Standard Deviation

Accusations of double standards, hypocrisy, or exceptionalism levelled at the West are omnipresent these days. One such instance came in the form of a widely noted criticism by India’s External Affairs Minister, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, who argued that the way Europeans have dealt with Russia’s war against Ukraine suggest they think “Europe’s problems are the world’s problems, but the world’s problems are not Europe’s problems.”^[1] In another case, it was the Indonesian Defense Minister and President-elect, who made the accusation that, when it comes to pushing for peace, Western governments seem to “have one set of principles for Ukraine and another for the Palestinians.”^[2] Western states, so the underlying allegations by governments in the Global South go, may claim fealty to globally applicable rules and principles. In their foreign policies, however, they all too frequently deviate from these principles or follow them inconsistently. The principles in question include those of territorial integrity, of support for democratic governance and respect for fundamental human rights, and of open and nondiscriminatory trade. But they also include a pledge to combat global equalities – a commitment to “leaving no one behind”^[3] as enshrined in the Agenda 2030 and the UN Sustainable Development Goals. Together, these principles make up what is often referred to as the rules-based international order.

The accusations themselves are hardly new.^[5] Leaders in the Global South have long criticized the United States and European governments for applying international rules inconsistently or for putting themselves above the law. Regarding disrespect for other states’ territorial integrity, they have pointed to the US-led intervention in Iraq or invoked the UK’s unwillingness to return the Chagos Island to its former colony Mauritius.^[6] When it comes to double standards on supporting human rights and democratic rule, they have referred to illegal detentions conducted in the name of Washington’s war on terror or to European leaders’ pacts with North African autocrats aimed at curbing Europe-bound migration.^[7] And concerning the West’s failure to promote greater global equality – in line with their pledge to “leave no one behind” – they have cited broken promises on delivering coronavirus vaccines and providing meaningful debt relief.^[8] Moreover, they have regularly brought up a perceived Western reluctance to reform international institutions in a way that provides countries of the Global South with better voice and representation.

Yet, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and Israel’s war in Gaza, something seems to have changed. Just as Western states have ramped up their discourse about the need to defend international rules, governments in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East appear to have become more outspoken about what they perceive as double standards applied by Europe and the US. Moreover, the accusations reflected in leaders’ discourse have a new quality. Above all, they reflect growing cynicism about the idea of universal rules and principles themselves. Debates about Western double standards have seemingly become a proxy debate about the validity of universal standards and thus about the rules-based international order as such.

On the one hand, governments in the Global South are using accusations of double standards to ramp up normative pressure on the West to improve its record of consistency. These actors’ allegations of Western hypocrisy indicate growing frustration at a perceived mismatch: between Western states’ recent record of compliance with international standards and the West’s increasingly universalist rhetoric and touting of the rules-based international order. Moreover, their criticism also reflects concerns that, amid growing geopolitical competition, the transatlantic partners and their allies are further reducing their commitment to upholding international principles.

On the other hand, accusations of double standards are used to challenge the very idea of universal rules and principles as such. Some governments use allegations of hypocrisy to downplay the role of international principles or pursue what some have called a “de-universalisation”^[9] of international rules. This includes autocracies like China and Russia. They point to Western double standards to distract from their flagrant violations of international norms and to relativize their revisionism of international rules. Beijing and Moscow also cite Western double standards to undermine the wider international community’s commitment to principles and ideas that they see as reinforcing Western hegemony. But the challenge to international principles comes from another side as well: from actors for whom Western double standards present a welcome excuse for adopting an unprincipled, transactional foreign policy approach. This approach does not pretend to be guided by broader principles but by the pursuit of narrow interests, including states’ desires not to be pulled into others’ geopolitical competition.

As such, the debate about Western double standards has become a discussion about the future of universal rules that is deeply entangled with the dynamics of great power competition. The West is not in a position to simply ignore the pressure that is mounting from both sides. But whether its response ends up strengthening international rules and principles will not only be determined by how the West engages actors on both sides of the divide; it will also be shaped by how leaders’ debates about double standards and the validity of universal principles play out in the court of public opinion. In this regard, survey data from nine populous non-Western countries, collected for the Munich Security Conference (MSC) by Kekst CNC, provides some valuable initial insights.^[10] It includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudia Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey, which together account for around a third of the global population. Above all, the data highlights that people in other parts of the world do not see Western states as disproportionately rule-abiding – but it also suggests that in this regard, the US and European countries are far from homogenously perceived. Moreover, although the survey data shows that many people are vulnerable to revisionist narratives, it also reveals that, overall, people still believe in the merit of existing international rules.

Many governments in the Global South have expressed frustration that the West is ramping up its rhetoric about the rules-based international order precisely at a time when doubts are growing about Western states’ commitment to the international order’s principles.

In response, Western governments have tried to highlight the differences between Russia’s and Israel’s wars. They argue that, unlike Russia’s war, Israel’s military campaign is an act of self-defense. The country was brutally attacked, with approximately 1,200 of its people killed and around 250 people abducted by Hamas.^[23] They also argue that in Gaza, civilian casualties are hard to fully avoid, given Hamas’s deliberate use of civilians as human shields, but the same is not true in Ukraine.^[24] Last but not least, the United States and European governments have pointed out that they have been urging the Israeli government to mitigate civilian harm and allow for more aid to flow into Gaza.^[25] They also note that they have provided substantive humanitarian support for the Palestinian people. In that vein, John Kirby, the White House National Security Communications Advisor, rhetorically asked his audience to name him “one more nation, any other nation that’s doing as much as the United States to alleviate the pain and suffering of the people of Gaza.”^[26]

However, this has not changed the perception among many governments in the world that the West’s efforts to protect Palestinian lives pale in comparison to its efforts to protect the lives of Israelis or Ukrainians.^[27] “We are now in a situation where the identity of the aggressor or the identity of the victim determines how the world responds,” argued Udo Jude Ilo, the then-Executive Director of Civilians in Conflict.^[28] Moreover, Western states’ responses to the International Criminal Court (ICC) decision to simultaneously seek arrest warrants for Israeli officials and Hamas leaders has further compounded accusations of hypocrisy. They included threats of retaliation against the ICC as well as criticism that the warrant would create a false moral equivalence between the actions of terrorists and those of a democratic state.^[29] This has reinforced the perception of “a sense of democratic moral superiority” in the West, meaning that different crimes are not judged against the same legal standard but assessed according to whether the perpetrator is a democratic ally or an autocratic foe.^[30]

This hardly implies that those who accuse the West of hypocrisy are without sin and do not employ double standards themselves. Arab states routinely chide Israel for its treatment of the Palestinian people. When it comes to China’s actions toward Uyghur Muslims, however, these governments are largely silent.^[31] Moreover, despite their legitimate criticism of European states for failing to come to terms with their imperialist and colonialist legacies, many leaders in Africa and elsewhere have refused to recognize the colonial nature of Russia’s war against Ukraine.^[32] “[H]ypocrisy,” as one observer has put it, “is fairly evenly distributed in the North and the South.”^[33] But the impression that Western states have both benefitted disproportionately from the existing international order and have often portrayed themselves as champions of its principles and rules has regularly invited particularly close scrutiny of their behavior.

For many in the Global South, it is not only recent events that sit oddly with the ramped up Western rhetoric about championing universal principles and rules. They also believe that Western states’ commitments to rules and principles meant to benefit all are bound to decrease due to growing geopolitical competition.^[34] What was always a universality full of caveats, they fear, is bound to be restricted even further. Governments across the world are well aware that in their efforts to contain Russian and Chinese revisionism, the United States, with its European partners, increasingly feels the need to abandon some of the principles of the rules-based international order and “operat[e] outside the very institutions and norms it helped create.”^[35] To them, the best example of this is the roll-back of the rules-based trading order.

The fact that Western states, who have long sold “a set of doctrines known as neoliberal economics”^[36] as the only convincing path to growth, are now chipping away at the rules of open trade has not gone unnoticed in many parts of the world.^[37] Western governments, faced with economic coercion by autocratic states, may have good reasons to rethink the idea of economic openness and invest in their own resilience.^[38] But seen through the eyes of leaders whose countries have struggled under neoliberal doctrines, it is highly inconsistent that “rich countries and regions,” as the special economic advisor to Brazil’s president has described it, are “now openly espousing and defending industrial policy.”^[39] To these governments, the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act and the EU’s Net Zero Industry Act must look like obvious double standards. The same is true for US actions that have crippled the appellate body of the World Trade Organization and US and European efforts to restrict the pursuit of mutually beneficial trade to politically like-minded states.^[40] Many leaders in the Global South feel that Western states have not satisfactorily explained how they will square these policies with their promise to grow the proverbial pie for the benefit of all.^[41] After all, the International Monetary Fund and other international organizations have pointed to the substantial risks that growing trade fragmentation poses for global poverty reduction.^[42] And states with insufficient resources to effectively compete have good reason to fear that the subsidy race that is already underway between Western states and China will trap them at the lower end of global value chains.^[43]

In short, governments in the Global South do not just worry that, with growing geopolitical competition, Western states may become more inconsistent; they fear that the existing divide is bound to grow further, with the transatlantic partners continuing to prioritize a stable order while countries of the Global South seek more justice and inclusion.

Some governments accusing the transatlantic partners of double standards are not primarily concerned with the future of the rules-based international order; rather, they seek to eliminate international rules and principles, particular those with a liberal thrust. This group most prominently includes China, Russia, and some of their autocratic peers. The notion of rules and principles that can constrain powerful actors’ behavior clashes with their desire for “unconstrained power politics that allow big countries to carve out regional spheres of influence.”^[44] But they are particularly hostile to standards that prescribe how governments must treat their own citizens, especially the principles of liberal democracy and rules enshrined in human rights law. As they see it, these pose a threat to the stability and security of their illiberal regimes.^[45] For Beijing and Moscow, accusations of Western double standards are a useful tool in the growing systemic competition with the West and especially with the United States: They serve the dual purpose of eroding the West’s normative power while also undermining the idea of liberal universal rules and principles as such, which both regimes see as embedding US hegemony and as standing in the way of “a world safe for autocracy.”^[46]

Accusing Western countries of hypocrisy helps China and Russia divert attention from their own violations of international rules. In this vein, China has recently sought to downplay its treatment of Xinjiang’s Uyghur Muslims, which a 2022 report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights has argued “may constitute international crimes, in particular crimes against humanity.”^[48] Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin has argued that although “[i]t’s millions of Muslims in Gaza not Muslims in Xinjiang that suffer from hunger, deportation, and killing,” the US is criticizing China for its treatment of Muslim Uyghurs rather than helping to protect Palestinian Muslims.^[49] Similarly, when Putin declared war on Ukraine on February 24, 2022, he underplayed his own violation of the norm against territorial conquest by listing past instances of alleged Western “disregard for international law,” among them the NATO airstrikes on Belgrade and the US invasion of Iraq.^[50]

Accusations of double standards have also helped Beijing and Moscow simultaneously tarnish the West’s image among a global audience while also sowing divisions within Western societies. In this vein, Chinese-controlled media have eagerly reported on arrests of pro-Palestinian protesters on the campuses of various American universities. They have portrayed this as pointing to double standards in Washington’s approach to free speech at home and in the world.^[51]

Most importantly, in making these accusations of double standards, China and Russia have taken aim at international standards themselves. Xi Jingping, with Vladimir Putin’s support, is trying to establish a world “where liberal values carry no merit or moral freight in their own right.”^[53] Moreover, both China and Russia are working hard to undermine other states’ commitment to universalist ideas. They have thus formulated a narrative that delegitimizes universal rules as a Western imposition and inseparably links the notion of universal principles to Western domination and exceptionalism. According to this narrative, the rules and principles embedded in the international order are not universal but Western-made and imposed on the rest of the world. Chinese officials thus regularly speak of the “so-called” rules-based order and of “so-called” universal values.^[54] Moreover, so they claim, these rules serve as tools of Western domination because they only benefit the West and because Western states apply them selectively in pursuit of parochial aims.^[55]

In this way, China and Russia are trying to “cleanse” the international order of rules and norms that nondemocratic countries struggle to comply with. In the place of these rules, China in particular has spoken of the “common values of humanity,”^[56] the idea of “absolute sovereignty”^[57] – that is, noninterference mostly in its own domestic affairs – and respect for “civilizational diversity.”^[58] These notions, all of which contradict the idea of universal liberal norms that can constrain governments’ behavior, are also core to the series of global initiatives launched by China over the past several years, among them the Global Civilization Initiative introduced in March 2023.^[59] The concepts of “common values” and “civilizational diversity” imply that different societies may interpret values differently. What China and Russia are promoting is thus what the EU High Representative Josep Borrell has called “a form of political culturalism, whereby every society would be entitled to have its own values”^[60] and few obligations would be binding on all states.

As such, China’s and Russia’s propaganda around Western double standards and international rules is self-serving, underpinning what German Chancellor Olaf Scholz has described as “authoritarian and imperialistic ambitions.”^[61] Yet, both states have sought to ensure that their accusations resonate with governments in other parts of the world: with middle powers that see their pursuit of a greater role on the international stage thwarted by a West that clings to its privileges, with governments that are already resentful that the international order has failed to “grow the pie for the benefit of all,”^[62] and with leaders that feel Western states have insufficiently reflected on their colonial pasts and have often lectured them rather than treating them with respect.^[63]

Autocrats are not the only actors who use references to Western double standards to justify practices that challenge international rules. Other actors, often called “transactional”^[74] states, are not necessarily at war with international rules and principles themselves. Yet, for them, Western inconsistencies present a welcome excuse to justify a decidedly unprincipled foreign policy approach. This approach does not aim to achieve greater global consistency in the application of international principles and includes no commitment to defending international rules. For transactional governments, the guiding principle is whether a given foreign policy decision furthers their country’s narrow national interests.^[75] Moreover, the core tenet for engaging in partnerships is not shared values but the immediate benefits cooperation provides.^[76]

Transactional governments implicitly present their own interest-based, “explicitly amoral” approach as the more honest alternative to Western hypocrisy.^[77] They argue that the claims by Western states that they are guided by overarching principles has never held the water. When push came to shove, the West has often acted in narrowly self-interested ways and has been unwilling to sacrifice core material interests in defense of general rules and principles like human rights, democracy, or free trade. To these actors, the conduct of the US during the presidency of Donald Trump, who was well-known for his “deal-making inclinations,”^[78] illustrates this particularly clearly. Unlike the West, so these governments suggest, they “are not pretending” to pursue anything larger than their own parochial aims.^[79] Moreover, many of them perceive Western countries’ communication about international rules and principles as “preachy.”^[80] This, in turn, makes it easier for them to argue that their pragmatic pursuit of unilateral interests is not only much more honest but is also more respectful vis-à-vis other countries in the world.

As accusations of double standards are mounting from all sides, the West faces a growing dilemma. On the one hand, the consequences of ignoring accusations of double standards are undoubtedly growing. Such a policy risks undermining residual beliefs in the validity of universally applicable principles, fueling what French President Emmanuel Macron has described as “a new cynicism that is tearing down the global order.”^[94] It also jeopardizes the cooperation necessary to defend and strengthen the rules of the game. On the other hand, Western states fear that a more self-critical engagement with their own inconsistencies may well strengthen the opponents of international rules. Given how well the rules and principles enshrined in the order have served Western interests in the past, neither growing normative disillusionment nor ramped-up rule revisionism is in Western countries’ interest.

Western inconsistencies and a rhetoric that denies or glosses over them are feeding right into revisionist countries’ propaganda that universally applicable rules and principles are a Western chimera. But they are also playing into the hands of governments who try to downplay the relevance of principles. These leaders only have to point to instances where Western states failed to stick to prior normative commitments to argue that short-term self-interestedness is the rule and not the exception among states.^[95] Hence, if Western states fail to “regularly promote and claim fealty” to the order’s core principles, they risk undermining perceptions of the legitimacy of these standards elsewhere in the world.^[96] This is particularly worrisome at a time when the West’s relative power is declining and both the perceived legitimacy of the standards in question and other actors’ support is becoming more pertinent in ensuring widespread rule compliance.

For many Western states, it is difficult to reconcile the impression that they are standing “at an inflection point”^[105] with a more self-critical discourse and with a commitment to improve their practice. There are many cases in which Western states’ fears that they will strengthen the rule revisionists – or weaken the coalition in defense of international rules – stand in the way of correcting double standards or addressing systemic inequalities. Protracted efforts to reform international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are a case in point.^[106] Widespread perceptions of institutionalized inequality could be somewhat altered by increasing the voting share held by emerging and developing economies.Yet, because it would also see Beijing gain more influence, the US and European countries have hesitated to do so.^[107] Moreover, as suggested by muted criticism of Israel’s ongoing military campaign, many Western states find the need to close ranks among governments that generally support the international order’s principles difficult to square with honest criticism of allies and partners when they deviate from agree-upon rules.^[108]

In short, the pressure exerted on Western democracies by growing geopolitical competition has raised the stakes when it comes to Western inconsistencies. Yet, it has also put some obstacles in the way of Western countries that want to change course.

The US and European governments cannot ignore this dilemma, which is only bound to grow as geopolitical competition intensifies. Their response should incorporate three elements. First, Western states need to make greater efforts to become more consistent in how they apply the rules and principles of the international order. In that regard, efforts to reduce the type of inconsistencies that touch upon the most sensitive areas of international law or that conflict with longstanding demands for greater global justice and inclusion should be a top priority. Second, Western countries need to be more honest when their capacity to be consistent hits its limits. This also includes abandoning the black-and-white language that often characterizes their communication about international standards. Yet, third, the US and European countries also need to firmly push back against what is often implied in other leaders’ criticisms: that an order characterized by double standards is no longer preferable to an order without standards at all.

If Western states want to convince the broader international community that revisionist forces and transactional ideas threaten international rules and principles, they need to make greater efforts to reduce the deficits in their own application of international rules. In improving their consistency, they should put respect for what some consider the “basis of fundamental rights,”^[109] namely the dignity of all human life, front and center. As responses to Israel’s war in Gaza reveal,^[110] the strongest catalyst of cynicism about international principles seems to be the perception that countries are not heeding “the most fundamental standards”^[111] of the international order, including the protection of civilians in conflict and of basic human rights.

Moreover, Western states should avoid inconsistencies that are seen as systematically disempowering others – instances where the failure to “walk the talk” of championing international standards reduces other countries’ opportunities. Examples include industrial policies that disadvantage states without the resources to effectively compete. Another example would involve trading rules that condemn some countries “to being commodity producers, reserving the higher value-added production” for countries that are more economically advanced.^[112] These inconsistencies amplify the impression that Western countries are not committed to an international order whose principles are truly meant to benefit all.

Nothing would better disprove China’s and Russia’s narrative that international rules and principles are tools for “maintaining Western dominance,”^[114] than a demonstration that countries can be politically and economically empowered in the framework of existing rules. In the economic realm, this could include strengthening nondiscriminatory trade by better integrating Global South economies into diversified global supply chains. Additionally, Western states could work to ensure that more developing countries “can benefit from better trade terms within the framework set by the US Inflation Reduction Act” and Europe’s Green Deal Industrial Plan.^[115]

There is also a need for greater honesty when inconsistency is hard to avoid. Rather than omitting inconsistencies or pretending to be consistent when they clearly are not, Western states should acknowledge such situations, be transparent about the normative trade-offs they face, and explain how they seek to ensure that inconsistencies remain the exception. After all, full consistency is neither attainable nor always desirable. Policies or partners always need to be assessed “against the plausible possibilities, not against the utopian ideal.”^[116] The initial reluctance of some European states to break with the Sahel’s military juntas after they seized power in a series of military coups was surely at odds with European countries’ stated commitment to advancing democratic rule. It was, however, seen as the only way to prevent Russian mercenaries from stepping into the breach – something that has now happened. Given these actors’ record of human rights violations, more trouble is likely in the region.^[117]

A more honest conversation will also require Western states to discard stylized binary narratives, which are especially prevalent in Washington and imply an ideal-type distinction between morally pure democracies protecting international rules and evil autocracies aiming to undo them.^[118] As previously highlighted, many countries in the Global South do not see the world as black and white. That, however, does not suggest that they are not open to seeing it in shades of gray. In fact, the survey data shows that although respondents in the societies surveyed may not view democracies as morally pure, they still acknowledge relevant differences in the rule-abiding behavior of democratic and autocratic states (Figure 8).

Rather than drawing yet more attention to Western countries’ sins, a discourse that shifts away from black-and-white narratives and instead highlights relevant shades of gray may even play to Western strengths. One such shade of gray worth highlighting is the fact that, unlike autocratic systems like those in China and Russia, the political systems of democratic states allow for the types of discourse and mechanisms needed for self-correction. Western states’ abilities to admit and correct flaws could well be turned into an advantage in the fight for global credibility, especially when they are compared with countries “that do not even recognize the concept of sin.”^[119]