New Release

Too Big to Fill? Reducing Gaps in Development Finance Post-USAID | Munich Security Analysis 3/2025

More
Container und Containerschiffe im Hafen
Beyond Lose-Lose: Europe and the Global South in the Age of Geoeconomics - (PDF) - 211 KB

Beyond Lose-Lose

Europe and the Global South in the Age of Geoeconomics

US trade wars and Chinese market distortions are unleashing lose-lose dynamics that could destroy the international trade order. Both the EU and countries in the so-called Global South face dramatic repercussions. In this age of geoeconomics, they need to deepen their partnerships to cushion the blow and work together toward reforming the international trade system.

Keypoints

  1. The dramatic US tariff hike is only the latest sign that the world has entered the age of geoeconomics. With zero-sum thinking increasingly shaping trade policies, the global economic order is in jeopardy.

  2. The EU and countries in the so-called Global South are not only adversely affected by US tariffs and Chinese market distortions. They would also both suffer enormously from a breakdown of the international trade system.

  3. The EU and countries in the Global South should use the geoeconomic disruptions as an opportunity to deepen their relationship and work towards reforming the trade system. This will require the EU to be much more sensitive to the concerns of its partners than in the past.

The world has unequivocally entered the age of geoeconomics. Tensions have been building for more than a decade as states, particularly China, have increasingly used trade instruments to advance national security interests and gain a relative advantage over others. These tensions dramatically came to a head in April 2025, when US President Donald Trump imposed sweeping tariffs — the highest in over a century.

There is no denying that the trade order is in need of reform. The gains from globalization have been distributed unevenly within many countries, the WTO rulebook is outdated as consensus requirements have paralyzed the organization, and the growing weaponization of interdependencies warrants recalibrating the balance between economic efficiency and economic security. However, with the US launching a unilateral, frontal assault on the trade order rather than a coordinated attempt with allies and partners to adapt the system, there is a distinct danger of a downward protectionist spiral causing vast economic costs. Indeed, by doubling down on practices China is widely criticized for, including protectionism, industrial policy, export controls, and constraints on foreign investment, “instead of China coming to resemble the US, the US is behaving more like China.”[1]

“There is no denying that the trade order is in need of reform. However, with the US launching a unilateral, frontal aussault on the trade order, there is a distinct danger of a downward protectionist spiral.”

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte•Munich Security Analysis 2/2025: Beyond Lose-Lose

As a trading powerhouse and key stakeholder in the international system, the EU has a central role to play in pushing back against the protectionist turn. But it should not do this alone. In fact, many countries in the Global South are similarly squeezed between US and Chinese mercantilism and would be disproportionately affected by a collapse of the international trade order. The EU thus has a strategic interest in forging much closer partnerships with similarly minded actors in the Global South. Out of the wreckage of the trade order, there is an opportunity for the EU and its partners in the Global South to work toward reforming the system together and setting it on a more sustainable footing.

Geoeconomics of Scale

Growing geoeconomic tensions are challenging the liberal paradigm that economic interdependence is inherently and mutually beneficial. The risk of lose-lose dynamics — where all actors end up worse off — has significantly increased as some countries exploit their economic leverage over others, prompting them to prioritize economic security over efficiency.

Geoeconomics is commonly understood as the implementation of economic policies to pursue foreign, strategic, and security policy objectives. In applying geoeconomic strategies, states tend to follow a zero-sum logic where gains can only be made at the expense of others.[2] This marks a departure from the positive sum-logic of the liberal economic order according to which free trade not only fosters stability as the trading partners’ fate become inextricably intertwined. It also produces mutual prosperity by creating incentives to both specialize in the production of goods in which states have a comparative advantage and freely trade with others to obtain what they cannot produce themselves, thus maximizing economic efficiency.[3] Today, this order is eroding as many governments try to secure their individual gains at the expense of others by turning to economic coercion and protectionism. There is a growing risk of lose-lose dynamics, with the most relevant question being “who loses less?”[4] Public opinion seems to reflect this shift: Pluralities in most countries surveyed for the Munich Security Index[5] agree with the statement that countries can only get rich at the expense of others (Figure 1).[6]
 

Figure 1: Share of respondents agreeing/disagreeing that countries can only get rich at the expense of others

These views point to a general dissatisfaction with globalization. Although global per capita income has increased by about 65 percent over the past three decades and living standards have improved in most parts of the world, the gains have not been evenly distributed.[7] Inequalities between countries have decreased, but increased within them, fueling a public backlash against global trade.[8] In high-income economies, industrial decline has led many to believe that they would be better off if their governments focused on reshoring manufacturing rather than trading with others. Meanwhile, in low- and middle-income economies, there is a persistent concern that the global economic order disproportionately serves the interests of rich countries.[9] This sentiment was also shared by many representatives of the Global South during the Munich Security Conference 2025, who advocated for a reform of the system.

Many in the world perceive the US, China, and Russia as the main drivers of a rising zero-sum logic and of the geoeconomic shift more broadly. All three have a well-established practice of using their control over global economic chokepoints as leverage for geopolitical ends. Washington has, for instance, used its dominance in financial and telecommunications networks to gather intelligence on adversaries and allies alike and to impose sweeping financial sanctions on Iran and Russia. Likewise, Beijing has exploited its competitive advantage in key markets on many occasions, including for the strategic distribution of masks during the Covid-19 pandemic. And following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Moscow attempted to weaponize its gas supplies against Europe.[10]

In response, other countries are increasingly focusing on strengthening their own economic security. With its Economic Security Strategy launched in 2023, the EU is seeking to “promote” its market, to “protect” itself against coercion, and to “partner” with countries that have aligned interests. Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UK have adopted similar policies.[11] Reducing dependence on geopolitical rivals is a logical step in a more hostile environment and means that maximizing efficiency can no longer be the dominant goal of economic policy. Yet, if the pursuit of economic security leads to a spiral of protectionism, even allied countries may hurt each other’s economies in the name of resilience. The central task in the age of geoeconomics is thus to preserve the benefits of interdependencies where possible, while adapting to the increasing risks of economic coercion where necessary.

“The central task in the age of geoeconomics is to preserve the benefits of interdependencies where possible, while adapting to the increasing risks of economic coercion where necessary.”

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte•Munich Security Analysis 2/2025: Beyond Lose-Lose

Liberty and Poverty for All

Despite their diverse economic systems, EU member states and countries in the Global South face at least three common, pressing geoeconomic challenges: 1) US tariff wars, 2) Chinese market distortions, and 3) the prospect of an eroding international trade order.

The flurry of tariffs announced by the Trump administration epitomizes lose-lose dynamics. In February 2025, the US imposed bilateral tariffs against Canada, China, and Mexico, prompting retaliation. In March 2025, the administration announced sectoral tariffs on steel and aluminum as well as on cars, again triggering counter-measures. These efforts culminated on April 2, or “Liberation Day,” when President Trump imposed vast, ostensibly reciprocal, tariffs on around 60 “of the worst offenders” and a universal import levy of ten percent on other countries. Issuing a “declaration of economic independence,”[12] the Trump administration erected the highest tariff wall since the late 19th century, higher than after the protectionist 1930 Smoot-Hawley Act that many economists blame for fueling the Great Depression.[13]

While the US hit China the hardest, it did not spare either allies such as the EU or Japan, or low- and middle-income countries. In fact, low- and middle-income countries, notably Cambodia, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, face some of the highest tariffs. In addition to the impacts of tariffs, the broader financial volatility has already caused currency depreciation and rising borrowing costs in low- and middle-income countries, which in many ways will “bear the brunt of the crisis.”[14] The tariffs not only represent a dramatic escalation of trade tensions but also ride roughshod over the global trading system and the central principle of the WTO that members may not discriminate between countries unless their trade is covered by an agreement. Indeed, as data from the Munich Security Index indicates, people around the world had rightly grown increasingly worried about the risk of trade wars, even before President Trump's tariff announcements (Figure 2).[15]

Figure 2: Respondents’ perception of trade wars

While at this point estimates of the costs of tariff wars need to be treated cautiously, most studies point in the same direction: They will unleash lose-lose dynamics. The tariffs imposed by the Trump administration will not only hurt the US itself and their respective target but also world trade more broadly. A study by Oxford Economics predicts a reduction in global trade volumes of between nine and ten percent relative to the baseline forecast by 2031 if the Trump administration fully implements all tariffs proposed during the election campaign and other countries retaliate.[16] Modelling by Bloomberg Economics also underscores the significant damage to world trade, estimating a drop in trade volume by around seven percent.[17] The Kiel Institute for the World Economy details the likely reductions in both exports and GDP across the world, highlighting that the US itself will be hit the hardest by its tariff policy. But China and the BRICS countries, too, will see a significant drop in exports and GDP, while European countries will be modestly affected.[18] Finally, the Peterson Institute has calculated the impact of a 100 percent US tariff on the BRICS countries — which President Trump threatened to impose on these countries for allegedly undermining the role of the US dollar — and found that they will likely lower GDP and boost inflation in both the US and all BRICS countries.[19] Thus, US tariffs will have significant repercussions for virtually every country around the globe.

In addition to these acute geoeconomic threats from the US, systematic Chinese market distortions have long posed a geoeconomic challenge not just to Europe but also to many countries in the Global South. This challenge has recently become even more formidable. China’s model has “reached a point of incompatibility”[20] with market economy norms. Beijing employs industrial policy instruments — such as a range of subsidies and selectively enforced regulation to discriminate against foreign entities — more systematically and on a greater scale than any other actor.[21] Exacerbated by anemic domestic demand, these distortive policies have created substantial overcapacities, with China’s manufacturing surplus at a staggering ten percent of its GDP.[22] In turn, Chinese exports, often at dumping prices, have surged over the past four years and allowed China to significantly increase its global market share in various sectors, including steel and electric vehicles. This has created fears in industrialized economies of a “second China shock” and dangerous dependencies on an increasingly assertive rival.[23] Indeed, China is already instrumentalizing its market power to coerce others for political advantage. From Australia to Lithuania, numerous countries have faced boycotts, import and export embargos, and restrictions on tourism for defying Beijing’s will.

“In addition to the acute geoeconomic threats from the US, systematic Chinese market distortions have long posed a geoeconomic challenge not just to Europe but also to many countries in the Global South.”

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte•Munich Security Analysis 2/2025: Beyond Lose-Lose

What is often neglected, however, is that Chinese overcapacities also pose an enormous challenge to low- and middle-income countries. Since 2020, China’s trade surplus with those countries has grown substantially.Cheap Chinese goods may reduce costs, but often stifle local industries by unfairly outcompeting domestic manufacturers. Thus, Chinese overcapacities slow technological and industrial development, impede the build-up of local supply chains, and ultimately make it difficult for countries to move up the value chain.[24] In response, numerous countries from the Global South have imposed trade protection measures to cope with China’s overproduction.[25] In 2024, China faced the highest number of WTO investigations of any member for dumping and subsidizing, with emerging-market countries bringing the most cases.[26] Hence, there is a “potential global coalition that worries about the economic model adopted by President Xi.”[27]

The wider externalities of the growing trade tensions could, however, be even worse than the direct costs arising from China’s market distortions and US tariffs. Indeed, the very foundations of the global economic order are in jeopardy due to two interrelated trends. First, respect for WTO rules is decreasing as the surge in discriminatory policy interventions testifies to (Figure 3).[28]

Figure 3: Discriminatory policy interventions

With the US blocking judicial appointments to the WTO’s Appellate Body, it has effectively rendered the organization’s core function of dispute settlement dysfunctional. As a result, WTO rules can no longer be enforced, meaning that fewer disputes are being brought to the WTO in the first place and more cases are being appealed “into the void” of indefinite delay, as there are no judges to hear them.[29] Second, as multilateral rules lose authority, geopolitical considerations are increasingly shaping trade policy. Several studies have highlighted that the process of “geoeconomic fragmentation” is already underway.[30]

Since the beginning of Russia’s war against Ukraine in 2022, both trade flows and foreign direct investment projects between politically distant blocs (i.e. a US-led and a China-led one) have slowed disproportionately, respectively declining by eleven and twelve percent more than flows and projects within blocs. With the Trump administration’s quest for “economic independence” and tariffs on its allies, even the US-led bloc itself could fragment.
 

“The wider externalities of the growing trade tensions could be even worse than the direct costs arising from China's market distortions and US tariffs.”

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte•Munich Security Analysis 2/2025: Beyond Lose-Lose

The cost of a breakdown of the WTO and the fragmentation of the world economy would be immense. The WTO has long played a crucial role in reducing trade barriers and providing a legal framework for resolving trade disputes. Perhaps even more importantly, the WTO has increased predictability for businesses and generated confidence that trade wars were a thing of the past — many economists considered this to be among the organization’s greatest contributions.[31] If that System were to break down and replaced by a chaotic web of bilateral agreements that could change at a whim, GDP losses would likely far exceed those caused by tariff wars. According to calculations by the Kiel Institute, a worst-case scenario of global fragmentation and concurrent breakdown of the WTO would cause global GDP to decrease by 2.6 percent in the short run and one percent in the long run.[32] China would suffer the greatest decline in GDP, but the EU, the US, and BRICS countries would also experience significant welfare losses.

For the export-oriented EU, the indirect economic costs of an eroding global trading system would outweigh the direct costs of US tariffs. Emerging markets and low-income countries would suffer immensely too, because they particularly depend on WTO rules (these countries have typically signed fewer trade agreements), technological spillovers from more technologically advanced countries, and global public goods such as climate mitigation and international financial stability, all of which would be under threat.[33]

“The WTO has increased predictability for businesses and generated confidence that trade wars were a thing of the past — many economists considered this to be among the organization’s greatest contributions.”

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte•Munich Security Analysis 2/2025: Beyond Lose-Lose

New Partners for a New Order

Common geoeconomic challenges should pave the way for deeper cooperation between countries in the EU and the Global South. They should coordinate their responses to US tariffs and sign new trade agreements and partnerships to reduce their economic dependence on China. The EU and countries in the Global South should also work together to reform global trade rules and institutions to better represent today’s power distribution.

Instead of giving in to Trump’s demand for bilateral deals, countries can increase their leverage by forming coalitions. Smaller countries in particular are unlikely to see concessions from Washington and would thus Benefit from jointly pursuing their interests.[34] ASEAN, for instance, has issued a joint statement but it could be more effective if its members negotiated as a group.[35] As the world's largest economic bloc, the EU already has considerable bargaining power. But by working with additional countries, it could strengthen its position even further. One way forward would be to jointly advocate for renegotiation of the tariffs in accordance with WTO rules. The fact that the US has already violated its WTO obligations to consult members with a “substantial interest” in the changed tariff rates should not prevent other members from using the WTO system to form their opposition.[36] Another forum for coordination could be the G20, which does not require consensus among its members but has proven itself as a crisis-solving committee for example during the 2008 financial crisis.[37] It also already has experience in issuing joint statements by all members minus the US.[38] To ensure adeqaute representation, however, it needs to become “a little more African and a little less European,” as Celso Amorim, Chief Advisor to the Brazilian President, noted at the last Munich Security Conference in February 2025.

New partnerships could also help the EU and countries in the Global South to deal with the challenges they face from China. For many developing economies, China remains a key source of investment, despite the criticism of its trade policy. It also accounts for a large share of South-South trade, which has surged from 2.3 trillion US dollars in 2007 to 5.6 trillion US dollars in 2023.[39] Beijing is already trying to use the disruptions caused by the US to present itself as the more reliable partner, not only for countries in the Global South, but also for the EU.[40] Countries that seek to both reduce their dependence on China and prevent the dumping of products on their markets that China can no longer sell in the US need to deepen their trade relations.
 

“Common geoeconomic challenges should pave the way for deeper cooperation between countries in the EU and the Global South.”

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte•Munich Security Analysis 2/2025: Beyond Lose-Lose

If the EU wants to find new partners, it needs to rethink its approach to trade policy. According to a recent survey by the Körber Foundation, 80 percent of respondents in Brazil consider the EU's trade practices to be unfair. In South Africa and India, the figures are 60 and 56 percent respectively.[41] Like other Western powers, the EU has long called on developing countries to open their economies while protecting parts of its own markets. In addition, many governments in the Global South see new policies such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism and the Net Zero Act as a form of “green protectionism,”[42] further fueling accusations of the EU applying double standards.[43] At the same time, negotiations on free trade agreements with partners such as Mercosur, India, and Indonesia have accelerated. To conclude them, however, the EU will have to make further concessions, including by opening up its agricultural market.[44] Meanwhile, partnerships for raw materials provide an opportunity for the EU to demonstrate its commitment to mining resources “in a way which is socially and environmentally sound” and to developing local processing facilities, as Peru’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Elmer Schialer argued for during this year’s Munich Security Conference.[45] This will also help countries become more economically self-sufficient, a goal outlined by Rebeca Grynspan, Director General of UNCTAD, at the conference.

Given that the US is withdrawing from key institutions like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, and China’s state capitalist practices often violate global trade rules, the EU and countries in the Global South that continue to rely on a stable and predictable order should work together to reform it. At a roundtable organized by the Munich Security Conference in the context of its geoeconomics project, several participants from Europe and the Global South argued that while the institutions are no longer fit for purpose, they should not be abandoned. Instead, key functions and decision-making processes need to be updated.[46] The EU has taken the lead in finding an interim solution for the blocked Appellate Body of the WTO. The next step would be a fundamental reform of the dispute settlement mechanism and of the organization more broadly. Members need to be able to address the increased use of geoeconomic policies inside the WTO. While it may be difficult to reach a consensus in this regard, open plurilateral negotiations, the so-called “Joint Statement Initiatives” launched in 2017 as a more flexible alternative to multilateral negotiations, could serve as a starting point to find new rules on subsidies and discuss the rise of protectionism.[47] The IMF and the World Bank also have to be reformed to better represent today’s multipolarizing world and to provide more room for the interests of countries in the Global South.[48] This means, for example, increasing the regional representation of countries in the Global South among senior staff and intensifying efforts in areas that many low- and middle-income countries see as their priorities, such as debt relief and debt restructuring.[49]

The old trade order is dying and the new order struggles to be born. Both the EU member states and countries in the Global South have a shared interest in midwifing a new rules-based system that is more responsive to the needs of low- and middle-income countries and rebalances economic security and efficiency. If they deepen their partnership and set a reform process in motion, there may yet be a way to move beyond lose-lose dynamics.

Beyond Lose-Lose: Europe and the Global South in the Age of Geoeconomics

Nora Kürzdörfer and Leonard Schütte, “Beyond Lose-Lose: Europe and the Global South in the Age of Geoeconomics,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Analysis 2, April 2025, https://doi.org/10.47342/WPCD1222.

Download PDF 211 KB
  1. [1] Michael Froman, “China Has Already Remade the International System,” Foreign Affairs, March 25, 2025.
  2. [2] Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” The National Interest 20 (1990), 17–23.
  3. [3] Leonard Schütte, “Economics: Trade Off,” in: Tobias Bunde/Sophie Eisentraut/Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024: Lose-Lose?, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2024, doi.org/10.47342/BMQK9457, 85.
  4. [4] Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Introduction: Lose-Lose?,” in: Bunde/Eisentraut/Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024, 24.
  5. [5] For more information on the Munich Security Index, including the methodology, see Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, and Leonard Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025: Multipolarization, Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2025, doi.org/10.47342/EZUC8623.
  6. [6] In response to the question “Countries can only get rich at the expense of others. - Do you agree or disagree with the following?" respondents were given the following options: “strongly agree,” “slightly agree,” “neither agree nor disagree,” “slightly disagree,” “strongly disagree,” and “don’t know.” Figures shown here combine the net responses agreeing and disagreeing, with the gray area representing the rest.
  7. [7] WTO, “World Trade Report 2024: Trade and Inclusiveness: How to Make Trade Work for All,” Geneva, 2024, perma.cc/HGD7-EVPM, 10.
  8. [8] Branko Milanovic, “What Comes After Globalization?,” Jacobin, March 24, 2025.
  9. [9] Bunde and Eisentraut, “Introduction,” 17; Schütte, “Economics,” 79.
  10. [10] Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44:1 (2019), 42–79; Helena Legarda, “The PLA’s Mask Diplomacy,” Berlin: MERICS, China Global Security Tracker, August 2020, perma.cc/AE8W-6LP8; Schütte, “Economics,” 80.
  11. [11] Francesca Ghiretti, “From Opportunity to Risk: The Changing Economic Security Policies in Australia, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea, the UK and the US,” Berlin: MERICS, Report, February, 2023, perma.cc/6R7W-E8UZ.
  12. [12] Jamie Dettmer, “How Trump Cost America the World,” Politico, April 5, 2025.
  13. [13] Jesse Pound, “US Tariff Rates Under Trump Will Be Higher Than the Smoot-Hawley Levels From Great Depression Era,” CNBC, April 3, 2025.
  14. [14] Jayati Ghoshi, “The Global South Will Pay for Trump’s Trade War,” Project Syndicate, April 16, 2025.
  15. [15] In response to the question “How great a risk do trade wars pose to your country?” respondents rated the risk on a scale from 1–10. On the 1–10 scale, 1–3 represents a "low," 4–7 a "medium," and 8–10 a "high" rating. The figures show for each country are the share of respondents rating the risk to be high.
  16. [16] Cited in Steven Altman and Caroline Bastian, “DHL Trade Atlas 2025: Mapping the Shifting Landscape of Global Trade,” New York: DHL/NYU Stern School of Business, 2025, perma.cc/9X6V-YX6B.
  17. [17] Walter Frick, “What’s Left of Globalization Without the US?,” Bloomberg, November 15, 2024.
  18. [18] Gabriel Felbermayr, Julian Hinz, and Rolf J. Langhammer, “US Trade Policy After 2024: What Is at Stake for Europe,” Kiel: IfW Kiel, Kiel Policy Brief 178, October 2024, perma.cc/72XR-BRMX, 26.
  19. [19] Warwick McKibbin and Marcus Noland, “Trump's Threatened Tariffs Projected to Harm Economies of US and the BRICS,” Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, Realtime Economics, March 11, 2025, www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2025/trumps-threatened-tariffs-projected-harm-economies-us-and-brics.
  20. [20] Jacob Gunter et al., “Beyond Overcapacity: Chinese-Style Modernization and the Clash of Economic Models,” Berlin: MERICS, MERICS Report, March 2025, perma.cc/7ZGL-A3P8.
  21. [21] Camille Boullenois, Agatha Kratz, and Daniel Rosen, “Far From Normal: An Augmented Assessment of China’s State Support,” New York: Rhodium Group, March 17, 2025, perma.cc/RQ6X-HVD2.
  22. [22] Brad Setser, Michael Weilandt, and Volkmar Bauer, “China’s Record Manufacturing Surplus,” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, March 10, 2024, perma.cc/NFQ9-FMLN.
  23. [23] Brad Setser and Michael Weilandt, “China’s Stunning 2024 Export Growth,” New York: Council on Foreign Relations, December 17, 2024, perma.cc/ZTX2-MPYZ. The first “China shock” refers to the widely unexpected surge in Chinese manufacturing exports in the years following its accession to the WTO in 2001, which is often associated with significant job losses in industrial regions in industrialized countries, especially in the US.
  24. [24] Aya Adachi, “The Global South in the Wake of China's Economic Surplus,” Hamburg: Bundeskanzler-Helmut-Schmidt Stiftung, BKHS Perspectives 01, March 4, 2025, perma.cc/AH6W-PZ42, 8.
  25. [25] Claus Soong and Jacob Gunter, “It’s Not Us, It’s You: China’s Surging Overcapacities and Distortive Exports Are Pressuring Many Developing Countries Too,” Berlin: MERICS, China Global Competition Tracker 3, November 2024, perma. cc/AE2U-9PV4.
  26. [26] “Can the World’s Free-Traders Withstand Trump’s Attack,” The Economist, April 2, 2025.
  27. [27] Sander Tordoir and Brad Setser, “How German Industry Can Survive the Second China Shock,” London: Centre for European Reform, January 16, 2025, perma.cc/SP9K-GL52, 11.
  28. [28] Illustration by the Munich Security Conference based on “Global Dynamics: Total Number of Implemented Interventions since November 2008,” St. Gallen: St. Gallen Endowment for Prosperity Through Trade, April 16, 2025, perma.cc/F2SL-CU4P. When comparing current year activity to that of previous ones, Global Trade Alert (GTA) recommends using snapshots of the GTA database taken on the same date within each year. The GTA dataset is a growing dataset as the GTA analysts continue reporting on years past. In this case, the cut-off date is April 16, 2025. That is, the dataset used here comprises the number of interventions recorded by April 16 of the respective year to ensure comparability.
  29. [29] Kristen Hopewell, “The World Is Abandoning the WTO,” Foreign Affairs, October 7, 2024.
  30. [30] For an overview, see Gita Gopinath, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, and Andrea Presbitero, “Changing Global Linkages: A New Cold War?,” Journal of International Economics 153 (2025), 1–10.
  31. [31] “Trump’s Incoherent Trade Policy Will Do Lasting Damage,” The Economist, April 10, 2025.
  32. [32] Felbermayr, Hinz, and Langhammer, “US Trade Policy After 2024,” 29.
  33. [33] Alison Durkee, “Will Trump Negotiate Tariffs? Japan Meeting at White House Today as Countries Say They Want Fair Deals,” Forbes, April 16, 2025.
  34. [34] Amrita Narlikar, “Must the Weak Suffer What They Must? The Global South in a World of Weaponized Interdependence,” in: Daniel Drezner/Henry Farrell/Abraham Newman (eds.), The Uses and Abuses of Weaponized Interdependence, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2021, 289–304, perma.cc/BVM5-G2TN.
  35. [35] ASEAN, “Joint Statement of the ASEAN Economic Ministers on the Introduction of Unilateral Tariffs of the United States,” Joint Statement, April 10, 2025, perma.cc/9XNB-H29G.
  36. [36] For a detailed description of this process, see Mona Paulsen and Dan Ciuriak, “Collective Economic Security,” International Economic Law and Policy Blog, April 3, 2025, ielp.worldtradelaw.net/2025/04/collective-economic-security.html.
  37. [37] Bert Hofman, “Responding to Trump 2.0: A Committee to Save the Rest of the World,“ Singapore: Hinrich Foundation, Blog, March 18, 2025, perma.cc/6WZB-GKUC.
  38. [38] In 2017, all members except for the US stated their commitment to the Paris climate agreement. Oliver Milman, “G20 Leaders’ Statement on Climate Change Highlights Rift With US,” The Guardian, July 8, 2017.
  39. [39] UNCTAD, “The Reshaping of Global Trade: How Developing Countries Can Strategize,” Geneva, October 29, 2024, perma.cc/8VXC-HDNY.
  40. [40] Kate Lamb and Helen Davidson, “China’s Xi Aims to ‘Screw’ US on South-East Asia Tour, Says Trump,” The Guardian, April 15, 2025; David Latona, “China Wants Partnership With EU to Counter US 'Abuse', Says Envoy to Spain,” Reuters, April 16, 2025.
  41. [41] Körber Stiftung, “Emerging Middle Powers Report 2025,” Hamburg, April 2025, perma.cc/4LGK-E6DA, 5.
  42. [42] Clara Weinhardt and Ferdi De Ville, “The Geoeconomic Turn in EU Trade and Investment Policy: Implications for Developing Countries,” Politics and Governance 12, (2024), Article 8217; Trevor Sutton and Sagatom Saha, “The Risks and Opportunities of the EU’s Green Trade Agenda,” Washington, DC: Brookings, March 26, 2025, perma.cc/GAM6-BNKR.
  43. [43] Sophie Eisentraut, “Standard Deviation: Views on Western Double Standards and the Value of International Rules,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Brief 1, September 2024, doi.org/10.47342/LDPB2956, 10.
  44. [44] Nora Kürzdörfer, Eduardo Valencia, and Ariel Macaspac Hernandez, “Global Perspectives on Responsible Economic Statecraft,” Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies, T4T Co-LABorate Series 1, 2025, doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.32649.04963, 22.
  45. [45] See also Julia Hammelehle, “Climate: Heated Atmosphere,” in: Bunde/Eisentraut/Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2024, 87–93.
  46. [46] Munich Security Conference, “New MSC Geoeconomics Project ‘Beyond Lose-Lose’: Kick-off at the Munich Security Conference 2025,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, March 17, 2025, securityconference.org/en/news/full/msc-geoeconomics-project-beyond-lose-lose-kick-off/.
  47. [47] Claudia Schmucker and Stormy-Annika Mildner, “Reforming the WTO Through Inclusive and Development-friendly Approaches,” Berlin: DGAP, DGAP Policy Brief No. 26, September 22, 2023, perma.cc/4YR3-P6QR; Mona Pinchis-Paulsen, “Let’s Agree to Disagree: A Strategy for Trade-Security,” Journal of International Economic Law 25:4 (2022).
  48. [48] Tobias Bunde and Sophie Eisentraut, “Westlessness Reloaded? Key Takeaways From the Munich Security Conference 2025,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Munich Security Debrief 1, February 2025, doi.org/10.47342/LFJW7131.
  49. [49] Nicole Koenig and Isabell Kump, “Brazil: Lula Land,” in: Bunde/Eisentraut/Schütte (eds.), Munich Security Report 2025, 103–109; Julia Hammelehle and Isabell Kump, “Actions Speak Louder Than Words: Key Takeaways From the Munich Leaders Meeting in Nairobi,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, Debrief 1, November 2023, doi.org/10.47342/JEHZ9824.