Turning Dependency Into Despair

In 2012, the Global Burden of Disease report documented a stunning paradox: Obesity is surging even as food insecurity persists and increases. Between 1990 and 2010, global obesity rates increased by more than 80 percent, with the largest surge occurring in countries in the Middle East and the only exception being sub-Saharan Africa.^[1] This dynamic has further intensified. Today, one in eight people on the planet is affected by obesity, but conversely one in eleven suffers from food insecurity. Even in China, a country long haunted by malnourishment, the number of overweight people is now twice as high as the number of underweight people.^[2] At the same time, altogether more than 730 million people suffer from hunger, and 2.8 billion people cannot afford a healthy diet.^[3] Obesity and hunger are two sides of a hyper-industrialized corporate agrifood system that is, in large part, globally integrated. This system has created vast amounts of surplus food among prosperous middle classes and, at the same time, leaves healthy, nutritious food out of reach for many — even before other exacerbating factors like conflict and climate change come into play.

Awareness exists regarding the ethical dimensions of a broken agrifood system; however, the security dimensions are still greatly underestimated in an era of globalized food production and trade.^[4] This has created critical security vulnerabilities that are already being exploited: Food insecurity can be deployed as a geopolitical weapon by deliberately raising food prices in wealthy nations to influence their politics.^[5] And, more importantly, it can be used by targeting food supply structures to create upheaval in global markets and push people living in areas far from battlefields to the brink of famine.

While as recently as 2018, the UN Security Council unanimously passed a resolution stating that “the use of starvation of civilians as a method of warfare may constitute a war crime,” international norms are an insufficient deterrent to the use of food as a weapon.^[6] Although outlawed and widely condemned, food has been weaponized in several conflicts in recent decades. Looking at prominent and well-documented case studies from Sudan to Yemen or from Gaza to Tigray, weaponization of food can take different forms: the manipulation of food aid, the use of food as a recruitment and retention tool, and the targeting of agricultural infrastructure. The recent cases of the war in Sudan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have demonstrated a novel quality in all three methods of food weaponization: their global scope and their use to further geopolitical goals. This requires a broader reassessment of how governments define national security, and which responses are needed to deter new types of security threats, including globalized food weaponization. It involves building “coalitions of the willing” to pursue strategies of preventive deterrence, such as investing in resilient agrifood systems.

Weaponization of food consists in deliberate manipulation of food supplies, access, or quality, with the purpose of hurting or subduing a targeted group. This includes manufacturing shortages, manipulating prices, and depriving individuals directly of access to food.^[7] Since 1966, the right to food has been guaranteed as an integral part of the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which affirms the “fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.”^[8] In an era of substantial economic expansion in most of the world, including emerging economies, such a normative entrenchment of rights seemed feasible as prosperity grew.

Surging conflicts in the aftermath of decolonization movements, especially in Africa and Asia, led to an Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions in 1977. It codified that “it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations, and supplies and irrigation works […].”^[9] These norms were reemphasized in 1998 by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Its Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) states that “intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival” is a war crime.^[10]  

However, the enforcement capabilities associated with these international legal frameworks, designed to deter the use of food as a weapon or hold perpetrators accountable, remain insufficient. With ongoing conflicts and civil wars in numerous countries, in 2018, the UN Security Council agreed on the landmark Resolution 2417.^[11] It reinforced that starvation of civilians constitutes a war crime. In retrospect, it is remarkable that the resolution, which was initiated by the Netherlands, passed unanimously. Furthermore, contrasted with Article 8 of the Rome Statute, the resolution does not distinguish between different types of conflict, strengthening its legal foundation, since it can be applied in a wider range of contexts.^[12] In addition, the resolution spells out concrete types of weaponization, including the denial of humanitarian access and the “willful obstruction of aid deliveries,” and it outlines several vulnerable parts of the agrifood system, from farms to storage facilities, and transportation, significantly reducing room for interpretation regarding what acts constitute food weaponization.^[13] A year later, the international community took yet another critical step to strengthen existing legal frameworks with the expansion of the ICC’s jurisdiction to also cover intra-state conflicts. This reform, too, was passed unanimously by the 122 state parties to the Rome Statute.^[14] These milestones raised hopes for irreversible momentum towards the prosecution of food weaponization. However, offenders are yet to be held accountable.  

Despite its inhumane nature, food weaponization happens frequently. Throughout history, hunger tactics have been used — though in different magnitudes.^[15] One example is the barbaric strategy of the German Nazi regime intending to starve Russians in 1941.^[16] Even though the plan was ultimately unsuccessful in eliminating the entire population as was intended, hundreds of thousands of people still died of hunger during the blockade of Leningrad. A decade earlier, Soviet industrialization and Stalinist politics had created a man-made famine in Ukraine, costing millions of lives.^[17] A more recent example is the case of President Bashar al-Assad’s “Starvation Until Submission Campaign” during the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011.^[18]  
 

The regime employed food as a weapon to strengthen its position in the conflict. However, governments are not the only actors who have weaponized food. There are numerous cases of food weaponization by non-state actors. One prominent example is Boko Haram in Nigeria, where the insurgent group has targeted farming infrastructure and used access to food as an incentive to recruit and retain fighters.^[19] In view of the current weakening of international rules, more frequent and extensive use of food as a weapon is to be expected. It is often considered an effective repressive tool, as food constitutes the most basic human need. Its use as a weapon is comparatively cheap and can easily affect large numbers of people.^[20] Perpetrating actors often disguise such tactics as collateral damage to avoid accountability. Furthermore, today’s interconnected global agrifood systems, featuring complex global supply chains and trade dependencies, offer new opportunities for weaponization. This makes food an easy target and its weaponization in future conflicts likely unless disincentivized or deterred. It is therefore worthwhile for states to assess how they can shore up their defenses against this weapon.

To adequately assess the security implications of food weaponization, it is essential to distinguish between different methods. While some cases do not fit neatly into one category, often because food is weaponized in multiple ways in one context, three strategies to weaponize food can be broadly identified:

1. the manipulation of food access, including aid;
2. the use of food insecurity as a tool for recruitment and retention, especially in asymmetric warfare; and
3. the strategic targeting of agricultural infrastructure and supply chains.

First and foremost, manipulating food supply routes and preventing targeted parts of the civilian population from receiving food aid is a devastating method of food weaponization. Barriers to food supply can be put up by state and non-state actors, using bureaucratic or violent means. This strategy may also involve the looting of trucks or facilities holding food aid, as well as blockades on key supply routes. So far, the strategic use of food supplies and the distribution or withholding of food aid have been an effective tool to change the dynamics between parties engaged in conflict. The most prominent case is the war in Gaza, following Hamas’ terrorist attacks against Israel in October 2023. In 2024, for the first time, the ICC issued arrest warrants that cited Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the Rome Statute. These warrants were directed at Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant. ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan’s justification included allegations that Israel was “intentionally and systematically” depriving the Gazan civilian population of “objects indispensable to human survival,” like food.^[21] Israel is accused of using starvation methods by continuing to restrict the delivery of humanitarian aid into Gaza.^[22] The prosecution pointed to evidence that these methods are supported by Israeli officials, who have alluded to the goal of depriving the population of Gaza of food and water.^[23] Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich has publicly stated that “no one in the world will allow us to starve two million people, even though it might be justified and moral in order to free the hostages.”^[24] Another recent example of aid manipulation can be found in the Tigray region of Ethiopia beginning in 2021. Numerous reports document how the governments of Ethiopia and Eritrea have coordinated efforts to deliberately block aid deliveries to parts of Tigray not controlled by the Ethiopian government.^[25]

The second method of food weaponization is the use of food as a recruitment and retention tool, for example by insurgent groups as part of their asymmetric warfare against government forces. Militants either exploit existing food insecurity or create artificial scarcity to attract or coerce people to join their cause. The seizure of resources during territorial advances is often part of this strategy. Extremist groups target potential recruits when they are vulnerable, often unable to meet the basic needs of their families.^[26] Food is not only used for initial recruitment, but also to retain members and supporters. Control over food supplies increases compliance with the activities of the insurgent group among the broader society and helps it to establish itself as an indispensable authority, especially in areas of fragile governance.^[27]
 

A prominent example of a group that employed these tactics is Al Shabab in Somalia. The jihadist militia controlled Mogadishu, Somalia’s capital, and large parts of the country between 2009 and 2011.^[28] While the group no longer holds swaths of territory, it remains active. Food was a critical tool for Al Shabab to gain a foothold in Somalia. The organization exploited the lack of functioning governance structures and legitimized itself by distributing meals and digging canals for irrigation in some parts, while strategically limiting access to food for other communities and counter-terrorism forces.^[29] Although the overall state of food security in Somalia deteriorated, weaponization of food proved to be an effective strategy for Al Shabab, demonstrating the consequences of being on the side of the insurgency versus resisting it. Similarly, Boko Haram in Nigeria used food as a tool to attract supporters and control the general public.^[30] Food served as a reward for those who supported the group, which was trying to appeal to marginalized communities in particular.  

Thirdly, targeting agricultural infrastructure and supply routes constitutes another established method of food weaponization. This tactic involves the deliberate manipulation and destruction of any elements of modern and traditional agrifood systems. Tactics range from the destruction of crops, harvests, or livestock, to bombing farmland and poisoning water reservoirs or agricultural products. They also include destroying storage facilities such as silos or blocking of transportation routes along the entire food supply chain on land and sea.

The war of aggression against Ukraine is one example. Russian forces have targeted every element of Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure. According to Ukrainian Foreign Minister Andrii Sybiha, Russia carried out “50 attacks against Ukraine's Black Sea ports, damaging more than 300 port infrastructure facilities and 23 civilian vessels and destroying more than 100,000 metric tons of agricultural products” between February 2022 and November 2024.^[31] The Ukrainian population was directly impacted by reduced access to staple foods and by losing a major income source due to disrupted exports.^[32] While grain was particularly affected, prices for oilseeds and fertilizers rose as well.^[33] To mitigate the damage and allow exports to resume, the UN brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July of 2022. However, Russia first temporarily suspended the initiative and then finally withdrew in July of the next year.^[34] The Kremlin subsequently resumed attacks on port infrastructure, and naval mines laid by Moscow in the Black Sea continue to pose a significant threat.^[35] More recently, Ukraine and Russia agreed to cease military confrontation in the Black Sea, but the details and longevity of this agreement remain unclear.^[36] The war in Yemen, which started in 2014, also exemplifies this method of food weaponization.^[37] While it is the Houthi militia that is mainly accused of blocking aid access into parts of the country, there is ample evidence that the coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to counter Houthi advances also repeatedly targeted Yemeni agricultural areas and infrastructure with airstrikes, including farms, irrigation facilities, and fishing boats.^[38]

While some of these strategies to weaponize food have been used for centuries, a closer analysis of modern case studies reveals a new quality: the transnational reach when food is strategically leveraged as a geopolitical tool.

The case of Sudan shows this new quality with regard to the manipulation of aid. The Sudanese population is currently experiencing the worst humanitarian crisis on earth with 30 million people in need of aid this year.^[39] World leaders have accused both warring parties, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), of deliberately disrupting or blocking desperately needed food aid from reaching the starving population.^[40]  SAF and RSF are both applying this starvation tactic. While the RSF have been accused of using this strategy to advance their ethnic cleansing of Masalit, Fur, and Zaghawa groups, the SAF are accused of working to ensure that RSF-controlled areas are the places where the food crisis is worst.^[41]

In addition to blocking access to and looting aid hubs, which is integral to this method of food weaponization, a new quality can be observed — patterns that extend beyond Sudan’s borders or citizens. Aid workers are increasingly being deliberately targeted in Sudan.^[42] This strategy has affected workers from international humanitarian organizations as well as volunteers in local aid kitchens.^[43] Such local projects are increasingly supported and financed by international agencies who are actively prevented from accessing Sudan and face major restrictions on establishing or maintaining their own presence.^[44] Targeting aid workers amplifies the use of food as a weapon, as it undermines international aid strategies and undercuts humanitarian operations with a new level of effectiveness, forcing organizations to weigh the risks of deploying their personnel.^[45] Moreover, assaulting those who provide food and other assistance on behalf of the international community is not only yet another violation of international law, but it also constitutes an attack on humanitarian relief for civilians on the brink of starvation more broadly.
 

In addition, the United Nations has pointed out that foreign governments providing financial and military support to the warring parties in Sudan are complicit in the war crimes being committed.^[46] Many outside parties have a vested interest in the outcome of the conflict in Sudan. However, they have faced little consequences for their role in supporting a growing famine. The most prominent supporters of the RSF are Libya, Russia, through the Wagner Group, and the UAE. The SAF is known to be supported by Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.^[47] There is no indication that these allies have called on the warring parties to stop weaponizing food or withdrawn their support because of these crimes. Despite the devastating number of over 24 million Sudanese living in acute hunger and extensive evidence of food aid blockades, there is a continued lack of accountability, as food wars are actively supported by outside powers who suffer few consequences.^[48]

The second case study to consider is Russia’s war against Ukraine. Beyond targeting Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure, Russia also actively manipulated global food supply chains on an unprecedented scale. Both Ukraine and Russia are critical to global food supply, together producing 30 percent of the world's wheat, 20 percent of its corn, and 70 percent of its sunflower oil.^[49] The targeting of Ukraine's agricultural infrastructure and export hubs not only resulted in significant economic losses for Ukrainians, but also in a calculated increase in global food insecurity. Many countries heavily rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine and were affected immediately by the war. The invasion increased the number of people facing hunger worldwide to over 730 million, including one-fifth of the entire population of the African continent.^[50] The shock to global food markets had a particularly profound and immediate impact in the Middle East and North Africa, worsening an already fragile state of food security. Egypt, for example, imports about 12 million tons of wheat per year, 85 percent of which came from Russia and Ukraine until the onset of the invasion.^[51] Furthermore, global food prices, already on the rise before February 2022, hit record highs as a direct result of the war.^[52] The political, strategic, and security implications of food weaponization in this case cannot be overstated: It exacerbated hunger in places as diverse as Lebanon, Malawi, Sudan, Venezuela, or Zambia, which have nothing to do with the original conflict.^[53]

The Russian regime has long strategically positioned itself as a major agricultural power, describing grain as its “second oil.”^[54] Thus, the Kremlin creates dependencies and exploits them: By controlling a substantial share of the world's agricultural commodities, Russia uses this instrument to recruit and retain supporters in the international arena, most noticeably in Africa. Countries that were previously dependent on imports from Ukraine have become Russia's new agricultural trading partners. One striking example are Russian wheat exports to sub-Saharan Africa, which increased by 39 percent within a year of the invasion, while Ukraine’s overall exports dropped by 90 percent after ports were blocked and have only recovered slowly.^[55] Russian President Vladimir Putin declared in 2023 that Russia was ready to “replace Ukrainian grain” and be a “responsible supplier,” especially to “needy countries.”^[56] However, These supplies come with strings attached and serve the strategic purpose of signaling to importing countries that Russia decides on the state of food security across the world.^[57] At the Russia-Africa Summit in 2023, Putin also promised large shipments of free aid to several African countries. Four of the six countries promised food aid subsequently voted with Russia or abstained on UN resolutions regarding Russia's war against Ukraine.^[58] The global food supply has been successfully instrumentalized by Russia and now serves as a lever to exert geopolitical influence and recruit or retain supporters globally. Food has become an effective long-range weapon.

Given the qualitative shift in food weaponization, the key question for policymakers and those interested in a more just and stable global order is how to move forward from here. The argument for strengthening international law is obvious, as, to date, “there is no unconditional — or absolute — prohibition of starvation under international humanitarian law.”^[59] Even the progressive Rome Statute requires proof of intent on the part of the perpetrator.^[60] It is clear that only if war crimes were judged by outcome instead of the perpetrator’s motivations would the states that agree to this prohibition be more constrained in their use of food as a weapon.^[61] But such an achievement is a long shot in the current geopolitical climate. The same is true for much-needed stronger accountability and cooperation mechanisms. This is only going to become more difficult given that the United States, who has never committed to the ICC in the first place, is now further pushing back on any application of international law that constrains its foreign policy and is withdrawing from many of the relevant multilateral institutions — including the World Health Organization and the Paris Climate Agreement.

Another avenue for addressing the new quality of food weaponization is more promising to yield results: investments in resilient global agrifood systems. Food weaponization is effective because of the fragility of global food systems, particularly in countries that are disproportionately exposed to trade dependencies, population growth, and climate change. Hence, more open regional agricultural trade regimes, for example in Africa, would deter or minimize the impact of food weaponization.^[62] This would benefit diversifying agrifood trade, thereby reducing dependence on specific imports or exports and providing a path towards greater resilience.^[63] In addition, investments in climate change mitigation and adaptation efforts are critical to relieve pressure and reduce vulnerabilities.

To achieve the necessary significant funding for more resilient global agrifood systems, new coalitions of the willing are required. They must be composed of multilateral organizations, enlightened governments in wealthier European and Asian countries, as well as those members of the BRICS who are willing to set aside long-held anti-Western resentments and offer political and financial investments in global governance given their growing economies. This is particularly important as to offer relief to debt-burdened economies in the Global South with little financial resources and legitimate reservations given their history of colonization and ambivalent experiences with multilateral institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
 

In addition, positioning food insecurity not as a purely humanitarian issue but as a potential long-range weapon is an important approach. Development and humanitarian spending will likely decrease over the next decade and maybe beyond. Since military budgets are set to grow disproportionately, food security needs to be recognized as what it is: an integral part of a strategic understanding of national and international security. It must therefore be included in national security strategies and, in the medium term, governments need to consider designating part of their defense spending as unified national security budgets. This would allow other agencies to draw from these resources to support security-relevant challenges — like strengthening agrifood systems as a critical form of forward defense against the weaponization of food by rogue actors. Only by creating resilient agrifood systems and treating food insecurity as a matter of security can preventive deterrence be effectively put into place.
 

Food can be used as a long-range weapon with geopolitical consequences. Despite existing legal frameworks outlawing the use of starvation tactics, food has always been and continues to be used as a weapon. The war in Sudan demonstrates that the manipulation of aid has been taken to another level as it witnessed the targeting of aid workers, thereby undermining international efforts to provide humanitarian relief. In addition, it shows in a merciless way that even though the tactic has led to famine among civilians, neither the warring parties nor their foreign supporters are held accountable. In turn, Russia’s targeted attacks not only destroyed much of Ukraine’s agricultural infrastructure. They also deliberately disrupted global supply chains, leading to a surge in global hunger levels and leaving many countries even more dependent on Russia — dependencies the Kremlin is willing to exploit for its geopolitical objectives. Different methods of food weaponization still require further analysis and discussion in their new globalized form. This will include matters of global trade, since economic sanctions, tariffs, and export restrictions present yet another layer of an already pervasive challenge. As the economist Vera Songwe recently put it: “We have 1,700 trade bans around the world. A lot of them are around food. […] In some sense, that is a silent sort of food insecurity war.”^[64]

Ultimately, food security is national security — and new methods of food weaponization require new strategies of deterrence. The impact of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine laid bare the non-binding and weakened nature of normative agreements. These contemporary trends must be better understood. Thus, food security should be among the top security concerns of military planners, the intelligence community, diplomatic leaders, and multilateral organizations alike. New coalitions of the willing, including the private sector and civil society organizations, need to address food weaponization jointly. These shifts must also be reflected institutionally: Ministries for economic cooperation and development should analyze the security dimensions of globalized food systems more closely and work with foreign ministries, as well as defense and intelligence agencies, to translate them into policies. Large international financial institutions like the World Bank, the IMF, or Multilateral Development Banks must equally embrace these changes. The existential threat of food weaponization as a geopolitical tactic forces a new political imperative upon multilateral organizations and high-income countries: Building more resilient agrifood systems is a critical form of deterrence.