the territory, thousands of people and on whose borders there are now 150,000 Russian troops, equipment and heavy weapons, the answer is obvious.

The architecture of world security is fragile and needs to be updated. The rules that the world agreed on decades ago no longer work. They do not keep up with new threats. They are not effective for overcoming them. This is a cough syrup when you need a coronavirus vaccine. The security system is slow. It crashes again. Because of different things: selfishness, self-confidence, irresponsibility of states at the global level. As a result, we have crimes of some and indifference of others. Indifference that makes you an accomplice. It is symbolic that I am talking about this right here. It was here 15 years ago that Russia announced its intention to challenge global security. What did the world say? Appeasement. Result? At least — the annexation of Crimea and aggression against my state.

The UN, which is supposed to defend peace and world security, cannot defend itself. When its Charter is violated. When one of the members of the UN Security Council annexes the territory of one of the founding members of the UN. And the UN itself ignores the Crimea Platform, the goal of which is to de-occupy Crimea peacefully and protect the rights of Crimeans.

Three years ago, it was here that Angela Merkel said: "Who will pick up the wreckage of the world order? Only all of us, together." The audience gave a standing ovation. But, unfortunately, the collective applause did not grow into collective action. And now, when the world is talking about the threat of a great war, the question arises: is there anything left to pick up? The security architecture in Europe and the world is almost destroyed. It's too late to think about repairs, it's time to build a new system. Mankind has done this twice, paying too high a price — two world wars. We have a chance to break this trend until it becomes a consistent pattern. And start building a new system before millions of victims. Having the old lessons of the First and Second World Wars, not our own experience of the possible third, God forbid.

I talked about it here. And on the rostrum of the UN. That in the twenty-first century there are no more foreign wars. That the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas affects the whole world. And this is not a war in Ukraine, but a war in Europe. I said this at summits and forums. In 2019, 2020, 2021. Will the world be able to hear me in 2022?

This is no longer a hypothesis, but not an axiom yet. Why? Evidence is needed. More important than words on Twitter or statements in the media. Action is required. It is the world that needs it, not just us.

We will defend our land with or without the support of partners. Whether they give us hundreds of modern weapons or five thousand helmets. We appreciate any help, but everyone should understand that these are not charitable contributions that Ukraine should ask for or remind of.

These are not noble gestures for which Ukraine should bow low. This is your contribution to the security of Europe and the world. Where Ukraine has been a reliable shield for eight years. And for eight years it has been rebuffing one of the world's biggest armies. Which stands along our borders, not the borders of the EU.

And Grad rockets hit Mariupol, not European cities. And after almost six months of fighting, the airport in Donetsk was destroyed, not in Frankfurt. And it's always hot in the Avdiivka industrial zone — it was hot there in the last days, not in Montmartre. And no European country knows what military burials every day in all regions are. And no European leader knows what regular meetings with the families of the deceased are.

Be that as it may, we will defend our beautiful land no matter if we have 50,000, 150 or one million soldiers of any army on the border. To really help Ukraine, it is not necessary to say how many servicemen and military equipment are on the border. Say what numbers we have.

To really help Ukraine, it is not necessary to constantly talk only about the dates of the probable invasion. We will defend our land on February 16, March 1 and December 31. We need other dates much more. And everyone understands perfectly well which ones.

Tomorrow in Ukraine is the Day of the Heroes of the Heavenly Hundred. Eight years ago, Ukrainians made their choice, and many gave their lives for that choice. Eight years later, should Ukraine constantly call for recognition of the European perspective? Since 2014, Russia has been convincing that we have chosen the wrong path, that no one is waiting for us in Europe. Shouldn't Europe constantly say and prove by action that this is not true? Shouldn't the EU say today that its citizens are positive about Ukraine's accession to the Union? Why do we avoid this question? Doesn't Ukraine deserve direct and honest answers?

This also applies to NATO. We are told: the door is open. But so far authorized access only. If not all members of the Alliance want to see us or all members of the Alliance do not want to see us, be honest. Open doors are good, but we need open answers, not open questions for years. Isn't the right to the truth one of our enhanced opportunities? The best time for it is the next summit in Madrid.

Russia says Ukraine seeks to join the Alliance to return Crimea by force. It is gratifying that the words «return Crimea» appear in their rhetoric. But they inattentively read Article 5 of the NATO Charter: collective action is for protection, not offensive. Crimea and the occupied regions of Donbas will certainly return to Ukraine, but only peacefully.

Ukraine consistently implements the Normandy agreements and the Minsk agreements. Their foundation is the unquestionable recognition of the territorial integrity and independence of our state. We seek a diplomatic settlement of the armed conflict. Note: solely on the basis of international law.

So what is really going on in the peace process? Two years ago, we agreed with the Presidents of France, the Russian Federation, the Chancellor of Germany on a full-scale ceasefire. And Ukraine is scrupulously adhering to these agreements. We are as restrained as possible against the background of constant provocations. We are constantly making proposals in the framework of the Normandy Four and the Trilateral Contact Group. And what do we see? Shells and bullets from the other side. Our soldiers and civilians are being killed and wounded, and civilian infrastructure is being destroyed.

The last days have become especially illustrative. Hundreds of massive shelling occasions with weapons prohibited by the Minsk agreements. It is also important to stop restricting the admission of OSCE observers to Ukraine's TOT. They are threatened. They are intimidated. All humanitarian issues are blocked.

Two years ago, I signed a law on the unconditional admission of representatives of humanitarian organizations to detainees. But they are simply not admitted to the temporarily occupied territories. After two exchanges of captives, the process was blocked, although Ukraine provided agreed lists. Inhuman torture at the infamous Isolation Prison in Donetsk has become a symbol of human rights abuses.

The two new checkpoints we opened in November 2020 in the Luhansk region still do not function — and here we see outright obstruction under contrived pretexts.

Ukraine is doing everything possible to reach progress in discussions and political issues. In the TCG, in the Minsk process, we've put forward proposals — draft laws, but everything is blocked — no one talks about them. Ukraine demands to unblock the negotiation process immediately. But this does not mean that the search for peace is limited to it alone.

We are ready to look for the key to the end of the war in all possible formats and platforms: Paris, Berlin, Minsk. Istanbul, Geneva, Brussels, New York, Beijing — I don't care where in the world to negotiate peace in Ukraine.

It does not matter if four countries, seven or a hundred participate, the main thing is that Ukraine and Russia are among them. What is really important is the understanding that peace is needed not only by us, the world needs peace in Ukraine. Peace and restoration of territorial integrity within internationally recognized borders. This is the only way. And I hope no one thinks of Ukraine as a convenient and eternal buffer zone between the West and Russia. This will never happen. Nobody will allow that.

Otherwise — who's next? Will NATO countries have to defend each other? I want to believe that the North Atlantic Treaty and Article 5 will be more effective than the Budapest Memorandum.

Ukraine has received security guarantees for abandoning the world's third nuclear capability. We don't have that weapon. We also have no security. We also do not have part of the territory of our state that is larger in area than Switzerland, the Netherlands or Belgium. And most importantly — we don't have millions of our citizens. We don't have all this.

Therefore, we have something. The right to demand a shift from a policy of appeasement to ensuring security and peace guarantees.

Since 2014, Ukraine has tried three times to convene consultations with the guarantor states of the Budapest Memorandum. Three times without success. Today Ukraine will do it for the fourth time. I, as President, will do this for the first time. But both Ukraine and I are doing this for the last time. I am initiating consultations in the framework of the Budapest Memorandum. The Minister of Foreign Affairs was commissioned to convene them. If they do not happen again or their results do not guarantee security for our country, Ukraine will have every right to believe that the Budapest Memorandum is not working and all the package decisions of 1994 are in doubt.

I also propose to convene a summit of permanent members of the UN Security Council in the coming weeks with the participation of Ukraine, Germany and Turkey in order to address security challenges in Europe. And elaborate new, effective security guarantees for Ukraine. Guarantees today, as long as we are not a member of the Alliance and in fact are in the gray zone — in a security vacuum.

What else can we do now? Continue to effectively support Ukraine and its defense capabilities. Provide Ukraine with a clear European perspective, the tools of support available to candidate countries, and clear and comprehensive timeframes for joining the Alliance.

Support the transformation in our country. Establish a Stability and Reconstruction Fund for Ukraine, a land-lease program, the supply of the latest weapons, machinery and equipment for our army — an army that protects the whole of Europe.

Develop an effective package of preventive sanctions to deter aggression. Guarantee Ukraine's energy security, ensure its integration into the EU energy market when Nord Stream 2 is used as a weapon.

All these questions need answers.

So far we have silence instead of them. And as long as there is silence, there will be no silence in the east of our state. That is — in Europe. That is — in the whole world. I hope the whole world finally understands this, Europe understands.

I thank all the states that supported Ukraine today.

In words, in declarations, in concrete help. Those who are on our side today. On the side of truth and international law. I'm not calling you by name — I don't want some other countries to be ashamed. But this is their business, this is their karma. And this is on their conscience. However, I do not know how they will be able to explain their actions to the two soldiers killed and three wounded in Ukraine today.

And most importantly — to three girls from Kyiv. One is ten years old, the second is six, and the third is only one. Today they were left without a father. At 6 o'clock in the morning Central European Time. When the Ukrainian intelligence officer, Captain Anton Sydorov was killed as a result of artillery fire prohibited by the Minsk agreements. I don't know what he thought at the last moment of his life. He definitely didn't know what agenda someone needs to meet to end the war.

But he knows exactly the answer to the question I asked at the beginning. He knows exactly who of us is lying.

May his memory live forever. May the memory of all those who died today and during the war in the east of our state live forever.

2023

Jens Stoltenberg

Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Addressing the Munich Security Conference 2023, Jens Stoltenberg called for greater efforts to support Ukraine, deter Russia, and enhance the resilience of NATO.

Thank you so much Heather and it's great to be back in Munich, and great to be here together with Mette, Sauli and Maia. And I look forward to our conversation in just a few minutes.

Russia's war against Ukraine grinds on. We may be shocked by its brutality. But we should not be surprised.

This is part of a pattern of Russian aggression for several years.And NATO Allies shared precise intelligence about Moscow's plans for an invasion long in advance.

Over many months, we made every effort to engage Russia in diplomacy. And just days before, on this very stage in Munich, I called on President Putin to step back from the brink.

But despite our calls for peace, He chose to attack. We can already draw some important lessons from the war.

First, we must sustain and step up our support to Ukraine. Putin is not planning for peace. He is planning for more war. New offensives.

And there are no indications he has changed his ambitions. He is mobilising hundreds of thousands of troops. Increasingly putting the Russian economy on a war footing. And reaching out to other authoritarian regimes, such as Iran and North Korea, to get more weapons. So we must give Ukraine what they need to win and prevail as a sovereign, independent nation in Europe.

Some worry that our support to Ukraine risks triggering escalation.

Let me be clear. There are no risk-free options. But the biggest risk of all is if Putin wins.

If Putin wins in Ukraine, the message to him and other authoritarian leaders will be that they can use force to get what they want. This will make

the world more dangerous. And us more vulnerable. So supporting Ukraine is not only the morally right thing to do. It is also in our own security interest.

The second lesson is that we need to continue to strengthen our deterrence and defence. Wars are unpredictable. And we do not know when or how this one will end.

But I do know this. Even if the war ends tomorrow, our security environment has changed for the long-term. There is no going back. The Kremlin wants a different Europe. One where Russia controls neighbours.

We also know that Beijing is watching closely. To see the price Russia pays. Or the reward it receives for its aggression.

What is happening in Europe today could happen in Asia tomorrow. So the war in Ukraine demonstrates that security is not regional, it is global. In this new and more contested world, we can no longer afford to treat defence as optional. It is a necessity.

Yes, spending more on defence means less money for other important tasks. But nothing is more important than our security. To preserve peace.

The third lesson is that we need to strengthen the resilience of our societies. Military forces are necessary to protect our security. But they are not sufficient.

We must also secure our cyber space, our supply chains, and our infrastructure. The war in Ukraine has made clear the danger of over-reliance on authoritarian regimes.

Not so long ago, many argued that importing Russian gas was purely an economic issue. It is not. It is a political issue. It is about our security. Because Europe's dependency on Russian gas made us vulnerable.

So we should not make the same mistakes with China and other authoritarian regimes.

We must not become too dependent on products and raw materials we import. Avoid exporting key technologies that could be used against us. And protect our critical infrastructure at home.

Of course, we should continue to trade and engage economically with China. But our economies and our economic interests cannot outweigh our security interests.

So it is only right that we protect ourselves. But in doing so, we must remember that trade among friends and Allies makes us stronger and more resilient. We must not create new barriers between free and open economies.

The most important lesson from the war in Ukraine is that North America and Europe must stand together. In a more dangerous world, we need our transatlantic Alliance more than ever.

Without NATO, there is no security in Europe. So, this is not the time to look beyond the Alliance. This is the time to strengthen and enlarge our Alliance.

To promote peace. Protect our shared security. And defend a global system based on our values and international law.

2023

Emmanuel Macron

President of the French Republic

In 2023, Emmanuel Macron took the stage at the Munich Security Conference to deliver this call for European sovereignty and unity.

I am pleased to be back with you today in this place where, for nearly 60 years, many debates have been held which have been formative for our world and have fed into this transatlantic community's field of thought. But today — as we have just seen with President Zelenskyy and Chancellor Scholz, who preceded me and whose earlier speeches I commend — is obviously a time of gravity. In a few days it will be one year since the start of the disastrous war of aggression waged by Russia against Ukraine. And even though now is not the time for conclusions, it is already time for an assessment and, I believe, for a few common expectations that we can give ourselves. So I am obviously going to focus my remarks on the war started by Russia in Ukraine. But I want to say that, for all that, we have not forgotten the wars in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Africa, the fight against terrorism, the nuclear security issues also posed in other regions, etc. But it is indeed Ukraine that we are going to talk about today.

Now, one year on, the toll of a disastrous and unjustified conflict is considerable. And basically I would like to stress one point, namely that this war, contrary to what I read too often, is not merely a Europeans' war. It affects the whole planet, first of all because it is an aggression with no justification whatsoever and which I would describe — as I did on the rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly a few monghs ago — as neo-colonialist and imperialist. This is indeed the world vision that dominates this aggression, which denies a neighbour's identity, sees part of its territory or indeed its whole territory as capable of being captured without respect, and arrogates to itself a form of guardianship over another people. And to accept this, look away, close one's eyes, is to regard neo-colonialism and imperial power as legitimate anywhere else in the world.

The second thing is that in the name of this world vision, all taboos have been broken: not only the violation of the Charter of the United Nations, itself accepted by a power that is a permanent member of the Security Council, but murders, rapes, war crimes, the systematic destruction of civilian infrastructure, and therefore a systematization of war crimes against the Ukrainian people, but also nuclear threats. And here I want to pay tribute to the tireless work done from the outset by the IAEA and its Director General, Mr Grossi — in Ukraine as in Iran, because this subject remains on our minds. Finally, this aggression is having disastrous effects on the world, and Russia bears full responsibility for them: the food crisis, the unprecedented rise in the price of raw materials despite the solidarity measures we are taking with the most vulnerable countries. And I know some of our partners in the world say, "it's a European matter", "there are wrongs on both sides". I ask them to leave behind this relativism. There is indeed an aggressor and an aggressee, and above all there are principles underlying this aggression which are clear and which we cannot allow to win if we want a stable international order and lasting peace. The second major point I would like to make is that the Russian aggression has already been marked — crowned, as it were — by four clear failures.

The first failure is on the ground. The basic theory was that the attack would be swift, that Ukraine would not resist and that it was a matter of a few days or weeks. The extraordinary courage of Ukraine's armed forces and people, of its leaders and all its political forces — and here I pay tribute to all the friends I can see in this hall and the President, whom we saw on the screen earlier — thwarted that terrible plan, and the resistance in Kyiv [thwarted] the recapture of the north. What was also done in Kherson, Kharkhiv and so many places showed a failure of Russia's initial military plan.

The second failure is very clearly that of the colonial mentality. There was a discourse which sought to create confusion between a zone of influence and a zone of coercion and explain that there was some legitimacy to this conflict. One year on, this has not succeeded. I want to say clearly that it is the duty of us all to continue this work of explaining and spelling out the fact that Russia today is an unbalancing power, a power of disorder, not only in Ukraine but also in the Caucasus, the Middle East and Africa, through Wagner, because this war has also enabled the ambiguity and indeed hypocrisy we have seen in recent years to be spelt out. I myself was in Russia a year ago to try and argue for peace. And President Putin said to me, with a confidence I thought was relative but which I nevertheless believed in: "Those Wagner people are not ours. They pose problems for us in Russia too." They have now officially confirmed that Wagner was an explicit, direct,

diplomatic-military, mafia-style conduit for Russia worldwide and is going to basically extend the international network of crime and disorder. We have defeated it in relative terms, but we must see the job through.

Russia's third failure is a misreading of the future. The concrete result is the consolidation of Ukraine and its strength, and the decision by Finland and Sweden to join NATO, and I want to tell the leaders how much we are with them on this path. It also means increased international dependence, a loss of prestige at every level, a deeply-rooted suspicion and a legitimate mistrust that many in the region may have. How can we believe that the challenges in the Caucasus will be resolved by the neo-colonial Russia I have described? And I say this to my friend Prime Minister Pachinyan, by whose side we continue to stand and will continue to act. And the fourth failure, probably the most disturbing one, is President Putin's current failure to give back to Russia what he promised, namely its authority in the world, because ultimately how can Russia make do with being a producer of raw materials rather than a creative economy, make do with a mediocre gross domestic product despite having the strengths of a global power, and now make do with widespread suspicion from all its neighbours?

So having said all that, I can easily repeat what I argued on this very rostrum two years ago: none of us will change Russia's geography, it will always be on European soil. And none of us will be able to avert what is today an inevitability. But our dilemma is that there will be no full and lasting peace on our continent unless we can tackle the Russia question, but in a clear-sighted way, without complacency, and this is a reality. And it is really in this spirit that we must continue to move forward, without taking any easy route. This has also driven my words and deeds since this conflict began and before: no easy routes, no naivety, genuine determination, strength when we need it, but also the courage to re-engage in dialogue to find lasting solutions. But today is very clearly not the time for dialogue, because we have a Russia which has chosen war, chosen to intensify the war and chosen to go as far as war crimes and attacking civilian infrastructure. So the short-term conclusion we must draw from this pattern is simple: Russia cannot and must not win this war, and the Russian aggression must fail, because we cannot allow the illegal use of force to become the norm, otherwise European security as a whole and, more generally, global stability would be called into question. This is why we, together with our European and American partners and several others, have been at the forefront of this security and support.

Sanctions: 10 sanctions packages adopted by the Europeans on Russia since the beginning of the war, and military, economic and humanitarian support for Ukraine and its people, with support conferences on civilian infrastructure, equipment transferred, finance, and constant mobilization. And thank you, Secretary-General, for all the work done. Each time, France has prioritized sectors with greater added value, taking Ukraine's expectations into account: artillery, anti-aircraft defence in particular, and a training programme for thousands of soldiers. This is why we have simultaneously agreed to strengthen our share of the defence of NATO's eastern flank, especially in Romania, Estonia and in Europe's skies, while also increasing our presence in the Mediterranean, where our carrier battle group is helping to provide reassurance. This is the strategy adopted since the first days of the conflict, because we turned this reinforcement into actions on the ground, for example on Romanian soil, as early as the end of February 2022.

And we are going to continue and step this up because, as I speak, I am convinced that we absolutely must intensify our support and our effort to assist the resistance by the Ukrainian people and army and enable them to conduct the counter-offensive, which is the only way of bringing about credible negotiations under conditions chosen by Ukraine, its authorities and its people. And so while we wait, as it were, to be surprised by peace, we are ready to step things up today, because the coming weeks and months are decisive and we are ready for a prolonged conflict. Saying this does not mean I wish for it, but above all, if we do not wish for it, we must be credible collectively in our ability to make this long-term effort. And this is how France is part of it. This is our state of mind, our determination, our desire today standing alongside Ukraine, because it is the only way to get Russia back to the discussion table in an acceptable way and build a lasting peace: in other words, at the time and under the conditions that are chosen by the Ukrainians.

Having said that, I wanted to make a few appeals now to my European friends, building on and continuing the few convictions I have just shared. The first appeal is to reinvest massively in our defence. If we Europeans want peace, we must give ourselves the resources for it. France is playing its part, following a National Strategic Review which I set out last November, and the Government has just submitted to the nation's elected representatives a military estimates bill that will bring our budget over the period 2024–2030 to €400 billion, i.e. €100 billion more than the previous period. This is a considerable increase, and Europeans need to make this effort. But rearming also means strengthening the Defence Technological and Industrial Base, keeping alive and extending all the mechanisms we have recently developed, particularly through the so-called Versailles agenda nearly a year ago. Many States that would like to help arm Ukraine today sometimes depend on decisions by non-European countries and

many non-European manufacturers. And if Europe wants to be able to defend Europe, it must also arm itself, take advantage of NATO's interoperability and speed up its ability to produce on European soil. So before the summer I would like us to adopt an ambitious European programme of investment in defence and, in the immediate future, make the most of the European Defence Fund. We must also look again at our speed; together as Europeans we must look at how to produce more and faster, and this war economy which, since the spring, we have wanted to strengthen in France — we must go even further, move to more standardization, more simplification, and do so as Europeans.

The second appeal is to take into account the nuclear factor in this crisis. Everyone, over the past year, has gained an idea of the importance of one of the unspoken things in this conflict, or, dare I say it, one of the things sometimes spoken about too much in this conflict: nuclear weapons. The Russian aggression has been waged in the shadow of deterrence, and deterrence has been a significant factor, on the other side, in the allies' protection. This situation is a reminder of the importance of the role nuclear weapons play and must continue to play in the European Union and NATO. France's deterrent capability, along with that of the United Kingdom, plays a specific role here, enabling Europe to help strengthen NATO's overall security. Obviously, our American allies also play a crucial role in this regard. I would like to see us reaffirm NATO's nuclear status and draw the appropriate consequences of this status in all international forums. I also want to repeat the offer I made at the Ecole de Guerre in February 2020, i.e., to hold a dialogue with those European partners who wish to discuss France's nuclear deterrent and how Europe fits in with France's vital interests.

My third appeal is to rethink our security doctrine in order to guarantee Europe's participation in all future arms control talks. One example I find especially striking relates to intermediate-range missiles. At a NATO summit in late 2019, as Olaf no doubt remembers, I highlighted the grotesque situation that we found ourselves in. The United States, under a different administration, had decided to pull out of certain treaties that the Russians hadn't abided by for years; they related to our territory and yet we were not involved in those decisions.

We must put an end to this situation, in which we Europeans are a sort of geopolitical minority. Europe's security is at stake. It is we who must conceive of this doctrine, produce it, negotiate it and guarantee it, in partnership with our NATO allies and as Europeans. Intermediate-range weapons, as I was saying, were governed by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. France was not a party to that treaty. We abided by its provisions and then we realized that a treaty dealing with this risk no longer existed. There are lessons to be learned here — reviving negotiations on this issue would represent a real contribution to Europe's system of protection. When these kinds of instruments are negotiated in the future, Europe must have a seat at the table. This relates to the broader issue so rightly raised by Chancellor Scholz concerning the continent's air defences. It is a good topic for discussion.

That is why I would like to hold a conference in Paris on Europe's air defences that includes our German, Italian and British partners, and all those in Europe who wish to join us. It will allow us to approach the issue from an industrial perspective, joined by all European manufacturers who have solutions to offer, as well as from a strategic perspective, with an in-depth look at the questions of deterrence and strike capabilities. It is by mentally and physically re-equipping ourselves that we will enable Europe to fully play its role in future security arrangements.

My fourth appeal to you is to imagine what types of mechanisms will allow us over the long term to avoid the cycles of aggression that our continent has experienced in recent decades. We will need a framework for the future which restores transparency and predictability on the continent and which must respect basic principles: the inviolability of borders and national sovereignty. Which reaffirms the stabilizing role of deterrence in Europe. Which re-establishes a credible arms-control architecture that steadily restores the balance of forces at the lowest possible level. And which establishes a framework for resolving extended conflicts and crises on the continent, based on existing structures such as the OSCE.

Obviously, Europe must be at the heart of this. And as you know, I'm not dogmatic when it comes to Europe. In addition to the EU, we must think about a broader Europe: the Europe we have begun to forge through the European Political Community, which will have a special role to play in this regard — which will include nations that may have chosen to leave the EU but remain anchored in Europe's geopolitical interests. Nations that never joined the EU but which partner with us on security and energy and so many other issues. And nations that may aspire to join the EU, and which I hope will join us, but are currently outside its borders. From Norway to our British friends, from the Western Balkans to Moldova and Ukraine. This European Political Community is a geopolitical framework that will help prevent crises, and we must think about its framework and architecture. In this regard, I want to express our full support for Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who will host the next meeting of the European Political Community and who is facing so many challenges. We need to build a new

cooperation area on our continent and NATO has a key role to play in this regard. I believe that these past few months have allowed us to show that everyone who thought that a stronger Defence Europe — that strengthening European defence policy — constituted a threat to NATO now clearly understands that this only serves to strengthen our transatlantic alliance because all our efforts have been carried out in concert with our American and Canadian partners, among others, and we have demonstrated our willingness to share common strategic objectives. 6 Lastly, I would like to issue two very quick final appeals to all our European partners.

Today, my fifth appeal, outside of this conflict, is for us to continue taking action together on other forms of conflict that are already impacting us and may threaten us. There is a risk that we all must face. By this I mean that we will — we must — help Ukraine, step up our efforts and face certain major geopolitical challenges in the coming weeks and months. At the same time, we must also face new forms of conflict in new areas. Let's not forget about cyber, space and maritime risks, as well as our democracies' vulnerability to disinformation and destabilization. Those risks and those spaces will be used by Russia or perhaps by other authoritarian powers that, given the current context, will seek to destabilize us. Therefore, we must boost our cooperation and our investments, as well as our ability to work together in these fields in the near term.

My last comment — my last appeal — to all the Europeans and to the Americans too is for us to start laying the groundwork for peace as well. In the near term, we must be strong. We must show that we are strong and determined in our backing of Ukraine and that we are prepared to keep this up over the long term. However, we must begin preparing the terms for peace right away. It's our responsibility. Not in a compromising spirit but rather, in a spirit of responsibility. This peace will be all the more possible and credible if we stand strong today and manage to stay strong over the long term. But we must prepare the terms.

That means re-engaging those in Asia, the Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America who, at present, aren't thinking along the lines of the terms that I just outlined. Despite what I said at the outset of my speech, they continue saying, "There are double standards. You keep spending massive amounts on Ukraine, yet you still don't spend anything on us. You are fighting against this war with all your might but you don't do enough to fight poverty in our countries. We've been living with war for decades and you've done practically nothing about it!" We need to hear them out. Therefore, we need to use diplomacy to re-engage all these countries in order to convince them to join us in pressuring Russia and laying the groundwork for peace. It's our responsibility. In particular, we must do this by countering this narrative of a double standard that is taking root. That is why, as we make all these investments, I call on the Europeans, the Americans, all the G7 and members and even the G20 members to help us rebuild a North-South partnership. That will allow us to rethink the terms of international solidarity and invest heavily in countries that need these funds for their healthcare and education systems, as well as their fight against food insecurity. More specifically, this will lend new credibility to all the wealthy nations that need to re-engage many emerging countries, middle-income countries and developing countries in this effort by showing them that while we are defending our principles and want to achieve a fair and lasting peace under the conditions set forth by the Ukrainians in Ukraine, we haven't forgotten them. We also want a fairer world that can tackle the climate challenges and their consequences, both in their countries and in other places.

This is a key responsibility. Let's not forget, our response to this new geopolitical situation must include investments in the military and a firm stance. However, we must also be able to commit to achieving a credible peace and redouble our efforts when it comes to our solidarity policies. I have gone on for too long, so I'll leave it at that.

2023

Wang Yi

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China and Director of the Office of the Foreign Affairs Commission of the Communist Party of China's Central Committee

Wang Yi used his speech to the 2023 Munich Security Conference to outline China's peace plan for Ukraine.

I am delighted to join you in person at the Munich Security Conference after three years and meet face to face with friends old and new.

I recall vividly how I came here with the Chinese delegation three years ago when COVID-19 just struck. I presented China's efforts in fighting the virus and urged solidarity among countries in face of the trying times. The international community gave China valuable understanding and support, for which we are deeply grateful.

Humanity's three-year fight against COVID tells us a simple truth: as President Xi Jinping repeatedly stressed, we are members of one global village, and we belong to one community with a shared future. We can overcome challenges when we stand together; we can win victory when we trust each other.

Three years on, the pandemic is contained, but the world is not yet safer. Trust between major countries is lacking, geopolitical rifts are widening, unilateralism is rampant, the Cold War mentality is back, new types of security threats from energy, food, climate, bio-security and artificial intelligence keep emerging.

Standing at a critical juncture of history, human society must not repeat the old path of antagonism, division and confrontation, and must not fall into the trap of zero-sum game, war and conflict. Making the world a safer place is the strong desire of all people, the common responsibility of all countries and, more importantly, the right direction for the advance of our times.

For a safer world, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected.

Power politics and hegemony are a recipe for global instability, and do the biggest damage to global peace. Interference in other countries' internal affairs, in whatever name, disregards and defies the basic norms of international relations. Any violation of the one-China principle on the Taiwan question, or attempt to create "one China, one Taiwan" or "two Chinas", however framed, are a gross infringement of China's territorial integrity, and pose real threats to peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

The principle of sovereignty is the cornerstone of the contemporary international order. All countries should abide by the principle in both words and deeds, rather than apply it selectively, still less with double standards. China will resolutely curb acts of separatism and interference to safeguard its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

For a safer world, disputes should be peacefully resolved through dialogue and consultation.

Disagreements and frictions do exist between countries. Yet handling them with pressuring, smear campaigns or unilateral sanctions is often counterproductive, and may even entail endless trouble. However complex the issue is, dialogue and consultation should not be abandoned. However intense the dispute is, a political resolution should be pursued. However difficult the situation is, peace should be given a chance.

China follows a new vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security, as put forward by President Xi Jinping. China takes a responsible stance on international disputes based on the merits of each issue, and plays a constructive role. On the Ukraine issue, China's position boils down to supporting talks for peace. We will put forth China's proposition on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, and stay firm on the side of peace and dialogue.

For a safer world, the purposes and principles of the UN Charter should be upheld.

The chaos and conflicts plaguing our world today occur because the purposes and principles of the Charter have not been truly observed. Fanning ideological confrontation and forming exclusionary blocs harms international solidarity and hampers global cooperation. Hyping security threats and stoking tensions undercuts strategic mutual trust and elevates the risk of miscalculation.

The pressing need now is for all to put the larger interest embodied in the purposes and principles of the UN Charter above one's own lesser interest, and work together to oppose the Cold War mentality and bloc confrontation.

For a safer world, the key role of development must be fully harnessed.

The world should not be a place where the rich stay rich while the poor remain poor. Efforts should be stepped up in implementing the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the legitimate right to development of all countries, especially developing countries, should be effectively protected, and assistance should be extended to under-developed regions to improve people's lives and grow the economy. A holistic approach is needed to address both symptoms and root causes and remove the breeding ground for conflict.

The world should not veer off into the wrong path of protectionism, decoupling and cutting chains. We must firmly reject the attempts to politicize, weaponize and draw ideological lines in the cooperation on trade, science and technology. If security is to be firmly established and to last, people in all countries should get to lead a better life.

Making the world a safer place is China's abiding commitment.

Last October, the Communist Party of China convened its 20th National Congress. General Secretary Xi Jinping declared that China's central task in the new era and on the new journey is to advance the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation on all fronts through a Chinese path to modernization. On how to accomplish this modernization of the largest scale in human history, China has given an unequivocal and steadfast answer — keeping to peaceful development. Peaceful development is not an expediency, nor diplomatic rhetoric, but a strategic choice informed by a deep grasp of the past, present and future.

Looking over the past, China suffered deeply from foreign aggression and expansion in modern times. This country fully appreciates the value of peace and the importance of development. Shortly after the founding of New China, we put forward the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Over the past seventy-plus years, China has never initiated a war or occupied an inch of foreign land. It is the only country that has put peaceful development in its Constitution, and the only country among the five nuclear-weapon states to pledge no-first-use of nuclear weapons. China's track record on peace can stand the scrutiny of history, and China's peaceful rise is an unprecedented miracle in human history.

At present, the top priority for the CPC and the Chinese government is to pursue high-quality development and deliver a better life for all Chinese people. We know full well that development is only possible in a peaceful and tranquil international environment. This requires that China must live in peace with other countries and pursue win-win cooperation with the rest of the world. We will always be an advocate for peace, development and win-win cooperation, and work to deepen and expand global partnerships based on equality, openness and cooperation.

Looking to the future, peace and development remain the trend of history and the aspiration of the people. Some people assert that a strong country is bound to seek hegemony, and assume that China will walk away from peaceful development as it gets stronger. However, China's experience shows that the path of peaceful development has worked, and worked well. There is no reason for us to discontinue, but every reason to stay the course, and come together with more countries in the pursuit of peaceful development. Any increase in China's strength is an increase in the hope for world peace. When all countries pursue peaceful development, the future of humanity will be full of promise.

With a keen grasp of the changing world, President Xi Jinping put forward the Global Development Initiative (GDI) and the Global Security Initiative (GSI) in recent years, offering China's proposals and wisdom for advancing peace and development, the two main issues facing humanity. As of now, more than 100 countries and international organizations, including the UN, have expressed support for the two initiatives. Some 70 countries have joined the "Group of Friends of the GDI". I am pleased to announce that China will be launching a GSI Concept Paper to lay out a more systematic approach and more practical measures to address global security challenges. We welcome your active participation.

Making the world a safer place hinges on the right choice of both China and Europe.

China and Europe are two major forces, markets and civilizations in an increasingly multi-polar world. The choices we make have a huge impact on where the world goes. If we choose dialogue and cooperation, bloc confrontation will not emerge. If we choose peace and stability, a new Cold War will not break out. If we choose openness and win-win, global development and prosperity will have greater hope. Making the right choice is a responsibility we share. This should be how we respond to the call of history and the needs of the people.

Here in Munich stands the Angel of Peace, a renowned monument marking the end of a war and embodying the wish for lasting peace. Long as the journey is, we will reach our destination if we stay the course; difficult as the task is, we will get the job done if we keep working at it. Let us all join hands and work together to make the world a safer place.

2024

António Guterres

Secretary-General of the United Nations

In his opening speech at the Munich Security Conference 2024, António Guterres called for a global order that "works for everyone".

As the title of our discussion implies, today's global order is not working for everyone. In fact, I would go further and say: it's not working for anyone.

Our world is facing existential challenges, but the global community is more fragmented and divided than at any time during the past 75 years. Even the Cold War era was, in some ways, less dangerous.

The threat of nuclear war was real and existential. That's why the United States and the Soviet Union agreed on arms reductions and controls and other mechanisms to prevent mutually assured destruction.

Today, in our multipolar world, we still face the nuclear danger. And we are dealing with two more threats with existential dimensions: the climate crisis, and the risks of uncontrolled Artificial Intelligence. We have been unable to take effective steps to respond to any of these existential challenges. Multipolarity has created important opportunities for balance and justice, and for new leadership on the global stage.

But the transition to multipolarity without strong global institutions can create chaos. When power relations are vague, the dangers of aggressive opportunism and miscalculation grow. Today we see countries doing whatever they like, with no accountability. Impunity seems to be the name of the game and so we must all be determined to establish the primacy of the rule of law.

As the Munich Security Report makes clear, relative gains through competition between countries are being prioritized over absolute gains for all through cooperation. Crises are multiplying, linked to competition and impunity. A global order that works for everyone must address these gaps and provide solutions.

If countries fulfilled their obligations under the UN Charter and international law, every person on earth would live in peace and dignity. The problem is that many governments are ignoring these commitments. Millions of civilians are paying a terrible price. Record numbers have been forced to flee.

Nothing can justify the unconscionable terror attacks launched by Hamas on 7 October against Israel. And nothing can justify the collective punishment of the Palestinian people in Israel's military response. The situation in Gaza is an appalling indictment of the deadlock in global relations. The level of death and destruction is shocking in itself. The war is also spilling over borders across the region and affecting global trade. The humanitarian aid operation is now on life support. It is barely functioning.

Humanitarians are working under unimaginable conditions — including live fire, multiple physical obstacles and Israeli restrictions as well as the breakdown of public order. Rafah is at the core of the entire humanitarian aid operation. An all out offensive on the city would be devastating for the 1.5 million Palestinian civilians there who are already on the edge of survival. I have repeatedly called for the immediate and unconditional release of all hostages, and a humanitarian ceasefire. That is the only way to massively scale up the aid delivery in Gaza. This must be the foundation for concrete and irreversible steps towards a two-state solution, based on international law and United Nations resolutions.

The war triggered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, in clear violation of the UN charter, has no place in the Europe of the 21st century. Two years in, the cost in human lives and suffering is appalling and the impact on the global economy has been particularly devastating for developing countries. We desperately need a just and sustained peace for Ukraine, for Russia, and for the world. A peace in line with the UN Charter and international law which establishes the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of sovereign states. And around the world, from the Sahel to Libya and Sudan, from the Great Lakes to the Horn of Africa, from Yemen to Myanmar, we need concerted efforts to strengthen regional organizations and for global powers to pressure the parties to war to come to the peace table and to pursue their goals through negotiations. The recent decision of the Security Council to support African Union-led peace enforcing and counter-terrorism operations is an important step in the right direction.

Beyond these immediate crises, we need to strengthen the global peace and security architecture to deal with today's threats and challenges. Those who drafted the UN Charter did not conceive [of] the climate crisis, Artificial Intelligence or cyberweapons. The New Agenda for Peace, to be discussed at the Summit of the Future in September, aims to update our collective security systems based on a more networked and inclusive multilateralism, for a world in transition.

From reform of the UN Security Council to a recommitment to eliminating nuclear weapons, and the role of sustainable development and climate action in preventing conflict, the New Agenda for Peace seeks to update global commitments for the challenges of today and tomorrow. It includes measures to prevent the further fragmentation of global trade rules, supply chains and more. And it calls for new norms and frameworks to regulate new technologies in the military domain.

Competition at the global level cannot obscure the divisions we see around us. Communities are riven by hate speech, discrimination, and deepening polarization. Truth and facts are being drained of all meaning in an age of deep fakes and disinformation. We are witnessing an intolerable explosion of anti-semitism and other forms of religious and racial hatred.

Divided societies are weak societies where extremist narratives can take hold and tensions quickly escalate into violence, undermining democratic values. Tech companies should assume their responsibilities and stop profiting from the amplification of toxic content of all kinds. We need a new emphasis on social cohesion and the security of every individual, through a renewed social contract based on justice and inclusion and anchored in human rights. This will be a focus of the World Social Summit we will host next year.

Now we come to the pie of the next discussion: the global economy. Everyone is fighting for a piece of that pie. But zero-sum mindsets mean everyone may get zero — increasing threats to security and prosperity for all. We need peace with justice.

Today's global financial architecture, based on frameworks agreed nearly 80 years ago, is outdated, dysfunctional and unfair. It has failed the world's poorest countries, still suffering the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. They will owe more in debt service this year than their public spending on health, education and infrastructure — combined. Unfortunately, we still lack an effective debt relief mechanism.

All this is a development emergency with deep implications for global security. We need urgent action in two areas: a stimulus of 500 billion US dollars annually in affordable long-term finance for developing countries to invest in the Sustainable Development Goals, as endorsed by the UN General Assembly in September.

We are working with a small group of Heads of State to champion and monitor its implementation. And we need a new Bretton Woods moment to reform the global financial architecture so that it corresponds to today's global economy and is able to create a true global safety net, in particular for developing countries drowning in debt. The Summit of the Future will consider the need for deep reforms to make these institutions and frameworks truly universal and inclusive and based on the rule of law. This is essential to create a global economy that works for everyone, everywhere.

Finally, we must end our war with nature. The climate crisis is gathering pace. Last year was the hottest on record. It could be the coolest for many years to come. The next few years are decisive. Emissions must have peaked by next year — 2025 — and must fall by 45 percent by 2030. We have the tools. We know what to do.

We need to progressively phase out fossil fuels and promote a just and equitable transition to renewable energy, led by the G20 countries that are responsible for 80 percent of global emissions. The next two years must see ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions — national climate plans — from every country, covering every sector.

We also need to triple global renewable energy capacity, double the energy efficiency by 2030 and unlock the necessary finance for developing countries, from public and private sources, so they can meet the growing demand for electricity with the infinite, clean energy of renewables. All financial commitments made by developed countries in support of climate action, both in mitigation and adaptation, must be met.

It is clear that our world is in deep trouble. Global governance in its present form is entrenching divisions and fuelling discontent. We must work based on justice, with renewed urgency and solidarity. There is always an opportunity to create a more inclusive, comprehensive, and effective global order that works for everyone based on international law. A safer world — and a bigger pie — for all. That is the objective of the UN Summit of the Future in September. Let's seize the opportunity.

2024

Kamala D. Harris

Vice President of the United States of America

In her third speech at a Munich Security Conference, Kamala Harris focused on the crucial role of NATO ahead of the 75th anniversary summit in Washington DC.

Before I begin today, we've all just received reports that Aleksey Navalny has died in Russia. This is, of course, terrible news, which we are working to confirm. My prayers are with his family including his wife, Yulia, who is with us today.

And if confirmed, this would be a further sign of Putin's brutality. Whatever story they tell, let us be clear: Russia is responsible. And we will have more to say on this later. As Christoph said, this is my third time here, and I'm honored to be with so many friends.

This year, we gather amid an increased instability and conflict in the Middle East. We gather amid Russia's ongoing aggression in Ukraine, China's efforts to reshape the international order, transformative technological change, and, of course, the existential threat of the climate crisis.

In this context, I know that there are questions here in Europe and around the world about the future of America's role of global leadership. These are questions the American people must also ask ourselves: Whether it is in America's interest to continue to engage with the world or to turn inward. Whether it is in our interest to defend longstanding rules and norms that have provided for unprecedented peace and prosperity or to allow them to be trampled. Whether it is in America's interest to fight for democracy or to accept the rise of dictators. And whether it is in America's interest to continue to work in lockstep with our allies and partners or go it alone.

Today, I will explain how President Biden and I answer these questions, with full knowledge that how America responds will affect the American people, the people of Europe, and people around the world. I believe it is in the fundamental interest of the American people for the United States to fulfill our longstanding role of global leadership.

As President Biden and I have made clear over the past three years, we are committed to pursue global engagement, to uphold international rules and norms, to defend democratic values at home and abroad, and to work with our allies and partners in pursuit of shared goals.

As I travel throughout my country and the world, it is clear to me: This approach makes America strong, and it keeps Americans safe. However, there are some in the United States who disagree. They suggest it is in the best interest of the American people to isolate ourselves from the world, to flout common understandings among nations, to embrace dictators and adopt their repressive tactics, and to abandon commitments to our allies in favor of unilateral action.

Let me be clear: That worldview is dangerous, destabilizing, and indeed short-sighted. That view would weaken America and would undermine global stability and undermine global prosperity. President Biden and I, therefore, reject that view.

And please do understand, our approach is not based on the virtues of charity. We pursue our approach because it is in our strategic interest.

I strongly believe America's role of global leadership is to the direct benefit of the American people. Our leadership keeps our homeland safe, supports American jobs, secures supply chains, and opens new markets for American goods. And I firmly believe our commitment to build and sustain alliances has helped America become the most powerful and prosperous country in the world — alliances that have prevented wars, defended freedom, and maintained stability from Europe to the Indo-Pacific. To put all of that at risk would be foolish.

President Biden and I have demonstrated there is a smarter way. When it comes to America's national security, our approach starts with our historic, direct investment in the working people of America, an investment which has helped build a resilient and innovative economy.

We are clear: We cannot be strong abroad if we are not strong at home.

We have made a once-in-a-generation investment to rebuild our roads and bridges and ports and highways with more than 40,000 infrastructure projects across all of our 50 states. We're bringing semiconductor manufacturing back to America, which will secure our supply chains and enable the future of technology. And we have invested $1 trillion to address the climate crisis and build a new clean energy economy, reduce emissions, and meet our global climate commitments.

Our economic vision has ensured America's economy remains the strongest in the world, with historic job creation, historic creation of small businesses, and broad-based economic growth.

And over the past three years, backed by this strong track record at home, we have implemented our National Security Strategy.

In the Indo-Pacific, we have invested heavily in our alliances and partnerships and created new ones to ensure peace and security and, of course, the free flow of commerce. We have responsibly managed competition with China, standing up to Beijing when necessary and also working together when it serves our interest.

In the Middle East, we are working to end the conflict that Hamas triggered on October 7th as soon as possible and ensure it ends in a way where Israel is secure, hostages are released, the humanitarian crisis is resolved, Hamas does not control Gaza, and Palestinians can enjoy their right to security, dignity, freedom, and self-determination.

This work — while we also work to counter aggression from Iran and its proxies, prevent regional escalation, and promote regional integration.

In addition, we have strengthened our partnerships on the continent of Africa, understanding that the innovation happening on the continent will shape the future of our world. We have also worked with partners in the Caribbean and throughout Latin America to increase private sector investment, address the climate crisis, and address the root causes of migration.

And the Biden-Harris administration has led the world to respond to the climate crisis and ensure AI is developed in service of the public interest. We have also worked to advance and uphold rules and norms for outer space and to empower women around the globe. And here in Europe, we have joined forces with our friends and allies to stand up for freedom and democracy.

Christoph, I reflect on two years ago, when I first stood on this stage on the eve of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Many of — of us will recall that time when many thought Kyiv would fall within days. Yet, the skill and the bravery of the people of Ukraine, along with the leadership of President Zelenskyy and the 50-nation coalition the United States has led, has allowed Ukraine to achieve what so many thought was impossible. Today, Kyiv stands free and strong.

The world has come together, with leadership from the United States, to defend the basic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity and to stop an imperialist authoritarian from subjugating a free and democratic people. Make no mistake, Putin's war has already been an utter failure for Russia.

Ukraine has regained more than half the territory Russia occupied at the start of the conflict thanks, in part, to a massive supply of American and European weapons. The Russian military has suffered severe setbacks. It has lost two thirds of its tanks and more than a third of its fleet in the Black Sea.

Because of Putin's aggression and recklessness, Russia has also suffered over 300,000 casualties. Remember, that's more than five times what it lost in 10 years in Afghanistan. And now it forces conscripts onto the frontlines with as little as two weeks of training.

We have also imposed economic costs on Russia for its aggression. And together with our G7 partners, we have frozen Russia's sovereign assets and made clear Russia must pay for the damages it has caused to Ukraine.

I applaud the recent $54 billion commitment the EU made to support Ukraine on top of the more than $100 billion our European allies and partners have already dedicated.

You have made clear that Europe will stand with Ukraine, and I will make clear President Joe Biden and I stand with Ukraine.

In partnership with supportive, bipartisan majorities in both houses of the United States Congress, we will work to secure critical weapons and resources that Ukraine so badly needs. And let me be clear: The failure to do so would be a gift to Vladimir Putin.

More broadly, NATO is central to our approach to global security. For President Biden and me, our sacred commitment to NATO remains ironclad. And I do believe, as I have said before, NATO is the greatest military alliance the world has ever known.

NATO was founded on a very simple premise: An attack on one is an attack on all. And when it comes to conflict between nations, NATO has deterred aggression against its members to the benefit of the security of the American people.

For the past 75 years, NATO members have maintained this solemn pact, including on 9/11 when terrorists attacked America and for the first and only time, NATO invoked Article 5, the collective defense clause. And NATO stood by America's side. Nevertheless, recall, before the President and I took office, some questioned the usefulness of NATO, suggested it was, quote, "obsolete."

Some in my country also questioned the value of our commitment to NATO's collective defense and called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Germany. Now, thanks to the leadership of the United States, NATO is stronger, larger, more unified, and more effective than ever before.

We have reinforced NATO's eastern flank with more weapons and forces, including air defense and fighter coverage, a sustained presence of army brigades, and a permanent U.S Army headquarters in Poland.

And, of course, Europeans are also stepping up. Since President Biden and I took office, the number of NATO members that have met the goal of

spending 2 percent of GDP has doubled. NATO has also added one new member, and we're on track to add another. And we look forward to welcoming both Finland and Sweden to Washington for NATO's 75th anniversary summit this summer.

Around the world, we have made great progress. But ultimately, I do believe none of the gains we have made will be permanent unless we are vigilant. And let us remember, none of these gains were inevitable.

I ask you: Imagine if America turned our back on Ukraine and abandoned our NATO Allies and abandoned our treaty commitments. Imagine if we went easy on Putin, let alone encouraged him.

History offers a clue. If we stand by while an aggressor invades its neighbor with impunity, they will keep going. And in the case of Putin, that means all of Europe would be threatened. If we fail to impose severe consequences on Russia, other authoritarians across the globe would be emboldened, because you see, they will be watching — they are watching and drawing lessons.

History has also shown us: If we only look inward, we cannot defeat threats from outside. Isolation is not insulation. In fact, when America has isolated herself, threats have only grown.

I need not remind the people of Europe of a dark history when the forces of tyranny and fascism were on the march, and then America joined our allies in defense of freedom and to safeguard our collective security.

So, I'll close with this. In these unsettled times, it is clear: America cannot retreat. America must stand strong for democracy. We must stand in defense of international rules and norms, and we must stand with our allies.

That is what represents the ideals of America, and the American people know that is what make us strong.

And make no mistake, the American people will meet this moment, and America will continue to lead.

2024

Yulia Navalnaya

Chairwoman of the Advisory Board of the Anti-Corruption Foundation and wife of the late Russian activist Alexei Navalny

Just minutes before the opening of the Munich Security Conference 2024, the Russian prison service reported that Alexei Navalny had died in an Arctic penal colony. In response, the Munich Security Conference made a rare schedule adjustment to allow Yulia Navalnaya, his wife, to address the conference. She called for President Putin to be held accountable.

Thank you very much for having me here. Thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak in this room. And you all heard about the horrific news. I thought about it quite a while.

I thought, should I stand here before you, or should I go back to my children? And then I thought, what would have Alexei done in my place? And I'm sure that he would have been standing here on this stage.

I don't know. Should we believe the terrible news we get? The news we get only from the official media, because for many years, and you know, all this, we have been in this situation. We cannot believe Putin and his government, they are lying constantly.

But if it is the truth, I would like Putin and all his staff, everybody around him, his government, his friends, I want them know that they will be punished for what they have done with our country. With my family and with my husband, they will be brought to justice. And this day will come soon. And I would like to call upon all the international community, all the people in the world, we should come together and we should fight against this evil. We should fight this horrific regime in Russia today.

This regime and Vladimir Putin should be personally held responsible for all the atrocities they have committed in our country the last years.

2024

JD Vance

Senator and Member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, of the United States of America (later Vice President of the United States of America)

JD Vance used his remarks at the Munich Security Conference 2024 to call for Europe to "finally take a bigger role in assuring its own security".

It's good to be with you. I can't speak for Donald Trump. I can speak for myself — and I think that he agrees with what I'm going to say, but I can't speak for the former and I think likely future President of the United States.

So, first of all, we have to remember that despite a lot of the handwringing, and I've heard a lot of it in private meetings and public meetings, Donald Trump was maybe the best President at deterring Russia in a generation.

In fact, the only time that Russia has not invaded a foreign country over the last 20 years was the four years that Donald Trump was President. And it's interesting that so many people accuse Trump, or me, or others of being in Putin's pocket, and yet the person that Vladimir Putin says he wants to be the next president is not Donald Trump. He says Joe Biden is his preferred candidate because he's more predictable.

Now, on the question of European security, I think there's a fundamental issue here that Europe really has to wake up to. And I offer this in the spirit of friendship, not in the spirit of criticism, because, no, I don't think that we should pull out of NATO, and no, I don't think that we should abandon Europe. But yes, I think that we should pivot. The United States has to focus more on East Asia. That is going to be the future of American foreign policy for the next 40 years, and Europe has to wake up to that fact.

Now, let me just throw a couple of facts out there. Number one, the problem in Ukraine from the perspective of the United States of America, and I represent, I believe, the majority of American public opinion, even though I don't represent the majority of opinion of senators who come to Munich, is that there's no clear endpoint, and fundamentally the limiting factors for American support of Ukraine, it's not money, it's munitions. America, and this is true, by the way, of Europe too, we don't make enough munitions to support a war in Eastern Europe, a war in the Middle East, and potentially a contingency in East Asia. So the United States is fundamentally limited.

Now, let me just throw very — very specific details, okay? The PAC-3, which is a Patriot interceptor, Ukraine uses in a month what the United States makes in a year, okay? The Patriot missile system is on a five year back order, 155 millimeter artillery shells on more than a five year back order. We're talking in the United States about ramping up our production of artillery to 100,000 a month by the end of 2025. The Russians make close to 500,000 a month right now at this very minute. So the problem here vis-à-vis Ukraine is America doesn't make enough weapons; Europe doesn't make enough weapons; and that reality is far more important than American political will or how much money we print and then send to Europe.

And the final point that I'll make just to respond here, because I know people have heard what, you know, Trump said, and, you know, they've criticized it and they've said, "Well, "Trump is going to abandon Europe." I don't think that's true at all. I think Trump is actually issuing a wake up call to say that Europe has to take a bigger role in its own security. Germany just this year will spend more than 2% of GDP, okay? That, of course, is something that we had to really push for in the United States, and it just now has finally cleared that threshold.

But it's not just about money spent. How many mechanized brigades could Germany field tomorrow? Maybe one. Maybe one. Okay? The problem with Europe is that it doesn't provide enough of a deterrence on its own because it hasn't taken the initiative in its own security. I think that the American security blanket has allowed European security to atrophy.

And again, the point is not we want to abandon Europe. The point is we need to focus as a country on East Asia, and we need our European allies to step up in Europe. And of course, England has been one of the few exceptions, where I think it has fielded a very capable military over the last generation. But that hasn't been true for a lot of Europe, and that has to change.

It's very hard, the juxtaposition between the idea that Putin poses an existential threat to Europe, compared again against the fact that we're trying to convince our allies to spend 2% of GDP. Those ideas are very much in tension. I do not think that Vladimir Putin is an existential threat to Europe and to the extent that he is, again, that suggests that Europe has to take a more aggressive role in its own security.

That's number one. But again, I go back to this question about "abandoning Ukraine." If the package that's running through the Congress right now, 61 billion dollars of supplemental aid to Ukraine, goes through, I have to be honest to you, that is not going to fundamentally change the reality on the battlefield. The amount of munitions that we can send to Ukraine right now is very limited — again, not by American willpower or by American money, but by American manufacturing capacity. All of those back orders that I just highlighted, those are not problems in the future. Those are problems today, and they provide real limitations.

So all I'm saying is in that world of real limitations, what is realistic to accomplish in Ukraine? Can we send the level of weaponry we've set for the last 18 months for the next 18 months? We simply cannot. No matter how many checks the US Congress writes, we are limited there, okay? Munitions matter a lot in — in warfare. What we haven't talked about, of course, is manpower matters a lot in warfare, and we know the Ukrainians are very limited on that.

So our argument, at least my argument here is, given the realities that we face, the very real constraints in munitions and manpower, what is reasonable to accomplish and when do we actually think we're going to accomplish it? And my argument is, look, I think what's reasonable to accomplish is some negotiated peace. I think Russia has incentive to come to the table right now. I think Ukraine, Europe, and the United States have incentive to come to the table. That is going to happen. This will end in a negotiated peace. The question is when it ends in a negotiated peace and what that looks like.

On prioritizing American interests when engaging with adversaries: First of all, I'm a fan of AUKUS. And to respond to Navalny's death: Look, he was clearly a brave person. His death is a tragedy. I don't think that he should have been in prison. I don't think that he should have been killed in prison. And I condemn Putin for doing it.

But here's the problem: it doesn't teach us anything new about Putin.

I've never once argued that Putin is a kind and friendly person. I've argued that he's a person with distinct interests, and the United States has to respond to that person with distinct interests. We don't have to agree with him. We can contest him and we often will contest him. But the fact that he's a bad guy does not mean we can't engage in basic diplomacy and prioritizing America's interests. There are a lot of bad guys all over the world, and I'm much more interested in some of the problems in East Asia right now than I am in Europe.

On the state of weapons manufacturing in the West, the risk posed by deindustrialization, and the inability of measures like GDP to indicate a nation's military strength: Now to respond to sort of one of the earlier questions. I mean, to the question about the Heritage 2025 initiative, I'm broadly aware of what they're talking about with NATO and I think it's consistent with what I'm articulating here which is that we need Europe to play a bigger share of the security role. And that's not because we don't care about Europe. It's because we have to recognize that we live in a world of scarcity.

When I sort of listen to these questions and I listen to so many of the private conversations I've had, one of the attitudes that I think is very, very dominant at the Munich Security Conference is the idea of the American superpower that can do everything all at once. And what I'm telling you is that we live in a world of scarcity, a world of scarcity and weapons manufacturing and America's capacity to make the critical machinery of war, and that world of scarcity is what I'm trying to get us all to wake up to. In that world of scarcity, we can't support Ukraine and the Middle East and contingencies in East Asia. It just doesn't make any sense. The math doesn't work out in terms of weapons manufacturing.

The one final point I want to make here is, I hear a lot of self-congratulation in this room and some of the conversations that I've had back home in the United States, this is not just a criticism of Europe, a lot of self-congratulation about how much our GDP is bigger than Russia's GDP. And yes, we are richer than Russia. Our citizens have better lives than the average Russian citizen. That is certainly something to celebrate and be proud of.

But you don't win wars with GDP or euros or dollars. You win wars with weapons, and the West doesn't make enough weapons. Now, I don't mean to beat up on Germany here because I love Germany, but I want to respond to something Ms. Lang said earlier. Look, Germany is the one country, maybe, in NATO, that did not follow the stupid Washington consensus and allow their country to be deindustrialized during the '70s, '80s, and '90s. And yet, at the very moment that Putin is more and more powerful, where the Russian army is invading European countries en masse, this is the point at which Germany starts to deindustrialize?

Look at the number of people working in manufacturing in Germany now versus 10 years ago. Look at the critical raw materials produced in Germany now versus ten years ago; the energy dependence now versus 10 or 20 years ago. We have got to stop deindustrializing. We want Europe to be successful, but Europe has got to take a bigger role in its own security. It can't do that without industry.

Acknowledgments

Let me share a few more words of thanks with you. Naturally, the first must be directed to the protagonists of this book, the many speakers that have graced our stages over the last sixty years. There are countless conferences and other opportunities out there they could have used to make their points, but they all chose to return to our events over and over again. Some of them have been to the MSC dozens of times. We are deeply appreciative of the many close relationships that have resulted from these visits and will do everything we can to merit frequent returns.

Secondly, I want to reiterate my thanks to all those on whose work the current MSC team has been able to build. There have been many such teams over the last six decades and every single one has helped turn this organization into what it is today. From the small secretariat which supported our founder Ewald von Kleist to the BMW-Stiftung which helped his successor Horst Teltschik to the band of brothers and sisters Wolfgang Ischinger brought on board, all of them deserve more gratitude than I can express here.

Lastly, I am deeply grateful to the outstanding team of Tamm Media GmbH and its Koehler Mittler Verlagsgesellschaft. Special thanks must go to Jürgen Karl-Heinz Fischer, who saved the day when another (unnamed) publishing house wanted to force us into bureaucratic quagmires and derailed a carefully planned publishing timeline. By involving Sylvia Fuhlisch and Guido Sturmat, Jürgen not only restored our faith in the publishing industry but also in the applicability of the MSC's basic operating principle (that one can be both, highly professional and daring) to other fields. Without Sylvia and Guido, this project would not have been realised. The same is true for our editor, Meike Nieberding, and our proofreader, Paul Bewicke, who graciously corrected our mistakes and made this book much better in the process. We cannot wait to work with all of them on the second volume.

Benedikt Franke

Imprint

Mittler

at Koehler Mittler Verlagsgesellschaft mbH
Stadthausbrücke 4, 20355 Hamburg, Germany
A TAMMMEDIA Company
Herstellung@koehler-mittler.de

Edited by Benedikt Franke
Editorial team: Nardine Luca and E. Ronny von Gülich-Thurow
Design: SW Design, Hamburg
Print and Binding: Plump Druck & Medien GmbH, Rolandsecker Weg 33, 53619 Rheinbreitbach
Printed in Germany

Printed on FSC-certified paper and C02 neutral

We would be delighted to send you a full catalogue of our books in print. Please send an e-mail with your postal address to: vertrieb@koehler-mittler.de

Our entire publishing programme is also available on the internet at: www.koehler-mittler-shop.de

Munich Security Conference

Selected Key Speeches 1963–2024

Over the last sixty years, the Munich Security Conference (MSC) has developed into the world's leading platform for the debate of foreign and security policy. While its formats have evolved over the years, its mission has remained unchanged since 1963, namely, to build trust, and ultimately peace, through sustained exchange between key decision-makers. From the early days of Ewald von Kleist and Henry Kissinger to the more recent appearances of President Putin or President Biden, the conference has offered stages to many hundreds of important speeches, a large number of them with significant historical value. Against this background, this small booklet is an attempt at opening a first window into the rich history of the MSC.

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