Siberian Permafrost: A Present Yet Ignored Security Risk

One example of a Grey Rhino is the melting of Siberian permafrost. Alongside more obvious attendant risks such as methane release, and damage to infrastructure, a less-appreciated risk is that of the potential release of frozen pathogens.

Permafrost melt has become more regular in summer, especially with unseasonably warm heatwaves becoming more common. Permafrost thaw overall could become widespread with temperatures only slightly higher than those at present. In 2016, a heatwave in the Yamal peninsula thawed anthrax spores in a deer carcass (frozen in 1941), which then entered local water sources and spread to local people, resulting in numerous hospitalisations. Smallpox and influenza are also present in permafrost due to the burial of victims from past pandemics. Most concerningly, there are a number of never-before-recorded viruses, christened “pandoraviruses” which have been recently discovered in permafrost. One specimen was 30,000 years old; whilst these cannot infect humans, the possibility of the existence of pathogens which are yet undiscovered and humans are susceptible to cannot be ruled out. Indeed, the potential for the spread of frozen pathogens is evident.

The increasing melt of permafrost, and the Russian government’s stated desire to develop such newly-available land for farming and industry, (not to mention the movement of people from moresoutherly regions of Russia due to climate change) will undoubtedly increase the population in contact with the natural environment in northern Siberia where these pathogens are found. As such, authorities should prepare for the outbreak of pathogens we already understand (such as anthrax) and those we do not. Treating familiar diseases will be relatively straightforward, as vaccines already exist and mass vaccination programmes have been shown to be possible and effective.

For those that have not been discovered yet, a widespread program of pathogen discovery, thawing, reactivation and then DNA sequencing and protein analysis should be carried out, focusing on those areas where permafrost melt is significant, where human habitation is most likely, and major aquifers and watercourses. Such sequencing would seek to discover (ahead of an outbreak) pathogens which could infect humans and thus pose a threat to human life (either through immediate deadliness or transmission and mutation potential). Based on this, vaccines could then be developed to provide immunity to these pathogens, and then either distributed to local populations or stockpiled for later use. Whilst initially vaccination programs would logically be restricted to those in the immediate Siberian region, the formula for vaccines should be distributed globally. Indeed, given the huge advances in mRNA technology catalysed by the COVID-19 pandemic, the potential for the rapid development of effective vaccines is thankfully evident. Given the speed with which pandemics can spread globally, it is thus better to be prepared ahead of time. Ideally, this should begin as soon as possible – whilst the immediate threat may seem far-off, it is unknown when a dangerous pathogen could be introduced into society. Moreover, utilising the recent institutional and public memory of a global pandemic and the dangers of infectious disease is a useful vehicle to effect action – leaving it too late invites myopia and short-termism or lack of political will to take hold. Policymakers should thus “strike whilst the iron is hot” on this issue.

Tristan Leeland ist a Master Student of Intelligence and International Security at King’s College, London.